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Russia and Asia

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Russia and the Balkans

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History and Russian Nationalism*

Roman Szporluk

THE Soviet Union is a multinational state, and of all its nationality problems that of the Russians is the most important, as they are the largest and most powerful national group. The resurgent interest in Russian history, which is characteristic of Russian nationalism today, has import for the Soviet political and ethnic situation corresponding to the role Russia plays in the USSR. Russian nationalism is concerned with two basic issues. These issues are, first, the relationship between the Russian nation and the Soviet regime, and, secondly, the position of the Russians among the nations of the USSR. On both these issues Russian nationalist thinking has been developing its point of view by reference to history.

Although such distinctions involve an oversimplification of individual positions, this article argues that Russian nationalist opinion, insofar as it is concerned with historical problems, divides into two currents. One current conceives of Russian nationality as basically cultural or spiritual in nature. It attaches fundamental importance to the language, literature, ancestral homelands (soil) and religion, as markers of Russian identity, and it tends to judge politics—the state—in terms of conformity to these non-political dimensions of Russian nationhood. This article will try to show that some, but by no means all, conceptions of Russian history inspired by this position result in a political challenge to the Soviet system, or even in a denial of its legitimacy. To some, the Soviet regime, because it is based on Marxism-Leninism, is "un-Russian."

The second current in Russian nationalist thought sees Russian history as an essentially political process, as the history of the Russian state, which it views as the most genuine expression of the Russian nation.[1] On the whole, those who share this position treat the Soviet

* This article is a contribution to E. Allworth (Ed.), *Ethnic Russia Today: The Dilemma of Dominance* (Pergamon Press, New York and Oxford, 1980, forthcoming) and is printed here with the kind permission of the publishers.

[1] This is an ironic development because before the revolution Russian nationalism, to quote Hans Rogger,

> could only with difficulty, if at all, view the tsarist state as the embodiment of the national purpose, as the necessary instrument and expression of national goals and values, while the state, for its part, looked upon every autonomous expression of nationalism with fear and suspicion.

(Hans Rogger, "Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. IV, 1962, p. 253.)

> In the years after 1905, attempts at a liberal nationalism (Struve) as well as at a national socialism (The Union of the Russian People) failed equally to find a wide public resonance because of the stumbling block of the state and the diversity in interests and outlook between the various sectors of society. It is conceivable,

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regime as a continuation of the old Russian state, including its immediate predecessor, the Romanov empire, and they believe that the uniquely Russian genius has created a political form of government that is opposed to western, liberal and democratic, political systems. They are less interested in ideologies *per se*, which they judge from the point of view of their usefulness to the state. Since their approval of the Soviet regime is based on their recognition of it as a Russian institution, the challenge which this current of nationalism now poses is directed against the federal structure of the USSR, the principle of equality of the nations of the USSR, not against the party in power. While the former, or " culturalist " current attacks the regime as un-Russian, this one, which we might call " statist," directs its attack against the non-Russian nationalities by advocating the transformation of the USSR into a centralized Russian nation-state which would be officially called Russia.

To understand these two challenges to official ideology it is necessary to place them in historical perspective, against the background of Soviet history since 1917. So viewed, they appear to be critiques of Stalinist historical ideology which was consolidated in the 1930s and has in its essentials been retained to the present time.

But first let us ask ourselves whether historical ideas really are politically important. This is a big topic which cannot be discussed here in a way that would do it justice.[2] Instead, we shall dispose of the issue by means of quotations from two very prominent, but also very different, authorities. One, Karl Deutsch, writes:

> autonomy in the long run depends on memory. Where all memory is lost, where all past information and preferences have ceased to be effective, we are no longer dealing with a self-determining individual or social group, but with a self-steering automaton. . . . There is no will, no conation, without some operating memory.[3]

though it must for long remain a matter of speculation, that the Soviet regime, by reducing this diversity and by its ruthless policy of industrialization and modernization, has gone further in bridging the gulf between itself and the nation than the more easy-going autocracy of tsarist days.

(ibid. pp. 263–4.)

[2] Some works dealing with this problem may be listed here. This writer's thinking about the subject owes a good deal to two seminal Polish works: Nina Assorodobraj, " Zywa historia. Swiadomosc historyczna: symptomy i propozycje badawcze," *Studia Socjologiczne*, 1963, No. 2 (9), and Roman Zimand, " Uwagi o teorii narodu na marginesie analizy nacjonalistycznej teorii narodu," *Studia Filozoficzne*, 1967, No. 4 (51). Relevant works in English include David C. Gordon, *Self-Determination and History in the Third World* (Princeton University Press, 1971); Stanley Mellon, *The Political Uses of History: A Study of Historians in the French Revolution* (Stanford University Press, 1958); Donald Denoon and Adam Kuper, " Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation: The 'New Historiography' in Dar Es Salaam," *African Affairs*, vol. 69, No. 277 (Oct. 1970); Frank Hearn, " Remembrance and Critique: The Uses of the Past for Discrediting the Present and Anticipating the Future," *Politics and Society*, vol. 5, No. 2 (1975) and David Thomson, " Must History Stay Nationalist? " *Encounter*, June 1968. Needless to say the role of history in nationalism is discussed in most standard works on nationalism.

[3] Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (The Free Press and Collier-Macmillan, New York and London, 1966), pp. 128–9. (See also pp. 206–7.)

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The other, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, speaks about literature but it is clear that his words also apply to historical writing:

> There is one . . . invaluable direction in which literature transmits incontrovertible condensed experience: from generation to generation. In this way literature becomes the living memory of a nation. . . . woe to the nation whose literature is cut short by the intrusion of force. This is not merely interference with "freedom of the press" but the sealing up of a nation's heart, the excision of its memory. A nation can no longer remember itself, it loses its spiritual unity, and despite their seemingly common language, countrymen cease to understand one another.[4]

The emergence of unorthodox historical ideas in post-Stalinist USSR is one aspect of the broader process of the rise of social and political thought, the formation of ideas expressing the points of view of diverse social, including ethnic, groups. According to Deutsch, "the development of separate memories and memory facilities [for this is what the emergence of uncontrolled historical views is] may represent . . . aspects of the process of secession."[5] In our case, we are dealing with "secession" from Stalinism.

THE Stalinist historical conception was imposed on historians in the Soviet Union after a period which may be described as "internationalist" or, perhaps more accurately, "anti-nationalist." Although Marxism considers class, not nation, the primary form of social tie, its followers did not develop a conception of history as a history of classes and class struggles; such a history, one would have thought, would treat nations and states as important but subordinate phenomena in a class history; naturally, it would be a history transcending narrow geographic, not to mention ethnic, boundaries. Since the Bolsheviks took power in Russia in the name of the world proletariat, claiming to be only its advance guard, it would have made sense from their point of view to develop an appropriate large-scale view of history. In such a history, the "precursors" of modern socialism, especially its Bolshevik incarnation, would be Spartacus, Wat Tyler, Jan Hus, Thomas Münzer, various radical religious reformers, peasant rebels, and so on. They would also be Russian revolutionaries, of course, but the history which the first socialist state on earth would regard as its own would not be any one nation's history.[6]

Indeed, immediately after 1917 universalism was in vogue, and Spartacus and the Communards, not to mention Rosa Luxemburg or Karl Liebknecht, became household (or perhaps communal apartment)

[4] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The Nobel Lecture*, tr. by Alexis Klimoff (Ad Hoc Committee for Intellectual Freedom, New York, 1973), pp. 14–15.

[5] Deutsch, op. cit. p. 207.

[6] The problem of the antecedents of socialism interested Marx and Engels, while Karl Kautsky wrote a number of works on this question, including one entitled "The Predecessors of Modern Socialism." See Assorodobraj, op. cit. p. 19.

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names. No new history was formed, however; in place of "Russian history" a "history of the peoples of the USSR" was introduced.[7] In practice, in the largest and most powerful of the republics, the RSFSR, a new name covered the same old subject, a history of Russia. (In the other republics, but not in Russia, national histories in addition to a common history of the peoples were written.) It became, however, "anti-history" in relation to what it replaced: the heroes of tsarist textbooks —tsars, generals, saints—were its villains; the outcasts of the old (the Pugachevs, the Razins, the Shamils) were now transformed into heroes. This "anti-history" pictured the tsarist state as a class exploiter and as a conqueror and oppressor of the non-Russian nationalities. Implicit in the conception of a "history of the peoples of the USSR" was the idea that before 1917 they were united by common oppression; no positive value was attached to any nationality's inclusion under tsarist rule. The Soviet Union as a multinational state was seen as a product of the 1917 revolution and its aftermath, not as in any way a continuation of a "unity" that had been formed earlier, in however rudimentary a form. October represented a new opening, an initial step toward a wider international community, not a transformed Russian empire which had become the USSR.

THIS historical formula provided a framework for the study of pre-revolutionary history at a time when the USSR was still seen as a way-station toward a wider international community which would emerge as the revolution spread to other countries of Europe and Asia. Its emphasis on the negative aspects of the pre-revolutionary association of the non-Russian peoples with Russia was useful to the Soviet regime because it provided such a contrast to the liberal linguistic and cultural policies of the 1920s.

However, as the hopes of a world revolution began to recede, and as Soviet domestic policies turned toward centralization, with a corresponding decrease in cultural and administrative autonomy for the nationalities (we hardly need to mention that those changes took place against the background of the first five-year plan, with rapid industrialization and collectivization), the anti-nationalist history ceased to be useful. It was now accepted that the Soviet Union as a state with a predominant

[7] Historiography after 1917 is reviewed in Anatole G. Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography* (Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1958), and in his *The Writing of History in the Soviet Union* (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1971), in Konstantin F. Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State* (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1962), in Cyril E. Black, ed., *Rewriting Russian History* (Vintage Books, New York, 1962), in Lowell Tillett, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1969), in Walter Kolarz, *Stalin and Eternal Russia* (Lindsay Drummond, London, 1944), and in Klaus Mehnert, *Stalin versus Marx* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1952). Historical problems in a wider context of Soviet ideological development are examined by Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1956) and by Elliot R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1960).

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Russian element was there to stay and its continuity with the empire it had replaced became clearer. Just as the nationalities began to suffer under the Soviets, a new historical interpretation was developed that told them that under tsarism things had not been so bad after all. "Soviet patriotism" became the legitimizing device for this postponement of the coming of a world Soviet state; "friendship of the peoples" was a retroactive application of this formula to the period of tsarist Russia.[8] As the USSR under Stalin was building "socialism in one country," so its new history was constructed as a history of its peoples who allegedly had had a common country in the past.

This new historical view re-examined the record of tsarist Russia and discovered that besides being an exploiter of the toiling masses the Russian state (one avoided calling it tsarist here) had also played a "progressive" role: it had defended the Russian people, and the other peoples of Russia, from *foreign* invaders. In most cases, therefore, its wars had been "just." Gradually, the official historians stopped referring to Russian tsarist conquests and explained the rise of the Russian empire as a product of a series of voluntary "unions," "reunions" and "extensions." Even if tsarism was not exactly the best conceivable form of government, the non-Russian peoples were better off under it than they would have been had they come under Polish, Turkish, Persian or British rule. The idea was clearly being promoted that say for the Estonians Russian rule was somehow less foreign than the Swedish or German rule of former times. The "rehabilitation" of the Russian state meant the restoration to national glory of the various tsars, generals, and diplomats, who had previously been condemned as oppressors. The peoples of the Caucasus were told to admire their conqueror, General Yermolov, and even the Poles in Stalin's time were required to celebrate the anniversaries of General Suvorov, whom they remembered from their pre-Stalinist history as the commander whose troops had massacred the population of Warsaw and suppressed a Polish national uprising in 1794.

Old Russian culture was also re-evaluated. Even those prominent artists of the pre-Soviet period who had displayed no "progressive" inclinations, had belonged to the ruling classes and even served the tsars, were now accepted as Russian figures and were extolled as the teachers and inspirers of their junior colleagues among the non-Russians.

Although this return to Russian pre-eminence only took place in the 1930s, some anti-communist Russians, at home and abroad, detected the signs of what they called the "Nationalization of October," to cite the title of an article by N. V. Ustryalov written in the 1920s. They were prepared to support the Soviet Union because it was a Russian state,

[8] For the ideology of Stalinism in relation to Russian nationalism, see Barghoorn, op. cit. *passim*. See also Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Atheneum, New York, 1968), and Richard V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton University Press, 1961).

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even though they disapproved of its political and economic policies and goals. What they valued most was the Soviet government's success in basically preserving the territorial unity of old Russia. Ustryalov did not care about the name of the state—he thought it was a camouflage—and he welcomed the emergence of what he called the new "Soviet state nation." He understood by this term a multi-ethnic community of the peoples of the USSR who were politically integrated in the USSR "in a Russian national form." He was not concerned with the rights of the nationalities in education or culture—what mattered was the Russian character of the state.[9]

An overwhelming majority of Russian émigrés did not accept Ustryalov's argument. They objected to Soviet communism for political, cultural and religious reasons. Many correctly perceived that Stalinism did not mark the return to an unqualified Russian orientation. Indeed, Soviet nationalism, as Frederick C. Barghoorn noted over 20 years ago, never was "a purely 'Russian' product." It was more an ideology which manipulated both Russian symbols and those of Marxism. This combination of a national Russian culture with the universalist ideology of Marxism contained an element of contradiction. Besides, the commitment on the part of the regime to Russian nationalism was not fully "sincere": it did not accept such elements of traditional Russian culture as the Orthodox religion. Barghoorn argued that tension between government and people would exist as long as the Soviet system remained totalitarian, and that the Soviet population felt that "the government and the people do not really speak the same language." Soviet patriotism helped to conceal the internal contradictions of Soviet society under "familiar, vague and emotionally moving" words. Writing in 1955, he speculated that "non-official thought" existed in Russia, although one could only guess at its content.[10]

EVEN though Stalin gave a privileged position to the Russian nation, history, language, and culture in the USSR, he preserved the formal structure of the state as a multinational federation in which Russia, under the name of the RSFSR, was simply one constituent republic, formally an equal of the Ukraine, Georgia, etc. Ideologically, the Soviet regime claimed to derive its legitimacy from its allegiance to Marxism-Leninism. It was known abroad, and wanted to be so known, as the first socialist state, the fatherland of the workers of all countries. Its use of Russian symbols was manipulative and selective, and Russian culture was subjected to strict ideological and political controls. Stalin promoted Russification but he did not publicly affirm a Russian character for the Soviet Union, and he virtually obliterated a separate identity

[9] N. V. Ustryalov, "Natsionalizatiya Oktyabrya," *Novosti zhizni*, 7 Nov. 1925, reprinted in *Pod znakom revolyutsii* (Kharbin, 1927), pp. 212–18.

[10] Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism*, pp. 25, 148–52, 182, 233–7, and 260.

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of the RSFSR within a broader concept of the Soviet Union (Soviet people, Soviet patriotism).

It was therefore natural that the first concessions to specifically Russian national feeling after Stalin's death found their expression in a revitalization of the Russian Republic, which recovered its separate governmental and public institutions, previously submerged under or blended with "all-Union" entities. There appeared specifically Russian, i.e. RSFSR, ministries, societies, publishing houses, newspapers. In 1956, a newspaper called *Sovetskaya Rossiya* was founded as an organ of the CC Bureau for the RSFSR—itself a post-Stalinist innovation. This was the first newspaper in the Soviet Union for several decades to use the word "Russia" in its title.

Such "concessions" to Russian national feeling did not prevent the rise of Russian dissent any more than concessions in the non-Russian republics satisfied the aspirations of the Ukrainians, Lithuanians or Armenians. This is not the place to trace the history of dissent and opposition in the Soviet Union after Stalin. For our purposes it is enough to note that in the general consensus of scholars there exists, among the various currents of dissent, a Russian nationalist current.[11]

AS we suggested earlier, for the purposes of this particular investigation, Russian nationalist thought may be seen to be concerned with two issues. Needless to say, Russian nationalism is not a homogeneous movement, and, moreover, Russian dissident opinion also includes explicitly non-nationalistic elements.[12]

One broad current, within which further subdivisions could be made, is concerned with Russian history as the history of the Russian nation which it defines in cultural terms. The history of Russia is the history

[11] For a scholarly treatment of dissent, including Russian dissent, see Rudolf L. Tökes, ed., *Dissent in the USSR: Politics, Ideology, and People* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1975), Peter Reddaway, "The Development of Dissent and Opposition," in Archie Brown and Michael Kaser, eds., *The Soviet Union since the Fall of Khrushchev* (The Free Press, New York, 1976), pp. 121–56, F. M. Feldbrugge, *Samizdat and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union* (A. W. Sijhoff, Leyden, 1975), and Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Detente and the Democratic Movement in* the USSR (The Free Press, New York, 1976). These are only some of the more recent works. The subject of Russian nationalism is dealt with by Dimitry Pospielovsky, "The Resurgence of Russian Nationalism in Samizdat," *Survey*, No. 86 (Winter 1973) and by this writer, "Nationalities and the Russian Problem in the U.S.S.R.: an historical outline," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 27, No. 1 (1973).

[12] Of course, there are other useful ways of classifying this current. Thus, Andrei Amalrik distinguishes within the broad concept of nationalism (which he sees to be one of three major currents, the others being Marxism and liberalism): neo-Stalinist nationalism, chauvinism, neo-Slavophilism, and messianism: cf. "Ideologies in Soviet Society," *Survey*, No. 99 (Spring 1976). There are several subcategories in Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR* (Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, 1978). See also works on dissent cited above. A representative selection of Russian dissident writings is to be found in Michael Meerson-Aksenov and Boris Shragin, eds., *The Political, Social and Religious Thought of Russian "Samizdat": An Anthology* (Nordland, Belmont, Mass., 1977). This is a massive volume of over 700 pages.

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of its art, architecture, literature, ideas, Church, and religious thought. Its territorial core is located where the Great Russian nationality was formed. Relatively less importance is attached to the political organization of society, although such institutions as monarchy are recognized by at least some "culturalists" as part of the Russian heritage. (The monarchy itself is seen as a religious institution to some extent: "the Orthodox tsar.") From a conception of history like this, a variety of political conclusions may be drawn that are of import today. Some people express concern about the preservation of Russian historical monuments. Some others believe that the works of Russian Orthodox theology should be made available, and that the Church should enjoy greater freedom. Yet others view the peasants of the central Russian provinces as the most authentic representatives of Russian nationality and demand that various social, economic and cultural measures be taken to help them and the region in which they live. Still others—and we are entering now more dangerous political ground—question the ideological foundations of the Soviet state by arguing that Marxism-Leninism is a foreign, thus non-Russian, body, and should be replaced by an ideology that is "truly Russian." Finally, there are those who are prepared to go one step farther and advocate a violent overthrow of the Soviet regime and its replacement by a *national* regime.[13]

The "culturalist" position in its most extreme political form may be found in Solzhenitsyn. Among his many statements to this effect, the following might be considered representative:

> . . . the transition from pre-1917 Russia to the USSR is not a continuation but a mortal fracture of the spine, which almost destroyed Russia as a nation. The Soviet development is not a continuation of the Russian one but a distortion of it in a completely new, unnatural direction, inimical to the Russian people. . . . The terms "Russian" and "Soviet", "Russia" and "USSR", are not only not interchangeable, not equivalent, not part of the same order of ideas: they are irreconcilable opposites, they completely exclude each other, and to confuse them or use them wrongly is a gross error and a mark of slipshod thinking.[14]

While Solzhenitsyn was engaged in intellectual struggle with the Soviet regime and its ideology, there existed in Russia from 1964 to 1967 a secret organization which sought, as its ultimate goal, to overthrow

[13] See, for the less anti-Soviet trends, for example, Deming Brown, "Nationalism and Ruralism in Recent Soviet Russian Literature," *Review of National Literatures*, vol. 3, No. 1 (1972), and the symposium on "The Revival of Interest in the Russian Past in the Soviet Union," with the article by Jack V. Haney (from whom we have borrowed the term "culturalism"), and comments by Thomas E. Bird and George L. Kline in *Slavic Review*, vol. 32, No. 1 (March 1973).

[14] Solzhenitsyn's speech at Stanford University, Russian text in *Vestnik RKhD*, No. 118, p. 170, here quoted from Boris Shragin, *The Challenge of the Spirit* (Knopf, New York, 1978), p. xiii.

The representative text of political "culturalist" position is *From Under the Rubble*, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and others (Bantam Books, New York, 1976), especially the contributions of Solzhenitsyn, Igor Shafarevich, and Vadim Borisov.

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communist rule and replace it by a system based on "Social-Christian" ideology. This organization called itself the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People.[15]

The conception of Russian identity upheld by the Union was cultural and ideological, not political or ethnic in the linguistic sense. It conceived of Russia as an Orthodox Christian nation, and it viewed this spiritual or cultural identity of the Russian nation as something taking precedence over its political organization: the legitimacy of the government, in its view, depended on the government's conformity to the spiritual character of the nation. Although the programme of the Union promised that other religions in the future Russia would be allowed to preach and worship without hindrance, the Russia it hoped to establish was not going to be a secular state by any means. It would be a country with an official ideology and the leaders of the Orthodox Church would enjoy a political function within the state. (See articles 50 and 51 of their programme, but compare them with articles 31 and 33, which declare the independence of the Church from the state and the rights of other "known" religions.) [16]

Indeed, at least some of the ideologues of the Union appear to think that a real Russian cannot but be a religious person. Evgenii Vagin is reported to have said over Radio Liberty:

> In relation to this quotation which you cited, whether a Russian can be an atheist, and to what extent the Russian nature is compatible with this: Yes, in this sense I share Dostoevsky's belief that to be a Russian is to be Orthodox, and that religion is certainly the profound nature of the Russian person.[17]

One may further infer that the Union intended to follow its ideologically-determined political conception in relations between Russia and other nations. Thus, article 83 offered Russian help to those nations where Soviet troops are now stationed "to initiate their own national self-determination on the basis of Social-Christianity." Is one to conclude that if those nations chose to determine their fate in some *other* form, they would not be helped? Insofar as Soviet internal nationality problems were concerned, the Union claimed to speak for all the nationalities of the USSR when it declared it was "a patriotic organization consisting of selfless representatives of all the nationalities of Great Russia" (article 73). The Union rejected the right to independence for the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the smaller nationalities of the USSR, and one of its pub-

[15] See John B. Dunlop, *The New Russian Revolutionaries* (Nordland, Belmont, 1976), a study of the origins, ideas, and suppression of the Union.

[16] Dunlop, op. cit. pp. 290 and 287.

[17] Yanov, *The Russian New Right*, p. 34. This principle was reflected in the Union's programme: article 84 granted the Russians now in exile "normal rights and opportunities in the Social-Christian union of the entire populace." (Dunlop, op. cit. p. 293.)

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licists maintains that Russia is by nature a multinational state.[18] Russian Social Christians seem to care very little about the status of the Catholic Lithuanians, Buddhist Kalmyks, or Moslem Uzbeks in a new Orthodox Russia they hope to see one day.

Although the All-Russian Social-Christian Union was suppressed by the authorities, Professor Dunlop considers that its ideas present the most serious challenge to the regime. He believes they will gain in influence in the future. Among the reasons for the appeal of the Union's ideology, according to him, are the comprehensiveness of its programme as an alternative to the Soviet system, its preference for a "maximally bloodless *coup d'état*" as a means of winning power, and, finally, the personal heroism of its leader, Igor Ogurtsov.[19]

Indeed, ideas close to those of the Union have been presented in such *samizdat* publications as *Veche* (Assembly), *Zemlya* (Land), and *Moskovskii sbornik* (Moscow Symposium). They are not as uncompromisingly hostile to the government, but they base their conception of Russian nationhood on cultural (religious, spiritual) features, and they judge political problems through an ideological, "culturalist" prism.[20]

THE other major grouping within Russian dissent may be given the name of "statism." While "culturalism" in any form contains an element of ideological dissent (its concern with Russian historical identity implies that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is an inadequate tool for the comprehension of the richness of Russian culture), "statism" views ideology, Marxist or any other, instrumentally. Its classic spokesman in the 1920s, Ustryalov, was not in the least disturbed by Moscow's being the seat of the world communist movement. On the contrary, he regarded this internationalist, universal ideology and movement as an instrument in the policies of the Russian state. An identical sentiment was expressed by another anti-communist Russian in the 1920s: "The International will pass, but the boundaries will remain," wrote the émigré V. Shulgin in 1922, and he expressed essentially the same view in the 1950s and 1960s, when he was in the Soviet Union.[21]

18 Dunlop, op. cit. pp. 214–17. See also: Vladimir Osipov, *Tri otnosheniya k rodine* (Possev, Frankfurt, 1978), pp. 119–20, who seems to adhere to a rather idealized view of Russian history when he claims that tsarist Orthodox Russia did not oppress Muslims, Catholics, Jews or Buddhists. Rather than by oppression, the Russian Empire "was supported by a moral authority of the great Russian culture and its carrier, the Russian people." Osipov favours the maintenance of a Russian-led multinational state in the future, and in this sense his position resembles that of the "statists," but he seems also to believe that in such a state the non-Russians would be allowed freedom of national life. The "statist" position denies such rights to the non-Russians. (It may be worth noting, though, that in accord with an old tsarist position, Osipov considers Ukrainians and Belorussians to be Russian. See *Tri otnosheniya*, p. 205.)

19 Dunlop, *The New Russian Revolutionaries*, pp. 225–7.

20 Ibid. and Yanov, *The Russian New Right*, pp. 62–84.

21 See Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (Monad Press, New York, 1974), p. 66. Dzyuba complained that "today even the enemy of communism V. Shulgin is welcomed among us, because he has expressed his Great-Power sympathies for the existing boundaries" (a typical "statist" position which cares about power, not ideology). See op. cit. p. 57.

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Just like the "culturalists," the "statists" do not form a single current. One point of view within the "statist" orientation is represented by the authors of a document known as *Slovo natsii* ("A Word of the Nation," or "A Nation Speaks"). According to Professor Pospielovsky, the authors of that manifesto

> may be much more interested in a revitalized national centralized dictatorship, a sort of national Bolshevism of the Ustryalov type, than in Christianity *per se*. Their attitude to the Church may be purely instrumental, their view of it as an institution being of the Pobedonostsev type.[22]

Pospielovsky further argues:

> . . . they show themselves as opponents of the October Revolution, i.e., of Bolshevism-Communism, from beginning to end. But at the same time their insistence on the necessity of a strong centralized government, their acceptance of dictatorship as a system of government, their elitism, are such that it becomes difficult to see in what essentials they oppose the Soviet system. . . . What the group may be heading for is a type of neo-Bolshevism, without Marx and Lenin, but with the Church as a moral instrument in the hands of a nationalist state.[23]

The document is racist and anti-semitic (egalitarianism and cosmopolitanism are called "an ideology of the Jewish diaspora"), and demands that the Russians should play the dominant role in the multinational state in which they live. It definitely rejects federalism.[24] The "statist" school, then, sees the essence of Russian nationhood in the state as it developed in the course of Russian history: that is a centralized, absolutist, multinational empire, opposed to western-style liberal and democratic societies, and dominated by the Great Russians.

WHO are the contemporary "statists" in the USSR? What do they criticize, and what do they want to achieve?

The monthly journal *Molodaya gvardiya* ("Young Guard"), organ of the youth organization Komsomol, served as a vehicle of "statist" historical ideas in the years 1968–70. Alexander Yanov has devoted a special chapter in his book on the Russian New Right to the ideology of "Young Guardism." He concludes that the journal, through the contributions of its leading authors (Lobanov, Chalmaev, Semanov) replaced the Marxist analysis of modern problems of the world in terms of classes and class conflicts with an approach based on a juxtaposition of "Russia" and "Russianness" to "Americanism." Lobanov's programme, says Yanov, was to give the regime and its policies a more pronounced Russian character. For Chalmaev, "there is no gulf between Soviet and tsarist Russia." "From his point of view the October

22 D. Pospielovsky, "The Resurgence," *Survey*, No. 86 (1973), p. 56.
23 Pospielovsky, op. cit. p. 62.
24 Ibid. pp. 60–1.

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Revolution was only a stage in the maturing of the 'Russian spirit,' and by no means the epochal date of the birth of socialism . . . the actions of Ivan the Terrible . . . are just as important as those of Lenin—all of them led the 'national spirit' on behalf of the state." [25]

Yanov believes that the ideologists of *Molodaya gvardiya* enjoyed considerable official support until the publication of the article by S. S. Semanov entitled "On Relative and Eternal Values." In that article Semanov not only described the October Revolution as the "Great Russian Revolution" and called it "our national achievement" but he praised unconditionally the Stalinist constitution of 1936 which, according to Semanov, introduced complete unity and equality among the people. The period of the late 1930s, moreover, was especially favourable to the development of culture according to the same writer. In Yanov's view, this was such an open refutation of the line of the 20th Party Congress that the regime had to intervene: the editor of *Molodaya gvardiya* was transferred to another post and the theoretical journal of the Party, *Kommunist*, published a critique of the errors of the youth magazine.[26]

Among the most significant articles published in *Molodaya gvardiya*, in addition to those by Lobanov, Chalmaev and Semanov, one might include M. Alpatov's "Letter by a Historian to a Writer." One of its themes is the idea of Russia's superiority over the West, and its position as the "No. 1 country" (*Strana No. 1*) in "the world camp of socialism"; another—the argument that Russia's particular claim to greatness lies in its having skipped the historical stage of "bourgeois democracy" and in its immunity to democratic socialism (*sotsial-demokratism*), the latter vice afflicting such countries as Czechoslovakia.[27] Thus, it is not any one state that the writers of *Molodaya gvardiya* approved of: the Stalinist regime of the 1930s (Semanov) was to their liking, they had good things to say about Ivan the Terrible, Peter I, even Nicholas I, but they were uniformly proud that Russia had managed to avoid the experience of western-style constitutional government.

To their credit, one has to note that both Sakharov and Semanov quite explicitly stated that they viewed critiques of the tsars, of Russia's past persecutions of the individual, absolutist abuse, terror, etc., as indirect criticism of the Soviet system. (They diligently registered such camouflaged critiques which had been published in *Novyi mir* and other less nationalistic periodicals.) They were thus providing independent confirmation of the argument that interest in Russian history has import for the Soviet political and ethnic situation.[28]

[25] Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right*, p. 45.

[26] Yanov, op. cit. pp. 53–5.

[27] M. Alpatov, "Pis'mo istorika pisatelyu," *Molodaya gvardiya*, 1969, No. 9, pp. 306, 310–11, 312–15.

[28] Alpatov, op. cit. p. 318, A. N. Sakharov, "Istoriya istinnaya i mnimaya," ibid. 1970, No. 3, p. 320, and S. N. Semanov, "O tsennostyakh otnositel'nykh i vechnykh," ibid. 1970, No. 8, pp. 312–13.

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"Statist" ideas produced critical reaction not only in official circles, but also among non-nationalist dissidents, one of whom, R. B. Lert, published a scathing attack on Semanov. Her article, entitled "Traktat o prelestyakh knuta" ("A Treatise on the Charms of the Knout") appeared first in the *samizdat* journal *Politicheskii dnevnik*, and was then reprinted in the West. Lert pointed out, very correctly, that Semanov, despite his words on the Russian people and Russian culture, did not care about either. What he did care for, however, was the idea of Russian Great Power (*velikoderzhavnost'*), and he praised Stalin because Stalin, while pretending to glorify the Russian people, had in fact rehabilitated Russian tsarism. Classifying the ideas of Semanov as chauvinism, Lert warned that great power chauvinism provokes among smaller nations a negative reaction toward that nation on whose behalf "the Semanovs" presume to speak.[29] A similar warning, more camouflaged in form, appeared in the legal press in an article by Igor Kon, the learned Soviet philosopher and sociologist of liberal persuasion.[30] Semanov's, and other Young Guardist, ideas, interestingly enough, were noted in at least one communist country in Eastern Europe.[31]

IN his stimulating work on the New Right in Russia, Dr Yanov has devoted a chapter to the thought of Gennadii Shimanov. From the vantage point of our discussion, Shimanov is another representative of "statist" nationalism. Shimanov argues that Russians are God's chosen people: it was because of this that God sent great calamities on the Russian nation (the reforms of Peter, the October 1917 revolution, the Gulag), but this was done in order to test and purify Russia.[32] In his political programme, Shimanov advocates an "ideocratic state" (the ideology being a mixture of Russian Orthodoxy with Lenin), but the accent is on the state, not the specific content of ideas. He attacks Solzhenitsyn for his support of "the free flow of ideas" in the future Russia. He is opposed in principle to freedom of thought and creative freedom.[33] Consistently, he condemns democracy. In Yanov's summary of Shimanov's conception of the good state

> a state which is "not absolute," "not autocratic," which does not possess "a highly developed nervous system in the form of a Party which embraces the entire organism of society almost down to its smallest cell"—such a state is for Shimanov not a state at all! . . . The Soviet regime is good because it contains the potential of totalitarianism and is able to provide such control. . . . The state takes the place of God in this totalitarian utopia. . . .[34]

[29] See "Traktat o prelestyakh knuta," *Novyi kolokol* (London, 1972), pp. 62, 68–9, and 71. See also *Politicheskii dnevnik 1965–1970* (Amsterdam 1975), pp. 711–12 and ff.
[30] I. Kon, "Dialektika razvitiya natsii," *Novyi mir*, 1970, No. 3, p. 141.
[31] W. (sic), "Polemiki literackie," *Polityka* (27 September 1969), pp. 8–9.
[32] Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right*, p. 117.
[33] Yanov, op. cit. p. 120.
[34] Ibid. p. 122.

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Although Shimanov considers Russia God's chosen nation, and although he advocates national isolationism—nations must not "have communion with foreigners when there is no need"—he upholds the idea of a Russian multinational empire. In Shimanov's words,

> The Soviet Union is not a mechanical conglomeration of nations of different kinds . . . but a MYSTICAL ORGANISM, composed of nations mutually supplementing each other and making up, under the leadership of the Russian people, a LITTLE MANKIND—the beginning and the spiritual detonator for the great mankind.[35]

Yanov concludes from this that in terms of practical politics "the Russian people is the only one which is permitted to have an *empire*." This empire would be closed and isolated from other nations until they in turn were ready to "speak with it in its own language." [36]

IT is clear that it is "culturalism" in its extreme political form, whether as an ideological current represented by Solzhenitsyn, or as an incipient political movement represented by the All-Russian Social-Christian Union, which poses the most serious danger to the regime because it denies its legitimacy and aims at its overthrow. It is another question, and one which cannot be discussed here, what degree of support this current enjoys among the Russian population.

On the other hand, "statism" as such is not dangerous to the regime's security, even though some of its implications may be disturbing to those elements in the establishment which have retained faith in the universal meaning of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, some found it offensive that "statists" have reduced the meaning of the October 1917 revolution to the status of a Russian—albeit Great—national revolution.[37] (But this "ranking," on the other hand, legitimizes Bolshevism in Russian nationalist terms: it thus helps to support the Soviet regime, while "culturalist" nationalism, viewing 1917 as an anti-Russian event, opposes Lenin and the revolution.) What it proposes is to de-ideologize the system by making it less internationalist in outlook, and more firmly committed to Russian national goals. In this aspect the thrust of "statism" is directed against the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR, rather than against the regime in Moscow, the principal target of "culturalism."

[35] Ibid. p. 123. Shimanov's work is entitled "Kak ponimat' nashu istoriyu," a *samizdat* text.

[36] Ibid.

[37] A. N. Yakovlev, "Protiv anti-istorizma," *Literaturnaya gazeta* (15 Nov. 1972). Yakovlev's article received a reply in the *samizdat* journal *Veche*, in an editorial entitled "The Struggle Against the So-Called Russophilism, or the Road to Suicide for the State." Its author was Vladimir Osipov. (See *Tri otnosheniya*, pp. 112–47). *Veche* pointed out that if he were consistent, Yakovlev should allow the non-Russian nations of the USSR the freedom to secede; otherwise he had no right to condemn old Russian conquests of the Ukraine or Central Asia. (See Yanov, op. cit. p. 59.) Soon thereafter, Yakovlev lost his post in the Central Committee, CPSU, apparatus and was sent as Ambassador to Canada, so that he could see, one imagines, what toleration in ethnic matters can lead to.

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(At least some " culturalists " can face the prospect of secession by the non-Russians; not so the " statists," who believe in a Russian *empire*.)

One may surmise that the idea that the entire USSR, not just the RSFSR, is a country in which the Russians play a special role, is likely to win a sympathetic response among the Russian masses who seem to be offended by the idea that they should learn the local languages when they decide to live outside Russia proper, and who feel threatened by the prospect of becoming a minority in consequence of the demographic growth of Central Asian peoples.[38] When Dunlop comments that it is " startling but true that many Russians today have the psychology of an oppressed minority," [39] one is reminded of those English nationalists today, such as Enoch Powell, who complain of the takeover of their old country by " coloured " immigrants.[40] One should never underestimate the popular potential of a racially-tinged nationalism.[41]

On a more elevated level, this " statism," drawing its support for Russian hegemony from the argument that the USSR is but a continuation of the old Russian state, can count on support in the military establishment, whose many prominent figures have proudly declared that they see a continuity between tsarist Russia's and the Soviet Union's military and territorial foreign-policy goals. One such prominent figure was Admiral Isakov, whom Dzyuba criticized in his exposé of Russification.[42] A recent Soviet work on the history of Russian-Finnish relations since 1713 presents in a consistently favourable light tsarism's foreign and military policies and its treatment of Finland, denies that tsarism attempted to Russify that nation, and condemns Finnish nationalism for its anti-Russian position before 1914.[43]

[38] Several authors have argued that the Russians are greatly, and increasingly, concerned about the potential dangers of population growth among the Muslim peoples. See, e.g., George L. Kline, " Religion, National Character, and the ' Rediscovery of Russian Roots,' " *Slavic Review*, vol. 32, No. 1 (March 1973), p. 39:

> There is the " demographic trauma " experienced by Great Russians when the latest Soviet census was published. . . . For the first time the Great Russians face the prospect of being reduced to a minority of the total Soviet population. . . . It is not surprising that Great Russians should be retreating into the " greatness of their past."

An official response to the population explosion in Soviet Central Asia is an intensified pressure to make the " ethnics " speak Russian from the earliest possible age. See Roman Solchanyk, " Russian, Russian Everywhere," *The New York Times*, 11 Oct. 1979.

[39] Dunlop, op. cit. p. 226.

[40] It would be interesting to compare the malaise which at about the same time seems to have afflicted two historically imperial nations, the Russians, whose " coloureds " live along with them in the same state, and the English, who seem never to have minded going themselves to India, Africa, or the West Indies, but who find it more difficult to welcome the return visits of the latter's natives to England. See the stimulating discussion by Tom Nairn, " English Nationalism: The Case of Enoch Powell," in his *The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (NL Books, London, 1977), pp. 256–90.

[41] Aleksander M. Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*, tr. by George Saunders (Norton, New York, 1978), provides telling examples of popular hostility to non-Russian victims of Stalinist deportations in the post-1956 period.

[42] Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification*, pp. 67–9.

[43] V. V. Pokhlebkin, *SSSR-Finlyandiya. 260 let otnoshenii 1713–1973* (Moscow, 1975). A Polish reviewer has noted such statements and the fact that Pokhlebkin often quotes

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It is understandable then, that both Yanov and Dunlop see the possibility of a rapprochement between the regime and Russian nationalism. "There is evidence," says Dunlop, "that elements in the Communist Party are attempting to direct Russian nationalist fervour into a neo-National-Socialist direction. (As Mussolini's biography suggests, a journey from Communism to Fascism has a certain logic.)" [44] Yanov is even more explicit on this prospect.[45]

In this situation, the regime may have found an issue to link it firmly with the Russian masses: the maintenance of the dominant position of the Russians in the USSR. It would go beyond the theme of this article to explore in the light of this hypothesis the meaning of the purges which took place in 1972–73 in the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and elsewhere. Their consequence everywhere has been increased emphasis on the use of the Russian language, and on limiting the social functions of the non-Russian languages correspondingly, and it is possible that this anti-nationality thrust has been a response by the regime to an intensification of "unofficial" Russian nationalism.[46] Another such concession to Russian ethnic feeling, and simultaneously an admission that Marxism-Leninism is no longer an operative guide to its policies, seems to be in the return to an idealization of tsarist Russia, including its conquests, in grass-roots propaganda. Thus, Nekrich points out that after nationalist demonstrations by the Ingush in the north Caucasus area in 1973, local propaganda work came to emphasize "the progressive significance of the unification [read: conquest] of Checheno-Ingushetia with Russia," and

approvingly the works of "the reactionary tsarist general, one of the theorists of the Russification policy," Mikhail Borodkin, and has observed that those patriotic actions of the Finns which Pokhlebkin condemns were supported in their time by Lenin, Social-Democrats, Lev Tolstoy, Maxim Gorky, and other progressive Russians. See Bernard Piotrowski's (untitled) review in *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, Warsaw, vol. 85, No. 2 (1978).

[44] John B. Dunlop, "The Eleventh Hour," *The Frontier*, vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 1975), p. 81.

[45] Yanov, op. cit. p. 127: "the Shamanovites . . . are practical politicians offering the 'leaders' more flexible and effective tactics, a deeper social base, a broader field of operations for political manoeuvre in case of crisis." (See also ibid. pp. 130–1, and 141 ff.)

[46] For authoritative scholarly and political statements reaffirming the role of the Russian language, and justifying corresponding limitations on the use of the non-Russian languages in the 1970s, see, for example, I. P. Tsamerian, *Teoreticheskie problemy obrazovaniya i razvitiya sovetskogo mnogonatsional'nogo gosudarstva* (Nauka, Moscow, 1973), pp. 243–4, 269, 273–4; Yu. D. Desheriev, *Razvitie obshchestvennykh funktsii literaturnykh yazykov* (Nauka, Moscow, 1976), p. 86, and E. A. Bagramov, *Leninskaya natsional'naya politika: dostizheniya i perspektivy* (Mysl', Moscow, 1977), p. 128. It is noteworthy that these official arguments had been advanced earlier by such a dissident Marxist figure as Roy Medvedev. In his *On Socialist Democracy* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1975), p. 359, written in 1970–71, Medvedev criticized the publication of original scientific research in Georgia, Armenia, the Ukraine and Estonia in the native languages, and thought that to publish scientific journals in the local languages was "rather ludicrous." It is strange that a freedom fighter like Roy Medvedev would support such a position but then, as F. J. M. Feldbrugge (*Samizdat and Political Dissent*, p. 189), has noted, "The general tenor of Medvedev's treatment of the national question suggests that on this count the majority of the authors of political *samizdat* is not too much out of step with the regime's policy which . . . promotes Russification in the guise of a gradual rapprochement between the nations of the Soviet Union. . . ."

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public praise was given to "the exploits of General Yermolov, the strangler of the Caucasian peoples." Nekrich speaks of "intensified Great Russian chauvinism in Checheno-Ingushetia" but it may be worth exploring whether this symptom is not noticeable elsewhere in the USSR as well.[47]

It appears that having staved off the challenge from Russian "culturalists" such as Solzhenitsyn, the regime has chosen to seek the support of the Russian masses by adopting a "pro-Russian" stand in the question of language in the non-Russian republics, thus letting the average Russian know that he is equally at home everywhere in the USSR. However, the regime has thought it imprudent to eliminate the Union Republics, or to deprive them of their right to secede from the USSR, or to proclaim the emergence of a "Soviet nation." Such proposals were in fact advanced during the "nationwide discussion" of the draft of the new Soviet Constitution, but they were rejected, as L. I. Brezhnev disclosed, as "erroneous." The Soviet peoples, he said, were in fact drawing ever closer together, but it would be dangerous to "step up this objective process of national integration" "artificially."[48] Simultaneously, a renewed stress on the historical continuity of Soviet and pre-1917 policies brings home to Russians and non-Russians alike that the Russian nation is the leading force in today's USSR. Although they were suppressed, the "culturalists" may indeed have inspired some official policies. Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Soviet Leaders," with its passionate concern for the fate of the Russian north east, that historic "core area" of the Russian nation, may have inspired the programme for the development of the Non-Black Earth Zone or at least have given that programme a nationalistic legitimation, and the *Veche* circles have been known to believe in the necessity of developing Siberia as the "second" Russia—another goal sympathetic to the Kremlin.[49]

[47] Nekrich, op. cit. pp. 163–4.

[48] L. I. Brezhnev, *On the Draft Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* (Novosti, Moscow, 1977), p. 21.

[49] A. Solzhenitsyn, *Pis'mo vozhdyam Sovetskogo Soyuza* (YMCA Press, Paris, 1974), pp. 23–33. For the nationalists' thinking on Siberia, see Yanov, op. cit. pp. 73–5. It would take a special study to explore the "historical geography" of contemporary Russian nationalists, a study on the lines of Ladis K. D. Kristof's "The Russian Image of Russia: An Applied Study in Geopolitical Methodology," in C. A. Fisher, ed., *Essays In Political Geography* (Methuen, London, 1968).

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The Many Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism

John B. Dunlop

I SHOULD like to state clearly first of all what this article is not intended to cover. I shall not attempt to trace the development of Russian nationalism in the Soviet period. I shall assume that the major phenomena associated with this movement are familiar: the abrupt halt in the policy of radical Marxist-Leninist internationalism that occurred in 1934; the tactical fostering of Russian nationalist and religious sentiment during the Second World War; the almost desperate reaction of Russian patriots to Khrushchev's wide-ranging anti-religious campaign of 1959–64, which resulted in the closure of 10,000 Orthodox churches and the razing of many of them, including architectural monuments; the formation of a clandestine nationalist revolutionary organization—"The All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People"—and of a formidable voluntary society, "The All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments," in the mid-1960s; the take-over of *Molodaya gvardiya*—no less than the journal of the Central Committee of the Komsomol—by a group of committed Russian nationalists in the late 1960s; the gradual revelation in the late 1960s and early 1970s that the most significant writer to have been born in the Soviet period, Nobel Laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn, was a Russian nationalist; and, finally, the founding in 1971 of *Veche*, a *samizdat* nationalist journal, which served as a forum for discussion and debate among the different wings of the nationalist movement until it was suppressed in 1974. Nor do I propose to give an outline of the views, assumptions and core sentiments of contemporary nationalists.[1]

The distinction on which I shall base my discussion of the "many faces of contemporary Russian nationalism" is between two basic types or categories of nationalists: (1) those who seek to work *within* the Soviet "system" to achieve their ends (and who may even regard the system as in some sense *theirs*), and (2) those who cannot work within the system or refuse to do so. I shall deal with the second category first.

ALTHOUGH he is regarded by some American commentators as "almost a fascist," it cannot be stressed enough that Alexander

[1] For this, see my recent book, *The New Russian Revolutionaries* (Nordland, Belmont, Mass., 1976), esp. chapter 12, and "The Eleventh Hour. An Account of Neo-Slavophilism. Is It the Emerging Ideology of a Post-Marxist Russia?" in *Frontier*, 18, No. 2 (Summer, 1975). I am presently completing a lengthy study of Russian nationalism of the post-Stalin period, entitled *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, which should appear in print in 1981.

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Solzhenitsyn (as well as his co-contributors to the 1974 *samizdat* collection *From Under the Rubble*) represents the most "liberal" strand in the nationalist movement.[2] The presence of Solzhenitsyn in this strand lends it considerable authority, for the novelist is seen by many in Russia as the first "great writer of the Russian land" to emerge since Tolstoy's death in 1910. Thanks to his world fame and to the undeniable artistic power of his writings, Solzhenitsyn's views resonate in the ranks of nationalists far to the right of him.

Solzhenitsyn and his associates (for example, mathematician Igor Shafarevich and historian Vadim Borisov) are anathema to the regime not so much because of their nationalism, nor even because of their Orthodox Christian convictions, but because of their unwillingness to accept any kind of *modus vivendi* with Marxism-Leninism. In *The Gulag Archipelago*, the work which precipitated his expulsion from the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn insisted on resurrecting the mass crimes against humanity committed by the Bolsheviks and showing that these atrocities sprang directly from the regime's adherence to a flinty, anti-human ideology. As if this were not enough, in *Gulag* and *Lenin in Zurich* Solzhenitsyn attacked the founder of the Bolshevik state himself. This type of *lèse majesté* is intolerable to the Kremlin since the so-called "Lenin theme" is the glue which holds the Soviet system together; it is also used to conjoin Marxism-Leninism and Russian patriotism in an essentially unnatural concordat. The proposal which Solzhenitsyn put to the Politburo in his *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* (1974)—i.e. that they let the "whirlwind" of ideology depart the country and, that while maintaining an "authoritarian" political structure, they begin to permit the country to breathe—was unacceptable to the ruling elite not so much, one suspects, because of any genuine devotion to ideology but because of their fear that a publicly admitted downgrading of Marxism might result in the loss of their power and class privileges. Moreover, it would remove the ideological justification for expansionist activities abroad; this, in turn, might lead the populace to pay more attention to domestic shortcomings.

The views of Solzhenitsyn and his colleagues are "liberal" in that they would, for example, permit any minority nationality which wished to do so to withdraw from the Russian federation. In addition, this nationalist strand seems to be interested, at least to some extent, in evolving judicial safeguards to prevent the abuse of power in Russia. Essentially, however, the ideas of the Solzhenitsyn-Shafarevich wing are in tune with those of most contemporary Russian nationalists. This can be seen, for example, in their advocacy of a decentralized zero-growth economy, of communes and artels employing the most advanced modern

2 The most important "programmatic" statements of this strand are Solzhenitsyn's *Pismo vozhdyam Sovetskogo Soyuza* (YMCA-Press, Paris, 1974) and the collection *Iz-pod glyb* (YMCA-Press, Paris, 1974). English translations: *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* (Harper and Row, New York, 1974) and *From Under the Rubble* (Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1975).

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technology, of a decentralized syndicalistic system of government, and of an absence of political parties. As far as foreign policy is concerned, Solzhenitsyn and his friends believe that *de facto* Russia has no serious enemies except China. A " healthy isolationism " is desired which would permit Russia to concentrate on healing the deep, almost fatal wounds inflicted by 60 years of communist rule. If the ideas of the Solzhenitsyn strand were implemented, one would see the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and a radical contraction of the Soviet military presence abroad.

Like virtually all of the groups and individuals I shall be examining, Solzhenitsyn and his associates would indignantly reject the tag " nationalist." As Christians, they would feel that such a term elevates the nation *above* God (this was Shatov's problem, it will be recalled, in Dostoevsky's *The Devils*). Through an intermediary, I approached Solzhenitsyn and asked him what term he would use for the present Russian nationalist upsurge. He replied that he favoured the term *natsionalno-religioznoe vozrozhdenie* (national and religious renaissance). And what, I asked, should the adherents of this movement be called? He suggested the terms: *pochvenniki* (from *pochva,* soil), *zemtsy* or *neo-zemtsy* (from *zemlya*, land). These terms, of course, have nineteenth-century antecedents—the *pochvenniki* and *zemstva*—and they stress the connexion of the movement to the soil, to historical " thousand-year-old " Russia, to the Russian Orthodox Church, and to popular mores and traditions.

MOVING somewhat to the right, but staying within the category of nationalists who refuse to cooperate with the regime, we encounter the two " saints " of the Russian national movement: Igor Ogurtsov (b. 1937) and Vladimir Osipov (b. 1938).[3] These two powerful personalities are respected by almost all representatives of the movement, and their incarceration is deeply resented. Ogurtsov, the founder, leader and principal ideologue of the " All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People " was given a 15 year sentence, to be followed by five years of exile, in 1967. Osipov, the editor of the first nine issues of *Veche*, was given an eight year sentence in 1975 (he previously served seven years in the camps in the 1960s). Ogurtsov, who survived seven years of gruelling incarceration in Vladimir Prison and was for a time forcibly held in a mental hospital, is reported to be in failing health, and

[3] On Ogurtsov and the organization he founded, see *The New Russian Revolutionaries, passim*, the collections *VSKhSON: sbornik materialov* (YMCA-Press, Paris, 1975) and " VSKhSON: materialy suda i programma," *Volnoe slovo* (Possev), 22 (1976), and *Russkoe vozrozhdenie*, 1 (1978). On Ogurtsov's seriously declining health, see *Novoe russkoe slovo*, 17 May 1979. On Osipov, see *The New Russian Revolutionaries, passim*, his article " Three Attitudes Toward the Homeland " in Michael Meerson-Aksenov and Boris Shragin, eds., *The Political and Social Thought of Russian " Samizdat "—An Anthology* (Nordland, Belmont, Mass., 1977) and his interview with two western correspondents in *Vestnik RSKhD*, 106 (1972). See also the collection of Osipov's writings *Tri otnosheniya k rodine* (Possev Verlag, Frankfurt, 1978).

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his physical survival is feared for. His premature death in prison would probably have a radicalizing effect on Russian nationalists. Both Ogurtsov and Osipov are Christians, neither is a xenophobe, both advocate the liberation of Eastern Europe and a radical contraction of the Soviet military presence abroad. If there is an area where their views are less "liberal" than those of the Solzhenitsyn-Shafarevich circle, it would probably be in the sphere of the minority nationalities, where they might not be as prepared to permit such nationalities to secede from the Russian federation.

Somewhat further to the right, we come across a variegated group of nationalist "centrists." Evgenii Vagin (b. 1938), former head of the "ideological division" of the Social-Christian Union, was permitted to emigrate to the West in August 1976.[4] Next to Solzhenitsyn, he is probably the most significant Russian nationalist at present outside the USSR. Like many contemporary nationalists, Vagin is an ardent monarchist, and his views on Russian domestic matters would seem to be somewhat more "authoritarian" than those of Solzhenitsyn-Shafarevich or Ogurtsov-Osipov. Another important "centrist" would be Leonid Borodin (b. 1938), a former member of the Social-Christian Union and editor of the *samizdat* journal *Moskovskii sbornik* which emerged after *Veche* was suppressed in 1974 (the authorities reportedly forced Borodin to cease publication of this journal).[5] A last name one might cite at this juncture would be that of Gennadii Shimanov (b. 1937),[6] a prolific *samizdat* publicist and religious activist (Shimanov's views, incidentally, have been caricatured by the recent émigré Aleksandr Yanov in his book, *The Russian New Right* [1978]). Those centrists who elect or have to remain in the Soviet Union are frequently forced to work at menial occupations (as watchmen, liftmen, etc.). While they seem without exception to be Christians, they tend to be quite suspicious of the West and of western-style democracy, and they are fairly "authoritarian" in their views. They also appear to be manifestly uninterested in conducting a dialogue with contemporary *neo-*

[4] The following interviews with and articles by Vagin are noteworthy: "Litsom k Rossii: intervyu E. A. Vagina 'Posevu'," *Posev*, 10 (1976), "Intervyu 'Vestniku RKhD'," *Vestnik RKhD*, 122 (1977), "Voennopoliticheskaya organizatsiya: neskolko slov o VSKhSON," *Nasha strana*, 23 Nov. 1976, "Religioznoe inakomyslie v segodnyashnei Rossii," *Russkoe vozrozhdenie*, 1 (1978), "K budushchei svobodnoi Rossii," *Russkaya mysl*, 18 Jan. 1979.

[5] See Borodin's essay "*Vestnik RSKhD* i russkaya intelligentsiya" in *Veche* No. 8, AS 1665. Also published under the title "O russkoi intelligentsii" in *Grani*, 96 (1975). See, too, the recent *samizdat* response to Borodin's piece by L. Ladov (pseud.), "Neskolko myslei o Rossii, sprovotsirovannykh sovremennymi 'slavyanofilami'," *Sintaksis*, 2 (1978). Possev Verlag has recently published a volume of Borodin's stories entitled *Povest strannogo vremeni: rasskazy*.

[6] Shimanov's most important political essays are contained in the collections *Protiv techeniya* (1975) and *Perekuem mechi na orala* (1978), both available from Keston College, Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism, Heathfield Road, Keston, Kent, BR2 6BA. See too his autobiography *Pered smertyu* (second *samizdat* edition, 1974, also available from Keston College). Shimanov's publicistic writings on religious themes regularly appear in *Vestnik RKhD*.

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zapadniki (neo-Westernizers) on the future of Russia. On the other hand, it should be stressed that these are not brutal men; their deeply held religious beliefs are a restraining force on any oppressive policies they might contemplate.

RELIGION plays a central role in the thought of the figures we have so far been examining. It is even more important for a small number of highly visible and influential religious activists with links to the Russian national movement whom we shall now treat. (By discussing them at this juncture, incidentally, I do not mean to suggest that they should be seen as standing to the political right of Vagin, Borodin and Shimanov.) On 27 December 1976, a *Khristianskii komitet zashchity prav veruyushchikh v SSSR* (Christian Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Believers in the USSR) was founded by the Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin, Deacon Varsonofii Khaibulin, and layman Viktor Kapitanchuk.[7] Fr Yakunin has been known to readers of *samizdat* since 1965 when he co-signed a lengthy appeal to Patriarch Aleksii of the Moscow Patriarchate protesting against the ravages wrought by the Khrushchev persecution of 1959–64. Khaibulin and Kapitanchuk have been active in nationalist affairs for some time, and both had links with *Veche*. The aims of the Christian Committee are:

1. To collect, study and disseminate information on the position of believers in the USSR.
2. To offer consultative assistance to believers in case of the infringement of their civil rights.
3. To address state agencies on questions concerning the rights of believers.
4. To carry out research to determine the legal and *de facto* position of religion in the USSR.
5. To assist the improvement of Soviet legislation on religion.

The Soviet regime, of course, has always asserted that no one in the USSR is persecuted for his or her religious beliefs. But now a watchdog committee has come into existence to ascertain independently the truth or falsehood of that claim and to monitor the position of believers. The regime, to be sure, could suppress the commitee, but what kind of a signal would *that* send—via the foreign radio—to the USSR's 50,000,000 Orthodox believers and the additional 50 to 70,000,000 Soviet citizens who feel to some extent attached to or attracted by Orthodoxy?

To give one example of the Christian Committee's *modus operandi*, on 8 June 1977, it addressed an open letter to Leonid Brezhnev, in his

[7] The Washington Street Research Center in San Francisco has published 10 volumes of Christian Committee materials under the title *Documents of the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights in the USSR*. See also the collection " Khristianskii komitet zashchity veruyushchikh v SSSR: dokumenty," *Volnoe slovo*, 28 (1977). Vadim Shcheglov was co-opted as a member of the committee in December 1977. Fr Khaibulin resigned his membership in December 1978. Fr Vasilii Fonchenkov, an instructor at the Moscow Theological Academy, joined the committee in May 1979.

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capacity as chairman of the Constitution Committee, asking that various changes be introduced into the Soviet Constitution.[8] Pointing out that the Statute of the CPSU requires members of the Party to carry out a decisive struggle against "religious survivals," the committee stressed that believers in the USSR are faced with a "torturous" dilemma—how can they in religious conscience support a system which seeks a radical secularization or *obezbozhivanie* of the entire society? In this sense, an implicit warning is contained in the committee's appeal to Brezhnev.

A recent tactic of the committee has been to recall that the year 1988 will mark the 1,000th anniversary of the baptism of Russia by St Vladimir. To commemorate that significant historical event, the committee is pressing for the re-opening of Russia's oldest monastery, the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, which was closed by the authorities in 1961.[9]

Let me now attempt to sum up the political importance of the Christian Committee: (1) It serves as a tribune and information clearing-house for Orthodox believers and also for not a few sectarians, particularly Baptists and Pentecostalists, who have accepted the hand of friendship extended to them by the committee, which has indicated that it wishes to atone for sins against sectarians committed by the Russian Church in the past; (2) Its juridical approach, which seeks to demonstrate both that Soviet legislation is prejudicial to the rights of believers and that the USSR does not observe those minimal freedoms granted to believers by the Constitution, strikes the regime in a place where it is especially vulnerable [10]; (3) The committee, whose members are Russian patriots serves as a symbolic link between the Russian national movement and the active remnants of the "democratic movement." At a Columbia University colloquium on ethnic Russia held in May 1978, Mikhail Meerson-Aksenov, a former *demokrat*, spoke of the gradual "Christianization" of the ranks of the democratic movement which is currently taking place.[11] Nationalist dissenters and "democrats," who

[8] *Volnoe slovo*, 28, pp. 33–7.

[9] *Documents of the Christian Committee*, vol. 1, p. 36.

[10] For the RSFSR legislation on religious "cults," as amended in 1975, see "Religious Persecution in the Soviet Union," *Hearings Before the Sub-committee on International Political and Military Affairs and on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives*, 24 and 30 June 1976 (US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1976), pp. 69–75.

[11] The proceedings of the 5–6 May 1978 Columbia University Colloquium on Ethnic Russia Today are due shortly to be published by Pergamon Press (New York and Oxford). The tentative title of the volume is: *Ethnic Russia Today: The Dilemma of the Dominant Group*. To support Meerson-Aksenov's statement about a growing *rapprochement* between "democrats" and Russian nationalists, one could cite imprisoned dissenter Sergei Soldatov's "12 printsipov russkogo dela: pismo k russkim patriotam," AS 3256. In this open letter, which is dated March, 1978, Soldatov describes himself as a "*veruyushchii demokrat i russkii chelovek*" ([religious] believer, democrat and a Russian). On Soldatov, see Peter Reddaway, "The Case of the Baltic Fleet Officers" in *Uncensored Russia* (American Heritage, New York, 1972). *The New York Times* has reported that the Christian Committee was formed at the suggestion of Professor Yurii Orlov of the Moscow-based Helsinki monitoring committee. (*The New York Times*, 19 May 1978.)

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once were quite distrustful of one another, are now moving closer together; (4) Through the Christian Committee, Russian patriots have established friendly ties with patriots representing the minority nationalities (Georgians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians).

Equally unpleasant to the regime have been the activities and *samizdat* writings of the intrepid Orthodox priest Dimitrii Dudko, whose views are known to many in Russia through the foreign radio.[12] Fr Dimitrii earned the ire of the authorities in late 1973 when he decided to give the sermons which he preached every Saturday night the character of a dialogue with the faithful. In the words of one commentator, Fr Dudko

> suggested that questions be submitted to him in writing, so that answers might be given in the following sermon. Soon, however, he also began to answer direct questions presented by members of the congregation. Inevitably the questions touched upon anti-religious propaganda, upon repression of religion, upon government control of the church. Fr Dudko did not ask for such provocative questions, but he did not avoid them either. . . . The character and content of the sermons was so unusual that the small church of St Nicholas [in Moscow] was soon full beyond capacity on Saturday night. Young people, intellectuals, believers and non-believers—and also foreign journalists—flocked to hear Fr Dimitrii.[13]

Since that time Fr Dudko has been transferred several times to parishes located outside Moscow, an attempt seems to have been made on his life,[14] and in April 1977 he was savagely attacked in *Literaturnaya gazeta*, a possible prelude to the pressing of criminal charges against him.[15] In his Easter sermon for 1977, which had an understandably militant and exalted tone, he advocated a spiritual war for Russia's "liberation from captivity" and signed his text: "Fr Dimitrii Dudko, Soldier of the Russian Army."[16] He is known to have strong sympathy for Russian nationalist causes.

[12] Three volumes of Fr Dudko's writings and conversations with believers have been published in the West: *O nashem upovanii: besedy* (YMCA-Press, Paris, 1975), *Veryu, Gospodi!* ("Zarya," London, Ontario, 1976), and *Voskresnye sobesedovaniya* (Izd. Bratstva prep. Iova Pochaevskogo, Montreal, 1977). Those interested in the reasons for the current religious revival in Russia would be well advised to consult two recent writings of Fr Dudko: "Kreshchenie na Rusi (Iz dnevnika svyashchennika)," *Vestnik RKhD*, 117 (1976), and "Pokayanie na Rusi: Iz dnevnika svyashchennika," *Vestnik RKhD*, 119 (1976), pp. 254–80. For a collection of Fr Dudko's most recent writings, see *Volnoe slovo*, 33 (1979). On Fr Dimitrii, see Anatolii Levitin-Krasnov, "Otets Dimitrii Dudko," *Posev*, 1 (1975), p. 26–36.

[13] Fr John Meyendorff, "Foreword" to Fr Dimitrii Dudko, *Our Hope* (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, Crestwood, N.Y., 1977), p. 9. This volume is a translation of *O nashem upovanii*.

[14] The apparent attempt on Fr Dudko's life occurred on 9 April 1975. See the account in *Russkaya mysl*, 29 Jan. 1976, p. 6.

[15] In early 1977, *Literaturnaya gazeta* featured an attack on Fr Dudko, Fr Yakunin, and Orthodox lay activists Aleksandr Ogorodnikov and Lev Regelson. See Boris Roshchin, "Svoboda religii i klevetniki," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 13 Apr. 1977, p. 14 and 20 Apr. 1977, p. 14. An English translation, entitled *Religious Freedom and Slanderers*, is available from Washington Street Research Center in San Francisco. It is accompanied by a statement from recent émigré Anatolii Levitin-Krasnov.

[16] "Paskhalnoe privetstvie o. Dimitriya Dudko," *Russkaya mysl*, 5 May 1977, p. 2.

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THE final nationalist strand outside the system which I shall discuss is composed of the members of the religio-philosophical *kruzhki* (circles) and seminars (or study groups) which have sprung up like mushrooms in recent years in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and, it seems, in other cities as well. In October 1974 an important religio-philosophical seminar was founded in Moscow under the leadership of Aleksandr Ogorodnikov (b. 1950).[17] These seminars seem to have combined religious and national themes—I have spoken with a European graduate student who came to know both Ogorodnikov and his work——and it is significant that *Literaturnaya gazeta* in its attack on Ogorodnikov accused him of being a monarchist.

Through unremitting persecution—three active participants in the group were incarcerated in prison mental hospitals and Ogorodnikov was sentenced in January 1979 to a year in camp—the authorities have succeeded in putting a stop to the open meetings of the seminar. Rather than cease operation, however, the seminar has gone underground. According to Mark Popovsky, a late 1977 émigré, leaders of the seminar have made "missionary journeys" to numerous areas in the Soviet Union, and Christian seminars have been held in the cities of Leningrad, Kazan, Ufa, Smolensk, Grodno, Lvov and Odessa. Like the Christian Committee, the Moscow seminar seems to have adopted the opening of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra as a short-term tactical goal.[18]

In the autumn of 1975, a similar religious seminar was formed in Leningrad.[19] In this case, too, religious and national interests appear to have been combined. (One of its participants emigrated to America,

[17] On the Moscow seminar, see the collection of documents in *Vestnik RKhD*, 119 (1976), pp. 281–334. See also Mark Popovsky, "SSSR: Khristianstvo molodeet" (bulletin of 20 June 1977) in "Iyunskie novosti (Zapiski neakkreditovannogo)," *Volnoe slovo*, 29 (1978), pp. 53–5, and "Deklaratsiya printsipov seminara," *Russkoe vozrozhdenie*, 2 (1978).

[18] In a letter to Brezhnev, dated 10 Nov. 1977, Ogorodnikov and two friends write: "We, the Orthodox youth of Russia . . . address the Supreme Soviet with these words: return to the Russian Church the hearth (*ochag*) of Russian sanctity—the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra. . . . Destroyed several times by the Tatars in 1240, 1299 and 1316 and lovingly restored by the people, it was turned into an anti-religious museum in 1961. The closing of the Lavra is a coarse insult to the religious feelings of believers and a trampling under foot of the national dignity of every Russian . . ." (*Documents of the Christian Committee*, vol. 1, p. 46). It will be noted that religious and national *motifs* are combined in this letter which is militant in tone. On Ogorodnikov's trial in Jan. 1979, see *Documents of the Christian Committee*, vol. 9 (1979), pp. 975–982. On the seminar's intention to carry on with its work, see *Posev*, 4 (1979), pp. 6–7.

[19] On the Leningrad seminar, see E. Giryaev, "Religiozno-filosofskii seminar v Leningrade," *Vestnik RKhD*, 123 (1977), N. Giryaev, "Obzor materialov opublikovannykh v samizdatovskom zhurnale '37'," *Vestnik RKhD*, 121 (1977), and "Kulturnoe-dukhovnoe dvizhenie v Leningrade," *Posev*, 3 (1977). Two leading participants in the seminar, Igor Sinyavin and Petr Boldyrev, have emigrated to the United States. See their statement on the nationalities question: *Nationalities Problems in the USSR*, available in both Russian and English from Americans to Free Captive Nations, Inc. (New York). The authors, both of whom are Russian patriots, advocate the disbanding of the Russian empire and the granting of full independence to all non-Russian peoples of the USSR. See also Boldyrev's monarchistic treatises "Demokratiya ili monarkhiya" and "Khristianskii smysl monarkhicheskoi idei" in *Nasha strana*, 21 Dec. 1976 and 28 Dec. 1976.

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where he has emerged as a monarchist theoretician.) Evgenii Vagin, who collected data on religious groups of this type before emigrating in the summer of 1976, has made some helpful generalizations about their structure.[20] The pattern for the emergence of these seminars, he reports, has been roughly the following: first, circles of close friends who have usually attended school together begin to meet for free-wheeling discussions. Out of these small *kruzhki* study groups devoted to concrete problems then begin to "crystallize." Vagin stresses that the seminars are by no means exclusively religious in their orientation. In April 1976, for example, a number of youth circles marked the 90th anniversary of the birth of the Acmeist poet Nikolai Gumilev, who was executed by the Bolsheviks for allegedly participating in an anti-revolutionary conspiracy; Gumilev's poems were read, his life was discussed, and the implications of both for Russia's future were examined. Almost half of the members of the circles and seminars, according to Vagin, belong to the technical intelligentsia, though many of the participants have repudiated the comfortable life to which their education would entitle them and have chosen to work at menial occupations (as night watchmen, etc.). While some of the active participants in these groups eventually decide to devote themselves full-time to service to the Church, others, Vagin reports, "begin to interest themselves more deeply in social and political problems. The experience acquired in such circles could serve as the seeds of future political organizations."

To conclude this first section, I should like to cite a statement made by Solzhenitsyn in 1976. Religion, he said, is the "organizing pivot" of intellectual ferment in today's USSR.[21]

THE second major category of Russian nationalists consists of those both willing and able to work within the system. Virtually all the adherents of this ideological cluster may be described as conservative nationalists, but they are in no sense a monolithic or monochromatic group. In my opinion, the conservative nationalists are already so strong that when the present ruling gerontocracy leaves the scene, they may well be in the driving seat. To support this perhaps controversial claim, one could refer to the opinions of two attentive and informed observers of the Soviet scene who could hardly be accused of sympathy for the nationalist cause—Lev Kopelev and Roy Medvedev.

20 "Intervyu E. A. Vagina . . . ," *Posev*, 10 (1976), pp. 52–9.

21 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "O rabote russkoi sektsii Bi-Bi-Si," *Kontinent*, 9 (1976), p. 218. Before concluding this section on the dissenting nationalists, I should point out that the growth of the Russian national movement in the Soviet Union has prompted Russians in the emigration to form several new organizations and to launch new publications. Thus a religio-patriotic organization, The Preparatory Committee for the One Thousandth Anniversary of the Baptism of Russia, was formed in the United States in 1977. This committee hosts an annual conference and publishes the journal *Russkoe vozrozhdenie*. A similar organization, The Russian National Union (*Rossiiskoe natsional-noe obedinenie*), has been formed in Europe. See the report "Novaya russkaya organizatsiya za rubezhom" in *Russkaya mysl*, 16 Mar. 1978, p. 12. A cross-fertilization of nationalists at home and in the emigration seems increasingly to be occurring.

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In his emotional and occasionally shrill rebuttal to Solzhenitsyn's *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* Kopelev writes:

> The heralds of Great-Russian superstate chauvinism operate unhindered in many publishing houses (*Molodaya gvardiya, Sovetskaya Rossiya*, the regional publishing houses of Rostov, Krasnodar et al.), on the editorial staff of the daily newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, the magazines *Ogonek, Molodaya gvardiya, Moskva, Neva, Don, Volga*, and many other publications; they head the "Society for the Preservation of Monuments," which has become in essence a legal association of new Black Hundreds; and they occupy posts in the most varied ideological institutions. Writers and scientists who openly call themselves admirers of the Romanov dynasty . . . publish books, poems and articles hardly disguising their ideas, which are unconditionally hostile to any version of Marxism. . . . At the same time, any attempt to concern oneself seriously with the problems of Marxism . . . provokes the harshest methods of repression. . . .[22]

And the neo-Marxist activist Roy Medvedev gives a warning in a book published in 1972:

> Some of the Russites and 'neo-Slavophiles' make use of Marxist terminology in their arguments, but others reject it as 'foreign ideology.' In print, of course, they express themselves cautiously, but at gatherings in the privacy of their homes these Russites openly declare that 'the October Revolution was a mistake,' that in the first years of the Revolution Lenin destroyed the 'ancient foundations of Russian life' and began the work of destroying the villages, the Russian church etc. . . . The majority of the Russites look backward, seeking what they feel to be of value in our culture mainly in the pre-revolutionary past, in the deeds and actions of the Russian tsars and Russian Orthodox Church, and in the Russian village.[23]

He continues:

> The Russian nationalists have up to now been openly supported in such influential bodies as the Political Department of the army and the Central Committee of the Komsomol, where their ideas are used for the purpose of 'patriotic education.' . . . The crudest forms of nationalist preaching by the Russites have been condemned by the Party press, and even in a special resolution of the Politburo. However, in other more veiled forms, the Russite movement continues to develop and receive highly influential support.[24]

Kopelev's and Medvedev's anxieties are not unfounded. The conservative nationalists are indeed highly visible and influential. It is also significant that the leading school of contemporary Soviet letters—the so-called

[22] Lev Z. Kopelev, "A Lie Is Conquered Only by Truth" in Roy A. Medvedev, ed., *The Samizdat Register*, (W. W. Norton, New York, 1977), p. 225.

[23] Roy A. Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy* (Knopf, New York, 1975), pp. 88–9.

[24] Ibid. p. 90.

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derevenshchik or " ruralist " school—shares many attitudes with Russian nationalism.[25] Since the ousting of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, there have been a number of skirmishes—which have been at least as heated as those between " liberals " and " hard-liners " during the Khrushchev period—between nationalists and those purporting to be true Marxist-Leninists. In these exchanges the nationalists have been bloodied no more than their opponents.

WE commence our examination of the conservatives by focusing upon what might be termed the " moderate right." The name of Vladimir Soloukhin (b. 1924), who has been in the nationalist trenches for 20 years, should be familiar to many. His *Vladimir Back Roads* (*Vladimirskie proselki*), which first appeared in 1957, served as an important catalyst for the national movement.[26] Soloukhin's writings have awakened a sense of the past and inspired a sense of commitment to the religio-cultural heritage of Russia among his countrymen. He was one of those who pushed very hard for the founding of the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments in the mid-1960s, and many of his works seek to dramatize the society's concerns.

Like other representatives of the moderate right, Soloukhin is often regarded with distrust by *neo-zapadniki* (neo-Westernizers) in the USSR and by émigrés of the so-called " third wave." Western commentators who rely on *neo-zapadniki* for their information understandably share such suspicions. Rumours abound to the effect that Soloukhin is an adroit KGB agent, that he served in SMERSH during the war, that he wears a ring with a portrait of Nicholas II. In the Soviet press he has frequently been attacked for deviations from Marxist orthodoxy. A notorious neo-Stalinist publicist, Vsevolod Kochetov, devoted more than a few pages of his 1969 novel *What Do You Finally Want?* to a transparent attack on Soloukhin, whom he portrayed as the character Savelii Bogoroditskii (from *bogoroditsa*—Mother of God), author of the narrative poem " On the pilgrimage " (" *Na bogomole* ").[27] Kochetov's Bogoroditskii bemoans the destruction of Russian churches and treasures a small snuff-box with a portrait of Empress Catherine II on it. He explains his membership in the Communist Party thus: " I entered it right after the war. Now, perhaps, I might not have done it. But at that time . . . there was the enthusiasm of victory." Asked by a certain Miss Brown—the action of the novel takes place abroad—why he does not resign from the Party, Bogoroditskii replies that there is no need to:

[25] See the papers devoted to this topic which were delivered at the May 5–6 1978 Columbia University Colloquium on Ethnic Russia Today. For a reference to a forthcoming volume which will contain the colloquium's proceedings, see footnote 11. See also Solzhenitsyn's recent effusive comments on the *derevenshchiki* in *The Listener*, 15 Feb. 1979, p. 241.

[26] " Vladimirskie proselki " in Vladimir Soloukhin, *Izbrannye Proizvedeniya*, vol. I (" Khudozhestvennaya Literatura," Moscow, 1974), pp. 13–245.

[27] Vsevolod Kochetov, " Chego zhe ty khochesh? " in *Oktyabr*, Nos. 9, 10, 11 (1969).

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" I don't go to [Party] meetings. It doesn't matter; they put up with it. I express myself rather freely—they squirm but bear it. Now things have become much freer. Not like it was 10 or 15 years ago. Then such a snuff-box [i.e. with the portrait of Catherine II] would have been unthinkable! " " Would they have sent you to Siberia? " Miss Brown inquires with interest. " No," Bogoroditskii responds, " but they would have asked me to leave the Party." When one of his Russian interlocutors describes himself as a " *sovetskii chelovek* " (Soviet man), Bogoroditskii makes an exasperated gesture and exclaims: " O.K., let's admit you're Soviet. Although no such nation exists on earth. But you are not Soviet by birth, and not by blood, but by circumstance. You were born in a Soviet country, so you happen to be Soviet. . . . But, my dear, national affiliation is higher than state structures. . . ."

Kochetov's feelings about what should be done with arch-heretics like Savelii Bogoroditskii are not hard to divine. But it is Kochetov who now lies buried in Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow, while Soloukhin—a Christian and member of the Communist Party—survives and prospers.

A second moderate nationalist who might be discussed is the painter Ilya Glazunov (b. 1930), another major cultural figure who, like Soloukhin, is frequently rumoured by *neo-zapadniki* to be a KGB agent.[28] At the same time, he is often taken to task by Marxist-Leninist purists in the USSR for deviations from the canons of Socialist Realism. His month-long exhibition at the Manege in Moscow drew over half a million visitors and was unquestionably *the* Russian cultural event of 1978. The exhibition which featured such controversial canvasses as the ten-by-six foot " Return of the Prodigal Son," based of course on a Biblical parable, openly preached the painter's religio-patriotic convictions. A photocopy of the visitors' comment book has reached the West; this unusual document, which contains several thousand statements, testifies to the immense interest aroused by the Glazunov exhibition. The one painting Glazunov was not permitted to show was his controversial " Mystery of the Twentieth Century," which, among others, depicts Christ, the Emperor Nicholas II, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn in prison garb.[29]

[28] On Glazunov, see the painter's autobiography, " Doroga k tebe: iz zapisok khudozhnika," *Molodaya gvardiya*, 10 (1965) and 12 (1965). See also the 82 pp. collection *Russkaya ideya ili KGB? Kto—Glazunov?*, issued by the émigré journal *Chasovoi* in 1977. The booklet includes Osipov's article " Russkii khudozhnik Ilya Glazunov," which first appeared in *Veche* No. 8 (AS 1665). Attacks on Glazunov, signed by A. Esenin-Volpin, S. Kudirka, A. Galich, V. Maksimov, V. Nekrasov and others, appeared in the émigré daily *Novoe russkoe slovo* on 1 July 1976 and 9 Jan. 1977. A defence of the painter, written by nationalist activist Anatolii Ivanov (Skuratov), has been circulating in American *samizdat*, along with statements in his behalf by recent émigrés Nikolai Tetenov, Iosif Gurvich and others.

[29] On the Manège exhibition in 1978, see Craig Whitney, " Unbridled Artist Proves Popular at Soviet Show," *The New York Times*, 18 June 1978. Excerpts from the exhibition comment book have been published in *Publitsisticheskaya tetrad* (West Germany) Nos. 5 and 6 (1978). For reactions to the exhibition see Fr Dimitrii Dudko, " O vystavke khudozhnika Ili Glazunova," *Russkaya mysl*, 24 Aug. 1978, Boris Mikhailov, " Na vystavke Ili Glazunova," *Vestnik RKhD*, 107 (1978), Leonid Borodin, " Po povodu vystavki I. Glazunova," *Russkoe vozrozhdenie*, 5 (1979) and Oleg Volkov,

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Even more than Soloukhin, Glazunov has involved himself in the frenetic struggle to save Russia's churches and historical monuments from nihilistic destruction. An article written on him for *Veche* by Vladimir Osipov chronicles Glazunov's unstinting participation in the battle. Under Khrushchev, Osipov reports, Glazunov and his friends made an attempt to interest the volatile Soviet leader in the formation of a society for the preservation of monuments, but Khrushchev impatiently cut short the reading of the appeal, putting an end to the matter. Undaunted, Glazunov thereupon proceeded to found a section for the preservation of monuments under the umbrella of the Committee for the Defence of Peace. Devoting himself almost full-time to this goal for a period of two years, Glazunov finally saw his efforts rewarded in the mid-1960s when the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments came into existence. These labours were followed by bureaucratic battles in the early 1970s to save Moscow's architecture from the "anti-national policies" of the Architecture and Planning Commission of the City of Moscow.

As Lev Kopelev has suggested, the Society for the Preservation of Monuments is a hotbed of nationalist sentiment, most of it, I suspect, of the "moderate right" variety. One year after its formation in 1965 this voluntary society numbered 1,000,000 participants; by 1972 it had grown to 7,000,000, and as of the summer of 1977 it numbered 12,500,000 active members.[30] In their struggle to ward off the bulldozers, the society's participants have at times become quite militant—see, for example, writer Leonid Leonov's letter in the *Literaturnaya gazeta* of 30 October 1965 which castigates the "uprooting" of monuments and "liquidation" of Russian antiquity—and a formidable *esprit de corps* has developed. The society has been permitted to publish collections of speeches and booklets promoting its concerns. When the author of one of these booklets, S. Semanov, a historian who had written on a Novgorod monument, was accused of ideological impurity in the pages of the anti-religious monthly *Nauka i religiya*, he replied, in 1974, with a blast in the pages of the journal *Moskva*.[31] To support his position, Semanov

"Ya uvidel Rossiyu," *Nash sovremennik*, 3 (1979). There is a detailed review of the exhibition in *Pravda*, 15 June 1978. On Glazunov's 10-by-20 foot painting "Mystery of the Twentieth Century," see S. Frederick Starr, "Soviet Painter Poses a Question," *The Smithsonian*, Dec. 1977. Starr's generally excellent piece is marred by a controversial contention that "Glazunov leaves us in no doubt as to his positive view of Stalin." I would interpret Glazunov's depiction of the despot differently. For a sharply polemical attack on Glazunov and his paintings see Igor Golomshtock, "Fenomen Glazunova," *Sintaksis*, 4 (1979).

[30] Membership as of the summer of 1977. The figure was quoted to Dr Arcadi Nebolsine, formerly of the University of Pittsburgh, when he visited leaders of the society in Moscow at that time.

[31] The exchange began with the appearance of Aleksandr Shamaro's "Razdumya nad knigoi," *Nauka i religiya*, 6 (1973), which was followed by S. Semanov's "Moskva stroilas ne srazu," *Moskva*, 7 (1974) and Shamaro's reply, "Eshche raz o pamyatnikakh otechestva," *Nauka i religiya*, 7 (1975). Semanov is of a National Bolshevik and not "moderate right" orientation. See his recent collection of essays *Serdtse rodiny* ("Moskovskii rabochii," Moscow, 1977).

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referred to a speech delivered in the summer of 1972 by V. I. Kochemasov, chairman of the society's central committee *and* Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. In this speech Kochemasov referred to the " incorrect attitude toward the preservation of monuments " which had manifested itself " in certain places " in the early 1960s. After recalling the " battles " and " many arguments " which characterized the society's formative period, Semanov states, " Now the Society for the Preservation of Monuments has entered firmly into the structure of our civic life." The words of his *Nauka i religiya* opponent, A. Shamaro, remind him of the " times gone forever " of Leopold Averbakh and RAPP, of the anti-Russian " nihilists " of the 1920s and 1930s.

The moderate right has so far largely engaged in defensive activities intended to preserve Russia's culture and past from oblivion. Many of its adherents are religious, while few seem to be hostile to religion. Though in no sense admirers of Marxism-Leninism, the adherents of this strand are willing to make the necessary tactical concessions. Thus, Lenin is metamorphosed into a patron saint of the Society for the Preservation of Monuments. " They say," Soloukhin wrote in a book published in 1965, " that practically in the first year of Soviet power Vladimir Ilyich Lenin noticed a broken window in a church while strolling about the Kremlin . . . Vladimir Ilyich immediately reprimanded the head of the museum division, saying that the task of preserving monuments in the Kremlin must be properly carried out. . . ." [32]

While the moderate right exhibits little sympathy for the words and causes of the *neo-zapadniki* and while many of its number would apparently rather be shot dead than emigrate, the strand as a whole does not seem to be especially xenophobic. Its members seem to respect the cultures and uniqueness of all nations. In foreign policy moderate rightists would probably be quasi-isolationist and be willing to withdraw from Eastern Europe. Soloukhin appears to be something of a pan-Slav who would probably favour some kind of common market among the Slavic nations, rather than the economic domination presently practised by the Soviet Union.

FURTHER to the right, we encounter the school or tendency usually referred to as National Bolshevism. Its adherents are often attacked by liberal and centrist nationalists for their apparent attempts to foster Russian patriotism without a Christian foundation. In *From Under the Rubble* Solzhenitsyn offers a summary of the views of this tendency:

> The Russian people is the noblest in the world; its ancient and its modern history are alike unblemished; tsarism and Bolshevism are equally irreproachable; the nation neither erred nor sinned either before 1917 or after . . . there are no nationality problems in relations

[32] Vladimir Soloukhin, *S liricheskikh pozitsii* (" Sovetskii Pisatel," Moscow, 1965), p. 164.

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> with the border republics . . . Communism is in fact unthinkable without patriotism; the prospects of Russia-USSR are brilliant; blood alone determines whether one is Russian or non-Russian. As for things spiritual, all trends are admissible. Orthodoxy is not the least more Russian than Marxism, atheism, the scientific outlook, or, shall we say, Hinduism.[33]

In an interview in 1976 Evgenii Vagin made these comments on National Bolshevism:

> For a time its representatives were grouped around the journal *Molodaya gvardiya* and the publishing house 'Sovremennik.' Echoes of this tendency could be heard in the first, not very successful issues of the journal *Veche* . . . the representatives of National Bolshevism have drawn, it seems to me, an incorrect conclusion from Berdyaev's mistaken thesis concerning Communism as a manifestation of the Russian spirit. The National Bolsheviks are original revisionists. One could say that they want not socialism with a human face but Communism with a national face.[34]

Because of its "absolute atheism," National Bolshevism cannot, Vagin feels, extract Russia from the crisis in which she now finds herself.

One wonders whether either Solzhenitsyn or Vagin has correctly discerned the boundaries separating National Bolsheviks and adherents of the "national and religious renaissance." I would not agree, for example, that the journals *Molodaya gvardiya* or *Nash sovremennik* are characterized by "absolute atheism." And both commentators seem to miss Aesopian references in the writings of some of those they term National Bolsheviks. But it is instructive that, while both Solzhenitsyn and Vagin are sharply critical of this tendency, they are less hostile towards it than towards the "patriotism" promoted by the regime; both appear to feel that there is some hope for the National Bolsheviks, that they can be enlightened. Were this current to assume power in Soviet Russia, one hesitates to assert that there would be dramatic improvements on the home front. While the National Bolsheviks would probably ease the persecution of religion, they might also exacerbate relations with the minority nationalities.

It might seem that we have extended our coverage fairly far to the right, yet there remain two more strands to be distinguished. The first is what Vagin calls "semi-official russophilism" (*ofitsioznyi rusofilizm*), which he characterizes as a cynical and manipulative attitude towards Russian nationalism exhibited by those close to the centre of power.[35] This current sees the words "Russian" and "Soviet" as interchangeable and has no intention of renouncing the "internationalist essence" of the politics of the present leadership. It maintains a purely "souvenir"

[33] A. Solzhenitsyn, "Repentence and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations" in *From Under the Rubble*, pp. 119–20.

[34] Vagin, "Litsom k Rossii . . . ," p. 58.

[35] Ibid. p. 57.

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attitude towards Russia's past. Here, too, one wonders whether Vagin's schema is nuanced and subtle enough. When, for example, Brezhnev reportedly intervened to permit the showing of Vasilii Shukshin's film *Kalina krasnaya* in 1974—a film which proceeded to take the country by storm—he put his *imprimatur* on a picture with religious overtones and considerably more than a "souvenir" attitude towards Russia's past.[36]

FINALLY, we arrive at the extreme right, a current which may accurately be described as neo-National Socialism or neo-Nazism. Furthermore, this is by no means a marginal phenomenon. Three examples of this tendency will suffice. In 1965 Valerii Skurlatov, a leading official of the Moscow Komsomol, is reported to have distributed "Rules for Morality" among activists of the Moscow City Committee and Komsomol Central Committee, calling for "the introduction of laws to preserve racial purity and prohibiting interracial marriages."[37] He also demanded "an intensification of 'heroic-military-patriotic education' with the aid of corporal punishment, barrack drill in school, and the suppression of any kind of 'debilitating intellectualism.'" Discussing this tendency, Roy Medvedev refers to its "racist programme which speaks of the 'Russian race,' the 'voice of the blood,' the 'cosmic mission of the people,' the 'duty to the ancestors' and calls for the 'sterilization of women who give themselves to foreigners.'"[38] The racist rage of this tendency can be partially explained by demographic factors (the exploding population of the Asiatic republics and the dwindling birth rate in the Slavic republics), political factors (the possibility of all-out war with the "yellow peril," China), and the existence of a virulent form of anti-semitism (Jews are seen collectively as a debilitating "cosmopolitan" parasite which fastens itself upon a nation and sucks up its vital juices until the nation dies).

Another example of this strand would be the book *Caution Zionism!*, written by a researcher for the Communist Party Central Committee, which appeared in 1969.[39] Masking his neo-Nazi argumentation in Marxist rhetoric, the author, Yurii Ivanov, saw the Jews as an almost cosmic power of evil bent upon Russia's destruction.

Finally, one might cite an open letter written to the *samizdat* journal *Veche* in 1974.[40] Although the author of the letter identified himself

[36] See the account in Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (Quadrangle, New York, 1976), pp. 381–3. On Shukshin, see Donald M. Fiene, ed., *Shukshin: Snowball Berry Red and Other Stories* (Ardis, Ann Arbor, 1979), and my review article "The Search for Peace," *The Times Literary Supplement*, 30 June 1978.

[37] Kopelev, p. 225.

[38] Medvedev, p. 88.

[39] On this work, see Mikhail Agursky, "Selling Anti-Semitism in Moscow," *The New York Review of Books*, 16 Nov. 1972.

[40] "Kriticheskie zametki russkogo cheloveka o patrioticheskom zhurnale 'Veche'." Published in *Novyi zhurnal*, 118 (1975), preceded by Mikhail Agursky's introduction "Neonatsistskaya opasnost v Sovetskom Soyuze." Both articles are available in English translation in Meerson-Aksenov and Shragin, pp. 414–19 and 438–48. The recently published study *Vtorzhenie bez oruzhiya* (Invasion Without Arms), a sharp and ostensibly

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merely as "a Russian man," his self-assurance and sense of authority betrayed him as one who moved in high circles. Evaluating *Veche's* pluses and minuses as "fifty-fifty" (he used the English term), he counselled the journal to jettison any hankering after tsarist-style autocracy and, above all, to cease its interest in Orthodox Christianity, which he saw as a "cosmopolitan" religion seeking to abolish all distinctions between nations, a form of Judaism for *goys*. A renewal of the cult of pagan Slavic gods is seriously suggested as an outlet for religious impulses. "If you throw off the Bolsheviks," the author predicts, "the Zionists and only the Zionists will come to power."

Neo-National-Socialist elements of this type are observable in the Komsomol, the armed forces, the KGB, and surely must exist in the higher echelons of the Party as well. Mikhail Agursky, a new émigré who now teaches at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, was closely acquainted with a number of Russian nationalists before leaving the Soviet Union and has done valuable research into Soviet neo-Nazism. While I believe that Agursky has a tendency to exaggerate the strength of this strand, I subscribe completely to the views which he aired in the journal *Midstream*:

> . . . religious nationalism is the chief opponent of racism among the Russian people because the liberal democratic movement does not have much of a future . . . [The Solzhenitsyn-Shafarevich group] has proposed the most humanistic and realistic alternative to Russian neo-Nazism. Unfortunately, many western observers have unwittingly interpreted Solzhenitsyn's programme as tantamount to extreme Russian nationalism. This is a grave error . . . Russian religious nationalism, the natural counter-balance to neo-Nazism, must have broad international support. . . .[41]

THIS completes my necessarily sketchy survey of the "faces" of contemporary Russian nationalism. I shall now attempt to answer a question which must inevitably spring to mind: how strong are the nationalists? They clearly are not yet in control, but they are already such a force that they cannot be attacked in the Soviet Union without fear of severe reprisal. When, for example, *Novyi mir* launched a campaign against *Molodaya gvardiya* in 1969, it received a stiff counter-blow (which Solzhenitsyn called a "*dvukhmillionyi zalp*," salvo of two million)

scholarly attack on world Zionism, could be considered another instance of this tendency. Though the book's author, V. Begun, is apparently of Jewish origin and his approach purports to be "orthodox" Marxist-Leninist, the volume's publication by "Molodaya gvardiya"—organ of the Komsomol, a hotbed of nationalist sentiment—in a mass edition of 150,000 copies could be seen in a sinister light, i.e. nationalists are expected to draw their own conclusions from Begun's exposure of world Zionism. On this and similar recent Soviet books, see Herbert Mitgang, "Soviet Books Found Full of Anti-Semitism," *The New York Times*, 25 May 1978.

[41] Mikhail Agursky, "Russian Neo-Nazism—A Growing Threat," *Midstream*, February (1976).

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from *Ogonek*.[42] Similarly, when A. Yakovlev, acting head of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, decided to expose the ideological heresies of the nationalists in the early 1970s, he had to wait nearly a year to get his piece published in *Literaturnaya gazeta*. When it finally appeared in November 1972, he was removed from his post and "exiled" to Canada as ambassador.[43] The tone of those who attack nationalist writings—even when the targets are obviously incompatible with the most liberal readings of Leninism—is inevitably defensive. Dementev, the author of the 1969 *Novyi mir* piece, for instance, pleads that he be "understood correctly"; he does not seek to justify the "destruction of our monasteries and churches," and he is fully aware of the "significance of the preservation and restoration of monuments of antiquity." He also goes out of his way to stress his opposition to the "vulgar sociological approach to problems of culture" which at one time resulted in the banning of Dostoevsky's books. As for the nationalists, one of their commonest and most effective arguments is to recall Stalin's fateful discovery during the Second World War that "Soviet patriotism" is insufficient: it was Russian patriotism that played a key role in repelling the German invaders. It is suggested, furthermore, that this will be equally important in any future confrontation with China.

The nationalists, of course, have also had their problems. *Molodaya gvardiya* was "purged" in late 1970, though it is interesting that the most blatant of the journal's offenders, Viktor Chalmaev, the author of articles for which he would, in Solzhenitsyn's words, "have immediately been shoved into a GPU prison and shot" in the 1920s and 1930s, escaped with minor reprimands.[44] The ruling gerontocracy's strategy (if strategy is the word here) seems to be to keep both Marxist-Leninist purists and nationalists from gaining a decisive upper hand, though the influence of the latter is clearly growing. That the successors of the present leadership will be able or even willing to continue this balancing act is highly problematical.

[42] See A. Dementev, "O traditsiyakh i narodnosti," *Novyi mir*, 4 (1969), and "Protiv chego vystupaet 'Novyi mir'?" *Ogonek*, 30 (1969). Solzhenitsyn's comments on the episode appeared in his literary memoirs *Bodalsya telenok s dubom* (YMCA-Press, Paris, 1975), pp. 266-275.

[43] A. Yakovlev, "Protiv antiistorizma," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 15 Nov. 1972, pp. 4–5. On the removal of Yakovlev, see Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union," *Dissent*, Spring (1976), p. 149.

[44] Solzhenitsyn, *Bodalsya*, p. 269. On Chalmaev and his writings, see the materials in the "unofficial" neo-Marxist journal *Politicheskii dnevnik* (Herzen Foundation, Amsterdam, 1972 & 1975), vol. I, pp. 494–509 and vol. II, pp. 426–8 & 453–6. Chalmaev has been permitted to continue publishing in Soviet journals. See, for example, his piece "Vozvrashchenie k muzyke" in *Sever*, 8 (1976).

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The Russian Nationalist Backlash

S. Enders Wimbush

CONTEMPORARY Great-Russian nationalism in the USSR is the result of complex and varied stimuli, ranging from incidents of personal soul-searching which are often incomprehensible and difficult to analyse, to more collective efforts at national revaluation and spiritual renaissance, and to outright external threats to the viability of the Russian nation. I have written elsewhere about this spectrum of stimuli and Russian responses to them.[1] In this short article, I shall concentrate on one part of this spectrum, on current Russian responses to actual and perceived threats and provocations by Soviet non-Russians. For the most part, I believe, these threats and provocations are the result of the unique political, ideological, and economic conditions in the Soviet Union and that the Russian response to them—characterized by a new self-awareness and self-assertiveness—should not be seen simply as the resurgence of an historical, unchanging, and unalterable Russian nationalism. Rather, contemporary Russian nationalism is in many respects *sui generis*, although it would be wrong-headed—indeed, foolish—to deny that today's Russian nationalism lacks historical content.

The dilemma of the Russians today is that they constitute the dominant nationality in a nominally Marxist-Leninist multinational state. It is ironic, perhaps, that many Russians see their ethnic dominance as something of a political, cultural, and social liability, that is, that they are forced to pay significant costs for their dominance. These costs are thought to be especially oppressive in those sensitive areas which dominance has traditionally guaranteed: the right to express one's national identity and the right to national autonomy. Many Russians believe that the occasional state support for Russian national prerogatives is not sufficient payment for the sacrifices they are expected to make for state development, above all for the assistance—both material and spiritual—they feel they have given to inferior cultures.

I offer no apologia for past or present Russian rule of the vast empire. The arrogance and violence of that rule have been chronicled all too fully, leaving would-be apologists no brief nor any room to manoeuvre. Rather, I seek to cast the nationalities net slightly wider, to include the Great-Russians. Russians, too, are an ethnic group with certain expectations of the Soviet state. Like the Uzbeks, the Latvians, or the Bashkirs, the Russians have a "nationality problem," inasmuch as the state

[1] S. Enders Wimbush, "Great Russians and the Soviet State: The Dilemmas of Ethnic Dominance," in Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1978).

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cannot meet their expectations either in the context of its official ideology or through its existing institutions. The "nationality problem" is not exclusively one of centre versus periphery. Russians are also part of the periphery: they too are concerned about the right to express their national identity, about the homogenization of their culture, about their diminishing human and material resources, and about the willingness of the regime to treat them as equals. To see Russian nationalism as something apart from the mainstream of nationality issues, rather than as an integral part of a larger question, is to see only half the picture. By identifying the actual costs of dominance as Russians themselves perceive them, we stand a better chance of understanding the intensification of Russian nationalist feeling. Moreover, the rise of contemporary Russian nationalism begs comparison with the self-awareness of dominant national groups in multinational environments elsewhere, which is stimulated in no small part by the explicit and implicit challenges of minority peoples. These challenges seem unlikely to recede.

IT has been argued that Lenin sought to avoid alienating Soviet minorities in the first years of Bolshevik rule by any means, in the knowledge that if he failed he would stand little chance of putting the Russian empire back together again. To this end, he placed restraints on those Russians, particularly those in the borderlands, who were convinced that the Revolution was intended to establish undisputed Russian predominance over the many nationalities. Stalin's position with regard to these same minorities was less ambiguous: he moved to defuse and eliminate actual and potential non-Russian nationalist movements and to create a climate of repression in the non-Russian borderlands which native elites could challenge only at their own peril. Non-Russian national communists in Central Asia, in the Caucasus, in the Tatar and Bashkir regions on the upper Volga, and in the Ukraine were systematically liquidated and their movements dispersed with considerable violence. The volatile nomadic Kazakhs were made sedentary at great human cost. Republic Communist Party organizations were regularly purged of their "bourgeois nationalist" elements. Entire ethnic groups were deported during the Second World War for their real or alleged anti-Soviet activities or pro-German inclinations. By these means and others, Stalin's regime eliminated any real or imagined challenges to the Russian state from disgruntled non-Russians.

It was the Georgian Stalin who more than anyone encouraged Russians to think of the Soviet Union as their own national state. It was he who initiated and inspired many Russian themes which evoked images of the imperilled Mother Russia during the Great Patriotic War; it was he who reopened the churches. And it was Stalin who proposed the famous toast to the "great Russian people—wise, patient, and heroic" in 1945 at the war's conclusion. Russians had fought first and foremost for their nation and not for a more abstract and foreign aglommeration of Soviet

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peoples, and Stalin knew it. But he also knew that the state which he had just led to safety would have an uneven future if Russian nationalism were allowed to run roughshod over the delicate balance of Soviet multinationalism. Therefore, he performed an intricate balancing act with Russian nationalism, accommodating it where necessary, but at the same time controlling it as he knew he must.

To control Russian nationalism in the realm of cultural affairs, Stalin demanded recantations from figures like Konstantin Simonov for their failure to eclipse national narrow-mindedness with a higher conception of Soviet patriotism. For Simonov and others like him, this must have been something of a shock. Only a few years before, while the war still raged and Simonov's plays were considered to be an important instrument in the campaign to mobilize the Russian population, plays like his *Russkie Lyudi*—wartime dramas rich in Russian national and religious symbolism—were applauded wildly as uncontaminated depictions of the true Russian national spirit.[2] In the realm of politics, Stalin engineered purges like the Leningrad Case, in which a number of ministers of the Russian Republic were eliminated allegedly for conspiring to establish a separate Russian Communist Party and to make Leningrad the capital of the RSFSR, leaving Moscow as the capital of the entire USSR.

To balance out these warnings to those Russians who might be inclined to go too far, Stalin set in motion Zhdanovism, which, among other things, stridently asserted the primacy of Russianness in the sciences and encouraged the ferreting out of "rootless cosmopolitans" and degenerates in the ranks of Soviet historians, littérateurs, philosophers, and artists. Importantly, accommodations to Russian national feeling of this kind included some doctrinal changes in what had been billed as the equal standing of Soviet nationalities: Russians were to become undisputed *primus inter pares*. The theory of "lesser evil"—by which the Russian conquest of the border peoples was declared to be less of a catastrophe than the alternative of being conquered by Britain, Persia, or Turkey—was jettisoned at the 19th Party Congress in 1952 in favour of the concept of "greater good." According to this latter idea, Russian conquest was not simply the best of a bad situation but a positive godsend. Because of it, backward, primitive societies were exposed to the civilizing influences of Russian culture. This decisive shift of emphasis was accentuated by newly rewritten histories of the non-Russian peoples, in which native national heroes such as Shamil and Kenesary Kasimov, formerly lauded officially as progressive freedom fighters, were attacked as reactionary because they opposed the Russian advance into their territories.[3] The national epics of the Soviet Muslim nationalities, which earlier had been praised as the purest examples of native artistic genius,

[2] To open its 1975–76 dramatic season, Moscow's *Malyi Teatr* produced a brilliantly staged and acted performance of *Russkie Lyudi*, which the author attended. As in the 1940s, this play was performed as an ode to Russian national consciousness.

[3] Lowell R. Tillett, "Soviet Second Thoughts on Tsarist Colonialism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (January 1964).

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were condemned as retrograde and anti-Russian.[4] At the same time, Russian status was upgraded to that of *starshii brat*, the "elder brother," responsible for leading less civilized siblings out of the wilderness.

In these ways and others, Stalin fed the Russian national ego, for he understood that as the state's largest and best educated people, the Russians had to be mobilized effectively to meet state goals. Russian nationalism was one proven mobilization tool. At the time of Stalin's death, there was nothing in the Soviet political spectrum which could be identified as a dissident Russian nationalist movement. Generally it was assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the regime had by this time co-opted Russian nationalism.

Perhaps it had, but when Nikita Khrushchev burst on the scene in 1956 with his famous denunciation of the dead dictator, he recast the relationship of the Russian nation to the other nationalities of the Soviet empire in such a way as to kindle the flames of a strong Russian nationalist backlash, which even now continues to build. Khrushchev alerted the 20th Party Congress to significant changes in the offing when he referred to "the mutual distrust which existed among the peoples in tsarist Russia."[5] This revelation instantly invalidated the whole notion of a "friendship of the peoples," which Stalin's historians had laboured so hard to make credible. Similarly tarnished were the concepts of the Russian "elder brother" and of "greater good," for everyone quickly deduced that little good springs from "mutual distrust," and that the "elder brother," therefore, could only be a Russian imperialist.

Khrushchev's personal attack on Stalin was enough to anger many Russians, for most viewed Stalin as a truly Russian leader who had raised Russia to pre-eminence in the post-war world. Still worse from a Russian point of view, Khrushchev was a literal-minded Leninist who insisted on a new internationalism for the Soviet people. His proclamation that the Soviet state had entered the communist stage of development filled many Russians with foreboding for the sacrifices they would inevitably be required to make for this quickened social engineering, and especially for those Khrushchevian tenets of faith which called for the equalization of rates of development among Soviet nationalities and for more general equal opportunity. More specifically, most Russians objected to Khrushchev's strong emphasis on the creation of a "new Soviet man," a project with ominous implications for nationalities of all kinds. While this idea promised Russification among Soviet non-Russians, nonetheless it also promised that the resulting Soviet culture—however much Russified—would be more diversified ethnically and culturally than the Russian culture of Stalin's time. To underscore his sincerity in this

[4] See Alexandre Bennigsen, "The Crisis of the Turkic National Epics, 1951–1952: Local Nationalism or Internationalism?" *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, XVII, 2 & 3 (Summer and Fall 1975).

[5] Quoted in Tillett, p. 315.

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regard, Khrushchev introduced the concepts of *sblizhenie* (the " drawing together " of nationalities) and *sliyanie* (" merging ") into official policy debates. " Merging "—which included biological assimilation—raised the spectre of mixed marriages, racial homogenization, and, ultimately, national degeneration.

In addition, Khrushchev opened the Party ranks and invited many non-Russians to enlist. At the same time, he encouraged many non-Russian nationalities to rewrite their histories to stress their cultural uniqueness, a licence which one Soviet historian of Turkic origins stretched to the limits when he declared that Russia was the beneficiary of the Tatar yoke and that Russian art forms, including the Russian national epic, *The Lay of Igor*, had been inspired by Asian models.[6]

Russian concern about these developments has intensified as more and more non-Russians have turned to open protest and violence. Nationalism among the Baltic peoples, fuelled by undisguised anti-Russian feeling, continues to escalate and to spawn a wide range of underground groups and public martyrs. Ukrainians from different parts of the political spectrum have staged intellectual and mass protests against Russification and the suppression of Ukrainian culture. Soviet Germans, Poles, Moldavians, and Greeks have emphasized their ethnic and spiritual attachments to homelands beyond Soviet borders, and, in many cases, their desire to leave the USSR has been supported officially by the governments of those countries. Disgruntled Georgians have turned more frequently to nationalist-inspired violence which only recently has included political bombings, attacks on Soviet officials, and, it is rumoured, a number of attempts—one nearly successful—on the life of E. A. Shevardnadze, First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party. Armenian nationalists recently accentuated their national self-assertiveness by bombing the Moscow metro. In the North Caucasus, the militantly anti-Russian Sufi brotherhoods are enjoying a significant renaissance; moreover, the brotherhoods of Central Asia are likewise showing new vitality as a consequence of the deportation there of entire Caucasian nationalities during the war.[7] Spanning the territories between the Caucasus and Central Asia, Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks, who were among those deported, have staged large demonstrations within earshot of large Soviet cities and have demanded the right to emigrate to Turkey. Indigenous Central Asians, who for years have been the quiescent and obedient servants of Soviet power, have begun to champ at the Russian bit. In one recent demonstration of nationalist anger, 10,000 Central Asians came together in Dushanbe to protest against their treatment by Russian *colons* and to chant anti-Russian

[6] Discussion of a book by Olzhas Suleimenov, *Voprosy istorii*, No. 9, 1976, pp. 147–154; abstracted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* hereafter (*CDSP*), XXVII, No. 5 (January 1977), pp. 15–16.

[7] Alexandre Bennigsen, " Muslim Conservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime: The Sufi Brotherhoods in the North Caucasus," in Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices*, p. 341.

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slogans, a breach of Soviet etiquette which required the intervention of Russian troops from a motorized rifle division of the Red Army.[8] This protest is surprising only because it is contrary to the Muslim practice of avoiding head-on clashes with Soviet power. In fact, it has its roots in the expanding, self-conscious efforts of Soviet Muslim elites to glorify their societies as meaningful "nations." Although created by the Russians decades earlier to impede the formation of pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic alliances against them, these "nations" of Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tadzhiks, and Turkmen have become nations in fact. Such is the paradox of Soviet nationalities policy in Central Asia.

Underlining these more frequent open protests and the spectre of instability or revolt in the Soviet borderlands, the 1970 Soviet census revealed that non-Russians—and especially Soviet Muslims—are making large demographic gains at the expense of Russians and other Slavs. The census makes clear that, if present trends continue, within several decades Russians will begin to suffer a decline in their absolute numbers; meanwhile, Soviet Muslim minorities will continue to experience some of the world's highest birthrates. These data stimulated the discussion of Soviet society in national terms and precipitated discussions of the proper allocation of resources among the republics, of the transfer of Central Asian labour surpluses to the "European" USSR to ease incipient labour deficits there, of competition for desirable positions in Central Asian cities between the emerging native elite and the resident Russians, of the impact on the Soviet armed forces of a draft cohort consisting increasingly of non-Russians: in short, of how to manage a multinational state whose ethnic variables are in transition.

Other important stimuli and opportunities for expression contributed to an upsurge of Russian national consciousness, but for most Russians the new self-assertiveness among Soviet minorities was especially worrisome. Military conflict between Soviet and Chinese forces over disputed borders heightened this anxiety. All are aware that this 4,000-mile-long border is hard to patrol and that any invading Chinese force which manages to penetrate the first line of Slav troops will find, not more Russians, but Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and other Asians whose allegiance to the Soviet state is questionable and who have increasingly been taunting Russian inhabitants of Central Asia: "Just wait till the Chinese come; they'll show you what's what!"[9] In the early 1960s, Russians began to react to these various threats, and began to discuss possible solutions in *samizdat*, in the official press, and, like Solzhenitsyn, even in exile.

ONE of the most often repeated Russian responses to the implicit and explicit threats of non-Russians is a rejection of the claim that

[8] *The Jerusalem Post*, 15 Sep. 1978.

[9] Igor Shafarevich, "Separation or Reconciliation? The Nationalities Question in the USSR," in Alexander Solzhenitsyn *et al.*, *From Under the Rubble* (Bantam Books, New York, 1976), p. 87.

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forced "internationalization" of the Soviet Union has been borne mainly by non-Russians. In the first place, argues Igor Shafarevich, a prominent member of the "democratic opposition" in Moscow, Russian culture was the *first* to be sacrificed to Soviet internationalism, at a time "when other nations were still being actively encouraged to assert their national identity." While minority cultures have been treated with caution and restraint, he concludes, Russian culture has been subjected systematically to violent attacks under the guise of suppressing "great power chauvinism." In fact, attacks of this kind "amounted to nothing more than an invitation to stamp out any manifestation of Russian national consciousness." [10] He concedes, as do Solzhenitsyn and others, that Marxism-Leninism aims for the "maximum destruction of all nations," but maintains that non-Russians are not the primary target: "Russians no less than others are its victims; indeed, they were the first to come under its fire." [11]

Solzhenitsyn adds a poignant note to this argument. Russians, he contends, have no moral responsibility for what the Soviet system does to minorities. Many minorities—and here Solzhenitsyn cites the revolutionary contributions of Jews and Latvians—helped to bring the Bolsheviks to power. "Did not the revolution throughout its early years have some of the characteristics of a foreign invasion?" he asks.[12] This argument can be extended to Russia's historical enemies as well. "If those whom we have hurt previously hurt us," Solzhenitsyn explains, "our guilt feelings are not so hysterical, their guilt modifies and mutes our own." In this manner, he disavows any responsibility for the plight of the Crimean Tatars, referring to them as "remnants of the Golden Horde." [13]

Other Russians have objected to another side of Soviet internationalism: the leadership's formula for social integration, whereby in the process of becoming more "internationalist" Soviet nationalities, including Russians, will "come closer together" (*sblizhenie*) and eventually "merge" (*sliyanie*)—including biological assimilation—into a "new Soviet people." For many Russians, the final half of this formula means the unwanted "yellowing" (*ozheltenie*) of Russian society; and some explicitly Russian nationalist programmes have warned that "random hybridization" will lead to the "biological degeneration" of the Russian nation.[14] This racial theme even has its proponents in the official press. One Russian scholar has argued that *ethnos*—the intangible essence which distinguishes ethnic groups from one another—is biologically determined. He concludes that ethnically-mixed marriages lead eventually to a genetic deterioration of the offspring; deficient

[10] Ibid. p. 94.
[11] Ibid. p. 96.
[12] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations," in ibid. p. 125.
[13] Ibid. p. 132.
[14] "A Word to the Nation," a *samizdat* document published in *Survey*, No. 80 (Summer 1971).

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offspring ultimately degrade the political states and social institutions which they constitute. Therefore, national assimilation equals national suicide.[15] More recently, some Russian scholars have stretched this genetic explanation of history to link the Russians with the other main Slav populations of the USSR, the Ukrainians and the Belorussians. Ostensibly, this connexion was made to refute Ukrainian nationalist assertions of a separate Ukrainian identity.[16] More logically, it can be interpreted as a voice against racial mixing, against " yellowing," against the adulteration of Russian (and Slav) gene pools.

Russians object as well to the enormous costs of maintaining minority cultures. Some look upon many nationalities as possessing an ersatz nationhood, that is, a national identity which could not stand on its own without supports—academies of science, literary languages, and other newly-created cultural traditions and national territories—which the Russians supply. In addition to cultural props, some Russian nationists have argued, Russians have made vast human and material sacrifices to make these pseudo-societies economically viable, and this raises other fears and apprehensions. Firstly, minorities seldom express more than the gratitude of official cant for these sacrifices. On the contrary, they slander the Russian presence through their nationalism. Secondly, minorities might choose to use their new-found economic power to challenge Moscow. Thirdly, at a time when most Russians are sensitive to Solzhenitsyn's plea—whether they actually have heard it or not—to develop the Russian North and Siberia as Russia's last defence against the depletion of resources and spiritual inertia, huge chunks of the Soviet budget must still be spent to develop minority economies. Simply, investment resources are limited and becoming more so; what is spent for minorities cannot be spent for Russia proper. Solzhenitsyn, among others, has directed strong pleas to the Soviet leadership to transfer its attention primarily to Russia's own underdeveloped regions, not only because they are plentiful in resources and because their development will invigorate the Russian spirit, but also because they may be the last refuge for Russians against outside pressures, including the inevitable restiveness of growing minorities.[17]

Debate on these questions has already been joined in circles where important policy decisions are made, which suggests that demands like Solzhenitsyn's strike a sympathetic chord in the ruling class. According to many recent Soviet émigrés, Alexander Shelepin (now dismissed from all important posts) and Dmitry Polyanskii (now Soviet Ambassador to Japan), in particular, hold strong Russia-first views on economic and

[15] These views are those of L. N. Gumilev. They are reviewed by V. I. Kozlov, " O biologo-geograficheskoi kontseptsii etnicheskoi istorii," *Voprosi istorii*, No. 12, 1974, pp. 72–85.

[16] See Roman Solchanyk, " The Politics of Hematology and Contemporary Soviet Nationality Policy," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 107/79, 30 March 1979.

[17] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union* (Harper & Row, New York, 1974), p. 27.

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cultural matters. Further, they attempted to structure the institutions that they directed to promote these goals and to elevate those underlings who shared their views on Russia's national rights and priorities. Economic issues are likely to give an additional boost to Russian nationalism, especially labour-related issues. Labour shortages in the western, largely Slav areas of the USSR will necessitate either the importation of Central Asians—who collectively enjoy a large labour surplus—to work as internal *Gastarbeiter*, or the location of a great deal of new industry in Central Asia in order to take advantage of available labour at its source. The first alternative is unlikely to please the Russians, who, despite all the official propaganda to the contrary, are not known for their tolerance of darker-skinned people in general and of those who speak Russian only haltingly in particular. Nor is the second alternative any panacea. Investment in Central Asia is not investment in Russia, as noted earlier. Moreover, for the most part, skilled Central Asian elites are now sufficiently numerous and sufficiently well-trained to compete on equal terms with those Russians who will follow new industry to Central Asia. The realization by these Russians that Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, or Kirghiz may now displace them or even be given priority in positions requiring skill and authority—positions which have traditionally fallen to Russians—will be an unpleasant one at best and is almost certain to lead to tensions and strains between Russians and natives of all classes.

The political corollaries and programmes which follow from these views on Soviet culture, race, and economics are a mixed lot. A few "liberal nationalists" are in favour of accommodating minorities in a loose federation and for granting them those rights guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution. For these rights and for the privilege of participating in the federation, minorities would have to pay their fair share for development and defence. These "liberals" assume, rather naïvely, either that minorities can be weaned magically from their economic and military dependence on Russia and that the Russians who for centuries have inhabited lands that are not their own can be persuaded to accept this new state of affairs gracefully; or they assume, more astutely, that these changes are unlikely to come about in any case, but no harm is done by raising the issue. Indeed, their liberal-democratic credentials are served by such posturing, especially in the western press, but any serious student of nationality problems in the Soviet Union should not be blind to other explanations.

In fact, most Russians who have addressed the problem of the proper organization of political power in a future Russian state call for more authoritarian solutions. Some, Solzhenitsyn among them, have called for the consolidation of Russian lands into a unified Russian state, discarding forever the empty notion of a Russian-dominated federation. Some of these men have been called "neo-Slavophiles" because they would allow the Orthodox Church to become a dominant social force in this state.

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Other Russians, who also seek a consolidation of Russian lands but who are less willing to jettison the notion of a larger Russian empire, argue that existing national units should be made to coincide with actual ethnic distribution in the Soviet state. Those parts of other republics which boast large Russian populations—Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, the Tatar and Bashkir ASSRs, and Karelia, for example—would be incorporated into the RSFSR. In either consolidated Russian environment, resources could be developed for the benefit of Russians first and foremost; the Leninist commitment to develop all regions of the Russian empire equally would be scrapped. Under this arrangement, Siberia's rich natural resources would be preserved and developed for future generations of Russians.

Other Russians, often referred to as "neo-Stalinists," because they believe that Stalin's brand of strong, centralized, militarist leadership is what the Russian empire still requires, would prefer a greater Russian empire in which minority cultures could be exploited for the Russian state and in which restive non-Russians could be held in check by force and coercion. Illustrative of this kind of Russian nationalism, perhaps, are the portraits of Stalin which one frequently sees displayed in the rear windows of Russian-owned cars on the streets of Central Asian cities. Although Stalin is missed for many reasons, the basic message these portraits are intended to convey would appear to be that at least one recent Russian leader knew how to deal with troublesome and recalcitrant minorities. Stalin's steely visage is meant as a warning to those non-Russians who are inclined to believe that the days of the Russian *colon* are numbered: a new Stalin could turn the clock back. Like-thinking Russians have at various times over the last two decades clustered around the editorial offices of such journals as *Moskva*, *Ogonek*, *Oktyabr*, and *Molodaya gvardiya* where their calls for strengthened public order and renewed vigilance have regularly been printed. Recent émigrés report that the anti-minority dialogue that these journals helped to kindle is repeated widely—at times, even encouraged—in important institutions like the KGB, the Red Army, and the Komsomol. But Stalin is no more, his remains evicted from Lenin's marble blockhouse. Until recently, his name was practically unmentionable in print and relegated to whispers in private conversations. Therefore, some Russians have suggested other national heroes, known for their Stalin-like temperaments and activities, as appropriate objects of adulation. General M. D. Shobelev, the conquerer of southern Turkestan, is the subject of considerable attention in *samizdat*.[18] Others look to Dezhnev, who explored Kamchatka; to Ermak, who conquered Siberia; and to Erofei Khabarov, who is remembered for fighting the Chinese, for torturing his prisoners, and for burning them alive.[19]

[18] *Arkhiv samizdat* 21, No. 1013.

[19] Viktor Chalmaev, "Neizbezhnost'," *Molodaya gvardiya* (1968), no. 9: 259–89.

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THE extreme demands of Russian nationalities of various persuasions to scrap Marxism-Leninism and its egalitarian credo vis-à-vis minority nationalities, for a reorganization of the Soviet polity to reflect Russian dominance at every level, or for the wholesale repression of minorities have not been met. Moreover, there is little evidence that solutions of this magnitude would be acceptable to the current Soviet leaders. The regime has moved to suppress any inclination towards such solutions, as shown for example by Shelepin and Polyanskii. Shelepin now tends his garden, and Polyanskii has been demoted to become Soviet ambassador to Japan. Those Russian nationalists who have spoken out on these issues —such as the *Veche* group—have been arrested and sent to work camps or, like Solzhenitsyn, into exile. Furthermore, to the certain consternation of those Russians who worry about the "yellowing" of their institutions, the ruling Politburo now contains three Turkic members.

On the other hand, the Soviet regime has demonstrated its interest in, if not its concern for, many of the issues that fuel Russian nationalist debates. For example, the regime quietly dropped the "merging" half of its formula for social integration and replaced it with less objectionable codewords. The new formula, which guides Soviet citizens towards a state of "full unity" (*polnoe edinstvo*) but not towards biological homogenization, stresses that the new Soviet man will retain his ethnic distinctions even in the final communist Utopia. Thus, the regime has sought to exorcise the repugnant spectre of officially sponsored racial mixing.

The regime has also expressed its concern that a disproportionate number of "new Soviet men," however ethnically pure, will be non-Russian and Muslim, and it has suggested ways of increasing Russian birthrates and controlling those of Soviet Muslims. First, the regime has exhorted young Russians to have more children, suggesting that those who only have one child are of questionable patriotism. It has even been suggested in the official press that the quality and quantity of offspring could be improved and infant mortality reduced if "drunken conception" could be prevented, reference to the high rate of alcoholism among Russians and its possible contribution to the low Russian birth rate.[20] Second, it has initiated a discussion in academic and professional circles about the feasibility of promoting differentiated rates of birth control in the USSR according to republic and region.[21] Third, the regime has taken steps to entice more Central Asian women into the labour force, which, it believes, will discourage these women from having more than three children. However, these are not comprehensive policies. Indeed, no comprehensive policy has been publicly approved.

[20] Zory Balayan and Viktor Kazmin, "Children of the Carnival," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 24, June 11, 1975, p. 13; in *CDSP*, XXVII, No. 46, p. 16.

[21] See B. Urlanis, "Demographic Policy in the Modern World," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, No. 5 (1975); in *The Soviet Review*, XVII, No. 2 (Summer 1976), p. 99; and David M. Heer, "Three Issues in Soviet Population Policy," *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1977).

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Although the new Soviet Constitution did not redraw republic boundaries to make Russian territory correspond to Russian ethnic distribution as some observers thought it might, nonetheless the regime has suggested elsewhere that border revisions could conceivably take place as part of broader *economic* reforms. To this end, some economists have noted the diminishing significance of republic borders, stressing that economic nationality could be improved if they were redrawn. Such a redrawing, notes one economist, is made feasible, if not logical, by the changed ethnic composition of certain republics. Kazakhstan, which has large concentrations of Russians, would appear to be the most likely candidate.[22]

Further, the new Constitution failed to make any special provisions for the dominant status of the Russian nation or to lend it more prestige than other Soviet nationalities. On the other hand, it did not offer minorities anything new in the way of guarantees nor did it elaborate their specific rights under Soviet law any further than Stalin had permitted in 1936, despite the efforts of "federalists" in the government to write in such provisions.[23] Moreover, the 1936 provision allowing for national military units has been entirely removed from the new Constitution. While this provision in the 1936 Constitution was never allowed in practice, it was a symbolic right nonetheless, and its removal should be seen as a victory for the "anti-federalists" in the regime—a position usually associated with Russian nationalists.

The Soviet regime has responded to minority restiveness forcefully and with little hesitation. Local unrest in the Baltic states has been dealt with sternly. In the Caucasus, the authorities have initiated a new campaign to eradicate all vestiges of the Sufi brotherhoods, potential seedbeds for Turkic-Muslim nationalist reactions. The recent Abkhazian protest against Georgian oppression was handled at the highest levels of the Politburo. A spontaneous demonstration involving several thousand Tadzhiks in Dushanbe, as noted earlier, was dispersed by troops from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division. Crimean Tatars, who have not been permitted to return to the Crimea since their deportation in the 1940s, are closely watched, their demonstrations often broken up by force, and their leaders arrested without hesitation. At the leadership level, the First Secretaries of Georgia, Armenia, and the Ukraine were purged in recent years for their inability to control local nationalism. The pattern of installing Russian Second Secretaries in the republics has been renewed as local nationalist tendencies have increased. Recent propaganda campaigns have extolled the Soviet border troops, as if to give advance notice to outside forces, especially to the Chinese, that no meddling in Soviet nationality politics will be tolerated. All of these

22 V. Kistanov, "The Leninist Nationalities Policy and Economic Regionalization in the USSR," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2 (1972), pp. 56–65; in *CDSP*, XXV, No. 9, pp. 1–4.

23 See Grey Hodnett, "The Debate Over Soviet Federalism," *Soviet Studies*, XVII, 4 (April 1967), pp. 458–81.

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measures are certain to please Russians and especially those *colons* who live in the borderland republics, who have become increasingly uneasy about the possibility of real ethnic unrest on Russia's periphery and about their own vulnerability to the abuse or even violence it might generate.

Finally, the Soviet regime has tolerated and in some cases encouraged the rise of Russian self-awareness by its manipulation of cultural and political symbols. It has, for example, co-opted what were originally voluntary societies for the preservation of monuments of Russian history and culture. The sacrifices of the Russian people during the Great Patriotic War have become a more frequent theme in literature and in public ceremonies. Stalin can again be written about and his name may be mentioned in public, a development which has recently caused vocal and sustained approval from a gathering of war veterans being addressed by Defence Minister Ustinov.[24] Russian anti-semitism, whether officially inspired or latent, is another convenient safety valve for Russian hostility toward non-Russians. This kind of nationalist paranoia could easily be vented on other ethnic groups with whom, many Russians feel, historic grievances remain unsettled: on Central Asians, for example. Of more immediate concern to the Soviet leadership, perhaps, is the possibility that Russian nationalists might use the Jewish issue as a way of attacking the regime itself for failing to accommodate Russian nationalism to their satisfaction. Such an attempt would appear to have been made recently by the so-called "Russian Liberation Movement," which distributed mimeographed pamphlets in Leningrad and Moscow charging Brezhnev himself with being the state's leading Zionist and referring to Prime Minister Kosygin, hardline Politburo ideologue Mikhail Suslov, and Politburo member and Leningrad Party boss Grigory Romanov (who is reputed to be a Suslov protégé) as the only "real Russians."[25]

THESE concessions by themselves are unlikely to be acceptable to committed Russian nationalists nor, as events progress, to those Russians whose concern for Russia has not yet been translated into explicitly nationalist dissent. Rather, they should be viewed as temporary pacifiers to help hold the new Russian self-awareness and self-assertiveness in check. It is difficult to estimate how long this may be possible, Russians being what they are and the regime's ability to muddle through threatening situations being so well demonstrated. While the manipulation of important Russian symbols may work for some time to come, the regime will eventually be faced with the unwillingness of Russians to accept symbolic gratification for real or strongly felt deprivation or discrimination. No one really believes the patently false notion of Marxist-Leninist internationalism any more and, therefore, the regime

[24] See *The Washington Post*, 23 Feb. 1978.
[25] *The New York Times*, 27 June 1979.

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will be unable to assuage agitated Russians by dwelling on their "Soviet patriotism."

It is difficult to imagine a more powerful catalyst for an open and militant Russian nationalism than the self-assertion of Soviet minorities. Opportunities for minorities to assert themselves increase in step with the growth in the relative sizes of their populations, with the expansion of their economies, and with the enhanced political sophistication of their elites. Daily strife between Russians and non-Russians will become more intense, especially in the cities of the national republics, where social distinctions depend largely on ethnic affiliation, where, for the most part, Russians and non-Russians are highly segregated, where competition between them for jobs and elite positions is potentially at its most fierce, and where instances of ethnically-inspired violence—already high in some cities—will continue to multiply as other conditions become less palatable for both sides. Strife also threatens in important Soviet institutions such as the Red Army, where the cohort of available conscripts will be increasingly found in Central Asia, where some non-Russians have called for "home basing" of their own soldiers, and where serious ethnic conflict has already been reported. Russian military leaders, who worry about the effects of "yellowing" on the ability of the Soviet armed forces to respond to particular threats and to assimilate more complex technology and weaponry, cannot be optimistic about these developments.

Other factors too will heighten non-Russian self-awareness. Recent events outside the Soviet Union have given non-Russians a new opportunity to compare their own material advances, spiritual welfare, and political freedoms with those of ethnically or religiously related communities across Soviet borders. For example, Uniate Ukrainians cannot escape the impact of Pope John Paul II's triumphant progress through Poland. Neither can Soviet Muslims in the Caucasus and Central Asia remain unaffected by the Islamic upheavals in Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Middle East. Just as the Pope attempted to speak to Soviet citizens of the Christian faith, so do Ayatollah Khomeini and Muammer Gadaffi attempt to speak in their own ways to Soviet Muslims. (Not surprisingly, Gadaffi's recent request for a Libyan consulate in Tashkent was turned down brusquely by the Soviets.) And, of course, the Chinese continue to speak to Soviet minorities along the Sino-Soviet border, as they have for nearly two decades. A full-scale war or even a border skirmish between the USSR and a neighbouring state would certainly throw the relationship of Russians to their borderland populations into a new frame of reference.

In Moscow, the debate over the allocation of scarce resources will become more pointed as minorities demand more and more for their own development while the regime simultaneously strives to allay incipient economic slowdown, labour deficits in the western USSR, and energy shortages. Russians will become more outspoken regarding

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their fair share of investment, thereby confronting the Soviet leadership with a very prickly challenge. In any event, it is conceivable that future bread riots in Russian cities will assume a more nationalistic tone. In this context, the 1972 bread riot in Novocherkask is illuminating: according to several reliable émigré reports, this serious Russian riot was put down by army troops composed mostly of Kazakhs and other Central Asians.

The problem before the Soviet regime is how to control the Russian nationalist backlash while simultaneously stoking the enthusiasm of the Russian population—the Soviet Union's largest and best educated—to produce for the state. Russian nationalism is a proven instrument of mobilization, but one whose use is fraught with considerable danger. Marxism-Leninism is a dead issue for Russians; it inspires no one. Thus, the regime may be tempted to turn to Russian nationalism for help, but this would encourage the development of a militant, organized Russian nationalist movement which could threaten the regime itself or seek to change it fundamentally. At the same time non-Russians, who have experienced the thrust of Russian nationalism before, will move to consolidate their own national movements. This, then, is the dilemma facing the Russian leadership: how to accommodate minority demands without alienating the dominant Russians; but also how to accommodate and control the rising level of Russian nationalism and then to channel it for the fulfilment of state goals without permitting it a life of its own.

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Several Nations or One People? Ethnic Consciousness among Soviet Central Asian Muslims

Alexandre Bennigsen

IN Soviet Central Asia today, there are three levels of ethnic consciousness among Muslims: sub-national, supra-national and national. Both the sub-national and supra-national have long histories and are deeply rooted in the culture of the area. The national, in contrast, is primarily a Soviet creation imposed in 1924—designed to divide, and to secure Soviet control over Central Asia. In this article, I consider the relative strength of all three levels for both the Central Asian masses and the modern elite. I suggest that the vitality of both sub-national and supra-national consciousness is greater than that of the national and that in the future these two levels are likely to define the nature of Central Asian ethnic identity. This identity would then cut across Soviet-imposed national divisions, thus contributing to the growth of Central Asian unity. Sub-national and supra-national levels of consciousness therefore constitute a potentially important long-term threat to Moscow's control of Central Asia.

Sub-National Consciousness

Before 1917 there were two basic identities among Central Asians. First, a religious identity. Central Asians called themselves "Muslims." Only the members of the relatively small native intellectual elite defined themselves differently, but even their terms of self-definition were often rooted in Islam as well: "Turkestani," "Turk," or simply "Muslim." Second, they defined themselves in terms either of their place of residence (in the case of the sedentary population) or their tribal affiliation (in the case of the nomadic population). Thus, most Kirghiz defined themselves in terms of clans and most Kazakhs in terms of tribal federations. The former nomadic and semi-nomadic nations of Central Asia—Turkmen, Kazakhs, Kirghiz (in part), Karakalpaks, and certain Uzbek tribes (Lokay, Kurama, Qypchaq, Mangyt)—settled only in the 1930s, and the memory of clan/tribal organizations or of tribal federations (hordes) still survives in varying degrees. Some of the great tribal formations of Mongol origin (Mangyt, Nayman, Ktay) which are found in all the Central Asian republics, the Northern Caucasus and in Bashkiria, have preserved a very powerful feeling of kinship—stronger, in some cases, than the sense of belonging to a modern nation. Although this survival is pyschological and not formal, it is nonetheless powerful and compulsive.

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Members of all these groups still comply strictly with endogamic and exogamic taboos of tribal origin. In many areas, notably Turkmenistan, but also Kazakhstan, the observance of clan/tribal rules has an obvious influence on the economic, cultural, and even political life of the people. In these areas, particularly in Kazakhstan, the *kolkhozy* are often based on clan kinship. In some places, even cadres are selected for certain positions in local party and government organs according to the clan/tribal structure. This gives a curious and unexpected "familial," or genuinely mafia-type character to local Communist Party organs.

The clan/tribal structure also has an impact on the operation of other social organizations. In Turkmenistan, for example, members of the Tekke tribe have traditionally dominated not only the apparatus of the Communist Party but also the higher educational institutions—the University of Ashhabad and the republican Academy of Sciences. In this way, clan/tribal consciousness restricts the opportunities for contact between natives and Russians, and endangers the smooth progress of economic and cultural life.

In some cases, these survivals of the clan/tribe system provide the basis for illegal religious organizations. The recruitment of certain Sufi brotherhoods (*tariqas*), especially in Turkmenistan and in the Northern Caucasus is often conducted within the limits of specific clans or tribes. This is true of some particularly militant groups of the Qadiriya Sufi brotherhood. Thus, the Battal Haji *wird* (branch), the most violently anti-Soviet of all North Caucasian *tariqas* limits the recruitment of its members to some Chechen and Ingush clans and *taipas* (extended families). Soviet sociological surveys often point to the frequent attempts of the *tariqas* to "obtain the control of the extended families and of the clans." The double loyalty of the adepts, to the brotherhood and to the clan, makes the infiltration of the *tariqa* by the KGB more difficult.[1] These clan/religious groups represent perfectly closed societies which can neither be won over nor infiltrated by the Soviet police. Generally, such groups are actual or potential adversaries of the Soviet establishment. It is in these illegal religious organizations that sub-national and supra-national consciousness come together in opposition to Soviet-imposed national consciousness.

Supra-National Consciousness

Since 1928, the Soviet government has sought to eradicate the religion of Islam and, with it, consciousness of a supra-national Muslim identity. After a half century the public, or "official," face of Islam now presents a bleak picture. The mufti Zia ud-Din Babakhanov,

[1] See: Kh. B. Mamleev, *Reaksionnaya suschchnost' muridizma* (Groznyi, 1966), pp. 22–24; V. G. Pivovarov, "Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya problem byta, natsional'nykh traditsii i verovanii v Checheno-Ingushskoy ASSR," *Voprosy Nauchnogo Ateizma*, XVII (1975), p. 317.

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chairman of the Tashkent Spiritual Directorate and the chief Muslim spiritual leader of the USSR, is the official representative of Soviet Islam abroad. Conspicuously loyal to the Soviet regime, he is entrusted with the task of demonstrating to the Muslim world at large the happiness and prosperity of the faithful in the Soviet Union. Thus integrated within the fold of the regime, the Muslim official hierarchy seemingly constitutes a precious ally and a valuable ambassador for Moscow in its relations with the Muslim world abroad.

The number of "working" mosques in Central Asia is probably no more than 150. A representative of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate in Tashkent told a western visitor in 1976 that the total number of "working" mosques in Central Asia and Kazakhstan was 143. Before 1959, their number was estimated at 1,000. Almost all were closed during Khrushchev's time and have not been reopened since. In 1963, the Soviet publication *Nauka i Religiya* (IX, 1963, p. 75) mentioned that in 1959 the total number of active mosques in Tadzhikistan with a total Muslim population of over 1,500,000, was 18 and the number of imams only 39. There are only two *medressehs* (Koranic schools) left in the Soviet Union: The "Mir-i Arab" (medium level) in Bukhara, opened in 1945, and the "Imam Ismail al-Bukhari" (high level) in Tashkent, opened in 1971. Fewer than 50 students graduate from these institutions each year—hardly sufficient to meet the needs of the 45 to 50 million Muslims in the Soviet Union.

The Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Tashkent which is in charge of the religious life of the five republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan controls a very restricted number of "clerics"—probably around 500—and publishes in Tashkent a modest quarterly journal, *Muslims of the Soviet East*. This journal was first published in 1969 in Arabic under the title of *Al-Muslimūn fī al-Sarq al-Sufiyatī* and in Uzbek (in Arabic script); two other editions were added in January 1974 in English (*Muslims of the Soviet East*) and in French (*Les Musulmans de l'Orient Soviétique*). All four editions are identical. These and the three or four editions of the Koran which have appeared since the war (there is contradictory testimony as to the number of editions of the Koran published in the USSR since 1945—it seems that three editions were published in Tashkent and one in Ufa) are the only Muslim religious publications in the USSR.

The true position of Islam, however, is less bleak than the foregoing might suggest. This is because Islam itself is not merely a religion. It encompasses not only a corpus of directly religious beliefs and rites, but also a complex aggregate of cultural, psychological and social traditions, attitudes, and customs governing the whole way of life of the Muslim community. Its "rooting" in every level of society is certainly deeper than that of any other religion of the world, and many of the traditions, attitudes and customs of Islam are not contingent on the strict observance of the faith.

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Because of centuries of symbiosis between religion and culture on the one hand and religion and politics on the other, Islam is more demanding politically and socially than other religions. But, paradoxically, it is also more "laxist" than other creeds. It commonly admits faith without religious practice and it has neither a "clergy" nor an established "church." Anyone with a certain knowledge of Arabic who is able to read the Koran and to recite prayers can perform the rites. Such characteristics make Islam more flexible and less susceptible to external pressure than other creeds. The closing of a mosque or of a *medresseh* does not have the same significance for the Muslim faithful as the destruction of a church or the prohibition of formal religious instruction has for Christians. In an Islamic community, the religious, the national, the social, and the political are practically fused. This is especially true of the Soviet Islamic community, where religion and nationalism are both subject to external pressure and are therefore mutually reinforcing.

Today Islam in the Soviet Union has another, "official," face. In the legal pronouncements of Muslim officials (*fetwas*) available to us, in certain articles published in *Muslim of the Soviet East*, and also in what can be gleaned from between the lines of Soviet anti-religious propaganda, we find evidence of a small but authentic Muslim religious elite composed of some official "clerics" and certain intellectuals who continue to practise their religion. This elite is partly responsible for what may be called a "religious-intellectual" revival among Muslims in the USSR. It has engaged in cautious, but demonstrably effective, propaganda in support of Islam. Among the most important themes advanced by this Muslim religious group are that Islam is the most liberal, humanistic and "advanced" of all religions; it is endowed with the highest and most progressive culture; it is the best fitted to prepare the faithful for the construction of real socialism; that, as a matter of fact, Muslims are the best socialists—or even that *only* Muslims are capable of building real socialism; and, finally, that there is no contradiction whatsoever between Marxism and Islam, since socialism in its ideal form is but a fulfilment of Islamic promises.

Still another source for the maintenance and revitalization of Islam in Central Asia are the "parallel," "unofficial," clandestine or semi-clandestine mystical Sufi orders, the *tariqas*. The existence of learned or semi-learned professional "technicians," who can correctly perform the rites, is necessary to preserve Islam from the grave danger of degenerating into superstition and shamanism. Without them, it undoubtedly would lose its purity and, finally, fade away. The *tariqas* not only function as training grounds for such "technicians," but also extend and strengthen the faith among the Muslim masses.

Five Sufi orders are particularly active in Central Asia: the Naqshbandiya, a Bukharian order founded in the fourteenth century (the tomb of Sheikh Baha ud-Din Naqshband, the founder of the order, is

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in Bukhara); the Qadiriya, a Bagdadi order founded in the twelfth century; the Kubrawiya, founded in the thirteenth century in Khorossan; the Yasawiya founded in the twelfth century in northern Uzbekistan (the tomb of Sheikh Ahmed Yasawi, the founder of the order is in the city of Turkestan), and the Kalandariya, an itinerant order, with its centre in Samarkand. The most active seems to be the Naqshbandi order and, since the Second World War, the Qadiriya. Several new branches (*wirds*) of this last *tariqa* were introduced into Kazakhstan and Kirghizia in the 1950s by the deported Chechen and Ingush.[2]

The Sufi brotherhoods are not small underground chapels, but rather illegal mass organizations. One Soviet sociologist recently reported, for example, that " more than half of the Muslim believers in the Checheno-Ingushskoy ASSR are adepts of a murid brotherhood." [3] In 1970, the Muslim population of this republic numbered 650,470. According to a survey conducted in 1972–73, believers constituted 68 per cent of the Muslims. This would mean that believers numbered about 442,000. Even if we exclude children, the very old and women (some women, however, may be adepts of a *tariqa*) we obtain the still fantastic number of some 150–200,000 Sufi adepts in one North Caucasian republic alone!

These groups are better organized and more dynamic than the " official " hierarchy and are spectacularly and uncompromisingly hostile to the Soviet regime. And, thanks to the overlap with clan and tribe noted earlier and to their iron discipline, they escape all attempts by the KGB to infiltrate or destroy them.

In Central Asia, these brotherhoods perform services which the official Islamic hierarchy is either unwilling or unable to perform. They maintain a network of clandestine Koranic schools and operate hundreds if not thousands of unofficial and illegal " houses of prayer." The latter are usually located near various " holy places "; often the tombs of Sufi sheikhs killed in action against the Russians—pilgrimage to those tombs serves as a substitute for the impossible *hadj* to Mecca required of each Muslim. Adepts of these brotherhoods perform religious rites such as circumcision, marriage, burials, and prayers at festivities in places where there are no official clerics nominated and paid by the Spiritual Directorate. In this way they provide an important supplement to the official clergy. But while they perform these services they also engage in intense, and sometimes violent anti-Soviet propaganda which, according to Soviet sources, is exceptionally effective. One Soviet writer classifies the Sufi brotherhoods together with other millenarian religious sects such as the Adventists, the Spiritual Molokans (" Jumpers ") and various Russian " God's People "

[2] O. A. Sukhareva, *Islam v Uzbekistane* (Tashkent, 1960), pp. 52–53.
[3] Pivovarov, op. cit. p. 316.
[4] A. Makatov, *Islam, Veruyushchii, Sovremennost'* (Groznyi, 1974), p. 27.

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(*Khlysty*) among the "unconditional adversaries of Soviet power."[5] And a very rich anti-religious literature in the languages of Central Asia directed against Sufism and the cult of "Holy Places" in Central Asia testifies to the special importance assigned by Soviet authorities to the struggle against the *tariqas*.[6]

Obviously, the existence of the Sufi brotherhoods is a serious obstacle to the success of anti-religious campaigns in Central Asia directed against Islam. Should Soviet pressure on "official" Islam become unbearable or the attitude of the official Muslim hierarchy towards the regime become too submissive, believers would not necessarily be forced into atheism. They could and probably would turn to the violently anti-Soviet, militant Sufi brotherhoods. As was observed in a famous article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* marking the end of Khrushchev's drive against religion: "Insults, violence and forcible closing of churches not only fail to reduce the number of believers, but actually tend to increase their number. They make clandestine religious groups more widespread and antagonize the believers against the Soviet State."[7] Such an outcome is perhaps even more likely in the case of Islam, because both the official hierarchy and the clandestine brotherhoods are perfectly legitimate institutions for the faithful. The Sufi brotherhoods are neither heretical nor schismatic and belong to the mainstream of Muslim religion. They differ from "official" Islam only in their attitude towards the Soviet regime. The Sufi *tariqas* represent the popular, militant, "holy war" (*jihad*) aspects

[5] Iv. V. Krianev, "Tipologiya religioznykh obedinenii i differentsiatsiya ateisticheskogo vospitaniya," *Vestnik Nauchnogo Ateizma*, III (1967), p. 54.

[6] The standard work on this question is V. N. Basilov, *Kul't sviatykh v Islame* (Moscow, 1970). But in the last twenty years, many works have been published in various Central Asian languages. The most important ones are: [in Uzbek:] N. Ahmedov, *The origin and the danger of the "holy" places and of the places of pilgrimage* (Tashkent, 1959); V. Ahmedzhanov, A. Kasymzade and N. Yildashev, *The cult of the Saints and the "Holy Places" in Islam* (Tashkent, 1959); A. Alimuhammedov, *The truth concerning the cult of the Saints (on the Ferghana valley)* (Tashkent, 1966); B. Yakubov, *The holy places and the places of worship—nest of parasites* (Tashkent, 1961); E. A. Poliakova, *The question of sects in Islam* (Tashkent, 1966) (in Russian); A. Rahmanov and S. Yusupov, *The holy places of Khwarezm and their origin* (Tashkent, 1963); E. Sharipov and E. Bozorov, *The truth about the holy places* (Tashkent, 1976).

[in Tadzhik:] Kh. D. Dodikhudoev, *Muslim Sects* (Dushambe, 1967); A. Kh. Hadjiev, *The reactionary essence of the sectarian ideology in Islam* (Dushambe, 1963); A. Muhtarov, *The holy places unmask the religion* (Dushambe, 1964); A. Safarov, *The Survivals of the Ishans cult in Tajikistan and how to overcome it* (Dushambe, 1965); A. Safarov, *The Truth about the "holy" places in Tajikistan* (Dushambe, 1964); A. Safarov, *The Origin and the Social meaning of the dervishism and of the cult of the Ishans* (Dushambe, 1975).

[in Kazakh:] O. Dastanov, *The truth about the "holy places"* (Alma Ata, 1967); Zh. Dinsenbin, *The cult of the Saints and the holy places in Islam* (Alma Ata, 1958); K. Zhanpeisova, *The itinerant mollahs* (Alma Ata, 1962).

[in Turkmen:] M. Agaev, *The secrets of the holy places* (Ashhabad, 1967); Dj. Dyrdyev, *The historical truth about the so called holy places in Turkmenistan* (Ashhabad, 1959).

[in Kirghiz:] S. Arystanbekov: *Some peculiar characteristics of religious survivals* (Frunze, 1965); T. G. Gafurov, *Analysis of some social and psychological reasons of the vitality of the Muslim cult of the saints* (Frunze, 1970); S. Mambetaliev, *Muslim Sects in Kirghizia* (Frunze, 1966); same author, *Sufism and its trends in Kirghizia* (Frunze, 1972).

[in Karakalpak:] Zh. Bazarbaev, *Secrets of the "holy" places* (Nukhus, 1972).

[7] *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, VIII, 15, 1965.

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of Islam, totally hostile to the Soviet establishment while the "official" Spiritual Directorate constitutes the liberal, intellectual, submissive face of the same Islam.

The presence of this second "face" certainly has saved Islam in Central Asia by protecting it against the two main dangers which threaten all religions in the USSR—official atheism among the intellectuals and a relapse into superstition and shamanism among the masses. The combination of "official" and "unofficial" Islam has promoted the revival of interest in, and sympathy for, Islamic religious and cultural traditions among the intellectuals and the maintenance of religious feelings and life among the Muslim masses. Much recent Soviet sociological research reports that in Central Asia and in other Muslim territories of the USSR a high proportion of the rural population and an only slightly smaller proportion of the urban remain faithful to the Muslim creed and way of life. Soviet sociologists classify Muslims into five categories of belief. The first consists of *firm believers.* This includes those who are militant, intolerant, often fanatical, who "form a religious *aktiv*" and refuse to participate in the collective social/cultural life. The second consists of *believers by tradition* who believe in God and observe all religious rites but do not try to force their views and ideals upon their neighbours or relatives. Soviet research indicates that these two categories may include from 25 to as much as 38 per cent of the Muslim population in certain areas of the USSR. The third category consists of the *hesitant*, those who believe in God and observe some religious rites (one daily prayer, limited fasting) and some of the Muslim customs, but are less interested in the spiritual than in the external, national aspect of Islam. Soviet research indicates that this category includes from 6 to 15 per cent of the Muslim population. Those who observe some rites and customs (circumcision, religious marriage, fasting, religious burial . . .) either because these are considered as national traditions or under the pressure of their neighbours and family comprise a fourth category of the *indifferent.* This category is reported to include as much as 38 per cent of the population. The fifth category, *atheists*, includes non-believers who nonetheless observe some rites (circumcision, religious funerals, fasting . . .) and who may even assist at important festivals considered more national than religious (Kurban Bayram, for example). This group is reported to include about 25 to 30 per cent of the Muslim population.[8]

Almost 100 per cent of Central Asians including atheists and party members practise circumcision. Sukhareva reports that "the rite of circumcision is widely observed by the Uzbeks. . . . It is deeply rooted in the Muslim consciousness and is considered compulsory. It is

[8] See: Zh. Bazarbaev, *Sekuliarizatsiya naseleniya sotsialisticheskoy Karakalpakii* (Nukhus, 1973), p. 53; Makatov, loc. cit.; V. G. Pivovarov, *Na etapakh sotsialisticheskogo issledovaniya* (Groznyi, 1974), p. 158; and A. Kadyrov, *Prichiny sushchestvovaniya i puti preodoleniya perezhitkov Islama* (Leninabad, 1966), pp. 14–15.

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very difficult to suppress it. . . . Uncircumcised children are ostracized by their comrades, made fun of, despised, ridiculed. . . . The parents are hard pressed by the older generation and finally they must yield. . . ." [9] Another Soviet researcher reported recently that in all Muslim territories, "the majority of people, both the believers and the atheists circumcise their children, because this rite is considered to be the symbol of national appurtenance." [10] Ashirov reports in his recent work on *Islam and the Nations* that in Uzbekistan there is a saying, "an uncircumcised man cannot be an Uzbek." [11] Religious marriage is practised widely and even the most hardened atheist is buried with religious rites in segregrated Muslim cemeteries. Common "Soviet" cemeteries, where non-Muslims would be admitted, are still but a dream of the far away future. Recently I learned from a young Uzbek historian, a member of the CPSU and therefore officially an atheist, that in Central Asia Russians and Muslims will lie in common cemeteries "only when communism has been achieved." Since the Second World War, most Central Asians have abandoned non-Muslim, Russian or European names which were sometimes favoured by those born after the revolution. And, finally, many customs which belong to the Islamic tradition and are in a way sanctified by it, even though they are not of religious origin, remain in force, such as polygamy, early marriage for girls, sex segregation, *kalym*, various endogamic taboos. Ashirov writes the "members of the older generation, including atheists pretend that religion is harmless, that it is even useful and necessary. It provides discipline, protects the young from bad things: alcohol, tobacco, foul talk." [12]

The proportion of atheists is reported to be lower among women and higher among the younger generation and intelligentsia. But, as we have already noted, a new sense of Muslim consciousness is emerging among the intelligentsia which is tied very closely to the social, political, or even ethnic, rather than to the strictly religious, aspects of Islam. Given the breadth of Soviet categories, even some of these intellectuals may be deemed "atheists." Indeed, Soviet sources themselves suggest that it is hard to draw a demarcation line between believers and atheists in Central Asia even among officially atheist intellectuals, graduates of various higher educational institutions, and officials of the party and state apparatus. The intellectual, party member and atheist, often complies with certain religious rules and customs for "national" rather than for spiritual reasons. Ashirov reports that this compliance "maintains the originality of the nation, it preserves the national traditions and the use of the national language. Religion is like a shepherd who leads his flock and takes

[9] Sukhareva, op. cit. pp. 81–82.
[10] E. G. Filimonov, "Sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie protsessa preodoleniya religii v sel'skoy mestnosti," *Vestnik Nauchnogo Ateizma*, XVI (1974), p. 81.
[11] N. Ashirov, *Islam i Natsii* (Moscow, 1975), p. 63.
[12] Ibid., pp. 69–70.

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care of it." [13] This compliance reflects a general feeling that "a non-Muslim cannot be an Uzbek or Kirghiz or Turkmen . . ." that is, that Muslim consciousness has priority in the minds of Central Asians.

Muslim consciousness has an especially strong impact on relations between Russians and Central Asians, on the content of Central Asian culture, and on the strength of pan-Islamic identity. The persistence of Muslim consciousness among Central Asians tends to reinforce the segregation of Muslims in relation to the Russian and European populations. Mixed marriages between Muslims and non-Muslim Russians are rare. When they do occur, they follow the prescription of Muslim law (*Shari'yat*): children born of a marriage with a Russian wife become Muslims. That is, males are circumcised and all are given Muslim names. The marriage of a Muslim girl with a non-Muslim is forbidden by the *Shari'yat* and is extremely rare in practice. Even in the northwestern Caucasus, where Muslims represent a small minority in a mostly Russian population, intermarriage between Muslims and non-Muslims is rare and the intermarriage of Muslim females with non-Muslims almost non-existent.[14]

Central Asian Muslims still embrace the concept of *Dar ul-Islam* (the "Land of Religion") as including Central Asia and other traditionally Muslim areas as against the *Dar ul-Harb* (the "Land of War") in which Muslims are a minority. One Soviet scholar, writing about religious belief in general, captured the psychology of the *Dar ul-Islam*: "When the traditional neighbourhood surrounding the believer," writes L. P. Bueva, "with its traditions, customs, its system of human relations, the specific psychological behaviour of its members, provides the believer with rules which do not correspond to, or even contradict the official rules which he receives from [Soviet] society, then either the personality of the believer becomes split, or he adopts a hostile attitude towards our society and its values." [15] This is an important psychological reality and it partly explains the unwillingness of Central Asians to migrate and settle outside their own territory.

Since the death of Stalin, many Central Asian intellectuals have rediscovered the classical culture of the Muslim past. This discovery parallels a similar development among Soviet Russians, but there is a significant difference—Muslim culture is more deeply "religious" in both form and content than any other culture and cannot be dissociated from its religious basis. The movement among Central Asian Muslim intellectuals is called *mirasism* (from the Arabic "*miras*"—patrimony) and has brought about a more or less complete rehabilitation of the entire traditional Arabic-Iranian-Turkic literature and philosophy. This literature and philosophy share a common

[13] Ibid.
[14] A. V. Avksent'ev, *Islam na Severnom Kavkaze* (Stavropol, 1973), p. 113.
[15] *Sotsial'naya sreda i soznanie lichnosti* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 203–04.

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characteristic—they are thoroughly inspired and penetrated by Islam. An understanding of Islamic religion is necessary as an introduction and key to the understanding of the prestigious Islamic culture of the tenth to seventeenth centuries. Consequently, the rediscovery of the cultural treasures of the Central Asian past, prompted by the growing strength of Muslim consciousness, has given new prestige to Islam as a religion.

Religious beliefs and practices prescribed by religious rules preserve in Central Asia the sense of the *Umma*, of belonging to the community of believers. And this in turn provides the basis for a feeling of spiritual solidarity and brotherhood between Muslims in Central Asia and those elsewhere in the Soviet Union and the world at large. So long as religious practice subsists—even at a minimal level—Central Asia remains within the fold of *Dar ul-Islam*. And it remains separated by an insuperable barrier from the non-Muslim territories of the Soviet Union, the alien *Dar ul-Harb*, even when this latter world forces its way into Muslim territory. This pan-Islamic sense of brotherhood is a powerful force in Central Asia. Soviet sources have already made reference to the danger of separatist or autonomist political ideologies elsewhere in the USSR based on Islam.[16]

National Consciousness

The Soviet regime has been attempting since 1924 to replace sub-national and supra-national types of loyalties in Central Asia with national consciousness and identity based on language. Although before 1917 practically no Central Asian had identified himself on the basis of language as an Uzbek, Tadzhik, Turkmen, Kazakh or Kirghiz, it was precisely on this basis that the Soviet leadership carried out the national demarcation (*razmezhevanie*) of the region in 1924. *Razmezhevanie* was designed to replace sub-national loyalties with larger ones and to break apart the supra-national consciousness with more restricted ones. It was actively opposed by an important faction of Central Asian intellectuals. Many important Muslim communist leaders declared themselves hostile to the division of the Central Asian population into six nations (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Turkmens, Tadzhiks, and Karakalpaks). Turar Ryskulov defended the idea of one *Turkestani* people and Sultan Galiev even defended the idea of one *Turkic* people which also included the Turks of the Volga, the Urals, and the Caucasus. These and other supporters of a United Turkestan were liquidated in the 1930s. Even today, only a few of

[16] Seradjuddin Gadjiev, " Pitayushchii natsionalizm," *Sovetskii Daghestan*, Makhach-Kala, II (1977), p. 51, writes about Daghestan (but the same idea may be applied to Central Asia): " Some members of our intelligentsia and part of our clerics try to isolate their nationality and even to separate it (from the Russians)."

On the rule of the *tariqas* more generally, see Alexandre Bennigsen, " Muslim Conservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime: the Sufi Brotherhoods in the North Caucasus," in Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York, 1978), pp. 334–348.

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the theoreticians of Muslim National Communism have been rehabilitated—the Kazakh Turar Ryskulov, the Tatar Galimdjan Ibragimov, the Uzbek Fayzulla Khodjaev and the Azeri Nariman Narimanov. Those of their works made available have been heavily edited. The most outspoken leaders have not been rehabilitated and their works are entirely forbidden: the Tatar Mir Sayid Sultan Galiev, the Turkestani jadids—Munevver Karri and Abdurrauf Fitrat, the leaders of the Kazakh Alash Orda—Ahmed Baytursun, Ali-Khan Bukeykhanov and Mir-Yakub Dulatov, the Crimean Veli-Ibrahimov, and many others. But even now the sense of belonging to one Turkestani people has not entirely given place to the more limited national consciousness encouraged by the Soviets.

Consciousness of "Turkestani" unity among Central Asians is reinforced by the common historical and cultural ancestry being rediscovered by the *mirasism* movement, by the mutual comprehensibility of their literary Turkic languages and especially by the common hostility of all Muslim natives toward the Russians living in their lands, and vice versa. Russians and other Europeans living in Central Asia used to, and still do, confound all Turkestanis under the same injurious appellation of "Blacks" (*chernye*).

Culturally, the nations created in 1924 remain artificial. The new Soviet nations of Central Asia now have become economic, administrative, and especially bureaucratic realities, but they have not yet become cultural ones. Entry of native cadres into increasing numbers of fields—the economy, the party and state apparatus, and the educational system—has led to competition between various nationalities and this in turn has reinforced friction between groups. This process may accentuate the already existing differences between Turks (Uzbeks) and Iranians (Tadzhiks), sedentaries (Uzbeks) and former nomads (Kazakhs), and Sunnis and Shiites. But, all sources attest that up to now such friction is manifest chiefly between Europeans and Muslims, and not among Muslims themselves.[17]

Paradoxically, it is the most artificial of all Central Asian nations—the Uzbeks—which is becoming a "real nation" with strong "imperialistic" tendencies. Before the revolution, the term "Uzbek" was applied exclusively to Turkic nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes. The turcophone or iranophone sedentaries were called "Sarts." The expression "Sart-Uzbek" was used to designate the Turkic-speaking sedentary groups of various origins which preserved their clan-tribal structure. The Uzbeks today present by far the most numerous and most developed group among the Central Asians. The settling of former nomadic groups, such as the Lokays, has given the Uzbek nation a greater cohesion. The Uzbek republic encompasses all the cultural and historical capitals of Central Asia—Bukhara, Samarkand,

[17] See Steven L. Burg, "Russians, Natives and Jews: Cadre Competition in Soviet Central Asia," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, XX:1 (1979).

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Kokand, Urgench and Khiva. The best Central Asian universities and scientific institutions are in Uzbekistan, as is the seat of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate and the only working *medressehs*. These advantages have allowed the Uzbeks to monopolize practically as their own the entire Muslim culture of Turkestan between the ninth and nineteenth centuries. Avicenna, Timur, Ulugh-beg, Ali-Shir Navai, and the Emperor Babur are claimed as "Uzbeks." By doing this, the Uzbeks are contributing to the merger of Uzbek and Muslim consciousness. Today the Uzbeks are recognized as the leaders of Central Asia as a whole by most other Central Asians, who see Uzbeks as "one of us" as against Russians who are seen as "one of them." At present this leadership is more psychological than economic or political. It is, however, certain that the importance of the role of the Uzbeks, as the directing element of all Central Asia and probably, in the near future, of all Soviet Islam, is growing. They may well take over the role played very successfully by the Volga Tatars until 1928. Judging by the violence of recent Soviet attacks against "Pan-Turkism," this new trend towards unification of Soviet Islam under the direction of the Uzbeks is taken very seriously by the regime.

SUB-NATIONAL and supra-national loyalties remain strong in Central Asia and actively compete with national ones. Indeed, the very process of modernization in Central Asia has brought new vitality to precisely those levels of consciousness which the Soviet national policy has been designed to eliminate. While modern Soviet "nations" seem to be emerging as distinct economic and administrative realities, awareness of belonging to one common culture and therefore to one people—Turkestani and Muslim—is growing steadily among the new Central Asian intelligentsia. This new modern Muslim elite of Central Asia, formed in Soviet-run higher educational institutions, is more aware than its pre-revolutionary predecessors that all Central Asian nations have the same history and share the same bilingual Irano-Turkic culture. From the eighth century until 50 years ago, Central Asia was either unified or divided along geographical lines. Now, it has been divided along linguistic lines. But, because of the introduction of a uniform political and economic (Russian-European) vocabulary, the strength of linguistic differences between the various Turkic languages has been weakened.

This intelligentsia is well educated, comparable in quality to the Russian intelligentsia, devoted to its people, and well prepared to assume full responsibility of power in its republics. It is also extremely proud of its recently rediscovered national culture and, because of the growing confusion between religion and nationality, increasingly respectful towards Islam. This in turn has led to a growing sense of kinship—even of unity—with the Muslim world in the rest of the USSR and abroad, and to a corresponding growth in the sense of difference from Russians and Europeans in general.

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At present, we have no evidence of dissent among the Muslim intellectual elite of Central Asia. There is no Central Asian *samizdat* and, with the exception of Crimean Tatars and Meshketian Turks, no collective or individual claims for human rights, general national or religious liberty, greater democracy or the right to emigrate. Anti-Russian feelings are openly manifested only in anomic incidents of mass violence, occasional individual assaults against Russians, and sometimes riots in Muslim or mixed cities (Tashkent, Dushambe, Groznyi, Ordjonikidze). But this absence of open protest does not mean that there is no discontent among the Central Asian elites.

Central Asia has not yet reached the point of exasperation which we find in Georgia, the North Caucasus, and Lithuania. Nevertheless, a general increase in the tension between Russians and Central Asian Muslim intellectuals can be observed. Among the points likely to be placed on the political agenda by an assertive Central Asian elite are: demands for a greater opening towards the Muslim world abroad; demands for a fuller rehabilitation of the past including the Muslim " national communists," the advocates of the " colonial revolution," and of the idea of a " Colonial International "; demands for greater nativization of positions—especially at the middle levels—of the party and state apparatus; and demands for greater access to traditional Muslim culture, including the rehabilitation of those classical writers who were put under taboo because of their " clerical," " mystical " or " nationalistic " character such as Jelaleddin Rumi, Nasir-i Khosrow and Amir-i Khosrow of Dehli.

A potential spur to the raising of such demands has been the increased contacts between Central Asians and other Muslim nationalities of the USSR—both the more militant (the North Caucasians) and the politically more advanced (the Volga Tatars and Azeris)—and between Central Asians and radical socialist Muslims from abroad who visit the Soviet Union. It is certainly through the channel of numerous Tatar intellectuals in Central Asia that reformist and national communist ideas and programmes—including the forbidden theories of Sultan Galiev—are being introduced to the Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia.

The ideas of " Pan-Turkism," " Pan-Turkestanism," and even " Pan-Islamism " are complementary rather than contradictory, and a combination of their ideas is possible. Attraction to one of them does not preclude attraction to others; and it is precisely an awareness of this which constitutes the most clearly formulated cultural—not yet political—expression of Central Asian dissent in opposition to Moscow. This awareness started to develop after the death of Stalin and the process is still continuing. It has a long way to go before it spills over into political dissent, but it certainly provides the basis for such action in the future. Here too, national consciousness remains much less important than sub-national and supra-national consciousness.

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In the past, it was the strength of these last two which caused the Soviet regime to divide Central Asia into artificial national units. Should the unity of Central Asia be restored on the basis of these older loyalties, this would now pose a much greater threat to Moscow. In the 1920s, Central Asian resistance took the form of elemental mass violence—the Basmachi revolt; at the end of our century, such mass violence might have the added force of direction by a modern skilled elite. But whether such resistance occurs or not, one thing remains certain: the several "nations" of Central Asia will have given way to one Muslim people.

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Soviet Policy and the Central Asian Problem

Steven L. Burg *

WESTERN scholars are devoting ever greater attention to nationality problems in the USSR, especially the Central Asian problem. The demographic explosion in that region presents the central Soviet government with two interrelated and mutually reinforcing policy problems: the allocation of scarce resources for regional economic development and the management of ethno-national tensions. Up to now, western scholars have considered these problems in isolation from one another. But if we are to understand their true dimensions we must consider them as the Soviet leadership does—not only as a set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing problems, but also in conjunction with corresponding sets of policy problems presented by conditions in other regions of the USSR. Only in this way can we appreciate the dilemma in which the central Soviet leadership finds itself today: any policy it adopts in order to "solve" [1] either of the problems of Central Asia is likely to aggravate such problems elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

In the first section of this article we examine the relationship between the problems of Central Asia and those of European Russia and the Ukraine. We have chosen these two regions because of their political and economic importance in the Soviet system and because in them, as in Central Asia, there is a close and potentially explosive connexion between the allocation of scarce resources to the region's economy and the management of national tensions there. In the second section we look at some of the structural, institutional and functional constraints which largely determine the policy choices of the Soviet leadership. And in the third section we suggest how these constraints will determine the "solution" to the Central Asian problem likely to be adopted by the Soviet leadership. In the concluding section we discuss this "solution" in terms of its probable impact. We suggest that it will not, in fact, "solve" the problems of Central Asia and that it may even intensify corresponding problems elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Finally, we suggest that the inability of the Soviet government to solve these problems presents political leaders in the West with a remarkable opportunity to influence the course of Soviet domestic and foreign policy.

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1 "Solve" is used here advisedly. See Richard Pipes, "The Solution of the Nationality Problem," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, VI, 3 (1967).

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European Russia, the Ukraine, and the Central Asian Problem

The problems of Central Asia result in the first place from the extraordinarily rapid growth rate of the Muslim peoples in that region—Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, and other groups—both in absolute terms and relative to the growth rates of other national groups in the USSR. According to the projections of a leading Soviet demographer, the four titular nationalities of the Central Asian republics alone will increase from the 14·3 million recorded in the 1970 census to 45·5 million in the year 2000.[2] Much of this growth is taking place in the rural areas of Central Asia, which already are almost totally Muslim. Even the cities, which once were European outposts, are now experiencing rapid increases of their Muslim populations. These changes place an enormous burden on the Soviet economy. Merely to clothe, feed, house, and employ this increasing population at current levels will require enormous capital expenditure. But the efforts of past Soviet leaderships to equalize regional development and to promote native cadres have produced a revolution of rising expectations among both the Central Asian masses and the upwardly mobile native cadres. Consequently, the present Soviet leadership is confronted by an even more difficult task: it must provide an increasing standard of living for increasing numbers of Muslims at all levels of the economy.

The economic development of Central Asia is bringing two peoples distinguished by race, religion, language, culture, and historical tradition into ever closer and more frequent contact at both the mass and elite levels. Recent literature on politics in the multicultural societies of Europe and North America suggests that precisely such increasing contact generates ethnic conflict.[3] It is not surprising, therefore, that there is increasing evidence of inter-ethnic conflict and hostility in Soviet Central Asia. More Muslims are coming into contact with Europeans in positions of authority in the educational system, the military and the economy. At the mass level, the "us-them" distinction resulting from such contacts heightens the sense of separateness among the Muslims of Central Asia. Thus, recent émigrés from the USSR report a relatively high level of tension at present between Europeans and Muslims in Central Asia and that Muslims now taunt Europeans with the warning "wait until the Chinese come."[4] Recent mass demonstrations are reported to have ethnic overtones.[5] Even greater numbers of Central

[2] G. A. Bondarskaya, *Rozhdaemost' v SSSR (Etnodemograficheskii aspekt)*, as cited in Murray Feshbach, "Population and Manpower Trends in the USSR," a paper presented at *Conference on Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects*, International Communication Agency and the Kennan Institute, Washington, D.C., 31 October 1978, Table 4 (n.p.).

[3] Some of this literature, and an extensive bibliography, may be found in Kenneth McRae (Ed.), *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1974).

[4] Igor Shafarevich, "Separation or Reconciliation? The Nationalities Question in the USSR," in Alexander Solzhenitsyn, et. al., *From Under the Rubble* (Little, Brown, Boston, 1975), p. 88.

[5] *Jerusalem Post*, 5 Sept. 1978.

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Asians are acquiring higher education and entering the scientific and technical elite. They are also occupying greater numbers of more responsible positions in the party and state apparats of that region. This increasing participation of Muslim cadres in Soviet social, political and economic institutions at the elite level is bringing them into increasing competition with dominant Europeans. Such competition is invested with ethnic meaning both by Europeans and Muslims and, as Soviet sociological studies attest, by itself generates ethno-national tension.[6] Should the Soviet leadership fail to provide its increasing numbers of native Muslim cadres with continuing opportunities for upward mobility, feelings of relative deprivation will arise among them; and these feelings almost certainly will lead to an intensification of ethno-national tensions in Central Asia.

The central Soviet leadership will not be able to control the level of ethno-national tension in Central Asia by the manipulation of cultural policy alone. Indeed, such action may be counter-productive: it may generate a revolution of rising expectations in the cultural sphere comparable to that already operating in the economy. If the central Soviet leadership is to control the level of ethno-national tensions in Central Asia, it must move to solve the economic problems underlying its rise. It will have to provide employment for the ever-increasing Central Asian Muslim population and opportunities for continued upward mobility for Muslim cadres. It can do this only by moving large numbers of Muslims to the more developed regions of the Soviet Union, by significantly increasing the rate of economic development of Central Asia or by some combination of the two. Its ability to do the former, however, is limited by the nature of the Muslim community and its ability to do the latter by the competing demands of other regions of the USSR.

THE Muslims of Central Asia share with Muslims elsewhere in the Soviet Union a common identity based on Islamic culture. This Muslim identity is extremely complex and differs radically from that of other nationalities in the Soviet Union. It competes with, and in critical ways is more important than, both the separate national identities imposed on them by the Soviet regime and the more ancient sub-national loyalties of tribe and clan.[7] Most important, this identity limits the ability of the central Soviet leadership to "solve" the economic problems underlying the rise of ethno-national tensions in Central Asia.

Central Asia lies within the boundaries of what for Muslims is the *Dar-ul-Islam*—the "Abode of Islam."[8] The *Dar-ul-Islam* is that compact

[6] See Jeremy R. Azrael and Steven L. Burg, "Political Participation and Ethnic Conflict in Soviet Central Asia," a paper presented at *Conference on Soviet Central Asia.*

[7] Alexandre Bennigsen, "Ethnic Consciousness in Soviet Central Asia," a paper presented at *Conference on Soviet Central Asia.*

[8] *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, New Edition, Vol. II, part 1 (E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1965), pp. 126, 127.

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territory defined by the presence of a Muslim majority in the population, some official protection for both the laws of Islam and the Muslim community (*Umma*), and at least symbolic representation of Muslims in the local leadership. It is the territory in which Muslims feel themselves " at home." Beyond its borders is the *Dar-ul-Harb,* the " Abode of War." This land is foreign to Muslims. Here there are no Muslims at all, or they are in the minority; and neither they nor the laws of Islam enjoy protection. Few Muslims are likely to settle permanently in this region voluntarily, except under conditions which will allow them to propagate the faith and thereby expand the borders of the *Dar-ul-Islam.* Soviet statistics on migration reveal a pronounced absence of movement out of the traditional areas of Muslim settlement. Data on the national composition of the party, local soviets, and scientific cadres elsewhere in the USSR indicate that even among " mobilized " Muslim cadres only a relatively small number of individuals are willing to move outside these areas. This reluctance of Muslims to settle in the *Dar-ul-Harb* severely limits the ability of the central Soviet leadership to employ Central Asian Muslim labour elsewhere in the Soviet Union on a large scale.

The central leadership might be able to transfer Muslim labour from one region of the *Dar-ul-Islam* to another through the use of economic incentives. But none of these regions is labour-deficient. Those regions which are—Siberia, European Russia, and the Ukraine—form part of the *Dar-ul-Harb.* Consequently, the central Soviet leadership will not be able to transfer Muslim labour to those regions unless it grants significant cultural concessions to the Muslims it seeks to transfer, or uses coercion to transfer them. It is highly unlikely to do the former because of the potentially explosive demonstration effect this would have on other nationalities, and it seems as yet unprepared to do the latter. Moreover, it is far from certain that such transfers would not in fact exacerbate ethno-national tensions in the USSR both by increasing inter-ethnic contact and by expanding the role of illegal Islamic brotherhoods in the Muslim community.[9] Consequently, if the Soviet leadership is to make use of Central Asian labour in European Russia or the Ukraine, it will be able to do so only on a limited scale and in a manner which restricts contacts between Muslims and native Slavs to a minimum. Such limited transfers of labour are unlikely to " solve " the economic and ethno-national problems of Central Asia.

GIVEN these constraints, the central Soviet leadership is likely to attempt to solve the economic and ethno-national problems of Central Asia by increasing the rate of economic development rather than by transferring labour out. For this strategy to work, it will have to increase capital investment in Central Asia on a scale sufficient to raise

[9] Alexandre Bennigsen, " Muslim Conservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime: The Sufi Brotherhoods in the North Caucasus," in Jeremy R. Azrael (Ed.), *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (Praeger, New York, 1978).

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the standard of living at a rate commensurate with rising expectations. This would require enormous amounts of capital even if it were possible for the Soviet leadership to apply its usual practices of urban concentration and *gigantizm* in industrial development. But these policies do not work in Central Asia. In a recent analysis, one western geographer has found that the Muslim labour force in Central Asia is not only overwhelmingly rural but is reluctant even to move to the European-style cities in its own republics. For many Muslims, the cultural costs of moving to, or even living in, such an urban environment outweigh any economic benefits.[10] At the same time, those Muslims who do make the move are likely to experience an intensification of their Muslim identity as a result both of increased contact with non-Muslims and closer communication with other Muslims. In the cities, Muslim identity is further reinforced by the existence of both official and unofficial Muslim organizations. Consequently, the central Soviet leadership will have to adopt a very different development strategy for Central Asia; and this strategy will entail even greater capital costs.

The Soviet leadership will have to direct investment in Central Asia into the construction of labour-intensive industry. Rather than constructing giant enterprises in the cities, it must build labour-intensive branch plants in the heavily populated rural areas. For any given level of capacity the construction of several branch plants requires more capital than the construction of a single giant one. Moreover, the capital required for infrastructure will be greater as well.

Because the Central Asian economy cannot produce the capital required to do this, the Soviet leadership will have to obtain such capital from elsewhere. There are only two regions in the USSR which could generate substantial amounts of capital for transfer to Central Asia: European Russia and the Ukraine. Both have diversified economies and are net capital producers. But the capital requirements of each, the ethno-national meaning such transfers would have for the Great-Russian and Ukrainian peoples, and the need to maintain and improve the performance of the Soviet economy as a whole severely limit the ability of the Soviet leadership to extract such capital in quantities sufficient to solve the Central Asian problem.

The performance of the Soviet economy as a whole depends to a great extent on the performance of the economies of European Russia and the Ukraine. The capital required to maintain production in these regions will be determined not only by the need to maintain and modernize physical plant, but also in large measure by the need to compensate for growing labour shortages. A recent western analysis of the 1970 Soviet census reveals that the population of able-bodied persons in the RSFSR will decline between 1981 and 1995.[11] And the Soviet leadership will not be able to increase significantly the labour supply in these regions.

[10] See Theodore Shabad, " Central Asia and the Soviet Economy: Implications for Policy," a paper presented at *Conference on Soviet Central Asia*, p. 2.

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It is unlikely to be able to import significant amounts of labour from the labour-rich areas of the Soviet Union. Muslims will not go willingly to European Russia or the Ukraine and neither of the Slav peoples there wants them to come. As we suggested above, limited transfers of labour may be possible under certain conditions, but any sudden dramatic increase in the working-age population resident in European Russia and the Ukraine would require the expenditure of substantial resources in the construction of housing and other non-capital producing infrastructure. Consequently, moving substantial amounts of Muslim labour in would be extremely costly to the Soviet leadership both in economic and ethno-national terms.

The Soviet leadership might choose to bring home Slavs now resident in Central Asia. But such Slavs are relatively few in number. Moreover, such transfers would adversely affect the efficiency of the Central Asian economy and threaten Moscow's control in Central Asia. For despite the advances by native cadres mentioned above, Slavs in Central Asia continue to perform crucial roles in economic and political institutions in the region. The party control functions and state security *apparat*, for example, appear still to be dominated by Slav cadres.[12] Nor is the Soviet leadership likely to attempt to reduce the labour shortages in European Russia and the Ukraine by transferring Slav labour from the countryside to the city. Such transfers would, in effect, be nothing more than a shell game. They would simply move existing labour from one sector of these economies to another, without significantly reducing capital requirements.

Furthermore, the Soviet leadership is unlikely to be able to reduce labour shortages by increasing the working week, by raising the retirement age, by lowering the age of entry into the work force, or by reducing hidden unemployment. All of these measures entail both efficiency costs for these economies, and psychic costs for the Great-Russian and Ukrainian peoples. Even if the Soviet leadership were willing to bear these costs, there will not be enough young Russians and Ukrainians entering the labour force in the next two decades for such measures to be effective.[13] The Soviet leadership is already attempting to encourage natural population growth among Russians and Ukrainians, but this obviously is a long-term solution to what is a critical short-term problem.

Unable to increase significantly the labour supply in European Russia and the Ukraine, the central Soviet leadership might attempt to make better use of the industrial plant of these regions by transferring it to

[11] Murray Feshbach, " Population and Manpower Trends in the USSR," op. cit. See also his " The Structure and Composition of the Soviet Industrial Labor Force," in *The USSR in the 1980s* (Nato Directorate of Economic Affairs, Brussels, 1978).

[12] See John H. Miller, " Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas," *Soviet Studies*, XXIX, 1 (January 1977), and Grey Hodnet and Val Ogareff, *Leaders of the Soviet Republics 1955-1972* (Australian National University, Canberra, 1973), *passim*.

[13] Feshbach, op. cit.

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labour-rich, but less-developed Central Asia. Such transfers, however, would entail important costs. First, the physical transfer of industrial plants would be expensive and there is no guarantee that any plant so transferred would resume operation at a comparable level of efficiency. Second, some transfer of personnel would also be required—at least in the early stages—and this would tend both to reduce the economic value of such transfers and to exacerbate ethno-national tensions in Central Asia. And third, such transfers would have an important symbolic meaning for Great-Russians and Ukrainians. They would call into question the commitment of the Soviet leadership to raising the standard of living for them and their children and suggest that the Soviet leadership was no longer "their own."[14] Consequently, while the economic costs of such transfers would be high, the ethno-national costs would be prohibitive.

GIVEN its inability to move labour in or to move physical plant out, the central Soviet leadership will have to maintain and improve the performance levels of the economies of European Russia and the Ukraine *in situ* despite increasing labour shortages. This will require substantial improvements in labour productivity. But if it is to raise the standard of living in these regions, promote the growth of the Soviet economy as a whole, and be able to provide the capital necessary for the development of Central Asia, the Soviet leadership must do more than this. It must increase the productivity of the physical plant of these economies as well. This will require the automation of much of the industrial plant.

Automation will require increased capital investment not only in European Russia and the Ukraine but in Siberia as well. The automation of the industrial plant in European Russia and the Ukraine will require enormous capital investment, especially in high-technology equipment. And if that automated plant is to operate at efficient levels of capacity, the central Soviet leadership must develop for it vast new energy resources and supplies of raw materials. Within the USSR, these can be obtained only by developing Siberia—including the far east; and this will require significant amounts of capital investment there in exploration, technology and infrastructure. Both automation and Siberian development will severely limit, at least in the short term, the amount of capital available for transfer to Central Asia. But only by such investment now can the Soviet leadership create an economic base inside the USSR large enough to generate in the future enough capital to "solve" the economic and ethno-national problems of Central Asia.

The capital necessary to do all these things simultaneously cannot be generated by the Soviet economy alone. But while it does not have the capital to do all of these the Soviet leadership cannot afford to ignore

[14] This concern for the Russian character of the Soviet state is one of the major themes in the novel *Vo imya otsa i syna* by Ivan Shevtsov (Moscow, 1968).

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any one of them: the costs—both economic and ethno-national—would be too great. Consequently, in the absence of an external supply of capital, the Soviet leadership will have to make some hard choices about precisely how much capital it will invest where. These choices are likely to be made on the basis of the Soviet leadership's estimates of the relative economic and ethno-national costs and benefits of particular investment strategies. These estimates will be largely determined by structural, institutional, and functional constraints imposed on each member of the Soviet leadership by regional, republican, and national factors.

Structural, Institutional, and Functional Constraints in the Politburo

The basic directions of Soviet policy are determined by the Politburo. Thus, in order to view the Central Asian problem as the Soviet leadership does, we must consider it from the perspective of the Politburo. We must examine the structural, institutional, and functional constraints which largely determine the policy choices of its members.

Individuals are co-opted into the Politburo by the existing membership in order to increase the political support of one or more of its members, to provide expertise in particular areas of policy discussion, and/or to incorporate certain bureaucratic domains into its purview. Each member of the Politburo thus has two constituencies, one he is responsible *to*, and the other he is responsible *for*. The first is a constituency in the accepted western sense. It is that group of people whose confidence he must maintain lest they remove him from office. This constituency is made up of his colleagues in the Politburo. The other consists of the bureaucratic domain for the operation of which he, as a member of the Politburo, is responsible. These domains are of two types: functional and territorial. Historically, the functional constituencies of Politburo members have included the party *apparat*, the state *apparat*, the secret police, heavy industry, agriculture, defence, foreign policy and culture. The territorial constituencies have included the non-Russian republics and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad. Not all of these constituencies have been represented in the Politburo at all times, and the relative power of their representatives has varied as well. The relative power of individual members of the Politburo in turn is determined by their bureaucratic domains, their performance in those domains, their personal relations with the other members of the Politburo, and their membership status in the Politburo.

Each member of the Politburo must perform two tasks: he must enforce Politburo decisions on his functional or territorial constituency, and he must represent the interests of that constituency in the deliberations of the Politburo. Thus, his role is as much to control interests as to convey them. Were he not to do the former he would lose the confidence of his Politburo constituency. Were he not to do the latter he would lose the support necessary to implement central policy in his functional or

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territorial constituency. In either case, it is highly likely that he would be dismissed from the Politburo.

Politburo members with territorial constituencies must necessarily represent certain functional interests because those functions are performed in their territory. Conversely, members with functional constituencies must necessarily represent certain territorial interests because their constituencies are located in specific territories. Thus, a first secretary of a territorial party organization must be attentive to a variety of functional institutions within " his " territory while a member responsible for heavy industry or agriculture must be attentive to conditions in the territories in which " his " institutions are located. No Politburo member, however, has an explicitly national constituency. But because the Soviet Union is a multinational state, because the national groups in it are distributed regionally, and because the political divisions of the state and party closely correspond to ethnographic boundaries, both Politburo members with functional constituencies and those with territorial ones are compelled to represent certain national interests as well.

It is obvious that Politburo members with territorial constituencies are compelled to represent the interests of the nationalities in their domain. It is less obvious but no less true that members who have functional constituencies must do the same thing. It would seem that because their constituencies cut across so many national boundaries this would not be the case. But in actual fact, they are. Because they are based in Moscow and view the Soviet system from its Russian centre, because the overwhelming majority of the institutions which compose their bureaucratic domain are located in the RSFSR, because the overwhelming majority of the cadres who staff those institutions both in the RSFSR and elsewhere are Russians, and because they themselves are in almost every case ethnically Russian, Politburo members with functional constituencies are compelled to represent Russian national interests. There are, however, severe limitations on just how far they may go in representing those interests.

Any attempt by one of these Politburo members to appropriate Russian national interests as his constituency would weaken his ability to represent the interests of his functional constituency, would pose a challenge to other Russian members of the Politburo, and would threaten the non-Russian members. Such action would almost certainly result in his immediate dismissal from the Politburo. The case of Shelepin comes immediately to mind.[15] Nor can these members of the Politburo act in concert to represent Russian national interests. This is because their functional constituencies often compel them to take conflicting positions on policy issues, because substantial portions of their constituencies are

[15] See Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right* (Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1978), pp, 141-2.

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situated in non-Russian territories, and most important because any such action would threaten the integrity of the Soviet state.

While the ability of these members to represent Russian national interests in the Politburo is severely restricted, their presence there precludes the active representation of those interests by anyone else. The potential threat that would be posed by the active representation of Russian national interests by another individual member of the Politburo is so great that the Soviet leadership has refused to create for the Russian republic a separate party organization as it has done for every non-Russian republic. And *as long as there are functional constituencies represented in the Politburo there cannot be a separate Russian party organization with its own representative in the Politburo.* For as long as there are Politburo members with functional constituencies, a Russian party secretary on the Politburo would have no substantial constituency to represent other than Russian nationalism. And even were such a position created solely to exercise the control function associated with Politburo membership its occupant would inevitably fail in his task. If he suppressed Russian nationalism—that is, if he drove it completely underground—he would destroy the regime's ability to control it; and if he expressed it, he would seriously weaken the regime's appeal to the non-Russian peoples, who now constitute half the Soviet population. In either case, he would be dismissed immediately. The danger of any appeal to nationality is especially acute for the only member of the Politburo whose constituency coincides with the Russian republic: the Premier of the RSFSR. Because he is the head of the state administration of the RSFSR he is responsible for it as a territorial economy rather than as a national territory. In the absence of a Russian party first secretary on the Politburo, therefore, only the General Secretary of the CPSU can serve as the symbolic representative of the Russian people; but because of his all-Union responsibilities he, too, is precluded from expressing Russian nationalist sentiments too vigorously.

Politburo members with territorial constituencies also are severely limited in just how far they can go in representing the national interests of the nationalities in their domains. These limitations apply with equal force both to the Politburo members with Russian territorial constituencies (Moscow and Leningrad) and to those with non-Russian constituencies. It is uncertain exactly what the role of the Moscow party first secretary is in the Politburo, but for precisely the reasons noted above he cannot become a spokesman for Russian national interests. Nor can the Leningrad party first secretary. But his position often compels him to do so. This is because Leningrad first secretaries are spokesmen for the interests of a territory which is both peripheral and Russian. This combination places them in an awkward position. As representatives of a peripheral territory they often are led to oppose the proclivity of Politburo members with functional constituencies toward centralization, and as representatives of a Russian one they are led to

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attempt to mobilize support for such opposition by appealing to Russian national sentiments. Just as in the case of other Politburo members with territorial constituencies, such opposition is likely to be perceived and portrayed as "bourgeois nationalism," a deviation for which they are dismissed immediately.

Politburo members with territorial constituencies populated by non-Russians are in an even more awkward position. As Politburo members they are not responsible for the representation of the national interests of the population in their territories, but as first secretaries of party organizations in non-Russian republics they are the symbolic representatives of the titular nationality in their republics. To carry out their Politburo responsibilities they must aggregate a host of competing interests in their territory in order to represent it in the Politburo, and they must mobilize the support of both cadres and the masses in their territory in order to enforce Politburo decisions there. Each of these tasks requires them to appeal to a sense of community, of shared interests. And their role as symbolic representative of the titular nationality invests such appeals with ethnic meaning.

This inevitable consequence of the dual role of the Politburo member/republican party first secretary is both useful to him and very dangerous. It is useful in that appeals to national sentiments are an effective means of aggregating interests and mobilizing support. It is dangerous because such appeals may alienate the non-native population—and especially non-native cadres—in his territory, because such appeals may activate nationalist forces in the native or non-native population which are outside the control of the party, and most importantly because such appeals may look to his colleagues on the Politburo like manifestations of "bourgeois nationalism." As the representative of a peripheral territory, a republican party first secretary in the Politburo—like his colleague from Leningrad—is often led to oppose the policy preferences of the members with functional constituencies. Consequently, he must formulate his appeals to national sentiments in his territory very carefully. They must be understood by his colleagues on the Politburo as applying only to the enforcement of Politburo decisions and not to the representation of territorial interests. That many of them have failed to do so is reflected in the fact that many such party leaders have been purged.[16]

The position of the first secretary of Uzbekistan is particularly difficult in this respect. He must limit his appeals to national sentiment not only for all the reasons outlined above but also for an additional and even more critical one. The growing sense of common Muslim identity among the nationalities of Central Asia means that any appeal to Uzbek national sentiments by the first secretary of Uzbekistan, unless it is constructed

[16] Several series of such purges and the issues surrounding them are reported in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, XXIII, 3 (May-June 1974),

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extremely carefully, is likely to appear to both his colleagues on the Politburo and non-Uzbek Central Asians as an appeal to the common ethno-cultural identity of that region. Any such appeal to the common ethno-cultural identity of Central Asians would be perceived by the other members of the Politburo as an attempt to form a regional constituency, and this is something which they would not long endure. The long tenure of the first secretary of Uzbekistan as a member of the Politburo suggests that he has been extremely circumspect in both words and actions.

In addition to all these constraints, there is yet another set about which we know very little but which almost certainly is important for the operation of the Politburo—the additional rules which govern the behaviour of candidate (non-voting) members in the deliberations of that body. This set of parameters will be particularly important in discussions of the inter-regional transfer of resources and the "solution" of the Central Asian problem because some Politburo members who are simultaneously first secretary of a non-Russian republican party organization are full voting members while others are only candidate members without a vote.

The "Solution" of the Central Asian Problem

As we have suggested, the Central Asian problem arises out of the competing resource requirements of modernization and automation of the physical plant in European Russia and the Ukraine, of Siberian development, and of the rapidly increasing population of Central Asia. At present the Soviet economy alone cannot supply the amount of capital necessary to meet all these requirements simultaneously. But, as we also suggested earlier, the Soviet-leadership cannot ignore any one of them completely. The economic and the ethno-national costs of doing so would be too great. Consequently, the members of the Politburo, acting within the constraints outlined above, will have to choose the extent to which they will meet each. The choices of each individual member on questions of investment are determined by the needs of *both* his constituencies—the functional or territorial domain, and his colleagues on the Politburo.

Those members of the Politburo with territorial constituencies in the relatively underdeveloped and demographically growing republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaidzhan and Georgia must represent the interests of these republics in Politburo debates on investment. Given their necessary sensitivity to the national factor and concern for the maintenance of control over their respective territories, they are highly likely to advocate a labour-intensive, dispersed investment strategy on a scale sufficient to provide continued upward mobility for all—but especially native—cadres, increasing employment for the mass population, and an increasing standard of living in their respective territories. At the same time, however, those members with constituencies in the more developed but demographically static territories of Leningrad,

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Moscow, Belorussia, and the Ukraine must do the same. And conditions in their territories compel them to advance substantial capital demands of their own. The relative power of these two groups of Politburo members is markedly unequal. All of the latter are full voting members, while among the former only the Kazakh first secretary is a full voting member of the Politburo. Although we do not know the full meaning of this difference, at the very least the latter group of members is able to represent the interests of their constituencies much more forcefully than the former. Indeed, the fate of Ukrainian party secretaries in the Politburo suggests that they have done so.

This inequality of status (and power) in the Politburo suggests further that the magnitude and pattern of investment in Central Asia and the other underdeveloped regions—and hence the " solution " of the Central Asian problem—depends almost entirely on the degree to which those voting members of the Politburo with functional constituencies perceive the need to invest in this region. Certain of these members are not at all likely to favour substantial capital investment in Central Asia. The members with constituencies in the state economic administration and in heavy industry are likely to view such investment as depriving vast portions of their constituencies—concentrated in European Russia and the Ukraine—of needed resources and, therefore, to oppose it as " economically irrational." The member responsible for heavy industry is especially likely to oppose any pattern of investment which expands the labour-intensive light industrial sector at the expense of his own constituency. The member responsible for the military and defence bureaucracies is likely to oppose such investment not only because of the resources it would divert from " the military-industrial complex "—also located primarily in European Russia and the Ukraine—whose interests he must represent, but also because Central Asia may become vulnerable to Chinese attack in the near future.[17] And, to the extent that a candidate member participates in such discussions, the member responsible for the economic administration of the RSFSR is likely to oppose such investment not only by advancing the interests of European Russia (in cooperation with the members from Leningrad and Moscow) but also by setting the benefits of investment in Siberia against the costs of investment in Central Asia.

Investment in Siberia is likely to present an attractive alternative for those Politburo members opposed to investment in Central Asia. Those with constituencies in the state economic administration and in heavy industry are highly likely to view the development of Siberian raw materials and energy resources as essential to the continuing development and expansion of the bureaucratic domains which compose their own constituencies. The member responsible for the military and defence establishments is likely to view development of Siberia both as an economic necessity for his constituency and as a military necessity for

[17] Jeremy R. Azrael (ed.), " Emergent Nationality Problems in the USSR," in Azrael, op. cit. p. 368.

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the Soviet Union. And the members with territorial and functional constituencies in the RSFSR undoubtedly view the development of Siberia as essential to the overall development of the Russian republic. But the development of Siberia is likely to have an even deeper attraction for these members of the Politburo as well.

Siberia is the frontier of the Soviet Union, and its development is invested with important ethnic meaning by the Great-Russian people. Indeed, it has been suggested by one western observer that Siberia constitutes a new "Russian heartland"[18]—an idea reflected in Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Soviet Leaders."[19] But while Siberia as a region is distinct from European Russia, the Ukraine, and Central Asia, it is at the same time an integral part of the Russian republic. The inter-regional transfer of capital resources from European Russia to Siberia, therefore, can be carried out as part of a programme for the economic development of the Russian republic. And commitment to the development of that republic carries with it an obvious, even if unstated message of support to the Russian people. Consequently, substantial capital investment in Siberian development not only offers potentially greater economic benefits, but also entails significantly fewer ethno-national costs to the Russian members of the Politburo responsible for functional constituencies than does investment on an equivalent scale in Central Asia. Moreover, it also promises them important ethno-national benefits. For it allows them to accommodate Russian nationalist sentiments in a way which is highly utilitarian, which does not increase disproportionately the power of any one of them, and which does not directly threaten the non-Russian nationalities.

Two important members of the Politburo, however, may favour substantial capital investment in Central Asia despite their perceptions that greater economic benefits could be derived from the investment of that capital in Siberia, European Russia, or the Ukraine. The General Secretary, as leader of the Soviet Union, must be especially sensitive and responsive to any potential threat to domestic stability in the USSR. And as head of the party he must be especially sensitive and responsive to conditions which threaten to disrupt the smooth execution of the party's control function. Thus, the potential consequences of ethno-national discontent arising out of a failure to develop the Central Asian economy are very likely to lead him to support capital investment there and to emphasize the continuing "nativization" of the state and party *apparats* of the region. The Politburo member responsible for security —at present the Chairman of the KGB—also must be sensitive and responsive to the potential control problems associated with a failure to develop the Central Asian economy. But he must be equally sensitive to the potential control problems associated with extensive development

[18] David J. M. Hooson, *A New Soviet Heartland?* (D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1964).
[19] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Letter to Soviet Leaders* (Harvill, London, 1974). See also his *A Lenten Letter to Pimen, Patriarch of All Russia* (Burgess, Minneapolis, 1972).

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of the almost entirely native countryside of that region. This sensitivity and his close ties to the military and to heavy industry are likely to lead him to advocate a more "typically Soviet" pattern of development for the region than is most appropriate for the "solution" of the problems there: one which emphasizes *gigantizm*, concentration, and most important from his perspective, central control.

Advocacy of limited development of the Central Asian economy according to "typically Soviet" patterns by these two powerful members of the Politburo is likely to attract some support from among those members of the Politburo otherwise opposed to any investment there. But the development effort which results is likely to be limited to a scale which allows the more rapid development of Siberia. For Siberian development holds many of the same attractions for the General Secretary and the Chairman of the KGB as for the other Russian members of the Politburo. As a result, a "consensus" may emerge in support of such a development strategy among the members of the Politburo with functional constituencies. The first secretaries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaidzhan and Georgia are also likely to support this strategy. Given their clearly inferior status in the Politburo and their need to maintain the confidence of their colleagues, it is probably the best they can do under present circumstances. Indeed, a recent review of Soviet regional development policies by a western economist suggests that such a strategy has already been adopted.[20]

One member of the Politburo, however, is likely to oppose this strategy. As in the past, the first secretary of the Ukraine will be compelled to do so by the capital requirements of the Ukrainian economy. He will be able to do so because of the greater political resources under his control in the Ukraine and because his power-political position in the Politburo is superior to those of the other republican first secretaries. But, as we have already noted, if he opposes this consensus too vigorously he will be replaced. Indeed, any defence of Ukrainian interests in the face of this consensus may be viewed by other members of the Politburo as unacceptable nationalism, for which he will be removed. Thus, the first secretary of the Ukraine may be able to moderate the capital demands likely to be placed on the Ukraine by the central Soviet leadership. But, in the absence of an external supply, he will not be able to prevent the export of increasing amounts of capital from the Ukraine to Siberia and Central Asia.

THIS strategy is not going to "solve" the Central Asian problem. The investment of capital in Siberia and European Russia will make it impossible for the central Soviet leadership to provide capital for investment in Central Asia in quantities sufficient to provide an increasing standard of living for the rapidly increasing population there. This failure

[20] Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Soviet Regional Development Policies in Perspective," in *The USSR in the 1980s.*

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is likely to increase feelings of relative deprivation among the Central Asians and to exacerbate existing ethno-national tensions. At the same time, this strategy is going to intensify problems in the Ukraine. The central Soviet leadership has exported capital from the Ukraine in the past to support development elsewhere,[21] and it is going to have to do so at an increasing rate in the future. This will result in a slowdown of the Ukrainian economy and a corresponding decline if not in the absolute level of the standard of living there, at least in the rate of its increase. Unlike the Great-Russians, the Ukrainian people do not derive any ethno-national benefits either from the development of Siberia or from the development of Central Asia which would counterbalance the economic costs. Nor do the economic opportunities created by the development of Central Asia and Siberia seem to provide countervailing benefits: in recent years, Ukrainians have been returning from these regions to the Ukraine despite the economic incentives for remaining.[22] All of this is likely to produce a widespread sense of relative deprivation among Ukrainians in the Ukraine. Given the strong national sentiments and the existence of an organized dissident movement in the Ukraine, such feelings of relative deprivation may produce an active *nationalist* movement there.

Although this strategy will not "solve" the problems of Central Asia and will exacerbate problems in the Ukraine, it is the only one on which, in the absence of an external supply of capital, the current Soviet leadership is likely to be able to agree. But the composition of that leadership will probably change soon and foreign supplies of capital may become a factor in Soviet decision-making. Thus, there will very likely be strong pressures inside the USSR to change this strategy in the near future.

Nationalism in the Ukraine and ethno-national tension in Central Asia will be manifest in domestic pressures for change at two levels: mass and elite. The Soviet system has the capacity to absorb and contain significant amounts of mass violence. Indeed, the Soviet leadership has demonstrated that it is both willing and able to employ the degree of coercive force necessary to suppress episodic mass violence; and it is not likely that any prolonged mass violence directed against the regime will emerge in the short-run. Under "normal" conditions, the Soviet leadership also has the ability to manage intra-elite conflicts. But under the conditions of a succession struggle—conditions which today are imminent—the management of such conflicts becomes much more

[21] See Z. Lew Melnyk, "Regional Contribution to Capital Formation in the USSR: The Case of the Ukrainian Republic," in Z. L. Melnyk and V. N. Bandera (eds.), *The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective* (Praeger, New York, 1973).

[22] Figures for the distribution of migrants into and out of the Ukraine in the 1970 census reveal that just in the two-year period prior to the census the Ukraine gained population from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan well in excess of the increase between 1959 and 1970 in the number of Central Asians resident in the republic. TsSU, SSSR, *Itogi vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda*, Vol. VII (Moscow, 1974), pp. 6-7.

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difficult. This is because a succession struggle calls into question the power-political ranking of the members of the Soviet leadership and thereby increases the relative power of the previously less powerful members; it requires the members of the Politburo to form new coalitions, and these will be based less on the control functions of its members than on their representation of territorial or functional constitutencies. Thus it is likely that the coalition supporting the strategy outlined above will come apart. Precisely what coalition or coalitions—and what strategies—will replace it remains unclear. But it is clear that under the conditions of such a struggle the representatives of the underdeveloped, labour-rich territories will be in a position to represent their territories more forcefully than at present.

THROUGHOUT this article we have excluded the availability of foreign capital as a factor in the Soviet policy-making process. But such capital, its sources, its quantity, and the conditions under which it may be acquired, are likely to play a critical role in determining Soviet policy. There are three major foreign sources of such capital: the Soviet bloc countries, the industrialized nations of the West, and the oil-producing states of the Middle East. The quantities of capital that could be obtained from the Soviet bloc countries are limited. Consequently, if the Soviet leadership is to acquire significant amounts of capital from abroad, it must obtain it from either the West or the Middle East or both. The amount of capital which the Soviet leadership can obtain from the West is limited both by the competing domestic capital requirements of the western economies and by the reluctance of political leaders in the West to make substantial quantities of capital available to the Soviet Union without attaching significant conditions, conditions which the Soviet leadership up to now has viewed as unacceptable interference in its domestic affairs.

The Soviet leadership has not yet turned to the oil-producing states of the Middle East as a source of capital, but in view of the enormous resources of these countries it is highly likely to do so in the near future. It can do so in any one of a number of ways, each of which, however, entails important domestic ethno-national costs and foreign policy consequences It could improve its relations with such countries, support radical insurgent movements in some of them in an effort to install regimes more friendly to the Soviet Union, pursue a policy of military conquest, or it could adopt some combination of these policies. Each of these policies would have an effect on the Muslim community of the USSR. The first may entail demands by the oil-producing countries for cultural concessions to the Muslim population of the Soviet Union, and the other two may have a demonstration effect on that community. In addition, each is likely to lead to a deterioration in relations with the West. Consequently, any attempt by the Soviet Union to obtain much-needed capital from the Middle East may involve costs equal to or even

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greater than the costs associated with obtaining that capital from the West.

The Central Asian problem and the Soviet leadership's attempts to solve it thus presents the political leadership of the West with a remarkable opportunity to influence the course of Soviet domestic *and* foreign policy. To maximize this influence western leaders must make capital available to the Soviet Union in quantities sufficient to alter the Soviet leadership's estimates of the relative benefits to be derived from intervention in the Middle East but not so great as to threaten western security interests. This can be done only if, at the same time, western leaders pursue a policy in the Middle East designed to increase the costs of Soviet penetration there. To the extent that they are unable to prevent Soviet penetration of the Middle East they will find it much more difficult to win concessions from the Soviet leadership in return for any given level of capital which they may make available to the Soviet Union. But to the extent that they are successful in this, they will be able to win greater concessions. Indeed, in the face of Soviet capital requirements it may even be possible to link the provision of western capital with the reduction of Soviet military expenditure. And this, for the West, is the real meaning of the Central Asian problem.

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Code Words and Catchwords of Brezhnev's Nationality Policy

Michael Rywkin

A COMPARISON of the speeches and debates celebrating the 50th anniversary of the creation of the USSR (1972) with those at the 25th Party Congress (1976) shows that between these two occasions changes took place in the terminology defining Soviet nationality policy.

In accordance with a well-established Soviet habit, basic dogmatic premises remained unchallenged. Speeches and articles were afflicted by habitual dullness and sameness. But the usual standard phrases about the achievements of Soviet nationality policies were punctuated by new or redefined code words, reflecting the changes taking place in Soviet nationality politics.

Since the time of Joseph Stalin, the key code words connoting the basic positions in Soviet nationality politics have been *rastsvet* (flourishment), *sblizhenie* (rapprochement) and *sliyanie* (fusion). "Flourishment" stands for the separate development of each Soviet socialist nationality within the community of Soviet nations, with each nationality striving for betterment and self-fulfilment. Thus "flourishment" accepts political, social and economic integration, but rejects national assimilation.

The second definition, that of "rapprochement," is a movement away from "flourishment" and towards eventual fusion, assimilation, amalgamation. Rapprochement is just a passing stage, albeit one which might take generations and is essential to present and foreseeable future situations. Manner, speed and conditions are of primary importance. Slow-moving rapprochement might last the entire period of transition from socialism to communism, that means forever.

The remote "fusion" is the final goal after the unity stage and is supposed to take place around the Russian nation and its language. The cultural amalgamation of this new "Soviet nation" supposedly already emerges out of the rapprochement of its individual component nationalities, each meanwhile flourishing on its own, and is currently taking place in the Soviet melting pot under the conditions of "developed socialism." The latter is supposed to characterize the USSR, but not the junior socialist nations of Eastern Europe and Asia, who are deemed to be at lower stages of socialist development. The flourishment→rapprochement→fusion terminology applied to the USSR differs from the parallel one applied to other socialist nations by limiting itself to forces operating within the restricted framework of the USSR and not in the bloc as a whole. Thus in the context of bloc politics, flourishment means autonomous development, rapprochement implies development in unison with the USSR, and fusion, the ultimate merger of all socialist

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states after attaining the final stage of communism. Within the USSR, as in the bloc, the inviolability of the Moscow-centred Soviet community of nations is taken for granted, and each component is supposed to follow the same road to communism under strict guidance from the pace-setting Russian *primus inter pares*.[1]

But the nations of the bloc are supposed to follow the USSR as a whole along the road to this distant paradisical future, not just its leading component, Russia, and are allowed more leeway in regard to the distance from the leader and the manner and speed of their own progress. Thus we can see already three individual " roads." The first is a sheep-like one for the component nationalities of the USSR, for whom rapprochement is supposed to lead to centralized unity[2] (i.e. to the ultimate disappearance of the federal structure and to the emergence of a culturally Russian Soviet nation). The second is the Indian-file path of the nations of the socialist bloc led by the USSR, allowing for discrepancies in speed and manner of progress, for whom rapprochement is supposed to lead to a unity resembling the present-day flourishment of individual republics within the USSR. Finally, there is the heretic " own road " of national communism which allows for socio-economic patterns similar to those prevailing in the USSR, but excludes dependence on the latter. Assailed by Moscow, followed by China and Albania on the left, by Yugoslavia and (to a lesser extent) Rumania on the right, now endorsed by the communist parties of France and Italy, this road rejects not only merger or centralized unity with the USSR but even obligatory unity of action with the USSR.

The non-Russian nationalities are in no position to aspire openly to the latter two choices, and their best hope is simply the slowest possible movement from the relative comfort of flourishment to the thorny road of rapprochement. Thus every Soviet work on nationality problems which limits itself to the theme of rapprochement automatically defends the national separateness of the component republics of the USSR against Russian-oriented centripetal forces.[3]

The 50th Anniversary

In 1972, in his speech marking the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev introduced new terms defining his national policy goals: *vsestoronnee sblizhenie* (all-around rapproche-

[1] L. Brezhnev, " O pyatidesyatiletii Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik," *Kommunist*, No. 18 (1972), p. 13, defines RSFSR as " pervaya sredi ravnykh " (first among equals) among union republics.

[2] For such articles, see I. P. Tsamerian, " Mezhdunarodnoe znachenie opyta KPSS," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 2 (1970); K. Khallik, " Rol' kulturnykh svyazei v ukreplenii druzhby sovetskikh lyudei," *Kommunist Estonii*, No. 9 (1969).

[3] P. Masherov (First Secretary of the CC of KP of Belorussia), " O nekotorykh chertakh i osobennostyakh natsional'nykh otnoshenii v uslovyakh razvitogo sotsializma," *Kommunist*, No. 15 (1972), p. 19; A. Snechkus (First Secretary of the CC of the KP of Lithuania), " Velikaya sila sotsialisticheskogo internatsionalizma," *Kommunist*, No. 11 (1972), p. 25.

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ment) and *splochenie* (unity/cohesion) as roads to *edinstvo* (unity),[4] terms defining the optimum stages of rapprochement. His deliberate choice of high-level code words was an obvious attempt to accelerate the still unsatisfactorily slow progress of rapprochement by speeding the reluctant union republics along the way.

At the same occasion, first Party secretaries of union republics used terms to denote either plain flourishment or extensions of it: *vsestoronii rastsvet* (all-around flourishment), or *vzaimoobogashchenie* (mutual enrichment), or, as a maximum concession, rapprochement without adjectives.

Standing between Brezhnev and union-republican leaders, the Soviet President Podgorny settled on code words denoting clear-cut moves away from the static position of flourishment, without endorsing Brezhnev's extreme vocabulary. Podgorny spoke of flourishment and gradual rapprochement and no more. Brezhnev's speech, on the other hand, coming *after* other leaders had already stated their views, underlined the existing gap between his thinking and that of the union republics' secretaries. Impatient with their reluctance, he warned against "any kind of attempt to slow down" (*sderzhivat'*) the process of rapprochement.

Under Brezhnev's pressure, the first Party secretaries were forced to make concessions. In 1973, Sharaf Rashidov of Uzbekistan adopted a whole new range of code words covering almost the entire spectrum of the rapprochement process: *tesnoe sblizhenie* (close rapprochement), *rastsvet i sblizhenie* (i=and), *vse bolshee sblizhenie* (ever-increasing rapprochement), and the complex pair: *sblizhenie cherez rastsvet* (rapprochement through flourishment) and *rastsvet cherez sblizhenie* (flourishment through rapprochement). But he still avoided Brezhnev's strongest definitions, such as all-round rapprochement, and especially words beyond the rapprochement stage, such as *splochenie* (unity/cohesion) and *edinstvo* (unity).[5] It was a concession, but not a capitulation.

The next development was the appearance of the code term *polnoe edintsvo* (full unity), which takes Brezhnev's "unity" one step further. This seemingly illogical concept, since unity is by definition indivisible, was taken from Lenin's statement about "federal union as a transitory stage towards full unity."[6] A scholarly article on "Soviet Federalism in the Period of Developed Socialism" attempted to interpret such stages and to provide a theoretical foundation for Brezhnev's views.[7] The self-contradictory stage of "full unity," a substitute for the highest stage of fusion, was adjudged equally unattainable in the foreseeable

[4] Brezhnev, p. 18.

[5] Sh. Rashidov, "Yazyk bratstva i druzhby narodov," *Kommunist*, No. 3 (1973), p. 21.

[6] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. 41, pp. 164 and 438.

[7] A. I. Lepeshkin, "Sovetskii federalizm v period razvitogo sotsializma," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 8 (1975), p. 5.

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future.[8] The author cautioned not only against "slowing down" (*sderzhivanie*), but also against "hurrying" (*toroplivost'*) in carrying on the process of rapprochement leading towards full unity. He also defined the four basic premises leading the present-day Soviet federal system towards the final goal of full unity: (1) economic unity, (2) inter-migration of labour, (3) enlargement of both federal *and* republican powers, and, finally, (4) the process of rapprochement itself, as a carrier of its own momentum. He attempted the impossible by arguing that both state and federal powers can simultaneously be enlarged, mainly through extending the system of double-level union-republican ministries, and rejected matter-of-fact arguments made by other Soviet scholars about the need for choice between these mutually exclusive positions.[9]

On the positive side of Brezhnev's arguments (echoed by Lepeshkin) has been the replacement of the highest code word "fusion" by Lenin's "unity" or "full unity,"[10] terms much preferable from the point of view of the non-Russian nationalities. First of all, in speaking of unity, Lenin meant a French style centralized system of government after the disappearance of the initial political necessity for a federal system; he hardly thought of melting-pot fusion, and never of assimilation or Russification. Secondly, in Russian, the word *sliyanie* (fusion) means not merely fusion in the abstract but also the fusion of liquids resulting in the dissolution of original substances. Unity, on the other hand, is a static state of consolidation of separate solid entities (Soviet Socialist nationalities) into one (Soviet nation), but without mutual assimilation or Russification. The non-assimilative character of "unity" makes it preferable to melting-pot "fusion" and represents a major concession to the national sensitivities of the non-Russian nationalities by both Leonid Brezhnev and his faithful follower, Professor Lepeshkin.[11]

Thus fusion as a final goal is replaced by the linguistically illogical, but politically more acceptable concepts of unity, full unity or even monolithic unity. Meanwhile, we are witnessing the splintering of the basic code word "rapprochement" into a multitude of fresh terms defining the new intermediary stages along the road of rapprochement. This enables us to interpret individual positions without paying too much attention to the conformist bulk of their declarations: it is their use of specific code words which suffices to determine the respective views of Soviet leaders and writers on nationality problems.

With so many new definitions introduced in the 1970s, we can list the stages of the process of rapprochement between the initial position

[8] Ibid. p. 8.

[9] Ibid. pp. 10–11. For opposite opinion, see I. M. Kislitsin in *Voprosy teorii i praktiki federal'nogo stroitel'stva Soyuza SSR* (Perm, 1969), p. 134, as quoted by Lepeshkin.

[10] Lepeshkin, p. 4, arguing against P. G. Semenov, *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 12 (1961), pp. 15, 23ff.

[11] Lepeshkin, p. 8; Brezhnev, p. 17, about "Tolerance and delicate handling of national feelings."

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of "flourishment" and the remote goal of "unity" in the following order:

1. Flourishment level. Words denoting its various aspects: *protsvetanie* (prospering), *vklad* (contribution, apport) *vsestoronnii rastsvet* (all-round flourishment).

2. Brotherly level. Catchwords stressing collaborative aspects of friendly mutual relations between nationalities: *bratstvo* (brotherhood), *bratskoe sotrudnichestvo* (brotherly cooperation), *tovarishchestvo* (comradely relationship), *druzhba* (friendship), with adjectives *velikaya* (great), *nepokolebimaya* (unshakeable), *nerushimaya* (untouchable), *svyashchennaya* (holy).

3. Stages of rapprochement.

A. Words emphasizing mutual influences between national groups: *vzaimosvyaz'* (mutual connexion), *vzaimopomoshch'* (mutual aid), *vzaimodeistvie* (mutual interaction or "intensive mutual interaction").

B. Stages of rapprochement in ascending order:

a) *sblizhenie cherez rastsvet*—rapprochement through flourishment
b) *vzaimnoe sblizhenie*—mutual rapprochement
c) *postepennoe sblizhenie*—gradual rapprochement
d) *rastsvet cherez sblizhenie*—flourishment through rapprochement
e) *sblizhenie*—rapprochement
f) *vse bolshee sblizhenie* ever-increasing rapprochement
g) *bolee tesnoe sblizhenie*—closer rapprochement
h) *vsestoronnee sblizhenie*—all-round rapprochement

4. Subservience to Russia. Words underlining the central *primus inter pares* position of the Russian people and its decisive role in the process of rapprochement: *starshii brat* (elder brother) or *velikii russkii narod* (great Russian people).

5. Post-rapprochement stages. *Splochennost'* (unity/cohesion), *edinstvo* (unity), *polnoe edinstvo* or *monolitnoe edinstvo* (full or monolithic unity).

6. *sliyanie*—fusion. A term no longer in use.

The 25th Party Congress (February–March 1976)

The 25th Party Congress showed convincingly how high-level pronouncements on nationality problems are delivered through the medium of nationality policy code words. The speeches of first Party secretaries of union republics contained certain key code words which disclosed their current positions and the extent of their disagreements with Brezhnev. Thus nobody mentioned "fusion," a sure sign of its final demise. Brezhnev's key word was "unshakeable unity." Vladimir Shcherbitskii of the Ukraine and Petr Masherov of Belorussia avoided discussing nationality problems altogether and, as some Russian regional secretaries did, spoke as though unconcerned about the whole matter. It is not known whether they did so of their own volition or under Brezhnev's pressure.

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The Party leaders of Moldavia, Estonia and to a lesser extent Georgia appeared either the most stubborn or the most secure, or both, in defending the autonomy of their respective republics, and the least subservient to Moscow, although diffident towards Brezhnev personally.

The Party leaders of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaidzhan were the most willing to accept Brezhnev's policy of unity, or perhaps the least able to resist his pressure.

Karen Demirchyan, the leader of Armenia, adopted a double approach. He followed the Georgians in staying clear of code words defining rapprochement, but outdid everybody else in his subservience to Mother Russia. He was the only one to proclaim (seriously or ironically?): "May the sacred hour be blessed when the foot of a Russian stepped on Armenian soil." [12]

The leaders of other republics took up positions between the two extremes.

It is also worth noting that when speaking of relations between nations of the socialist bloc, Brezhnev used some of the nationality code words usually reserved for internal consumption, namely, "unity," "full unity" and "unity/cohesion." [13]

A FEW years ago in the West, Soviet republics were sometimes classified in relation to Russia in terms of "brotherly" (Ukraine and Belorussia), "friendly" (Christian Georgia and Armenia, which chose Russia as a "lesser evil") and "unfriendly" conquered ones (everybody else). Despite the upsurge of Ukrainian nationalism and consequent purges, the category of brotherly Slav republics still remains, but the difference between the other two groupings has narrowed significantly. Not only have nationalist elements in formerly relatively free Georgia and Armenia been purged, but (in contrast to the situation in the Ukraine) Moscow has appointed Russian and other Slav functionaries to several key positions in both republics, a practice traditionally reserved for the Moslem and Baltic areas. The native Party leadership, especially in Armenia, seems scared and bids for time. On the other hand, the Estonian and Moldavian leaders, who were previously used to less freedom of action than their Transcaucasian counterparts, have somehow managed to assert themselves. The Estonians did it on the strength of their economic successes, their showpiece position as the most advanced area within the USSR and their unthreateningly small numbers and low birthrate. The equally non-numerous Moldavians succeeded by playing Ukrainian and Russian chauvinism against each other. Moscow's desire to maintain the illusion of Moldavian autonomy in the eyes of its neighbour and frustrated owner, Rumania, has also played a role.

The principal new Soviet slogan: "Soviet nation—a new historical

[12] Demirchyan (First Secretary of the CC of CP of Armenia), speech at the 25th Congress, *Pravda* (29 Feb. 1976), p. 5.

[13] L. Brezhnev, Speech at the 25th Party Congress, *Kommunist*, No. 4, 1976, pp. 6–7.

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Usage of Nationality Politics Code Words at the 25th Congress of the CPSU

	Category of Code Words in Order of Ascending Conformity*				
	1	2	3	4	5
Party Secretary	*rastsvet* level	" brotherly " level	*sblizhenie* level	" big brother " level	*edinstvo* level
USSR: Brezhnev		x			x
Ukraine: Shcherbitsky					
Belorussia: Masherov					
Moldavia: Bodyul	x	x			
Lithuania: Griškevičius		x		x	
Estonia: Käbin	x	x			
Latvia: Voss		x		x	
Georgia: Shevardnadze	x	x		x**	
Armenia: Demirchyan		x		x***	
Azerbaidzhan: Aliev		x	x	x	x
Kazakhstan: Kunaev		x	x	x	x
Uzbekistan: Rashidov		x		x	
Kirghizia: Usubaliev		x	x	x	
Tadzhikistan: Rasulov		x	x	x	
Turkmenistan: Gapurov		x		x	x

* See the classification given in the text.
** *Velikii brat* instead of *starshii brat.*
*** See expression in text.

Source: Speeches published in *Pravda*, 25 February to 5 March 1976.

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community of peoples " under the conditions of " developed socialism " meets with violent criticism on the part of Communist China. The Chinese press labels it " chauvinistic," " oppressive " and " assimilative " and equates Brezhnev's *primus inter pares* doctrine with the old " elder brother " concept, both to be rejected outright.[14]

But whether China likes it or not, Brezhnev has set a course which through a long process of rapprochement is supposed to create a Russian-led, Russian-oriented and Russian-speaking Soviet Nation. If unity is not achieved, then the ruling Russian people with its falling birthrate and jingoistic tendencies will find itself dangerously outnumbered and spiritually isolated within the confines of an increasingly antagonistic multinational community driven by nationalistic centrifugal forces.

[14] Hsiao Lou, " Five Years of Continual Backsliding," *Peking Review*, No. 9 (27 Feb. 1976), p. 16; " Soviet Social Imperialism Pursues a Policy of National Oppression," ibid. No. 22 (May 76), p. 19.

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The Bibliography of Barthold's Works and the Soviet Censorship

Yuri Bregel

THE literary legacy of the great Russian orientalist, V. V. Barthold, is immense. During the 38 years of his scholarly activity, from the publication of his first article in 1892 until his death in 1930, he published 670 works: books, articles (including 247 articles in the Encyclopaedia of Islam), notices and reviews. 14 of his works were published posthumously at various dates; about a dozen works prepared for publication by Barthold remained unpublished and until recently were preserved in his archives. By no means all these works were well known to the specialists, particularly in the West. Even for Russian readers, access to many of them was difficult, for they were scattered in various, sometimes provincial, periodicals, which had long ago become bibliographic rarities. As I. Krachkovskii wrote in 1944, the scholarly legacy of Barthold " was often underestimated, usually because of casual circumstances, including poor knowledge of Barthold's works themselves." [1] From the end of the 1920s, both in Barthold's lifetime and later, after his death, his works were repeatedly subjected to attacks (sometimes very crude and ignorant) from Party critics in the Soviet Union; this too was not conducive to his works being better known in the USSR.[2] In the post-Stalin period, however, criticism of Barthold's views assumed a more or less academic character, and more voices were heard demanding a new edition of his works. The first to raise this question was Krachkovskii, as early as 1944, in his paper cited above. These suggestions, however, remained unbacked by any practical action until 1958, when this present author decided to take advantage of his official duty at the Publishing House for Oriental Literature in Moscow to push through a project for publishing Barthold's collected works. In cooperation with the late Professor I. Umnyakov, we worked out a detailed project for this edition, which started to appear in 1963. Publication continued for 15 years and came to an end only in 1977 with the publication of the ninth volume (in fact the edition consists of 10 volumes, the second one being divided in two separate parts). This edition, the first six volumes of which have already received favourable reviews,[3] has at last given to the reader a corpus of Barthold's main works, so that now not only have many of

1 I. Krachkovskii, *Izbrannye Sochineniya* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1958), vol. V, p. 430.
2 For details see, Yu. Bregel, " Barthold: the man and his work," in V. V. Barthold, *Caliph and sultan and other essays* (Gerald Duckworth, London, forthcoming).
3 Cl. Cahen, JESHO, IX/III, 1966, pp. 320–1; G. Doerfer, ZDMG, 118/2 (1968), pp. 441–2; G. Doerfer, ZDMG, 123/1 (1973), p. 158.

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his publications, previously bibliographical rarities, become available, but also his scholarly output as a whole is much easier to review.[4] Especially important in this respect is the appearance of a book, consisting of a comprehensive bibliography of Barthold's works and a description of his archives, published in Moscow a year before the publication of the last volume of the collected works.[5]

THIS book had a long history and pre-history. The first bibliographical survey of Barthold's works was published in his lifetime, in 1926, compiled by Umnyakov.[6] It was chiefly on this work that M. Dostoevskii, grandson of the famous author, based his bio-bibliographical survey published in 1931.[7] In 1933–34, T. Menzel published a chronological list of Barthold's works,[8] drawing on a list compiled by I. Krachkovskii. Menzel's bibliography remained the most complete list of Barthold's publications until the book containing Umnyakov's bibliography appeared in 1976.

After publishing his initial survey in 1926, Umnyakov continued to collect material for the bibliography of Barthold's works, although circumstances were not exactly favourable. He lived in Tashkent without access to all the literature he needed; Stalin's purges of the 1930s also affected him, and in 1932–38, as his Soviet biographer put it euphemistically,[9] he "worked outside Central Asia." The biographer does not add, however, that an "assignment by the UzSSR Narkompros (People's Commissariat for Education) to a job in Samarkand" in 1939, was in fact exile by administrative order, and for many years, although a professor of Samarkand University, Umnyakov had no right to go even to Tashkent without special permission from the police. Despite all this, in 1939 Umnyakov submitted to the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, then in Leningrad, the manuscript of his "Analytical Bibliography of Works by Academician V. V. Barthold" (that was its original title). The work was fiercely attacked by some of the Institute's members. Professor Umnyakov once gave me a copy of the minutes of the discussion of his work at the Institute[10]; it reads more like the record of a party dispute devoted to the struggle against one of the recurrent "oppositions" than of the meeting of a scholarly

[4] A general appreciation of this edition has yet to appear.

[5] I. I. Umnyakov, *Annotirovannaya bibliografiya trudov akademika V. V. Bartol'da*, N. N. Tumanovich, *Opisanie arkhiva akademika V. V. Bartol'da* (Nauka, Moscow, 1976, 468 pp.).

[6] "V. V. Barthold. Po povodu 30-letiya professorskoi deyatel'nosti," *Byulleten' SAGU*, 14 (Tashkent, 1926), pp. 175–202.

[7] "W. Barthold zum Gedächtnis. Versuch einer Charakteristik," *Die Welt des Islams* (XII/3, 1931), pp. 89–136.

[8] "Versuch einer Barthold-Bibliographie," *Der Islam* (XXI/2–3, 1933), pp. 236–42, XXII/2 (1934), pp. 144–62.

[9] See B. V. Lunin in *Istoriya material'noi kultury Uzbekistana*, 3 (Tashkent, 1962), p. 160.

[10] A verbatim report of the meeting of the Academic Council of the Institute of Oriental Studies of 3 November 1939.

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institution (this style was, however, quite usual at that time). They accused Umnyakov in particular of having expounded in his annotations, objectively and without criticism, views by Barthold which had long ago become "outdated," "questionable" and "absolutely unacceptable." One of the reviews ended with a sentence which is characteristic of Soviet conditions of the time: "There are [in Umnyakov's work] names of the enemies of the people—Samoilovich, Validov [11] (they have been underlined throughout), they should be crossed out." It might seem unnecessary to bring this story to light now, but, as we shall see further on, Soviet conditions have not changed as drastically since then as is sometimes supposed.

Only thanks to the authority of Krachkovskii, who came out in defence of Umnyakov and took on the editing, was his work saved and a decision taken to publish it. But Umnyakov's work was ill-fated. In 1940 it was set up for printing in Leningrad, but soon afterwards the war broke out, Leningrad was besieged, and the setting was destroyed. After the war Krachkovskii tried to further its publication,[12] but now even his authority was not enough. It was only possible to return to this project in connexion with the edition of the collected works. The bibliography by Umnyakov was widely used during the preparation of individual volumes of the collected works.[13] But for the second time the preparation of the bibliography itself for publication dragged on for many years. The author, who lived far from the main library centres of the Soviet Union and was by that time an old man (he was born in 1890) and in bad health, needed time to check his work and to add new material.[14] Moreover, the editorial board of the collected works decided to publish the bibliography together with a description of Barthold's archives, and the preparation of the latter, which Mrs N. N. Tumanovich, a member of the Leningrad Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies, was responsible for, took more time than had initially been supposed. When the manuscripts of both works were at last submitted to the publishers, they were in no hurry to publish. As a result, the first proofs of the book did not appear until the end of 1973. But fate had another blow in store for Umnyakov, which, unfortunately, was struck by my hands (or, if it is permissible to put it this way, by my feet): at the beginning of 1974 I left the Soviet Union for Israel, and, as I was the editor of the book by Umnyakov and Tumanovich and my name appeared repeatedly as one of the participants in the editing of

11 A. N. Samoilovich, the well-known Turkologist, was arrested in October 1937 and executed in February 1938 (see *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1963, No. 2, p. 246); Validov, that is Zeki Velidi Togan, left Russia in 1923, after a long struggle against the Soviet authorities in Central Asia.

12 Cf. his paper cited above, note 1.

13 See V. V. Barthold, *Sochineniya*, vol. I (1963), p. 13.

14 V. Minorsky wrote to me in a letter (in Russian) on 12 July 1964, "Have you persuaded I. I. Umnyakov to submit at last to the publishers his 'century-old work'? [The allusion is to the well-known words in Pushkin's drama *Boris Godunov*.] He is a kind of man that is called in English 'perfectionist,' all the time he wants to perfect."

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the collected works, the publishing house took another three years to find a way out of this "difficult (by Soviet standards) situation." When the book, at long last, was published in summer 1976, Umnyakov was not among the living: he had died on 21 February 1976, not having lived to see his book, which he had started 50 years previously. The monument he had intended to raise to his teacher became a monument to himself as well. The publishers expressed their sorrow in an obituary printed before Umnyakov's foreword to his work.

As to the difficulties with the name of the editor, the solution found was very simple: instead of Yu. Bregel, A. N. Kononov appears now as the editor of the book. A comparison of the book with a copy of the 1973 proofs, which I have at my disposal, has led to the discovery of only one noticeable result of A. N. Kononov's editorial activity: a preface by Mrs Tumanovich to her description of Barthold's archives has been substantially abridged. Instead of the original 19 pages it now has only 4; interesting information about the state of Barthold's papers by the time of their transfer to the archives, about the sorting out and the description of these papers done by the Arabist S. L. Volin in the 1930s, a description of the outward appearance of Barthold's manuscripts, etc. have been totally omitted.[15] Apart from this the book is the same as it was when I finished the editing.[16]

Nevertheless, every cloud has a silver lining: the present author, now that his name has disappeared from the book, feels free to express his opinion on it and render full due both to the authors and to the publishers.

THE book, as its title shows, consists in fact of two independent, though closely connected, works, and it may be useful to examine each of them separately.

Annotirovannaya bibliografiya trudov akademika V. V. Bartol'da ("An Annotated Bibliography of Works by Academician V. V. Barthold"), by I. I. Umnyakov (pp. 7–229) is divided into seven sections: 1. Articles and notices in encyclopaedic dictionaries; 2. Books, articles, papers and notices; 3. Reviews and bibliographical notices; 4. Personalia; 5. Surveys of scholarly publications [of various scholars], compiled by Barthold and signed by him together with others; 6. Editorial work; 7. Literature on Barthold. Within each section the works by Barthold (in section 7—works on Barthold) have been arranged chronologically in order of publication; within each year the order of titles is arbitrary, for in most cases it was impossible to establish their relative chronology. In the first section (the articles in encyclopaedias) Barthold's works are arranged in alphabetical, and not in chronological, order because, as Umnyakov

[15] There are several abridgements, apparently resulting from "ideological censorship" (see below).

[16] Before leaving Moscow I had time to check the proofs and to sign them "ready for printing."

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explains in his preface, it was difficult to establish the exact publication dates of these articles. This was also one of the main reasons why Umnyakov rejected a chronological arrangement of all the material in one general list. This explanation, however, is not very convincing: Russian encyclopaedias were published in volumes, and not in issues, so that the publication dates are known, and the publication dates of individual issues of the Encyclopaedia of Islam can also be established.[17] I had discussed all this with Umnyakov as editor of the book, but it was too late for him to undertake a complete rearrangement of his work, and it was left divided into its original sections despite the evident deficiencies of such a structure.

As individual entries in the bibliography appear not only the original editions of Barthold's works, but also their subsequent editions, including new editions in the collected works and all the volumes of the collected works themselves, as well as their translations into other languages. Under separate numbers in the bibliography are included individual issues of the same work published in several instalments (e.g. *Kitab-i Dede Korkut*). There are extra numbers with letters (a, b, etc.) and double numbers (pp. 164–6), which are explained by the fact that several numbers were reserved for the publications of Barthold's archival material. The editorial board had planned to publish them as the second part of volume IX, but this plan could not be carried out, and it was too late to change the numbers in the bibliography. As a result of all this, the numbering in the bibliography (518 + 275 + 20) does not give an idea of the real number of Barthold's published works and to find this out, the reader has to make the calculation for himself. This calculation shows that the total number of Barthold's published works is 684.

It is possible to deduce from the bibliography how many works by Barthold have been translated from Russian into other languages[18]: the total number is 37, and some of these have been translated into several languages.

Included in the bibliography are translations of 22 works into Turkish, 18 into German, 12 into English, three into French, four into Persian, three into Farsi-Kabuli ("Dari"), two into Arabic, as well as translations into Uzbek, Tatar, Kirghiz and Georgian languages. In all in the bibliography we find 71 translations of Barthold's works. New translations (as well as reprints and new editions of the old ones) continue to be published from time to time,[19] so that in this respect the bibliography will have to be supplemented for a long time to come.

[17] Umnyakov gives one more reason for his arrangement of the material: it makes it possible "to stress some peculiar features of Barthold's scholarly activity." But the same goal could have been achieved by means of additional indexes.

[18] The figures given by Umnyakov himself in his preface (p. 12) should be corrected accordingly.

[19] A volume containing English translations of four works on the history of Islam has been prepared by Duckworth and Co., London, and is under press; I was informed recently that an English translation of "A historico-geographical survey of Iran" has been planned in the USA.

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There is one more section of the work by Umnyakov that certainly could be enlarged in future, namely "Literature on V. V. Barthold" (pp. 218–29) which now includes 141 titles. Most of these publications are small biographical and bibliographical notices, but among them are also about 30 works in Russian and other European languages containing a more detailed biography of Barthold and a description of his scholarly works. Lately such publications have been appearing every year.

Besides giving the title and imprint of each work, the bibliography gives the following data: archival materials pertaining to the work (with a reference to the corresponding entry in the description of the archives); information about new editions and translations (with references to corresponding entries, where these publications are described separately); a list of published synopses, reviews, appraisals and additions to the work; a short summary of the contents. All this information is given with the highest possible completeness and accuracy. Only a few bibliographical references could not be checked *de visu*, and all such cases are specifically mentioned. As far as bibliographical accuracy is concerned, Umnyakov's work may be considered a model. As to its completeness, some additions probably could be made (besides new translations and literature on Barthold) of unregistered reviews of Barthold's works; but it is likely that such hypothetical cases are very rare.

The main object of possible criticism, as Umnyakov himself admits in his preface (p. 12), could be the summaries of the contents of Barthold's works. Barthold used to write in a condensed, dry style; he "makes few attempts to render the spiritual food more digestible," as V. Minorsky put it [20]; some of his works give the impression of "a thoroughly abridged original: it seems that there is not a single unnecessary sentence, and even word." [21] Naturally enough, to summarize Barthold's works is a very difficult task. Umnyakov tried, wherever possible, to summarize them in Barthold's own words. But he could note only what seemed to him most important in the works described, and his opinion on the relative importance of various topics may not coincide with the opinions of other readers. Apart from this, some statements and observations that do not occupy the main place in the summarized work, or even casual remarks, may sometimes have special interest for a modern researcher. All this, of course, could be reflected only to a small degree in the relatively narrow framework of a bibliographical annotation. One should also bear in mind that the bibliography was compiled long before the publication of Barthold's collected works became a reality; there is no doubt that, if it had been compiled after the publication of the collected works, the author would have assigned more place to the works not included in the new edition and, in some cases, would have abridged the annotations of works now repub-

[20] Foreword by the translators to V. V. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, vol. I (Leiden, 1956), p. XIV.

[21] I. Krachkovskii, *Selected Works*, vol. V, p. 355.

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lished and easily available. But all this does not cast any doubt on the usefulness of the bibliography in the form in which it has been published: far from all the publications by Barthold are included in the collected works, and only the work of Umnyakov makes his immense literary legacy easily surveyable.

THE description of Barthold's archives (*Opisanie arkhiva akademika V. V. Bartol'da*, pp. 231–364) compiled by the Leningrad Iranologist Mrs N. N. Tumanovich also has a history of its own, which was related in some detail in the original version of the compiler's preface. This preface began with the following curious passage[22]:

> Academician V. V. Barthold used to keep his papers and manuscripts in immaculate order: materials of his archives (collection 68 of the Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) confirm the existing opinion that this scholar used to keep carefully not only finished works prepared for publication, but also working card-files, synopses, extracts. Every casual note made during research in some other field found its place in one of the files, which was given a working title. . . . Nevertheless, after V. V. Barthold's death on 19 August 1930, his manuscripts and papers were found in a most chaotic condition. P. E. Skachkov, who, shortly after the Academician's death, was one of those charged with selecting books from the library of the deceased for the Institute of Oriental Studies, told me that the floor of Barthold's apartment was virtually covered with papers. They were piled into boxes without any order, and some of them were sent to the Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, others to the Institute of Oriental Studies.

Naturally, a reader may well be puzzled by this story, but as it was impossible to reveal to the Soviet readers the reasons for the "chaotic condition" of Barthold's papers, it is no wonder that A. N. Kononov and the publishers considered it right to eliminate the whole passage.

But what happened to Barthold's papers? I heard the following account from the late Umnyakov, who received his information from Barthold's sister Ottilia, an eye-witness of the incident. When, after Barthold's death representatives of the Institute of Oriental Studies came to his apartment and began to examine his papers and his library,[23] a foreign banknote fell from one of his books. This was made known to the OGPU (later the NKVD), and the secret police came to search the apartment. The "chaos" that Skachkov saw was a result of the havoc created by the OGPU agents.[24]

[22] Here and further on in similar cases I am citing from the 1973 proofs which I have in my possession.

[23] Barthold was childless, and his wife died two years before him. I do not know whether he left his library by a formal will to the Institute.

[24] At this time in the Soviet Union the forcible expropriation of gold and other valuables from the members of "former exploiter classes" (that is, in practice, from all those about whom a suspicion could arise that they might have such things) was taking place. OGPU (The Special State Political Department) virtually knocked out

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The posthumous police search could no longer harm Barthold himself, but it caused great damage to his papers; some of the materials seemed to be lost, and most of them were reduced to such a state that sorting them out and putting them in order took about 10 years. This work was done mainly by a Leningrad Arabist, S. L. Volin, who by 1941 had finished sorting out the papers and had compiled an archival inventory and an article containing a general survey of the materials of Barthold's archives. Soon afterwards Volin was arrested and died in a labour camp,[25] and in 1946 his survey was published with no mention of the name of the author.[26]

The work of N. Tumanovich is a continuation and elaboration of the work of Volin. In the original version of her preface (pp. 231–4 of the proofs) Tumanovich gave detailed information on the work done by her predecessor; she noted that Volin "had been subjected to repression without any ground" and that his name "as a compiler of practically the first scholarly survey of the archives of the academician V. V. Barthold should be restored." Nothing remains of this in the book; the name of Volin is mentioned only once (p. 233) together with the names of the archivists who were engaged in "processing the collection"; nothing is said about the fact that the sorting out, attribution and classification of Barthold's papers were done by Volin and that it was he who compiled the now existing archival inventory, which served as a basis for the description compiled by Mrs Tumanovich. Instead, there is now only a somewhat obscure statement that "the compiler of the present description leaned in her work upon the work of predecessors" (p. 233).[27]

No less disappointing is the exclusion from the preface by Mrs Tumanovich of the section dealing with a general description of the outward appearance of Barthold's papers. This section could give some idea about the difficulties which the compiler of the description of the archives met in her work. The work done by Volin certainly facilitated Tumanovich's task but even reading Barthold's handwriting, especially in his rough drafts, often requires much effort; the reader can confirm this by examining the photos published in the preface to volume VII of the collected works.

The description of Barthold's archives contains more than 530 entries

of its victims gold and valuables, holding them in prison without trial or investigation, intimidating them, beating and torturing.

[25] The index to the fifth volume of *Selected Works* by Krachkovskii gives the date of his death as 1943. Volin is not included in the bio-bibliographical dictionary of Soviet orientalists published recently in Moscow.

[26] *Trudy Archiva AN SSSR*, 5 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1946), pp. 225–8.

[27] It is interesting that all other references to the name of Volin are also excluded (e.g. reference to notes made by Volin on Barthold's manuscripts). By Soviet standards Volin cannot be reckoned among the "unpersons," for he was "posthumously exonerated"; therefore, all these amendments cannot be ascribed to political censorship. It is to be assumed that this is also the result of the editorial activity of Kononov. (It should be added that Volin, unfortunately, was among those who attacked Umnyakov's work in 1939.)

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(517 numbers plus numbers with letters), which are divided into 16 sections.[28] Half of these sections is defined according to the subject of the material described (works on Central Asia; works on history, historical geography and archaeology of Iran; history of the Arab countries, etc.), the other half—mainly according to a formal principle ("copy-books and card-files," notebooks, etc.). The distribution of the material between the sections is in many cases arbitrary, and there is material which could be included, with equal justification, in various sections of the description. Within the sections, material is arranged in chronological order (works written over several years are placed according to the year of completion); works which cannot be dated exactly are placed at the end of the corresponding section.

The archives of Barthold contain more than 400 files of scholarly works and preparatory material (extracts, card-files, drafts of publications, etc.); most of the works concern, naturally, Central Asia. Included in this material are rough and fair copies of published works (in such cases the description includes references to the corresponding entries in the bibliography by Umnyakov), unpublished works (both completed and not fully prepared for publication), material for university courses given in various years, diaries of journeys and reports on scholarly missions abroad, extracts from oriental manuscripts, etc. Of special interest are unpublished works, both prepared for publication and not fully completed. The content of most of these is summarized by Tumanovich in more or less detail, with extensive quotations. I would like to note especially the summaries of the works "About the Bukhara and Khiva Khanates" (No. 77; a paper read in 1917), "A memorandum on the question of historical relations between Turkish and Iranian peoples of Central Asia" (No. 85), "An abstract of the paper on the ways of development of Europe and the East" (No. 113), "A rough draft of the work on Eastern Empires" (No. 118),[29] "The cultural past of the Near East" (No. 122), "The dictionary by Mahmud Kashghari" (No. 181; incomplete text of a paper of 1921), "To the sojourn in Turkey" (No. 220; a diary of the journey in 1926; important additions are to be found in No. 439), "A report on a journey to Turkey read at the meeting of the Board of Orientalists" (No. 223), "The service of Radlof in the study of the nomadic peoples of Central Asia" (No. 260), "About a *madrasah* in Sterlibash" (No. 379), "About the tasks of the young Russian intelligentsia in the nearest post-war period" (No. 380). Some other works by Barthold not intended for publication or summarized by Tumanovich more briefly, also deserve the full attention of scholars—

[28] These sections were introduced by Volin.

[29] In the published version of the work by Tumanovich no mention is made about the following curious note by Barthold at the beginning of the file: "A rough draft of the work on Eastern empires submitted at the beginning of February 1919 to Pokrovskii [the reference is to the well-known historian M. N. Pokrovskii] and not published, the promised fee also not being paid, and the manuscript not being returned to me despite my request in a registered letter sent to Pokrovskii."

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such as, for example, material for university courses "Historico-geographical survey of Central Asia" (No. 9), "Theses to the lectures on the history of Muslim culture" (No. 112), remarks about the character of teaching of the history of the East excluded from the edition of "Historico-geographical survey of Iran" (No. 89); programmes of university courses and other material (No. 424), and unpublished reviews of books, articles and theses by various persons (for a list of these see the preface by Tumanovich, pp. 235–6). Unfortunately, Tumanovich only gave very short summaries of four unpublished completed works: these are "The traces of the Greek myths in Central Asia" (No. 3), "A sketch of the history of Soghd" (No. 14), "A history of Turkestan before the Arab conquest" (No. 17),[30] and "A sketch of the history of Derbend" (No. 150). This is to be explained by the fact that at the time the description was being prepared, these four works, together with several others not previously published, were intended for inclusion in an additional volume of the collected works (vol. IX, part 2). This plan could not be carried out, because the publication of the additional volume was cancelled, and it was then too late for Tumanovich to enlarge her original short summaries.

The section, which describes material containing synopses and extracts of Oriental manuscripts (pp. 281–309) is very interesting. This part of Barthold's archives had not been treated in sufficient detail by Volin, and Mrs Tumanovich did a lot of work sorting out the extracts, establishing their sources and, in some cases, comparing them with Barthold's published works, where these extracts had been used. Thanks to all this, the reader can now have a good idea of the scope and variety of the manuscript sources in Oriental languages used by Barthold in his works; one can see which manuscripts in various world libraries drew his special attention. As Tumanovich herself noted in the proof-version of her preface, Barthold obtained most of the material for his works from the manuscripts of the Petersburg (Leningrad) libraries; in the second place, according to the volume of material extracted, were manuscripts in British collections (where Barthold worked four times: in 1895, 1899, 1914 and 1922–23). But particularly interesting are extracts from manuscripts in Turkish collections made by Barthold in 1926 (No. 221). Here Barthold was the first to study some important works (such as *Mīhmannāma-i Bukhārā* and *Tansūq-nāma-i īlkhānī*); his paper about the manuscripts in Turkish libraries read in Leningrad in the same year remained unpublished and unknown to specialists, and only now is it possible to know its contents thanks to a detailed summary by Tumanovich (No. 223).

Of no less interest than the description of the scholarly works by

[30] "A sketch of the history of Soghd" contains an unsurpassed summary of the data on Soghd found in the works of Arab historians. "A history of Turkestan before the Arab conquest," though outdated now from the factual point of view, is nevertheless of considerable interest, for here Barthold frequently expresses his opinions on the pre-Islamic history of Central Asia, not found in his other works.

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Barthold is the section " Material about the activities of V. V. Barthold " (pp. 334–59), containing a description of about 5,000 folios consisting of a great variety of documents on Barthold's activity as a professor of Petersburg (Leningrad) University, a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and of many other scholarly institutions and organizations. Mrs Tumanovich gives not only quite detailed lists of the documents, but also extensive quotations from many of them (e.g. from a memorandum by Barthold on the teaching of the history of orientalism in Russian universities, pp. 343–4; from the notes by Barthold connected with the publishing of the journals *Mir Islama* and *Musulmanskii Mir*, pp. 346–8, 352; from the report on a journey to Turkey, pp. 355–6).

Regarding the summaries of the contents of Barthold's unpublished works compiled by Tumanovich, what has been said above about the summaries of the published works compiled by Umnyakov also holds true: they inevitably reflect Tumanovich's own ideas on the relative importance of various topics touched by Barthold. However, the compiler of the description of the archives, like the compiler of the bibliography, did her best to reproduce Barthold's statements in his own words and in the most important cases she tries to give extensive quotations from the unpublished works.

THE book by Umnyakov and Tumanovich, as we have seen, gives a good idea of the scholarly work of Barthold, both published (during his lifetime and posthumously) and unpublished, remaining in manuscript form. It seems that there is no reference book of this kind on any other scholar, at least not on any other orientalist. It is to be hoped that the publication of this book, together with the completion of the publication of the collected works, will further a detailed analysis of all the academic writings of this outstanding scholar—a work which is long overdue. For such research one has also to turn to his abundant correspondence. Barthold had numerous correspondents in various countries, as the letters addressed to him and kept in his archive testify.[31] In the USSR, his own letters to various Russian scholars have been preserved in the archives of Leningrad, Moscow, Tashkent and other cities, as well as with private persons.[32] They contain very valuable material which throws light on his scholarly path, his *Weltanschauung* and political views, and one may hope that they will be the subject of the same thorough study as his scholarly works.[33]

[31] A list of Barthold's main correspondents is given in the preface by Tumanovich to her work, p. 233. Letters to Barthold are not included in the published description of his archives.

[32] In a footnote to the preface by Tumanovich, p. 233 (there was no such footnote in the proof-version) it is said: " As to the letters by Barthold himself, the main part of those which are in the USSR is to be found in Tashkent ". This refers, apparently, to his letters to N. Ostroumov and some other persons. But, as far as I know, in the Archives of the Academy of Sciences in Leningrad alone Barthold's letters have been preserved in at least 14 collections, and their number exceeds that in Tashkent.

[33] Till now almost only Barthold's letters to Ostroumov have been used in scholarly literature. There is no doubt that they cannot be published in the Soviet Union, because

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The book contains 10 indexes: 1. an alphabetic list of the published works by Barthold; 2. index of the names of persons; 3. index of the names of persons to be found in the titles of Barthold's works; 4. index of the names of the reviewers, translators, commentators etc. of the works by Barthold; 5. index of place-names; 6. index of place-names to be found in the titles of Barthold's works; 7. index of ethnic names; 8. index of titles of works written in Eastern languages; 9. index of titles of periodicals and collective publications; 10. subject index. Unfortunately, indexes 1, 3, 6, 9 concern only the bibliography by Umnyakov and do not include data from the description of the archives; the reasons for this are not stated, and can hardly be justified by any reasonable arguments.[34] Generally, the indexes are compiled carefully, though some unfortunate errors may be found.[35] These errors and other minor shortcomings, however, do not spoil the generally good outward appearance of the book, which has been conceived as a kind of appendix to the collected works.

UNFORTUNATELY, the book has suffered from a specific "political censorship," which will not be noticed by an uninitiated reader, but the change in the name of the editor is not its only manifestation. It is very probable that this change of names entailed especially captious "study" of the text by the publishers: if the editor, in his disloyalty to Soviet power, goes as far as "high treason" (this is how emigration to Israel is qualified in the USSR), the text edited by him inevitably becomes suspect. The results of the vigilance displayed by the publishers may easily be discovered by comparing the book with its 1973 proof-version. This vigilance has been expressed in the elimination of some passages, which were, apparently, unacceptable to the Soviet publishers because of political or ideological considerations. I managed to note 11 such places in the description of the archives, and it may be interesting for a reader to know them.

On page 240 (No. 9) a long paragraph concerning the influence of Chinese culture on Central Asia is excluded.[36] On page 258 (No. 85)

Barthold expresses in them, sometimes in rather strongly-worded form, his negative attitude to Soviet power and to Marxism as an official ideology.

[34] Index 4 also concerns only the bibliography, but this is "by definition."

[35] In the index of the names of persons (pp. 381 sqq.), in several cases the compiler could not identify the names: thus, for example, the same person is meant by: "Abdullah, bukharskii khan," "Abdullah II bukharskii" and "Abdullah b. Iskender"; "Badaulet" and "Ya' bub-bek," "Isma'il samanidskii" and "Isma'il b. Ahmed"; "Navoi," "Nevai" and "Mir Ali-Shir"; "Fasih al-Khawafi" and "Fasihi"; "Ahmed Yasewi" and "Khoja Yeseviiskii." In the same index a non-existent dynasty appears: "Iltezer" (in the text there is mentioned a Khan of Khiva Iltezer). In the index of the names of persons a name "Yemam" (which is the place-name Yemama) appears also, whereas in the index of place-names the name "Tekesh" appears (that is, the Khwarizmshah).

[36] With the beginning of the Soviet-Chinese conflict, the Soviet publishers and censors make every effort not to allow any material to appear in Soviet literature and press which could be considered even as an indirect confirmation of the Chinese territorial claims to the USSR; this fear sometimes assumes quite fantastic forms, when even material on prehistorical archaeology of the Far East is expurgated.

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the following sentence, very typical of Barthold, which concludes his memorandum of 1924 on the historical relations between the Turkish and the Iranian peoples of Central Asia is excluded:

> It is quite natural that, under the influence of the general Europeanization of the East, the principles adopted from Europe may become sometimes stronger than the local traditions, and there is no reason, as has been done sometimes, to distort or to misinterpret the facts of the local history to find in them justification for changes, which are being carried out at present.[37]

On p. 319 (No. 271) after the words "Rough . . . as well as fair copies of the articles for volume II of the Encyclopaedia [of Islam]" the following words, in brackets, are excluded: "on some of them—resolutions allowing to publish the articles abroad."[38] On p. 329 (No. 380), after the second paragraph there is excluded a long paragraph, in which Barthold (in 1916) expressed his concern about "a strengthening of the centrifugal aspirations in Russian society and especially among progressive young people"; he meant a strengthening of nationalistic tendencies in the Ukraine and Belorussia and, particularly, an increasing tendency to substitute local idioms for the Russian language as the common scientific language.

> A final victory of centrifugal aspirations in the question of the language of Russian science—wrote Barthold—the founding of Ukrainian and Belorussian universities and Ukrainian and Belorussian scientific literature would give advantage only to the enemies of Russia. . . .[39]

On p. 332 (No. 393) is a badly abridged quotation from Barthold's letter of 1922 to the editor of the newspaper *Izvestiya* protesting against the expulsion from Turkestan, "on the grounds of the decisions of the last congress of the Turkestan Soviets, where the Muslims constituted a majority," of the former governor of Samarkand, N. S. Lykoshin, a well known expert on Turkestan. The quotation finished originally with the following words:

> And this man, without any consideration for his former services, without any consideration for his usefulness at present and potential usefulness in future, has been reckoned among "colonialists," who allegedly had to be expelled according to the decisions of the congress. The incident with Lykoshin demonstrates clearly that a mass expulsion from the region of Russians who held administrative

[37] It is not surprising that this sentence proved to be unacceptable: "distortion or misinterpretation" of this kind is just the thing which Soviet official historiography is engaged in. "The cap fits," as the saying goes.

[38] The reference is to resolutions of a censor—an official of the so-called "Glavlit." Thus, these words, quite innocent for an uninitiated reader, are evidence of a political censorship, to which any material sent from the Soviet Union for publishing abroad is subjected; it is absolutely prohibited to mention facts of this sort in the Soviet press.

[39] It is interesting that Barthold's following words about the significance of the Russian language and Russian culture in the *Asiatic* dominions of Russia were not excluded and remained in the book.

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> posts under the former regime, damages most of all the interests of the local population, which is interested, even more than the Russians, in using all cultural forces available.

In the book, instead of all this, is inserted an obscure sentence at the beginning of the entry: "V. V. Barthold expresses his bewilderment and concern about the fate of the prominent expert and explorer of Central Asia N. S. Lykoshin;" it is not explained to the reader, what exactly had caused Barthold's "bewilderment and concern."[40] On p. 345 (No. 428) in the list of the documents contained in the file under the title "Official documents and other papers," there is a vague mention of "a letter to the journal 'Communist Thought';" in the proof-version this document is described as follows: "A refusal to contribute to the journal 'Communist Thought' because, as V. V. Barthold wrote: 'not being a communist I do not see it possible for myself to be a contributor' to this journal." On p. 352 (No. 434) is mentioned "A memorandum on the Congress of Turkologists in Baku" (1925) without a word about its contents. In the proof-version the following was said:

> The memorandum was compiled in connection with an examination [by Barthold] of the list of those invited to the congress. V. V. Barthold thought that a great number of persons would gather at the congress, who have nothing to do with Turkology; therefore, the Academy—as he wrote—'has no reason to send its delegate to the congress'.

The kind of people who would gather at this congress was explained in the proof-version of the preface by Tumanovich (p. 239), where there was a reference to "a note about the congress of Turkologists in Baku of 1926, where many Party and other public figures were invited."

Besides these "politico-ideological" expurgations, everywhere in the description of the archives the name of Ahmed Zeki Velidi (Togan) has been crossed out. On p. 300 in the summary of "A report on a journey to Turkey, read at the meeting of the Board of Orientalists" (No. 223) the following quotation from Barthold, present in the proof-version is excluded:

> But the most useful for me was information given to me, orally or in private letters, by our former colleague in ZVO [=Zapiski Vostochnogo Otdeleniya] Ahmed-zaki Validov, who drew my attention to a number of *unica* and rare copies [of the MSS in the Istanbul libraries], without any concern for his scholarly priority. I am indebted to Ahmed-zaki Validov, if not for all my findings, then, at least, for a considerable part of them.[41]

Further, on p. 301 in a quotation from Barthold, the name of Validov

[40] For further details the reader is referred to works by B. V. Lunin. Cf., however, the review of one of Lunin's work: Yu. Bregel, in *Pis'mennye pamyatniki Vostoka . . . Yezhegodnik 1968* (Moscow, 1970), p. 265 on this particular question.

[41] The same was said in the published short "Account on a scholarly mission to Turkey," which was also published in vol. V of the collected works (p. 463).

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is replaced by "V . . .," and on p. 302 (third line from the bottom) simply by three dots. It should be added that from the bibliography by Umnyakov, p. 159 (No. 327), a statement that the text of "The 12 lectures on the history of Turkish peoples of Central Asia" was published in the collected works "from Barthold's manuscript, which belonged to Prof. A. Z. V. Togan (Istanbul)" is also excluded.[42] In other places of the bibliography, however, the name of Validov (Togan) remains—as the author of reviews of some of Barthold's works, translator into Turkish of part of "The 12 lectures," and a person with whom Barthold entered into polemics (p. 91). Thus, the publishers tried to exclude only all "positive" mentions of the name of A. Z. V. Togan, retaining all "neutral" ones and one "negative" mention.[43]

For a long time, Validov (Togan) was considered an unperson in the Soviet Union. His name, like the names of "the enemies of the people," was not mentioned and his works were cited anonymously. The present author was perhaps the first who, in the post-Stalin period, referred openly to Togan in print (in a review, written together with E. N. Najib, of Kononov's edition of *Shajara-i Tarākima*).[44] Later such references became quite common; very many of them are to be found, in particular, in the commentary to almost all of the volumes of the collected works. A. N. Kononov even dared to meet Togan in Turkey and to receive from him for publication Barthold's manuscript of "The 12 lectures." But several years ago a secretary of the Bashkir regional committee of the Communist Party, having found in the journal *Narody Azii i Afriki* a reference to Togan, made a complaint (or rather a political denunciation) to the Central Committee of the Party; the editor of the journal, as well as the heads of the publishing house (the same publishing house which published the works of Umnyakov and Tumanovich) were strongly reprimanded. It seems that the consequences of the fright experienced at that time by the administration of the publishing house is still being felt. Probably, there has even been a renewal of a total ban on the name of Togan.[45] This is not the case with the name of another orientalist, who, like Togan, left the Soviet Union without due permission from the authorities: N. Poppe. After the Second World War works by

[42] This reference is now replaced by a reference to vol. V of the collected works, p. 16, where "information on the manuscript of V. V. Barthold which was [!] in Istanbul," may be found.

[43] It might be, however, that these corrections were made at the last moment in quite a haphazard way—the result (though unintentionally) being the same.

[44] See *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, 1959, No. 1, pp. 170, 172.

[45] I know at least one case, when Togan's name was suppressed from a book already in print. In a Russian translation of *Sīrat Sultān Djalāl al-Dīn* published by Z. Buniyatov (*Zhizneopisanie sultana Dzhalal ad-Dina Mankburny*, Baku, 1973) his name appeared twice: in the preface (p. 10) and, accordingly, in the index of proper names (p. 435). In both places the name has been thoroughly crossed out with a special black stamp; apparently it was done by order of the censor. In a book published in Moscow two years later Togan's work is cited without the name of the author (*Tyurkologicheskii sbornik 1973*, Moscow, 1975, p. 19, n. 52); this is the usual method in Soviet literature in such cases.

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Poppe were removed from Soviet libraries open to general use and placed in special departments of the libraries, the so-called "special depositories" (*spetzkhran* in Soviet newspeak), where all literature, considered to be "anti-Soviet" is kept, as well as the works of those authors who are considered unpersons. Works by Poppe (e.g. the very dangerous *Mongol'skii slovar' Mukaddimat al-Adab*) remained in a *spetzkhran* until very recently,[46] even though they were again cited in the Soviet Union and some of his Soviet colleagues ventured to correspond with him.

It is interesting, however, that the names of such persons as Togan and Poppe now seem to the Soviet authorities less dangerous than the names of those who recently emigrated from the Soviet Union, although, unlike the "old" émigrés they left the USSR quite officially and legally. As in Stalin's time, the basic fact of leaving the Soviet Union turns them into unpersons, just like those who are in Soviet prisons as political prisoners, and mention of their names in print, even in bibliographical references, is prohibited.[47] Therefore, the name of the present author disappeared from the book not only as the name of the editor, but also as the name of one of the participants in the edition of Barthold's collected works. According to the system adopted in the bibliography, the names of all those who prepared volumes of the collected works for publication, the authors of the prefaces and the commentaries to these volumes, translators into Russian of Barthold's works, originally published in other languages, etc. are mentioned.[48] Now everybody who uses the bibliography will assume (with the kind help of the publishers) that volume II part 2 of the collected works appeared by self-generation (see p. 153; in the 1973 proofs it is stated: "The second part of volume II of the collected works was prepared for publication by Yu. E. Bregel") and that by the same progressive method the preface and the commentaries to this volume were brought into the world. The same holds true for part of the commentaries to other volumes and most of the translations from German (including the articles in the Encyclopaedia of Islam).[49] In addition, the foreword to the book, which was entitled

[46] I myself happened to hear a curious *terminus technicus* of the Soviet censorship in this connection. In 1962, when I worked at the above mentioned publishing house, I had a business conversation with a censor, who censored these publishers' books, and he told me, among other things: "You, orientalists, are not in a difficult situation at present: with you only Poppe is 'closed' now."

[47] But, unlike in former times, the books written by these people usually are not removed from the libraries. Thus, it is not prohibited to use their books, it is only prohibited to cite them. This is, actually, a kind of official encouragement of scholarly plagiarism.

[48] See the index, pp. 402 sqq.

[49] The name of Bregel should appear in the following places of the bibliography: p. 152, note 84 (as one of the authors of the commentaries to vol. II/1), p. 153, No. 315 (compiler of vol. II/2, author of the preface and most of the commentaries to this volume, compiler of the bibliography and indexes and translator of articles from the Encyclopaedia of Islam), p. 157, Nos. 322, 323, 325 (translator); p. 159, No. 326 (41) (translator); p. 161, No. 333 (translator); p. 162, Nos. 334, 336, 337 (20) (translator); p. 162, note 99 (one of the authors of the commentaries—instead of "and others");

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"From the editor" and signed by Bregel, has turned into a foreword "From the publishing house," unsigned (only insignificant changes have been made to the text of the foreword).

It is difficult to say exactly who inserted all those ideological corrections mentioned above into the book and purged from it improper names; most probably it was done, as is customary in the Soviet Union, by the editorial staff of the publishing house.[50] But even if A. N. Kononov himself did not take part in it personally, he in any case sanctioned it with his name.

As one can see, the publication of the collected works of Barthold, which began as a purely scholarly enterprise, has been completed with this book, which in a peculiar way continues the traditions both of Russian academic orientalism (on the part of the authors) and of Soviet ideological censorship (on the part of the publishers). In this respect very little has changed in the Soviet Union during the 40 years which have passed since the reviewers of Umnyakov demanded that the names of "the enemies of the people" be eliminated from his work.

p. 163, Nos. 339, 340 (translator); p. 164, No. 341 (49) (translator); p. 205, No. 479 (translator); p. 226, No. 96 (author).

[50] The initial ideological censorship in the Soviet Union is the responsibility of the editorial staff of the publishing houses; then the official censors are brought the books, which have already undergone a preliminary censorship by the publishers.

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The Soviet Discussion of the Asiatic Mode of Production

Marian Sawer

THE discussions in the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1971 on the subject of the Asiatic Mode of Production * attracted a considerable amount of attention from Western scholars.[1] It is well known that a debate of similar dimensions was carried on in the Soviet Union between 1925 and 1931. However, the details of the latter have as yet to be treated in Western literature, owing to the inaccessibility of most of the sources.[2] It is now possible to rectify this omission to a certain extent, thanks to the publication by V. N. Nikiforov of the Soviet Institute of Oriental Studies of an extremely detailed account of this debate.[3] Nikiforov provides a surprisingly fair portrayal of the early supporters of the concept in view of the fact that he himself has been a leading opponent of it during the more recent discussions. The following article draws heavily on Nikiforov for the monograph literature, the periodical literature being more readily available in the West.

The contemporary relevance of the 1925–31 discussions on the AMP is that, like the more recent discussions, they are symptomatic of efforts by Soviet historians to break free of the strait-jacket of the five-stage schema of history while retaining a Marxist framework of investigation. In some ways the earlier discussions were of even greater interest than the recent ones, in that the earlier Soviet scholars, like many non-Soviet Marxist scholars today, used the AMP concept to make an explicit break with the unilinear schema of history, and hence were moving towards a theory of historical pluralism. The similarities and differences between the two stages of the debate will be discussed in greater detail below.

The Beginnings of the Debate: 1925–26

The 1925–31 discussions on the AMP, unlike the recent more diversified debates, were overwhelmingly concerned with the problems of the Chinese revolution, both in the optimistic period of 1925–27 and in

* Hereafter referred to as AMP except where discussing the origins of the term itself.

[1] For the most detailed account to date see S. Baron, "Marx's *Grundrisse* and the Asiatic Mode of Production," *Survey* Vol. 21, No. 1/2 (Winter–Spring 1975), pp. 128–47.

[2] For example, not even the late Boris Nicolaievsky possessed a copy of the published account of the 1931 Leningrad Conference on the AMP, and apparently no copies have been available in either Western Europe, or the USA. I am indebted to K. A. Wittfogel for access to his copy.

[3] V. N. Nikiforov, *Sovetskie istoriki o problemakh Kitaia*, Moscow, izd. "Nauka," 1970, esp. Chap. 5. The bulk of this chapter appeared earlier as "Diskussiia sovetskikh istorikov ob obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskom stroe Kitaia (1925–1931)," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5 (1965), pp. 75–91.

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the wake of the 1927 débâcle. Some attention was given to India in the later phases of the discussions but it was at all times overshadowed by the dominant preoccupation with China.

The debate was opened, however, in a similar way to that in 1964, with an essay by the economist Eugene Varga.[4] In 1925 Varga published an article entitled "Economic Problems of the Revolution in China"[5] in which he challenged the prevailing orthodoxy that pre-capitalist Chinese society was feudal in nature. He argued that unlike in Europe, state power "arose in China out of the necessity to regulate the water supply, to provide protection from floods, and to ensure the irrigation of the land." State power arose in China not out of class struggle but rather out of the need to provide certain large-scale public works, and it was of a "completely pacific nature." A "ruling class was formed of a special type unknown in the sphere of European culture—namely a class of *literati*."[6] Complementary to this special type of function-based ruling class was the "tyranny of the clan" at the village level, through which the peasants owned the land, and which prevented the emergence of a native capitalism.

It is not clear exactly what led to this sudden shift on the part of Varga, who had previously adhered to the orthodox position that the structure of pre-capitalist China could adequately be described in terms of the universal feudal stage of development. However, Varga did make explicit his indebtedness to Max Weber for the new framework of analysis he was adopting with its stress on the differences rather than the similarities between European and Chinese development and the use of these differences to explain why a native capitalism did not emerge in China.

In the following year (1926) Varga received support for his position on the absence of feudalism in Chinese pre-capitalist society from A. Ia. Kantorovich, then engaged in research in China. According to Kantorovich, in China there existed instead a combination of peasant or clan ownership and rule by a service estate of *literati*. He also brought forward the argument that in the absence of a feudal structure, peasant revolts did not serve to promote system-change, but, rather, to maintain the equilibrium of the system: "revolts should be regarded in the first instance as an element of the social-fiscal-political system of China

[4] Eugene or Jenö Varga (1879–1964) had become a professor of political economy at the University of Budapest in Nov. 1918, and was to become People's Commissar of Finance and Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919. With the fall of the Republic he migrated to the Soviet Union where he worked for Comintern and became Director of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics (1927–47). He returned to Hungary 1949–56 and was one of the architects of the first five-year plan. In 1956 he was restored to his position at the Institute of Economics in Moscow (and had been purged 1947–49 following censure from Stalin) and worked there until his death. His last book, *Ocherki po problemam politekonomii kapitalizma* was published in June 1964 and contained a final chapter in which he roundly condemned the eclipse of the concept of AMP after the early discussions.

[5] E. Varga, "Ekonomicheskie problemy revoliutsii v Kitae," *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 12 (1925), pp. 165–83.

[6] Ibid. p. 174.

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itself, as the necessary means for maintaining equilibrium in this system. . . ." [7]

Meanwhile the young German communist, K. A. Wittfogel, had been undergoing a similar evolution away from the concept of a universally occurring feudal stage, also under the influence of Max Weber. In his earlier work Wittfogel, like Varga, had upheld the orthodox conception of universal stages of development.[8] By 1926, however, he had already adopted the proposition that the classical feudalism of the Chou period had been superseded by the middle of the third century BC by a bureaucratic state system. The intensification of agricultural practices (rice cultivation etc.) had enhanced the importance and power of a class of officials concerned with irrigation and flood control. These state officials grew sufficiently strong to prevent a new flowering of a class of feudal lords, while the ever-present threat of peasant revolts served to hold the mandarinate itself in check. The peasant revolts which studded Chinese history were in fact class struggles directed against excessive exploitation in the form of taxes levied by the ruling official class. The creation of the bureaucratic state was accompanied by the revival of the clan organization of the peasantry at the village level. The consequence of the destruction of feudalism in China was that along with it was destroyed the machinery which in Europe was eventually to create free wage-labour.[9]

The Introduction of the Term Asiatic Mode of Production

It will be noted that during the period 1925–26 the term "Asiatic mode of production" had not yet made an appearance, and that Weber rather than Marx himself was employed to support the concept of the particularistic development of Chinese history. In fact Weber's views on, for example, the importance of the need for public (water) works in determining Chinese development were largely derived from Marx and Engels, but this was not explicit. Earlier Marxists such as G. V. Plekhanov who had derived the concept from Marx and Engels also did not use the term "Asiatic mode of production." Plekhanov, although quoting Marx's 1859 Preface concerning "the asiatic, the ancient, the feudal and the modern capitalist modes of production," himself preferred to use the terms "Oriental social system" or "social order' and in

[7] A. Ya. Kantorovich, "Sistema obshchestvennykh otnoshenii v Kitae do kapitalisticheskoi epokhi (v poradke gipotezy)," *Novyi Vostok*, No. 15 (1926), p. 91. Kantorovich's article was introduced by an editorial demurral about the presentation of the bureaucracy as an autonomous group rather than tied to a fundamental class in Chinese society, ibid. p. 61. Nevertheless, articles using the AMP concept were later to appear in *Novyi Vostok*. See, e.g. I. Reisner, "Novyi etap v rabochem dvizhenii Indii," *NV*, No. 25 (1929) and V. Ditiakin, "Agrarnye otnosheniia i sel'skoe khoziaistvo vo Frantsuzskom Indo-Kitae," *NV*, No. 29 (1930).

[8] E.g. K. A. Wittfogel, *Ot pervobytnogo kommunizma do proletarskoi revoliutsii*, 1. Pervobytnyi kommunizm i feodalizm, trans. from the German (Kharkov, 1923).

[9] K. A. Wittfogel, *Probuzhdaiushchiisia Kitai* trans. from German edition pub. Vienna 1926 by D. Strashunskii, izd. "priboi" 1926, Chs. 3 and 4. For further development of Wittfogel's position see U. Vogel, *Zur Theorie der Chinesischen Revolution* (Frankfurt a/M., 1974), pp. 64–70.

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particular the term Asiatic despotism (including the "economic foundations of Asiatic despotism").

The term seems to have been used for the first time by Lenin, in his Report on the Unity Congress, when he was attempting to reconstruct the logic of Plekhanov's argument about an Asiatic restoration, and to destroy the argument from within. Lenin wrote, *inter alia,* that: "To the extent that there existed (or if there existed) nationalization of land in Muscovite Russia, then its economic foundation would have been the Asiatic mode of production." Lenin used the term twice more in the continuation of this passage, but it does not seem to have appeared elsewhere in his work except in the 1859 Preface formulation.

The term seems to have achieved currency only with the publication by David Riazanov of an explanatory preface to Marx's article "Revolution in China and in Europe" (published in *Pravda* on 14 June 1925 and soon afterwards in *Inprecorr* and elsewhere).[11] In deference to its novelty, Riazanov places the term in inverted commas on each of the three occasions he uses it, although he clearly accepts its validity as a Marxian category. It was employed for the first time in an analysis of contemporary China by John Pepper,[12] entitled "Euro-American Imperialism and the Revolution in China," published in *Pravda* on 1 May 1927. Meanwhile others, guided by Riazanov, were also going back to Marx's writings for evidence of this newly discovered independent mode of production. S. A. Dalin had come out in its defence at the University of the Workers in China in 1926 and K. A. Wittfogel published an article in the *Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi Akademii* in late 1927 in which he drew on Riazanov.[13] In fact, as L. V. Danilova has claimed, from 1926–27 onwards "the question of the 'Asiatic' mode of production was never off the agenda."[14]

In November 1927 the assertion that the AMP had dominated China from the third century B.C. appeared in the Draft Agrarian Programme discussed at a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC.[15] The

[10] V. I. Lenin, *Doklad ob ob"editel'nom s"ezde, RSDRP, Sochineniia,* Vol. IX (1930), p. 187.

[11] D. Riazanov, "Karl Marx et la Chine," *La Correspondance Internationale* (Vienna) Yr. 5, No. 68 (8 July 1925), pp. 563–66.

[12] John Pepper (Jozsef Pogány) like Varga and the other famous "Aziatchik" Ludwig Mad'iar (Lajos Magyar) was a Hungarian survivor of the 1919 Revolution. It is not clear why Hungarians should have played such a leading role in promoting the AMP concept in 1925–31. Pepper was purged, and died in 1939.

[13] K. A. Wittfogel, "Problemy ekonomischeskoi istorii Kitaia (v poriadke obsuzhdeniia)," *Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi akademii,* Kn. XX, 1927.

[14] L. V. Danilova, Introduction to Chap. XII: "Sovetskie Vostokovedenie," in *Ocherki po istorii istoricheskoinauki v SSSR,* Vol. IV, ed. M. V. Nechkina et al., Moscow, Izd. "Nauka," 1966, p. 740. Here she provides a sensitive account of how early Soviet historiography of the East consciously attempted to overcome the derogatory implications of Asiatic exceptionalism by imposing a universalistic schema of development onto the facts of Oriental history. I.e. Soviet historiography attempted to overcome a Eurocentric bias by an approach which, while purportedly universalistic, in fact concealed an equally European bias.

[15] The sixth congress of the CPC in June–July 1928 was to reject the relevance of the AMP concept to China in the following resolution: "The attempt to characterize the

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Comintern representative V. V. Lominadze appears to have been responsible for its inclusion, and he repeated his belief in the existence of the AMP in China at the 15th Congress of the CPSU in December 1928. He argued that the Chinese social system was of a type quite unlike that of European feudalism, and had rested upon the performance of vital irrigation and drainage functions by the bureaucratic state apparatus. With the collapse of the centralized state power these functions were no longer carried out; extortionate taxes were still being demanded from the peasants, although the productive functions of state power were no longer being performed; and agriculture was in ruins.

The historical consequences of the existence of the AMP in China were seen by Lominadze as follows: the absence of feudalism meant the absence also of the conditions which could give rise to a native bourgeoisie as a viable political class. In so far as a Chinese bourgeoisie existed, it was the child of Western imperialism and incapable of sustaining the reform of Chinese society. The Kuomintang, for example, had degenerated into a self-seeking band of generals. The peasantry and the proletariat on the other hand were ripe for revolution, suffering conditions far worse than those in Europe.[16]

The tactical corollary of Lominadze's argument was of course at variance with official policy, and he was challenged by Stalin, Mif and Bukharin for his "repudiation" of the Chinese bourgeoisie. The following dialogue occurred during Mif's speech at the Congress.

> *Mif*: Comrade Lominadze has attempted to contrast with feudalism the "Asiatic" mode of production.
>
> *Lominadze*: Marx himself contrasted it.
>
> *Mif*: Marx did not contrast feudalism with the Asiatic mode of production.
>
> *Lominadze*: That means you don't know Marx.
>
> *Mif*: If you, Comrade Lominadze, read the letters of Engels and Marx on this question you will be convinced that by the "Asiatic" mode of production Marx understood one of the varieties of feudalism; to be specific, that there are here no differences in essence from the usual form of feudalism but that there are secondary differences of a more external kind, in the sphere of the judicial and historical system. This is the way that this question has been understood by

contemporary socio-economic structure of China as a whole, and of the Chinese village in particular as a transitional structure between the 'Asiatic mode of production' and capitalism must be acknowledged as mistaken. The most essential features of the 'Asiatic mode of production' are: firstly, the absence of private property in land; secondly, the state-directed creation of large-scale public works (above all, a rational system of water-supply)—that is, the construction of works representing the material basis of the power of the central government over the small producers organized in village communities; and finally, thirdly, the durable existence of a village system, resting on the basis of a domestic union between agriculture and industry. All these features, and particularly the first basis mentioned above contradict the reality of China." (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 43, 1928, p. 43).

[16] *Piatnadtsatyi s"ezd VKP/b: Protokoly*, Vol. 1, (Moscow, Gos. izd. pol. lit., 1961), pp. 773–36.

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> us up to now and this is the way that Comrade Lenin understood it.[17]

Mif went on to quote a passage from Lenin in which China was described as feudal and as a *coup de grâce* he suggested that Lominadze had been (vainly) attempting to find contradictions between Marx and Lenin.

Despite the official backing Mif received for his position, the AMP concept continued to appeal to influential Comintern activists. Indeed in 1928 the term, even if hedged about with quotation-marks, received an official *imprimatur* by being included in the Programme adopted by the Comintern at its Sixth Congress. The circumstances were as follows.

In May 1928 a draft programme was published, referring to " colonial and semi-colonial countries . . . with a predominance of medieval/feudal relations both in the economy and in the political superstructure." [18] (I.e. there was no mention of the AMP.) Protests were made by L. I. Mad'iar, who wished the programme to acknowledge the existence of a distinct " Eastern society." [19] In the same month (June 1928), Varga argued in the Comintern organ *La Correspondance Internationale* that " the employment of the term ' feudalism ' to characterize the situation in China was more harmful than useful to the understanding of the Chinese agrarian question." [20] Furthermore, the erroneous description of China as feudal encouraged a dangerous political opportunism. By analogy with Europe, an autochthonous development towards capitalism was expected, rather than there being a clear perception that the transition to capitalism in China could only signify China's submission to foreign capital.[21] A compromise was reached, and in the final version of the Programme the relevant sentence read: " countries . . . with a predominance of medieval/feudal relations or of the ' Asiatic mode of production ' . . . ." [22]

L. I. Mad'iar had spent 1926–27 engaged in diplomatic work in China, where, among his other activities, he had played a leading part in the successful defence of the Soviet consulate in Shanghai against a White Russian attack. While in China Mad'iar collected the materials for his famous book *The Economics of Agriculture in China,* which was published in Moscow in 1928 and became a focal point of the AMP discussions. From 1929 until he was purged in 1934 Mad'iar worked in the Eastern Secretariat of Comintern, where he promoted as far as

[17] Ibid. p. 805.

[18] " Proekt programmy Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala," *Pravda*, 27 May 1928.

[19] L. I. Mad'iar, " K proektu programmy. ' Diskussionyi listok '," *Pravda*, 24 June 1928. Mad'iar argued that the traditions of state provision of the conditions of production and nationalization of land in this society, lent themselves to propaganda in favour of nationalization in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

[20] E. Varga " Les problèmes fondamentaux de la révolution chinoise," Pt. 1, *LCI*, Yr. 8, No. 56 (16 June 1928), p. 669.

[21] Ibid. p. 670.

[22] *Stenograficheskii otchet VI kongressa Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (Moscow/Leningrad, 1929), Vol. 6.

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possible the AMP concept.[23] After 1931 he was forced to drop explicit references to it, but simply pasted the new label of "Asiatic feudalism" on the old content. When his book was republished in 1931 the section on the AMP was also removed.

In its original format, the book consisted firstly of a theoretical exposition of the AMP concept with many references to Marx and Engels, and secondly of a collection of materials on landownership and relations of production in contemporary Chinese agriculture. Unfortunately the empirical evidence, which seemed to show that feudal relations of landownership were strongly entrenched, did not support Mad'iar's theoretical framework. According to the latter the AMP had existed in China up to the beginning of the twentieth century (when feudal and capitalist concepts of private property were imported from Europe), and the survivals of the AMP were of great importance in determining the strategy of the Chinese revolution.

The lack of correlation between Mad'iar's theoretical framework and his empirical materials was acknowledged even in the review by Eugene Varga, who was second only to Mad'iar in his support for the concept as such, and was certainly the most durable of the *Aziatchiki.* Varga wrote: "This contradiction between the strong theoretical emphasis on the significance of the 'Asiatic mode of production' and the almost complete absence of corresponding concrete material represents the weak side of the book."[24]

However, Mad'iar's defence of the Marxist credentials of the concept, taken in isolation from his empirical materials, aroused considerable interest. It was an accurate presentation lacking only the evidence from the *Grundrisse* and some of the notebook materials (such as Marx's abstract of M. M. Kovalevsky) which were not yet available. It is true that Mad'iar went beyond Marx in describing state officials under the AMP as constituting an actual ruling class although their power derived from their function or office rather than from private property.

However, in developing this approach Mad'iar was only echoing Engels's account in *Anti-Dühring,*[25] as is clear from the following passage:

> ... the fundamental class division of Eastern society occurs between

[23] For biographical details see Nikiforov, who also cites an unpublished manuscript by himself and A. M. Grigor'ev on Mad'iar. The entry written by Nikiforov for the 3rd ed. of *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* gives the date of death as 1940—in his earlier piece Nikiforov gave the date as unknown.

[24] E. Varga, "Novaia nauchnaia literatura o Kitae," *Pravda*, 6 Jan. 1929. S. A. Dalin was less critical: "Comrade Mad'iar's book is a great scientific work. All of the extremely valuable material collected by him is passed through the prism not only of the Marxist point of view in general, but through the prism of the specific evaluation made by Marx, Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin of the majority of the Asiatic countries, and which (economic structure) they characterized as a special Asiatic mode of production. Having adopted this position the author succeeds particularly brilliantly in the first part of his book ..." S. A. Dalin, review of L. Mad'iar, *Ekonomika sel'skogo khoziaistva v Kitae, Izvestiia*, 4 Oct. 1928.

[25] Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, trans. E. Burns (London: Lawrence & Wishart, n.d.), p. 201.

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> the peasant masses, united in village communes, and the former servants of the communes who have separated themselves out of the communes and constituted themselves as a ruling class (the priests in Egypt, the literati of ancient China, etc.).[26]

Economic exploitation by such ruling classes takes the form of taxation —in the absence of private property in land, rent and taxes coincide.[27]

One way in which Mad'iar's account of Asiatic society differed from the writings of 1925–27, which relied on Weber, was in its rejection of the concept of a system based on kinship as distinct from the neighbourhood village system. Pepper had retained this clan-based approach but the *Aziatchiki* who, following him, derived the concept from Marx, on the whole rejected it.

Another very interesting aspect of Mad'iar's work is his treatment of G. V. Plekhanov. Mad'iar paid a warm tribute to Plekhanov for the latter's grasp of Marx's theory of social formations, in particular that of the AMP. This acknowledgement of Plekhanov's important role in the theoretical elucidation of Marx is to be found generally among the *Aziatchiki,* and distinguished their work from the rising school of Stalinist historiography. As a recent Soviet scholar has written: "During the period of the personality cult of I. V. Stalin the rich literary legacy of G. V. Plekhanov, even the works of his Marxist period, were buried in oblivion and his role in the development of the science of history was disparaged and ignored. After the 20th congress of the CPSU this tendency was reversed by the concerted efforts of philosophers, economists and historians, although it has still not been completely overcome." [28]

The repudiation of the applicability of the AMP concept to Russia [29] was hardly surprising considering that the whole legitimacy of Bolshevik rule rested on just such a repudiation. If the chief legacy of the Russian past was the hypertrophy of the state, which reflected and prolonged Russia's backwardness, then the correct antidote was a period of bourgeois democracy. As the historian A. G. Prigozhin, an opponent of the AMP concept, wrote:

> ... At the Fourth (Unity) Congress in Stockholm, Lenin raised precisely the objection that Plekhanov was attempting to construct the Menshevik conception of the Russian revolution out of his analysis of the "Asiatic character of Russian despotism" and of the Russian commune. If Marx and Engels really took the viewpoint of acknowledging an "Asiatic" mode of production in Russia, then it was not Lenin who was right as we have thought and believed

[26] L. Mad'iar, Preface to *Ekonomika sel'skogo khoziaistvo* (Moscow: izd. IKKI), p. iii.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] Iu. Z. Polevoi, "G. V. Plekhanov o vostochnom despotizme," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2 (1967), p. 73. By the same author see also "Nachalo marksistskoi istoriografii v Rossii," *Istoriia istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR* (Moscow, 1960).

[29] See also for example A. I. Lomakin, Discussion on the Report by S. M. Dubrovsky, *Istorik-Marksist*, Vol. 16 (1930), p. 121. Lomakin wrote that, despite this error, Plekhanov's general concept of the AMP "does not revise but develops Marx, and for us to learn from him is by no means shameful."

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> up till now, but Plekhanov: it was Menshevism that was right, and not Bolshevism! [30]

The sensitivity felt towards this subject was demonstrated at a discussion held in 1929 by the Society of Marxist Historians, when S. Shmonin caused an uproar (noted in the published account) by his claim that Marxists were correct in attributing the AMP to Russia. Shmonin went on to provide his own definition of the concept, which he believed was applicable to any pre-capitalist formation—even those with a developed form of exchange, which "incorporated an inner stability which precluded a transition to (industrial) capitalism." [31] Shmonin listed five different pre-capitalist formations which could suffer from the condition of stasis he described as the AMP, but he did not regard it as an autonomous formation in the manner of the true *Aziatchik*.

Returning to Mad'iar's appraisal of Plekhanov, we find that he drew particular attention to the fact that "Plekhanov introduced a higher and extremely valuable degree of precision into Marx's teaching, in the sense of a correct construction of the order of progression of the stages of the economic formation of society." [32] Mad'iar was referring to *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* where Plekhanov argued that although Marx originally regarded the Oriental and the Ancient as successive epochs, he changed his views after reading Morgan's *Ancient Society*.[33] Plekhanov's argument rested on the fact that both Morgan, and Marx's notes on Morgan, on which Engels's *Origin of the Family Private Property and the State* was based, depicted a transition from clan society to the slave-based state with no intervening "Oriental" stage. Plekhanov took this to indicate that Marx had been converted to the view that clan society could develop into *either* Oriental society (as in the 1859 Preface) *or* into Ancient society (as in the *Origin of the Family*).

Plekhanov's reasoning was in fact faulty in that the impact of Morgan on Marx and Engels was to strengthen, not to weaken their belief in a unilinear pattern of history. Morgan's work provided independent corroboration of such a universal schema, although it varied from that put forward by Marx and Engels in 1859. The respect felt by Marx and Engels for Morgan's work led them to substitute his version of the early development of history for their own working hypothesis.[34]

[30] A. G. Prigozhin, "Problema obshchestvennykh formatsii," *Pod znamenem marksizma*, No. 7–8 (1930), p. 165.

[31] Discussion on A. Efimov's report entitled "Kontseptsiia ekonomicheskikh formatsii y Marksa i Engel'sa i ikh vzgliady na struktury vostochnykh obshchestv," *Istorik-Marksist*, Vol. 16 (1930), p. 154.

[32] Mad'iar, Preface, p. lvi.

[33] G. V. Plekhanov, *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, trans. J. Katzer, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, n.d.), p. 63.

[34] *Cf.* M. Godes, *Diskussiia ob aziatskom sposobe proizvodstva*, Obshchestvo marksistov vostokovedov (Moscow/Leningrad, 1931), p. 24. Godes omits to remark that if a unilinear pattern is to be retained, the 1859 hypothesis was more plausible than Morgan's schema, in that the latter was at odds with what we now know about Mycenaean civilisation in Greece—which preceded the classical epoch and had some similarities with the AMP. This point has been made by the contemporary Soviet scholar M. A. Vitkin.

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All this does not detract from Plekhanov's correct conclusion, which Mad'iar built on, that whenever Marx and Engels actually turned their attention to Oriental society they were speaking in terms of an alternative form of social production determined by particular geographical and historical circumstances rather than of a universal stage. There was an ambivalence in Marx and Engels between a unilinear and a multilinear perception of historical progress, and it was this ambivalence which Plekhanov with his systematizing approach was unable to comprehend.

Plekhanov's rejection of the unilinear model of history, like that of Mad'iar and other *Aziatchiki* [35] was essentially based on knowledge of the work *published* by Marx and Engels on Asiatic society and their letters on the same subject. Hence they arrived at an essentially bilinear (East/West) view of historical development. Access to the *Grundrisse* has now revealed that Marx, when paying close attention to the forms of pre-capitalist development rather than writing polemical excurses, believed in the possibility of at least three major alternative forms of development out of the primitive community (the Asiatic, classical and Germanic) and other mixed forms of development such as the Slavonic.

Meanwhile S. A. Dalin, who had reviewed Mad'iar's book in *Izvestiia*, and was to survive to review E. Varga's book which reopened the debate in 1964 in *Novoe Vremia*, had published an important essay on the Taiping Rebellion in which he employed Mad'iar's theoretical framework. Dalin described the Taiping revolution as an aspect of the equilibrating mechanism of the AMP, already mentioned above in connexion with A. Ya. Kantorovich. The rebellion represented a striving to return to the "original primitive forms of 'Asiatic' society, rather than creating a new mode of production." [37] Varga followed Dalin in this respect in an article which reflected the post-1927 emphasis on Marx rather than Weber as the authority for regarding the AMP as an autonomous (non-Western) social formation.[38] Another *Aziatchik* who was to argue that peasant rebellions were one of the mechanisms ensuring the durability of the Asiatic system was A. I. Lomakin, who claimed that: "[popular revolutions] were the fundamental cause of the equilibrium of Eastern societies, condemning them to an immobile, stagnant condition, broken only by the incursion of imperialism." [39] The popular revolutions acted as a safety-valve when the tendencies of officials to transform themselves into a feudal ruling class became too strong, and they brought about the "formulation of a new 'popular' government, with the whole inevitable bureaucratic hierarchy." [40]

Taken as a whole, the 1927–28 period saw the expression of various

[35] M. D. Kokin, G. K. Papaian and A. I. Lomakin all followed Mad'iar in rejecting the unilinear conception.
[36] Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. M. Nicolaus, (Penguin, 1973), p. 471 ff.
[37] S. A. Dalin, *Taipiny* (Sbornik statei) (Moscow, 1928), pp. 15–16.
[38] E. S. Varga "Osnovyne problemy Kitaiskoi revoliutsii," *Bol'shevik*, No. 8 (1928).
[39] Discussion of the Report by S. M. Dubrovsky, *Istorik-Marksist*, Vol. 16 (1930), p. 123.
[40] Ibid. p. 122.

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views about Oriental and, in particular, Chinese society, which had previously been regarded as incompatible with the Marxist conception of historical progress. These views were now brought forward under the umbrella of the AMP concept, which was legitimized by numerous newly discovered references in the works of Marx and Engels.

The Peak of the Debate, 1929–31

The year 1929 opened with the long-overdue publication of Lenin's most explicit treatment of the problem of the sequence of social formations—the lecture on "The State" delivered at Sverdlov University on 11 July 1919.[41] In this lecture Lenin argued that:

> The development of all human societies for thousands of years, in all countries without exception, reveals a general conformity to law, a regularity and consistency in this development; so that at first we had a society without classes—the original patriarchal, primitive society, in which there were no aristocrats; then we had a society based on slavery—a slave-owning society....
>
> This form was followed in history by another—feudalism. In the great majority of countries slavery in the course of its development evolved into serfdom....
>
> Further, with the development of trade, the appearance of the world market and the development of money circulation, a new class arose within feudal society—the capitalist class.[42]

This utterance by Lenin provided a support for the rigid historical schema approved by Stalin, and which was to be given its definitive statement in the latter's "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" (1938). It had the great advantage over Marx's 1859 preface of excluding the problem-creating AMP. Supporters of the AMP concept did not have the advantage of access to Lenin's *Conspectus of the Correspondence of K. Marx and F. Engels 1844–1883* (first published in Moscow, in 1959), which more recent Soviet *Aziatchiki* have been swift to employ in demonstrating the Leninist credentials of the concept. In these notes Lenin wrote, inter alia: "The 'key' to Oriental systems is the absence of private property in land. All land = the property of the head of state." And, "The Asiatic villages, self-enclosed and self-sufficient [in a natural economy] form the basis of Asiatic systems and public works of the central government."[43]

Nonetheless, following the publication of the lecture on "The State" a series of lively discussions took place on the problem of the historical formations of society, and the *Aziatchiki* were not the only participants to challenge the five-stage schema now handed down from above.

Many of the discussions centred around the report prepared by S. M. Dubrovsky for the Scientific Association of Oriental Studies entitled "On

[41] Published in *Pravda*, 18 Jan. 1929.
[42] Lenin, *The State* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970), pp. 8–9.
[43] Taken from M. Trush [V. I. Lenin, *Konspekt "Perepiski K. Marksa i F. Engel'sa 1844–1883 gg"*], *Kommunist*, No. 2 (1960), p. 50.

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the Question of the Nature of the 'Asiatic' Mode of Production, Feudalism, Serfdom and Trading Capital." This report was presented early in 1929 and published as a separate monograph later that year.[44] In it Dubrovsky denied the existence of the Asiatic mode of production, but on the other hand he provocatively introduced new modes of production into the orthodox schema, including the division of feudalism into one mode of production based on small peasant holdings and another based on serfdom. In the subsequent discussions on the problem of social formations both supporters and opponents of the AMP concept were united in attacking Dubrovsky.

In May 1929 a discussion was held on Dubrovsky's report at an open session of the Sociological Section of the Society of Marxist Historians. In the same year a report was presented by M. Godes to Leningrad historians on the subject, and there was another Leningrad discussion, again with a report from Godes in 1931.[45] In January 1930 Mad'iar presented a report and Dubrovsky a dissenting report on the AMP to the Eastern Section of the All Union Conference of Marxist Agriculturalists.[46] Also in 1930 a discussion was held at Kharkov, and ones at Baku and Tiflis, where T. D. Berin, an *Aziatchik*, presented reports based on his (never published) work, *Feudalism and the Asiatic Mode of Production.*[47] Berin's report consisted of a large number of citations proving the existence of the AMP concept in Marx's work. The discussion of his report at Tiflis was extremely interesting in that his opponents (for example A. A. Bolotnikov and M. P. Zhakov) argued not so much that the concept did not exist in Marx's works but that the concept did not correspond to historical facts and hence Marx was wrong on this. Marxist methodology in approaching the facts of history was held to be more important than quoting Marx.[48] Alagardian drew an analogy between the AMP and the concepts of primitive communism and of matriarchy—in his view it was possible to be a Marxist and yet to deny the existence of these categories.[49]

At the discussion held by the Society of Marxist Historians another interesting issue was raised by I. M. Reisner, who on the basis of his own historical work believed that Moghul India was definitely "Asiatic"

[44] S. M. Dubrovsky, *K voprosu o sushchnosti asiatskogo sposobe proizvodstva, feodalizma, krepostnichestva i torgovogo kapitala* (Moscow: Izd. nauchnoi assotsiatsii vostokovedeniia, 1929).

[45] The latter was published under the title *Diskussiia ob aziatskom sposobe proizvodstva po dokladu M. Godesa* (Moscow: Leningrad, 1931). An accompanying report was presented by M. D. Kokin.

[46] Mad'iar's report was entitled "Obshchestvennye formatsii i agrarnyi vopros," and included theses on the AMP.

[47] The Tiflis discussion was published as: *Ob aziatskom sposobe proizvodstva Stenograficheskii otchet diskussii po dokladu t. Berina*, Zakkniga, 1930. Berin's report at the Baku session, "Vostochnyi feodalizm ili aziatskii sposob proizvodstva," (4 Apr. 1930) applied the concept to the history of Persia and pre-Revolutionary Azerbaijan. The conference materials were not published.

[48] Ibid. p. 98.

[49] Ibid. pp. 85–86.

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rather than feudal in character. At the conclusion of his exposition Reisner made the following remarks:

> It is necessary for us to turn back directly to Marx. The charge against us "Asiatophiles" of Eastern chauvanism is quite groundless. Our task, despite the Indian nationalists who blanket Indian history with the fog of mysticism, consists in discovering in this history the laws of class struggle.[50]

Reisner's formulation may have been quite deliberately paradoxical, for the concept of the AMP was unpopular with Eastern communists from the beginning of the debate, not because of its implications of Eastern chauvinism, but because of the fear that it was a weapon in the hands of Western chauvinism and paternalism. Marx and Engels, in common with the majority of nineteenth-century political economists, had believed that the AMP was characterized by stagnation and required Western intervention to provide the elements of progress. Hence to many non-Western communists any notion of Asiatic particularism was tainted by these nineteenth-century attitudes. These objections were tacitly recognized in the methodological approach officially prescribed in the Soviet Union from 1931:

> For us, there exists no division of peoples and countries into an Orient and an Occident, which are opposed to one another and which it would be appropriate to study in a different manner. In our Union, the Orient has the same rights as the Occident, and we study it with the same Marxist methodology as the Occident. There has been, and there is, class struggle in the East, just as much as in the West. The history of the Orient knows the same formations as those of the West. Such are the fundamental principles which govern our study of the Orient.[51]

Apart from the discussions held in 1929–31, at which the *Aziatchiki* put forward their claims for the concept, a number of monographs were to appear in 1930—the high tide mark of the respectability of the concept. These included a new book by L. I. Mad'iar, *Essays on the Economy of China* which was edited by E. Varga and contained a foreword and closing article by him; A. I. Shtusser's *Marx and Engels on India* (edited by and with a foreword by Mad'iar); *"Ching t'ien" The Agricultural Structure of Ancient China,* by M. D. Kokin and G. Papaian, edited by and with a foreword by L. Mad'iar. The English Marxist Paul Fox, who was then working in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow, published a very detailed study entitled "The Views of Marx and Engels on the Asiatic mode of production and their sources."[52] In this study Fox argued that, as his researches showed, there

[50] "Preniia po dokladu S. Dubrovskogo," *Istorik-Marksist*, Vol. 16 (1930), p. 115.

[51] S. Ol'denburg (Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences), statement made in 1931, quoted in J. Pečirka, "Discussions soviétiques" (first published in German, *Eirene* (Prague 1964), No. III), *Recherches internationales à la lumière du marxisme*, No. 57–58 (Jan.–Apr. 1967), p. 65.

[52] P. Foks, "Vzgliady Marksa i Engel'sa na aziatskii sposob proizvodstva i ikh istochniki," *Letopisi marksizma,* 1930, III (XIII), pp. 3–29.

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was no doubt that the AMP was a Marxist concept. There was also no doubt that a qualitative difference existed between Eastern and Western society. What Fox refused to commit himself to was whether the theory of the AMP, as understood by Marx and Engels, elucidated this difference in a definitive way, although he suggested that external evidence supported their point of view.[53]

The book by Kokin and Papaian, which represented their degree work as students of the Leningrad Institute of Oriental Studies, was of particular interest as an effort to show, by using old Chinese sources, that Chinese society of the Chou period was based on the AMP. The book opened with a preface of 75 pages by Mad'iar on the theory of the AMP—someone described the work of Kokin and Papaian as an "afterword to L. Mad'iar's foreword."[54] Kokin and Papaian themselves had a theoretical section on the AMP, in which they, foreshadowing the more recent *Aziatchiki,* opposed Marx's concept of the absolute stagnation of the East. Kokin and Papaian argued that when Marx and Engels were writing insufficient research had been done to reveal the internal dynamic of the Asiatic system, a dynamic which although different from that of Western European society nonetheless existed.[55]

The rest of the book was devoted in part to an account of the historiographical sources for the Chou period, and finally to a direct account of the social system. The latter they described as based on the "ching t'ien" or neighbourhood commune, which was exploited by a bureaucratic apparatus. Rent and tax coincided, the state owning the land. The official governing this or that region did not regard himself as the proprietor of the region. The external sign of the Asiatic structure of the society was the high degree of centralization, which distinguished it from classical feudalism. Kokin and Papaian, like the other *Aziatchiki,* found the explanation of the AMP to lie in the need for irrigation.

The closing essay by Eugene Varga in Mad'iar's book touched on the more contemporary problem of the relevance of the AMP concept to the strategy of the Chinese revolution. Varga argued that while the AMP no longer existed in China, neither did feudalism, and land-rent was in fact of a usury-capital variety. Feudal land-rent based on feudal rights did not exist in China and there was no class of feudal landowners distinct from the bourgeoisie such as existed in Europe before the bourgeois revolution.

There were dangerous similarities between this kind of position, denying the relevance of the feudal category to China (and hence denying the relevance of an anti-feudal revolution) and Trotsky's position that the Chinese revolution must be of an anti-capitalist nature. These similarities sealed the fate of the concept in 1931, when the *Aziatchiki*

[53] Ibid. p. 29.
[54] Reported in V. N. Nikiforov, op. cit. p. 231, fn.
[55] M. D. Kokin, G. Papaian, "*Tszin'-Tian.*" *Agrarnyi stroi drevnego Kitaia* (Leningrad: Izd. Leningr. vostochnogo instituta im. A. S. Enukidze, 1930), p. 85. Kokin and Papaian's book was translated and published in China in 1933.

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were loudly denounced as Trotskyites (although Trotsky had never used the AMP concept).

The Arguments Used Against the AMP concept

The types of criticism made of the AMP concept fall into three main categories, the methodological, the empirical and the pragmatic. All three categories were to be employed by E. Iolk in a vitriolic attack on the concept published in 1931,[56] in which he used every piece of ammunition which was to hand, and summarized many of the arguments put forward at the earlier discussions. The following account largely follows Iolk, but leaves out some of the more idiosyncratic attempts to prove that Marx and Engels did not put forward the AMP concept in their work.

(a) *Methodological Arguments*

Methodological arguments concerning the AMP concept have been common both in the earlier and more recent Soviet debates, and stem from the structural differences between this category and others defined by Marx as modes of production.

In the first place, the AMP was, by its very formulation geographically circumscribed, unlike the other modes of production which in the 1920s were regarded as being universal in character.[57] The appearance of the AMP was determined by regionally specific geographic factors (climate, extensive flood plains etc.) rather than by the universal logic of the development of forces of production.

This attribution of a determining role to geographical factors seemed to many of the opponents of the AMP concept to be a denial of the principles of historical materialism. As one of its critics remarked "Can one be surprised ... that a theory built upon water is soggy from the outset?"[58]

The belittling of the significance of geographical factors was characteristic of Stalinist historical materialism as a whole, according to which the role of geographical environment was limited to an "accelerating or retarding effect." This aspect of Stalinist historiography was officially renounced in 1963 and a major reassessment of the role of geographical factors in history has been taking place in the Soviet Union.[59]

A different kind of methodological objection concerned the problem of a mode of production in which the defining elements were of a secondary or superstructural character; that is, the functions of the state

[56] E. Iolk, "K voprosu ob 'aziatskom' sposobe proizvodstva," *Pod znamenem marksizma*, No. 3 (1931), pp. 133–56.

[57] In the recent debates, especially within the PCF this position has been more or less reversed, with the AMP being interpreted as a more universally occurring formation than the regionally restricted slavery and feudalism.

[58] M. Godes, in *Diskussiia ob aziatskom sposobe proizvodstva*, op. cit. p. 10. Cf. Iolk, p. 149.

[59] See Marian Sawer, "The Place of Geographical Factors in Historical Materialism," *Political Science*, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 66.

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in providing public works, the state ownership of the land, and the state monopoly of rent in the form of tax. According to a central stream of Marxist thinking the state is always a secondary phenomenon, brought into being as a consequence of class struggle, and subordinate to a dominant economic class. In the AMP thesis, however, the state is part of the economic base in so far as it supplies essential conditions of production and hence achieves a monopoly of surplus labour. This thesis was unacceptable and even incomprehensible to the opponents of the AMP concept. S. M. Dubrovsky was to write: "According to Comrade Lomakin, the mode of exploitation in Asiatic societies amounts to the collection of tribute: but the state collecting the tribute must represent the rule of a definite class." [60]

A similar refutation was made by one of the reviewers of Wittfogel's book, *China Awakes*:

> The officials constituted a class not because they were officials but because they represented the property interests of the ruling classes. The administration of the irrigation system was not the basis of the state but rather the means or instrument of its consolidation.[61]

Dubrovsky also argued, as did Iolk, that while Marx undeniably claimed that in the East the state owned the land, this did not constitute an independent mode of production as both the subject and the relationship were superstructural phenomena.[62] The analysis of the property relationship as superstructural was hardly tenable, as Varga has pointed out—for Marx, property relations were the legal expression of relations of production, and the key to any given social formation was the relationship by the direct producers to the owners of the means of production, in this case, the state.

Related to the special role of the state in Asiatic society was the problem of whether the state was a "supra-class" state, a theory associated with "bourgeois historiography," or whether the state could embody a ruling class based on function or office. Mad'iar, as has been pointed out, followed Engels in describing the bureaucracy as a ruling class, but many others of the *Aziatchiki* drew back from this position—involving as it did the apparent rejection of the concept of class as based

[60] S. M. Dubrovsky, "Preniia po dokladu S. Dubrovskogo, *loc. cit.* p. 123.

[61] M. Shchukar, [Review of K. Wittfogel, *Probuzhdaiushchiisia Kitai*], *Novyi Vostok*, No. 16–17 (1927), p. 380.

[62] The underlying assumption of the argument was that wherever cultivators worked with their own implements land to which they had certain hereditary rights, and were compelled to alienate surplus labour to a third party or parties, there existed a feudal mode of production. This line of reasoning still frequently appears, although Marx's notebooks on Kovalevsky and Phear were published in the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In these notebooks Marx specifically criticised the "falsifying of the facts [of Asiatic society] through phraseology borrowed from feudal Europe." (Marx's Conspectus of Phear.) He repeatedly stressed that the state appropriation of administrative, juridical and symbolic functions stemmed from a different structural basis than the private appropriation of these functions by the feudal lord in Western Europe, where "the functions of general and judge were attributes of landed property" (*Capital*, Vol. 1), and landed property was in turn the attribute of a hereditary nobility (*nulle terre sans seigneur*).

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on the private and hereditary ownership of the means of production. These doubts over whether the concept of a functional class was compatible with Marxism were expressed in the usage of words such as stratum, group, exploiting layers and so on.

Whether or not the bureaucracy associated with the AMP was defined as a class, the supporters of the concept agreed in viewing its role as an exploitative as well as a functional one. This involved the further problem of why this relationship of exploitation did not generate a dynamic class struggle, as occurred in the Marxist description of all other historical formations. According to the general principles of Marxist social analysis, relations of exploitation always breed social struggle, and are "the locomotive" of social change and progress. On the other hand, the concept of the AMP, even as modified by Kokin and Papaian and more contemporary Marxists, has always included the notion of relative stagnation and the failure to develop the prerequisites of industrial capitalism from within. Iolk described the failure of the *Aziatchiki* to perceive the internal dynamic of Eastern societies as due not so much to the backwardness of these societies as to the "backwardness of the 'Eastern' sector of our historical front." [63] Marx himself appears to have believed that although his general theory of history rested on the premise of necessary progress, lack of individualization and differentiation in the social division of labour could lead to a self-perpetuating system as long as conditions of isolation from expanding capitalism were preserved. These systems existed outside the mainstream of world progress, which provided the justification of Marx's general social theory, but as the critics pointed out, the very acknowledgement of the AMP also tended to destroy the concept of the inevitability of social progressions.

(b) *Empirical Arguments*

Even if the structure of the AMP concept was compatible with the Marxist theory of socio-economic formations, many opponents of the AMP concept believed it to be incompatible with empirical evidence. Marx did not have sufficient data at his disposal to determine whether in fact Eastern societies experienced the same or different modes of production from those in the West. More recent research showed that although the features comprising the AMP concept might have existed to some degree in Eastern societies they were not sufficiently dominant vis à vis patriarchal, and/or slavery, feudal and trading capital elements to warrant being defined as comprising an autonomous mode of production.

(c) *Pragmatic Arguments*

Pragmatic arguments raised against the AMP concept dealt in the main with its presumed political consequences, regardless of its methodological

[63] E. Iolk, "K voprosu ob 'aziatskom' sposobe proizvodstva," loc. cit. p. 155.

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correctness or its empirical truth. For a start there was the guilt by association, in that G. V. Plekhanov had been the only Marxist to develop and apply the concept systematically before the 1925–31 debate. The Bolshevik school of historiography headed in the 1920s by M. N. Pokrovsky had claimed that Plekhanov's erroneous conceptualization of the Russian state as relatively autonomous of social classes had led to his " defencist " position in the First World War. Iolk was to seize eagerly upon this ready-made argument as to the detrimental political consequences of the AMP concept.[64]

Secondly there was the argument alluded to in the main body of this essay, that the concept of Asiatic particularism and its connexions with the ideology of Western colonialism would alienate potential and actual Asian revolutionary movements. Instead, a history of class struggle similar to that of Western countries was to be discovered and deployed as the heroic antecedent of the existing struggle. Class struggle must not be depicted as something alien, imported along with Western imperialism.

A third pragmatic argument raised against the AMP concept was that it lent itself more to the Trotskyist than the Stalinist interpretation of the Chinese revolution. In fact the *Aziatchiki* differed from Trotsky in their understanding of Chinese history although their practical conclusions converged somewhat. Trotsky argued that capitalism was already firmly established in China and hence that the revolution must be socialist rather than bourgeois-democratic in character. The supporters of the AMP concept as noted before, tended to argue that because the native bourgeoisie had only been brought into existence through the influence of Western imperialism they should not be relied upon as a revolutionary force.

A fourth pragmatic argument against the AMP concept was never raised explicitly. This was the danger that the Soviet regime itself might be identified as a form of the AMP. Under the AMP the direct producers were not exploited through the medium of the private ownership of the means of production but by the state itself, embodied in a hierarchy of officials.

Hence the AMP represented a Marxist precedent for diagnosing relations of exploitation even where state ownership rather than hereditary private ownership of the means of production prevailed. K. A. Wittfogel in his *Oriental Despotism* treated this as the most important reason for the suppression of the concept: " from the standpoint of Russia's new totalitarian bureaucracy it was dynamite." [65]

It is certainly true that in recent years Marxist critics in Eastern Europe have seized upon the AMP concept to support their analysis of state socialism as an exploitative mode of production. See for example

[64] Iolk wrote that: " One could say that the whole theory of ' Eastern ' society is a mark of the negative aspects of Plekhanov's heritage." (Ibid. p. 147.)

[65] K. A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, Newhaven: Yale University Press (1970), p. 407.

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Milovan Djilas in *The New Class*,[66] Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski,[67] the "Budapest School" of sociologists[68] and Rudolf Bahro.[69] These Marxist dissidents have used the AMP concept not only to attack the analytic conflation of state and "social" (i.e. non-exploitive) ownership, but also to attack the historic imposition of the Soviet model of socialism on Eastern Europe. They have argued that the Soviet model is rooted in non-European historical traditions, that its *étatism* and bureaucratism is to some extent a carry-over from Russia's "Asiatic" past, and represents a step backward for Eastern European countries.

No wonder then that at the Leningrad Conference in 1931 Godes warned the *Madyariat* to consider first and foremost the political consequences of their theoretical position. Unfortunately, from 1931 onwards the *Aziatchiki* were in no position to answer the arguments of their opponents. However, their efforts have helped to fuel the recent debate in the Soviet Union and Eastern and Western Europe. So in a broad sense, the concept of the AMP has continued to act as the leverage point for efforts to resist the conversion of historical materialism from a critical apparatus into a rigid ideology. The early AMP debate is perhaps particularly notable for the fact that its leading protagonists had been active participants in at least one revolution (the Hungarian) and were deeply involved in another (the Chinese): for them, the preservation of Marxism as a critical rather than dogmatic theory was of the greatest importance in both analytic and practical work.

The Asiatic Mode of Production Today

Since 1964 there has been a dramatic revival of the AMP concept within Marxism, despite the gradual muting of the debate in the Soviet Union since 1971. This revival has been one aspect of the emergence of polycentrism and the accompanying attempt to break down the theoretical sclerosis induced by Stalinism. The AMP concept has functioned to stimulate a new heuristic approach to Marxism as a theory of world history, and to strengthen the view that history is not a closed and unitary process governed by immutable general laws determining its movement towards a single goal. The new approach implies that the historical pluralism affirmed by the AMP concept will not be submerged in either universal capitalism or universal socialism, but rather is likely to be preserved both as different roads to socialism and in different forms of socialism itself.

In the context of the non-Western world this means a rejection of the forced application of Western categories (slavery, feudalism, etc.) to

[66] M. Djilas, *The New Class*, London: Unwin (1966), p. 61.
[67] J. Kuron and K. Modzelewski, *An Open Letter to the Party*, London: Pluto Press (1966), p. 7.
[68] E.g. I. Szelenyi, "The Position of the Intelligentsia in the Class Structure of State-Socialist Societies," in M. Sawer (ed.), *Socialism and the New Class*, APSA Monograph No. 19 (1978), p. 73.
[69] R. Bahro, "The Alternative in Eastern Europe," *New Left Review* No. 106 (Nov.–Dec. 1977), pp. 10–13.

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non-Western history. It has also meant on the whole a rejection of Marx's Eurocentric perspective, and a recognition that non-European forms of development may have their own dynamics, which although overshadowed during the rapid industrial expansion of Europe during the nineteenth century, are now reasserting themselves in the form of self-proclaimed non-Western paths of development. Current work on the AMP concept has tended to bring into question, by developing one of the tensions within Marx's own work, the belief that the industrialization process was inextricably bound up with the forms of Western capitalism. It has also promoted a self-awareness that Marx's concept of socialism was inseparable from the European experience (the reconciliation of "bourgeois" individualism with ideals of community etc.) and that non-Western societies may be marching to a different drummer, whose rhythm is derived from their own historical traditions.

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The Soviet Factor in the Macedonian Dispute

Pedro Ramet

THOUGH the dispute between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over the ethnicity of the Macedonians goes back at least 100 years, to the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) which assigned most of Macedonia to Bulgaria, and the subsequent Congress of Berlin (also 1878) which turned over most of Macedonia to Serbia, the quarrel has recently entered a new phase. The Bulgarians are behind this, hoping perhaps to exploit the uncertainty surrounding the Tito succession. Thus, despite a brief thaw in Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations in the early 1970s, and despite ostensible interest on both sides in expanding trade relations, Sofia has recently intensified the polemical war over the Macedonian question. This development is important, of course, because it threatens to upset the fragile stability in the area (a stability which, unfortunately, conventional wisdom takes for granted, despite recurrent warning signals). But there is a more profound reason for dismay in this latest round, viz. that Bulgaria is functioning here, to a limited extent, as a proxy for the Soviet Union. Moreover, as I shall indicate below, the Soviets appear to be drawing closer to Sofia's position.

My purpose in this paper is to assess Soviet interests in the Macedonian dispute and to suggest likely Soviet policy choices in a crisis involving Macedonia.

The dispute in a nutshell is this: the Bulgarians deny that there is such a thing as a "Macedonian nation," claiming that the more than 1,200,000 Macedonians in Yugoslavia are in fact Bulgarians and that that portion of Yugoslavia which constitutes the Macedonian Republic is by rights part of "Greater Bulgaria."

The Yugoslavs accuse the Bulgarians of chauvinistic revanchism and of pursuing assimilationist policies at home. The Yugoslavs thus note that some 180,000 Macedonians were reported to be residing in Bulgaria in the 1956 Bulgarian census, but less than 9,000 in the 1960 census, and that the most recent Bulgarian census shows *no* Macedonians living in Bulgaria whatsoever. According to the Belgrade weekly, *NIN*, Sofia has systematically repressed Macedonian culture within its borders, confiscating Macedonian literature and phonograph records, prohibiting the singing of traditional Macedonian songs, transferring Macedonians from good jobs to menial ones, and relocating entire families from the western border region to districts in northern Bulgaria which are ethnically more Bulgarian.[1]

[1] *Nedeljne informativne novine*, (*NIN*), 5 Jan. 1975.

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The Bulgarians, in turn, claim that Macedonian is only a dialect of Bulgarian and that the Yugoslavs invented the Macedonian nationality in 1943 in order to justify retention of lands under the jurisdiction of the pre-war Yugoslav government and absorption of the western districts of Bulgaria (which the Yugoslavs call "Pirin Macedonia").[2] The Yugoslavs, however, insist that the closeness of Bulgarian and Macedonian proves nothing, and that Macedonian vocabulary is as different from Bulgarian as it is from Serbian. Moreover, far from being merely a dialect, Macedonian comprises numerous distinctive dialects of its own.

The language issue is, however, only one of two guises in which this territorial dispute manifests itself. The other is the question of the subjective self-identification of the inhabitants of the border territories. Each side accuses the other of applying coercion to compel census respondents to select the desired ethnic category. According to intermittent Yugoslav reports, moreover, there have been sporadic popular outbursts in Bulgarian Macedonia, where inhabitants have resisted assimilation and, especially since 1965, have conducted a tenacious protest campaign through underground leaflets, letters and public graffiti.[3] The use of graffiti has been a favourite Macedonian protest ploy and was at the root of the heavy arrests of Macedonians of Blagoevgrad in February 1973. For their own part, the Bulgarians, including even some "former Macedonians," shrug off Yugoslav insinuations and maintain that those Bulgarians who declared themselves Macedonians in 1956 did so merely at the direction of a central *apparat* which had not yet formulated a consistent policy on the Macedonian question.

Ironically, the Bulgarian communists have drawn freely on the writings of "bourgeois" Bulgarian apologists of the inter-war period in pressing their claims: thus, for instance, Vasil Subashkin, in a 1975 study that articulated the regime's position, resurrected the ideas of Anton Strashimirov (1923), dividing Bulgarians into five major groups—Shops, Mizeans, Thraceans, Rhoupians and *Macedonians*.[4]

Contrary to the implications of Sofia's argument, however, there is some suggestion that these ethnic considerations came much later than the original territorial drive. In a series of instalments in the Skopje daily, *Večer*, the Macedonian historian Dragan Taskovski pointed out that Great Bulgarian nationalism predates the Treaty of San Stefano and that that treaty actually narrowed down Bulgarian territorial aspirations. Prior to the Treaty of San Stefano, the more extreme elements in Bulgaria did not confine their ambitions to the Balkans and dreamt even of engorging the Ukraine.[5] Belgrade may fear,

[2] Excerpts from the memoirs of Tsola Dragoycheva, in *Septemvri* (January 1979), pp. 21–2, 71–2. An excellent study of the evolution of the policy of the Yugoslav Communists *vis-à-vis* the Macedonian question is Stephen E. Palmer, Jr., and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question* (Archon Books, Hamden, Conn., 1971).

[3] *NIN*, 5 Jan 1975.

[4] *Nova Makedonija* (Skopje), 4 May 1975.

[5] *Tanjug* (Belgrade, domestic service), 30 Aug. 1977.

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for that matter, that even now Sofia would not necessarily be sated with the ingestion of Vardar Macedonia. Giving vent to a disquiet which is apparently common in contemporary Yugoslavia, Djilas told West German correspondent Carl Gustav Stroehm in 1978 that Bulgarian irredentism reflects Sofia's ambition to become the strongest power in the Balkans.[6]

WHAT makes the Yugoslavs particularly nervous, however, is their obsession with the Soviet threat and their persistent fear of Soviet-Bulgarian collusion. The defection of a Czech general in 1968 brought the revelation of Soviet contingency plans for invading Yugoslavia. The plan, code-named "Operation Polarka," involved the use of Czech troops in a swift strike through neutral Austria in the event of "undesirable developments" after Tito's death.[7] Bulgarian provocation could conceivably lead to a situation in which the Soviets would feel impelled to make a decisive move.

For this reason, the Yugoslavs have been courting the Bulgarians almost frantically in recent months, hoping to elicit Bulgarian recognition of the Macedonian nation. Bilateral discussions in March 1979 made little progress towards resolving the dispute and when Bulgarian CP Politburo member Pencho Kubadinski paid an official visit to Belgrade, 18–21 June, the chief topic of discussion was the Macedonian question.[8] That the talks were abrasive and ultimately frustrating was suggested by Tito's failure to meet Kubadinski, thus neglecting to return the compliment paid to the Yugoslav Presidium member Dobrivoje Vidić by the Bulgarian strongman Todor Zhivkov on the occasion of the former's visit to Bulgaria in September 1976.

Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations were already strained in 1978 by two events: Hua Guofeng's visit to Yugoslavia in August, during which he visited Skopje, the capital of Yugoslavia's Macedonian Republic—a gesture that implied Chinese sympathy for Yugoslavia's position in the controversy—and the commemoration by Bulgaria of the 100th anniversary of the abortive Treaty of San Stefano, which had assigned what is now Yugoslav Macedonia ("Vardar Macedonia") to Bulgaria. Yugoslav Communists in Skopje reacted vociferously, but the Bulgarians stuck to their position that the Treaty of San Stefano was more "progressive" than the Congress of Berlin which superseded it and which divided up Macedonia more or less as it is today.[9]

The intensification of the dispute in 1979 was signalled by three events: the publication by the Bulgarians of certain incisive excerpts from the memoirs of Bulgarian CP Politburo member Tsola Dragoycheva in

[6] *Die Welt*, 22/23 July 1978.

[7] *The New York Times*, 9 June 1976.

[8] Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav-Bulgarian Talks in Belgrade End," *Radio Free Europe: RAD Background Report No. 143*, 26 June 1979.

[9] See *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 Aug. 1978; *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), 30 Aug. 1978; and *NIN*, 29 Jan. 1978.

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January, the reissue by the Yugoslavs of Lazar Koliševski's book, *Aspects of the Macedonian Question*, in May, and the release by the Soviets of a new edition of the *History of Southern and Western Slavs* in June.

A 76-page excerpt from Dragoycheva's memoirs, dealing exclusively with the Macedonian question, appeared in the January 1979 issue of the Bulgarian Writers' Union journal, *Septemvri*. A large section of the excerpts deals with the period of wartime cooperation between the Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist parties. Much of what she says has been said by the Bulgarians before. What is new is the detailing of events by which Dragoycheva advances her thesis that the Yugoslav CP unilaterally broke its agreement with the Bulgarian CP and decided on the forcible incorporation of all of Macedonia into Yugoslavia. This, she suggests, citing a survey conducted by the Bulgarian CP in 1942, was contrary to the wishes of the people of Macedonia who, she says, were openly anti-Yugoslav. Yugoslavia's stimulation of Macedonian national consciousness was, thus, by her account, both artificial and anti-Bulgarian, and—she adds—has resulted in the wholesale falsification of history.[10]

What nettled the Yugoslavs was not so much the charges themselves as the fact that they were now being voiced by a Politburo member (thus giving them the force of official policy) and the timing (coming during a particularly delicate phase in Soviet-Yugoslav relations). *Nova Makedonija*, the Skopje daily, reprinted selected portions of her memoirs and warned soberly that her article " represents the worst anti-Yugoslav slander and exceeds every anti-Yugoslav and anti-Macedonian slander published in Bulgaria in the last 20 years or so." [11]

The Yugoslavs' reply was to release a second edition of Koliševski's *Aspects of the Macedonian Question* in May. The first edition of this work appeared more than 15 years ago and republication by Skopje's prestigious Naša knjiga publishing house is clearly designed to serve as a foil against renewed Bulgarian irredentism.[12]

In a sense it is the Soviet publication which is the most ominous, at least as far as the Yugoslavs are concerned. For as long as the Macedonian question has been a point of controversy between these two Balkan communist states, the Yugoslav communists have stubbornly hoped to persuade the Kremlin to mediate in Yugoslavia's favour in this seemingly intractable issue. The Yugoslavs have thus believed that *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union was the key to the resolution of the Macedonian question. The Yugoslavs found reassurance in that the Soviets, unlike the Bulgarians, had never officially denied the existence of the Macedonian nation; that the Macedonian language continued to

[10] See G. S. with Patrick Moore, " The Macedonian Polemic Rides Again: Tsola Dragoycheva's Memoirs," *Radio Free Europe: RAD Background Report No. 26*, 31 Jan. 1979.

[11] *Nova Makedonija*, 20 Sept. and 21 Dec. 1978, quoted in Ibid.

[12] *Tanjug*, 30 May 1979.

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be taught as a separate subject at universities in the USSR; and that Moscow continued to publish Russian-Macedonian dictionaries.

Now, however, the latest edition of *History of Southern and Western Slavs* (Moscow, 1979) revises the previous Soviet assessment of Macedonian nationality and language. This new edition of a standard university textbook first published in 1969 gives greater support than hitherto to Bulgaria's position on the Macedonian question. In particular, the new edition has been meticulously censored to remove all references to the "Macedonian nation." Where the first edition spoke of the "Macedonian people" or the "Macedonian nation," the new edition speaks rather of "the people of the province of Macedonia." And where the old edition accepted the existence of a distinctive Macedonian language, the new edition now describes Macedonian as a dialect of Bulgarian. Soviet academia appears to be moving over to the Bulgarian position.

Vladimir Kostov argued recently (in *Le Figaro*, 25 April 1979) that the publication of Dragoycheva's memoirs was part of a Soviet-Bulgarian conspiracy to destabilize the Balkans. According to Kostov, the Kremlin is bent on reasserting its hegemony in the Balkans and Bulgarian irredentism is a pliable tool.[13] But one need not go as far as Kostov to appreciate that recent developments threaten the stability of the area. It is a troublesome fact that the sharpening of Yugoslav-Bulgarian polemics over the Macedonian question coincides with the emergence of fresh troubles in Soviet-Yugoslav relations (Yugoslav condemnation of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia early in 1979, Soviet-Yugoslav disagreement over the proper role of the non-aligned movement, which came to a head in September 1979, and new demonstrations of Yugoslav support of the Eurocommunists in their dispute with Moscow).

THERE is, to be sure, a parallelism between Soviet-Yugoslav and Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations. But Belgrade is probably going too far in viewing the Bulgarian CP as little more than a proxy for Soviet hegemonist aspirations. The danger is not that the Soviets will manipulate Bulgarian irredentism to their own advantage but rather that Bulgarian escalation of the dispute could create a situation in which some form of Soviet intervention will become unavoidable. This prospect, and the likelihood that such an eventuality would compromise Yugoslavia's independence, is what frightens Belgrade most of all.

The USSR has a strategic interest in Macedonia and therefore lends support to Bulgaria's irredentist claims. But this support remains ambiguous, thus permitting Moscow flexibility in the choice of the policy it would adopt in a crisis. Support of Bulgarian annexation, endorsement of the *status quo* in the context of an accommodation with Yugoslavia, and even Soviet underpinning for a secessionist Macedonian Republic remain conceivable Soviet options. Bulgaria's renown as the most reliable

[13] Kostov's article is translated in *Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS)*/ USSR, 7 May 1979.

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Soviet ally in Eastern Europe is well established. But it does not follow from that that the Kremlin would stand to gain from the territorial aggrandizement of its most loyal client. A Soviet strategy which, in conditions of crisis, would back a forcible incorporation of Vardar Macedonia into Bulgaria and which thus would make Bulgaria the linchpin of the Soviet presence in the Balkans, would at the same time alienate the Macedonians themselves, preclude any genuine Soviet-Yugoslav understanding (no Yugoslav government could acquiesce in the loss of Macedonia and yet retain the loyalty of its citizens), unnerve the Greeks (who continue to rule over the southern portion of historic Macedonia—a territory which the Yugoslavs insist is populated by Macedonians), and upset the delicate balance of power in the Balkans. Such a policy would also be profoundly alarming to the Rumanians, who have based their independent line on the maintenance of a close *rapport* with Belgrade. It is questionable what the Soviets would gain that could offset the high costs involved. Moreover, as the Soviets no doubt learned from their experience with East Germany (which was forced to acquiesce in the loss of extensive eastern territories, including mineral-rich Silesia, to Poland), a system whose boundaries are drawn by force comes to depend on force for its survival.

Moscow has, since 1955, maintained a constant policy of courting Belgrade, and in recent years the Soviet Union has emerged as Yugoslavia's most important trading partner.[14] Certainly the Kremlin hopes that Tito's successors will be more malleable, and that post-Tito Yugoslavia, its prestige diminished by the disappearance of the man who has guided the country since 1944, will gradually drift back into the Soviet sphere. Brezhnev's demonstrative pledges to honour Yugoslav sovereignty and integrity, during his visit to Belgrade in 1976, were accompanied by repeated proposals that Belgrade join the Warsaw Pact and permit the establishment of a naval base at Kotor. Thus it is unlikely that the Soviets would, say, support a Bulgarian seizure of Macedonia, let alone attempt a full-scale dismantlement of Yugoslavia.

IF, then, the Soviets have little to gain from a revision of the territorial *status quo* in the Balkans, what function, if any—one must ask—does the Macedonian question perform for Soviet foreign policy? It must be stressed that the Macedonian question is, of course, not a Soviet invention and that at least some elements in the Bulgarian elite would continue to be animated by irredentism even if the Soviets were to come down unambiguously on the Yugoslav side of the fence.

Nor is the Macedonian question a priority for Kremlin policymakers. Despite their statement in 1977 that " the CPSU and the BCP, as well as

[14] N. Vladimirov, " An Important Stage in Developing Soviet-Yugoslav Relations," in *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 11 (November 1977), p. 117; V. Chernyshev, " Economic Relations Between the USSR and the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (A Survey)," in *Problems of Economics*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July 1978), p. 91.
[15] *Pravda*, 6 June 1977.

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the USSR and the PRB, hold identical views and common positions in international affairs," [15] the Soviets have avoided explicit reference to the Macedonian question in official communiqués and have not been eager to allow the Bulgarians to draw them into the centre of this *mêlée*.

Yet willy-nilly the Macedonian question performs two functions for the Kremlin: (1) it gives the Soviets a certain leverage over both parties, which might make a crucial difference in a full-blown crisis; and (2) it provides a pretext upon which the Kremlin might intervene, again in the event of a crisis. In spite of Yugoslav worries, the Soviets are unlikely to give Sofia a blank cheque: unqualified Soviet endorsement of the Bulgarian position would constrict Moscow's options and unnecessarily allow Soviet policy to be dictated from Sofia.

Far from signalling a new commitment to Bulgaria in this dispute, recent changes in the Soviet leaders' attitude on Macedonia may reflect rather a veiled warning directed at Belgrade, and a deepening of their studied ambiguity. In Soviet carrot-and-stick diplomacy, the Macedonian question figures more as a stick in Moscow's Yugoslav policy than as a carrot in its Bulgarian policy.

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Traicho Kostov: Stalinist Orthodoxy in Bulgaria

John E. Horner

THE first dramatic event in Bulgaria's bleak history since the execution in 1949 of the party secretary, Traicho Kostov, was the expulsion from the Communist Party in 1961 of Vulko Chervenkov, a former prime minister and a party member since youth. Chervenkov's ultimate disgrace after a period of gradual decline dating from 1956 followed the eighth congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). It overshadowed a similar action depriving still another ex-prime minister, Anton Yugov, of his membership in the Central Committee. There were selective threads of irony in these proceedings which also saw the formal "rehabilitation" of Kostov. Chervenkov was charged with "artificially formulating" patently false accusations against Comrade Kostov: one of the principal indictments of Yugov was that in 1949, when he was Minister of Interior, he had been "personally guilty of the distortions and crude violations of legality" associated with the Kostov affair. And, presiding over the BCP eighth congress, was the colourless Todor Zhivkov, Chervenkov's protégé and effective leader of the BCP since 1954.[1]

Not one of the participants in the eighth congress recalled, at least in public, that the main charges against Kostov in 1949 had been delivered by the then President of the Republic, the veteran communist Vasil Kolarov. Nor did the proceedings record that when the trial of Kostov took place Georgi Dimitrov served as both prime minister and secretary-general of the BCP. It was an unobserved fact that in 1950 Chervenkov had publicly chided Yugov for insufficient vigilance in "unmasking" Kostov and his amorphous clique.[2] For the execration of Traicho Kostov formed part of a half-forgotten interlude associated with the imposition of ritual baptism by total immersion of a small Balkan nation. And, in a certain twisted sense, this had been a logical corollary to the hanging in 1947 of the agrarian leader, Nikola Petkov in the course of communist consolidation of power.[3]

Of the three protagonists, Chervenkov in 1949 appeared the least significant. The son of a non-commissioned officer in the Bulgarian Army, he had fled to Moscow after the explosion of a bomb aimed at

1 Todor Zhivkov, born in 1911 of a family of poor peasants, is now Chairman of the State Council, i.e. nominal Head of State. At the same time, he retains the far more significant position of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP. Zhivkov, an *apparatchik* risen through the ranks, is considered a colourless but disciplined bureaucrat.

2 Six years later, Yugov replaced Chervenkov as prime minister.

3 John E. Horner, "The Ordeal of Nikola Petkov and the Consolidation of Communist Rule in Bulgaria," *Survey*, No. 90, Winter 1974.

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Tsar Boris in the Sveta Nedelya Cathedral in Sofia on 16 April 1925 "planned and executed by members who had broken away from the party"[4]: Traicho Kostov, a law-student and active communist, was but one of the many caught up in the ensuing White Terror. Chervenkov remained in the USSR for many years, teaching in the Lenin Comintern School where he became a competent theoretician although lacking in intellectual stature. Of unprepossessing appearance, this future prime minister, Georgi Dimitrov's brother-in-law, returned to his homeland some months after the *coup d'état* mounted by the Fatherland Front on 9 September 1944 which accompanied the occupation of the country by the Red Army.

The second protagonist in the events of 1949 was Anton Yugov, a dandiacal native of Greek Macedonia whence he had come to Bulgaria as a refugee in the aftermath of the population exchanges which followed the First World War. By 1949, Yugov had occupied the sensitive post of interior minister for five years and was the driving force behind the repressive action which enabled the BCP to consolidate its hold over the country. Yugov, a member of the Politburo of the BCP since 1937, escaped from the concentration camp to which he had been consigned after the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. Playing an active role in the organization of partisan units against the right-wing regime of Tsar Boris and Professor Bogdan Filov, Yugov was less an intellectual than a highly effective party activist.

Just as the earlier trial of Nikola Petkov formed part of a pattern aimed at the establishment of monolithic regimes in the areas of Eastern Europe occupied by the Red Army, so the years 1948–52 saw parallel accusations of "nationalist deviation" brought against Wladyslaw Gomulka in Poland, Laszlo Rajk in Hungary, Lucretiu Patrascanu in Rumania, Vladimir Clementis in Czechoslovakia, and Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria. The main distinction was that the defendants in this second wave of trials were all distinguished members of their respective communist parties. The trials themselves were triggered off by the excommunication of the Yugoslav Communist Party by the Cominform on 28 July 1948: so far as is known, only Gomulka of the zealous communists mentioned above had openly opposed the Cominform's action: ironically, he was the only one of these "nationalist deviationists" not to be executed. For his part, Traicho Kostov seems to have strongly supported the Cominform's attack on Yugoslavia, and there is every reason to believe that his dislike of Tito and his colleagues was fully reciprocated.

The long litany of offences ascribed to the YCP, a "disgracefully, purely Turkish, terrorist regime," and other aspects of Tito's defiance of Stalin, have been fully described.[5] Suffice it to say that the expression

[4] *A Short History of Bulgaria* (Sofia, 1963). There is no indication that Chervenkov was personally involved in this episode, and his career suggests one possessed by a high degree of caution.

[5] Adam B. Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform* (Harvard, 1952).

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"nationalist deviationist" was initially a form of shorthand to portray a sympathizer with Joseph Broz-Tito, and the implication, however absurd it may appear today, is that the YCP overnight had become a willing and obedient tool of the "imperialists" sitting in their comfortable offices in Washington and London. The meaning was as crystal clear as the Soviet expression "rootless cosmopolitan" to delineate a Jew. Taking the longer historical view, it can be argued that Russian policy, as in 1876 and 1919, had again veered from support of Serbia to reliance on Bulgaria as the Balkan fulcrum of Russian power just as, after Nikita Khrushchev's pilgrimage to Belgrade in May 1955, there was a turn from Bulgaria towards Yugoslavia. These generalizations fail to bring out the personal traits of Traicho Kostov, the motivations of those who brought about his trial and execution, and the situation in which Bulgaria found herself in 1949.

A BRITISH observer who knew him well pictured Kostov as a "hard-faced, narrow-minded man of undoubted brain-power." The present writer, who had several lengthy sessions with him in 1947–48 on economic matters but was only able to follow the course of Kostov's trial in *Pravda* while on the staff of the American Embassy in Moscow, recalls him as entirely devoid of a sense of humour, an intense and studious Marxist, tough in support of what he conceived to be in Bulgaria's interests. The son of a railwayman of Macedonian origin, Kostov obtained a law degree from Sofia University and joined the newly-born BCP in 1920. During most of his life, he led a clandestine existence, specializing in propaganda work. His physical courage cannot be doubted: he once threw himself from the window of a police station in Sofia and suffered permanent back injuries because he feared that under torture he might implicate his comrades. Kostov spent the years 1929–31 in Moscow, returning to Bulgaria for underground work, and probably going in and out of the country on numerous occasions. He was instrumental in ridding the BCP of its "Left Sectarian" leaders and gaining acceptance in 1935 of the Comintern's Popular Front policy then being enunciated by Georgi Dimitrov.[6] After the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Kostov's role as the BCP leader within the country led to his being rounded up by Bogdan Filov's police. His death sentence, for reasons never explained, was commuted to life imprisonment, from which he was freed after the Red Army crossed the Danube into Bulgaria in September 1944 and the Fatherland Front seized power in Sofia. Kostov was appointed deputy prime minister by Georgi Dimitrov in 1946, and had general responsibility for economic planning. Three years later he was abruptly dismissed from this post

[6] *Seventh Congress of the Communist International* (Moscow, 1939). Dimitrov's Trojan Horse analogy comes to mind.

[7] *The Trial of Traicho Kostov and his Group* (Sofia: Ministry of Information and Arts, 1949).

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and from the BCP's Politburo, derisively made director of the National Library, and then brought to trial.

Kostov, in the words of Georgi Dimitrov, had made the "shameful assumption" that Soviet and Bulgarian interests might diverge and this is probably a fair statement of his thinking.[7] Simultaneously, he was accused of "left-wing deviation" and of being a British spy, an unlikely combination and certainly false. Even more ludicrous, the American minister in Sofia, who in fact had never met Kostov, was depicted as ordering the Bulgar to accept his instructions from Washington through Yugoslav channels.

If these charges bordered on the bizarre, the conduct of the trial partook of the same sense of unreality that had characterized Stalin's inquisitions during the 1930s. It was accompanied by an orchestrated press campaign and by "spontaneous" meetings of workers demanding that Kostov pay severe retribution for his crimes. In one sense, the trial was more poignant than that of Nikola Petkov, for Kostov had dedicated his entire life to serve those now tormenting him. Georgi Dimitrov's typical coarse taste was emphasized by jeering references in the press to Kostov's misshapen back. But in his own defence Kostov displayed in the words of Robert Conquest, "typical Bulgarian mulishness and resiliency."[8] The USSR had abandoned the confessional trial system in 1935: the last of the great public judgments held in Moscow was that of the 16 leaders of the Polish Communist Party. The revival of that system for Kostov quickly proved a cardinal error. In open court, and before an audience which included Western newsmen, Kostov repudiated a written confession earlier exacted from him under police torture. His condemnation was not delayed: the execution took place on 16 December 1949, six months after the death in a Moscow clinic of his old mentor, Georgi Dimitrov.

THESE are the bare bones of the story. But even in the perspective of 30 years, it is difficult to piece together a fully satisfactory explanation of the reasons behind the disgrace of a talented and devoted senior member of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Probably there is no single, let alone simple explanation. However, a list of the factors would include Stalin's growing paranoia and fear of the spread of dissident communist concepts spurred on by Tito's defiance of Kremlin infallibility, the personal ambition of Chervenkov, the need to find a scapegoat for the economic malaise affecting the country, genuine differences of opinion in the BCP hierarchy on the advisability of forced-draft industrialization and collectivization, and the dislike of Kostov and some of his associates, including finance minister Ivan Stefanov, of Soviet economic exploitation of the country. And the trial must also be considered in the context of the growing exacerbation of Soviet-American relations and the "Cold War."

[8] Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror* (London, 1968).

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Years later, when Kostov was "rehabilitated," the accusations, the trial, and the execution, were seen as ghastly mistakes the responsibility for which, on the local level, was laid at the door of Chervenkov and Yugov; in the overview of the period presented by Nikita Khrushchev to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the fault was heaped on Stalin's shoulders. Whether or not Stalin was a "monster," he did not act alone, and the trial of Kostov formed only part of a large tapestry in the weaving of which many busy hands were employed. As for Georgi Dimitrov, that "roaring lion of the Leipzig trial" had shown no trepidation in 1933 in betraying his two Bulgarian co-defendants, Popov and Tanev, both of whom emerged from Nazi confinement only to spend 15 years in one of Stalin's concentration camps on the charge of having plotted to assassinate Dimitrov.[9] An auto-repressive impulse had been set in motion in all of the Eastern European countries under Soviet control: a wave of hysteria followed the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform in which Dimitrov and Kolarov did not hesitate to join. The trend in Russian official thinking of that time is reflected in the defence of the "necessary, historically progressive measures" of Tsar Ivan the Dread who, in the sixteenth century, crushed the burghers of Novgorod for opposing the "unity of the Russian state."[10] "Unity" of the Soviet-bloc nations was a major theme in the years between the excommunication of the Yugoslavs in 1948 and the death of Stalin in 1953.[11]

In 1947 Nikola Petkov had been a symbol representing the non-communist majority of the Bulgarian people: his hanging had been followed by widespread repression of dissident elements. Following the execution of Kostov two years later, many "enemies of the people" from Bulgaria and other People's Democracies found themselves incarcerated in Moscow's Vladimir Prison charged with carrying out counter-revolutionary activities at the behest of Belgrade, London, and Washington.[12] As the Russian writer Roy Medvedev remarks, the Soviet "punitive agencies" provided the sinews.[13] The damage to the countries of the Soviet bloc proved considerable, particularly for backward Bulgaria which could ill afford the loss of many of her better-educated cadres: the wound, self-inflicted, bore the seal of approval of the most revered of BCP leaders, Georgi Dimitrov and Vassil Kolarov.

The downfall of Traicho Kostov clearly was to the benefit of Vulko Chervenkov. Dimitrov had been in failing health for some while, and

[9] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Gulag Archipelago* (Paris, 1974).

[10] I. Ya. Schipanov (Leningrad, 1949). Stalin liked to be compared with Peter the Great, and the general mood of the time was to laud the Russian past.

[11] As events in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were to demonstrate, Stalin's successors were no less vigilant in the pursuit of unity.

[12] Georgi Dimitrov explained to the fifth congress of the BCP on 25 Dec. 1948: "The Soviet regime and the Popular Democratic regime are two forms of one and the same system of government. . . . Both are based upon the dictatorship of the proletariat. Soviet experience is the only and best pattern for the building of socialism in our country. . . ."

[13] Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge* (New York, 1971).

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died in Moscow in 1949. Vassil Kolarov, the other towering figure of Bulgarian communism, briefly assumed the mantle of prime minister before his own demise in 1950. Thus, it fell to Chervenkov, following the execution of Kostov, to become Bulgaria's Little Stalin. It is entirely possible that Chervenkov had taken advantage of the prevalent "wave of hysteria" to eliminate Kostov, immeasurably his intellectual superior and the logical choice as Dimitrov's successor. The role of Yugov was less complex; he had made his career as a somewhat amiable hatchetman, and there was no particular love lost between him and Chervenkov.

In the years which encompassed the Kostov trial, many foreign observers considered the relentless struggle amongst the Eastern European communists to be between "Muscovites" and the "home grown" variety, i.e. that Stalin was promoting the ascendancy of those satellite communist leaders whose experience had been largely in the Soviet Union as against others who had spent their careers in the underground movements of their own countries. The distinction is essentially meaningless, for the ultimate test remained loyalty to the *Vozdh.* Dimitrov, Kolarov, and Chervenkov might best be regarded as senior civil servants of the Comintern, an organization in which Bulgarians had always been prominent and which was one arm of Russian external policy.

"Titoism" was a rather spurious issue at the time of the Kostov judgment unless the term is broadened to mean the assertion by communists outside the USSR of the "shameful assumption" that their national interests could diverge from those of the Russian Motherland. There were special reasons why Yugoslavia could be differentiated from Bulgaria. Tito had shaped his army, waged his own independence struggle with more help from the British than the Russians: he had a political solution, a federal one, for what was perhaps the major problem confronting his country since her creation after the First World War. Tito had loyally supported the USSR on all major international issues, although, it seems, he disagreed privately over the future of Trieste and Macedonia. It was only in the course of several years, long after the Kostov affair, that the Yugoslav "road to socialism" became sharply defined, and Western economic aid brought about technical and cultural contact inevitably affecting national attitudes. Conditions in Bulgaria were quite distinct, for BCP power resulted mainly from the overwhelming presence of the Red Army after September 1944 and subservience to Moscow was firmly inculcated in all Bulgarian communists. The BCP lacked the power to charter its own "road to socialism"; more important, it showed no desire to deviate. As Georgi Dimitrov proclaimed on 18 December 1948, "all communist parties have one leader and teacher, recognized by all—Comrade Stalin."

There existed solid arguments for finding a scapegoat for economic problems which by 1949 had reached considerable dimensions. The underlying reasons included the self-isolation of the country from the

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Marshall Plan,[14] the inability of war-devastated Russia to furnish the industrial equipment to make Bulgarian planning realistic, the relative lack of Bulgarians trained in economics, and the sullen resentment of the nation's peasant majority towards the regime. By late 1947, banks, insurance companies, and most foreign companies (largely German and Italian), and many domestic enterprises, had been nationalized. The subsequent Two-Year Plan allocated investments of 45 per cent to the industrial and mining sectors and only 6 per cent to the agricultural sector which formed the livelihood of 80 per cent of the people. By 1949 the government announced that the plan had been overfulfilled by 6 per cent but the figures were unreliable and sometimes fictitious. Double accounting, inadequate data available to the planners on preferences and production costs, and non-optimal factor proportions, contributed to a misallocation of capital stocks and an inconsistency in input-output relations. In agriculture, collectivization had barely begun in 1947 when 3·7 per cent of the arable land was held in what basically consisted of an adaptation of the long-established cooperatives. Bulgaria remained a land of dwarf peasant-holdings, unlike neighbouring Rumania and Hungary where large tracts of land were available for conversion into collectives. In February 1948 the *Sobranie* decreed compulsory purchase of larger types of agricultural equipment in private hands: this became the stock in trade of the Machine Tractor Stations whose purpose was political control rather than economic efficiency. While, at this stage, the collectivization programme continued to be highly tentative, a delicately-balanced and fairly stable cybernetic system which had evolved over the centuries was in the process of destruction. Hasty industrialization on an inadequate investment base, coupled with calculated insensitivity to the mores of the Bulgarian peasant proprietor, contributed to the unsatisfactory state of the economy by 1949. There is no hard evidence of where Kostov stood relative to future economic policy, or, more correctly, its pace. However, like Gomulka in Poland, he probably would have treated the peasants with some caution and advanced less precipitously in the area of industrialization. In any event, Chervenkov, above all a rigid Stalinist, proceeded on his advent to power into a headlong programme of collectivization of the land and greatly hastened the speed of industrialization.

There is good cause to believe that Kostov took a hard line on trading relations with the Soviet Union. It was common knowledge that the Russians were milking Bulgaria, purchasing such products as attar of roses and tobacco at low prices and reselling them on the world market for hard currencies: in return, Soviet products bought by Bulgaria had arbitrarily high fixed prices. There had been established, moreover, five joint Bulgaro-Soviet companies for the production of uranium, lead and

[14] In a conversation with the present author on 22 Aug. 1947, Kolarov asserted that Bulgaria had declined the Anglo-French invitation to participate in talks on European reconstruction because acceptance would have subjected the country to " unacceptable conditions."

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zinc, construction, civil aviation, and shipbuilding. All these were Soviet-managed with the Russian share in their assets representing confiscated German properties.[15] This formed a chief irritant, one which probably led to Kostov's "shameful assumption" that Russian and Bulgarian interests were not identical.

THE long-term effects of the execution of Traicho Kostov and the widespread purges of so-called "Kostovites" that ensued were diverse. At the time of Kostov's trial, but peripheral to it, two Bulgarian employees of the American Legation had been arrested on vague charges of being "foreign agents." One of these, Ivan Sekelov, a French-trained lawyer, died under police torture. The other, Michael Shipkov, during a brief escape from police custody, reached the Legation and signed an affidavit detailing police brutality and the false confession he had been forced to sign.[16] The true fault of both men was that they were not prepared to act as police informers.[17] The American refusal to withdraw the hapless Minister, Donald R. Heath, induced the severance of diplomatic relations and reinforced Bulgaria's isolation from the West.

More important, whatever faint spirit of intellectual independence that may have subsisted in the ranks of the BCP was effectively extinguished. After one of his earlier purges of Bolshevik heretics, Lenin had mused: "If you expel all the insufficiently obedient dumb-bells, will you not surely destroy the party?" The fact is that Chervenkov's period of ascendancy fastened upon the country a form of dull conformity carried out by the proliferating *apparatchiki.* This cannot, as Roy Mevdevev would have it, be laid solely at Stalin's door or attributed to the "personality cult" for which the *Vozdh* was excoriated by Nikita Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. As Louis Fischer has noted, "Lenin's greatest innovation was the removal of the heart and soul from politics and their replacement by a party organization."[18] And whatever visions may have been glimpsed in Moscow of the ultimate withering away of the State, no one has yet advocated the withering away of the party.

[15] J. F. Brown, *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule* (New York, 1970).

[16] Observing the First Balkan War, the Russian minister in Sofia remarked on one trait of Bulgarians, "cold and relentless cruelty." (A. Nekludoff, *Diplomatic Reminiscences* (London, 1920).)

[17] In time, such anomalies were corrected and Bulgaria adopted the Russian practice of having indigenous employees of foreign diplomatic missions furnished by a government agency.

[18] Louis Fischer, *The Life of Lenin* (London & New York, 1964).

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Churchill's "Spheres of Influence": Rumania and Bulgaria

Robert Garson

HISTORICAL accounts of the diplomacy of the Second World War seldom question the premise that Winston Churchill aimed to reduce Anglo-Soviet rivalry by dividing Europe into separate spheres of interest. This is understandable enough. After all, historical repute does not die easily. And in this particular case, historians have been particularly reluctant to question the received wisdom as Churchill himself fuelled and reinforced this view so vividly and convincingly in his wartime memoirs, *The Second World War*. According to this account, the Prime Minister and Josef Stalin attempted to allocate responsibility between themselves for specific areas of Eastern Europe in their dramatic face-to-face encounter in Moscow on 9 October 1944. At this notorious meeting, Stalin agreed after only a few minutes' discussion to allow Britain predominant interest in Greece in exchange for Soviet pre-eminence in Bulgaria and Rumania for the duration of the war. Percentages were used by the two leaders as a device to demarcate and qualify the respective authority of their governments. But on reflection Churchill seemed to experience considerable inner anxiety and doubt about this deal, despite his external confidence. In his worried moments he disregarded the specific qualifications—and it was this disregard that shaped subsequent analyses of his diplomatic strategy.[1]

[1] According to his memoirs, Churchill wrote out the agreed percentages "on a half-sheet of paper." They were:

Rumania:			
	Russia	.....	90%
	The Others	.....	10%
Greece:			
	Great Britain (in accord with USA)	.....	90%
	Russia	.....	10%
Yugoslavia		.....	50 – 50%
Hungary		.....	50 – 50%
Bulgaria:			
	Russia	.....	75%
	The Others	.....	25%

The official record shows that there was considerable haggling over the percentages, particularly between the foreign ministers. The final agreement varied slightly from the above figures, but this is unimportant, given that influence is unquantifiable anyway. For the purpose of the argument, the precise percentages matter less than the fact that proportions of responsibility were assigned to the West. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, VI: Triumph and Tragedy* (London, 1954), p. 198; Record, Anglo-Soviet Political Conversations, Moscow, 9–17 October 1944 in VI/10, Lord Ismay Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London. Also, Cordell Hull, *Memoirs, II* (New York, 1948), pp. 1454–59; Anthony Eden, *The Reckoning: The Memoirs of*

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Fundamentally, Churchill feared that his agreement would be viewed by the rest of the world and subsequent generations as a ruthless and cynical disposal of lands and people. At times he was so obsessed with the appearance rather than the substance of the arrangement that he forgot about its reservations and constraints. He confessed, or purported to confess, a sense of self-recrimination and guilt; he even wanted to destroy in front of Stalin the scrap of paper on which the details had been pencilled. Often people who express anxieties and make disclaimers serve only to create and reinforce the very images they seek to avoid. So, naturally, in his memoirs Churchill sought to justify his arrangement. Yet in doing so he began to perpetuate the idea that he had endorsed a deliberate division of Eastern Europe. His confident rationalizations revealed underlying qualms. There were hints of misgivings that he might have been party to the creation of new Soviet client states. According to Churchill, Britain needed to wield and safeguard control over Greek affairs and authority in Yugoslavia in order to preserve its dominance in the Mediterranean. So it made sense to acknowledge Russia's supremacy in Rumania and Bulgaria, which the Red Army occupied anyway. Britain's position was by no means secure in Greece, which was racked by civil war involving the pro-communist National Liberation Front (EAM). A trade was thus prudent. But his American allies and some sections of the British public might not see it that way. Anticipating criticism and a subsequent troubled conscience, he asked Stalin: "Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper." But Stalin gave him the reassurance he wanted. "No, you keep it," he replied.[2]

Despite the reassurance, the matter plagued Churchill. Three months earlier, when he had first mooted such an agreement, he wrote: "I cannot admit that I have done anything wrong in this matter."[3] After his meeting he felt the urge to reinforce his convictions by writing a memorandum for the record. "If we manage these affairs well we shall perhaps prevent several civil wars and much bloodshed and strife in the small countries concerned." He also felt obliged to placate the Foreign Office, which had been loath to surrender influence, especially in Bulgaria. The percentage deal, he reassured officials, "is not intended to be more than a guide," and could always be revised after the war.[4]

As it happens, Churchill did not need to fear the judgment of his contemporaries and the next generation. Many commentators and

Anthony Eden (London, 1965), p. 560; Lord Moran, *Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival* (London, 1966), p. 209; Sir Lleywellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (London, 1962), pp. 308–09.

[2] Churchill, op. cit. p. 198.

[3] Churchill to Roosevelt, 23 June 1944, in Prime Minister's Papers, Prem 3, 66/7, Public Record Office, London.

[4] Churchill, op. cit. pp. 202–03. See also Moran, op. cit. pp. 193–94.

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historians have praised his strategy as a realistic alternative to the United States' insistent policy of self-determination, mutual consent and collective security. Even his critics have been fairly gentle. Some argue that his policy was somewhat misguided as Stalin could do as he wished anyway; others that he was insensitive to the anxieties of his major ally, the United States. But historians have all shared one misunderstanding, a misunderstanding that Churchill himself nurtured and fuelled by his justifications. They have assumed that the Prime Minister intended and wanted to divide the Balkans into clear spheres of interest. For example, Elizabeth Barker's recent and exhaustive *British Policy in South-East Europe* maintains that Churchill recognized that the Soviets would control the Black Sea states and wished merely to guarantee his continued influence in Greece and Yugoslavia. "The agreement merely formalised an already existing situation," she writes, "except that the original percentages . . . under-stated actual Soviet predominance." Similarly, Daniel Yergin, drawing upon the official record of the meetings in the papers of Lord Ismay, praises the Prime Minister for his realism. If the mooted division of Europe had been fully accepted, argues Yergin, many post-war tensions could have been avoided. "Indeed, the very recognition of spheres," he contends, "might reduce their ultimate exclusiveness, for neither side would feel the need to tighten its defensive grip in order to fend off a feared drive against its sphere from the other." [5]

Admittedly, in the *last* resort Churchill was probably resigned to granting the Soviets a free hand in Rumania and Bulgaria. However, he was not prepared to admit this to Stalin. The Moscow agreement was not, therefore, an act of territorial abdication. It was in part an attempt to salvage western interests in areas under the temporary domination of the Red Army. The official record in the Ismay papers shows that Churchill's percentage plan sought not merely to preserve Britain's leading role in Greece but also to restore a declining initiative in the Black Sea states. Until the Red Army had occupied Rumania and Bulgaria, Britain had possessed some diplomatic leverage there. But it had evaporated when the former Axis satellites surrendered to the Soviet generals. In a separate conversation at Moscow Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, told his Soviet counterpart Vyacheslav Molotov that he was "unhappy" at "being presented with *faits accomplis*" in the Balkans. So Britain was now seeking to revive

[5] Elizabeth Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War* (London, 1976), pp. 146–47; Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, 1977), pp. 59–60. See also: John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement After the Second World War* (London, 1972); Lynn E. Davis, *The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American Conflict over Eastern Europe* (Princeton, 1974); Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton, 1957); Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (New York, 1970); John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York and London, 1972); Diane S. Clemens, *Yalta* (New York and London, 1970); Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York, 1965).

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its voice there. It would discriminate between its various claims in order to underscore the very existence of those claims. Churchill still believed that mutual goodwill and careful diplomacy would combine to give Britain a respectable voice in Balkan affairs. While he was probably willing in the final resort to trade influence for a free hand in Greece, he still hoped to avoid such a clear-cut exchange. If he could get Stalin to recognize categorically that Britain was to have a say, however slight, he could perhaps consolidate or even extend his position after the war. He knew it would be difficult later to alter patterns that had been established by military conquest. He told Stalin that " the time would come when they would meet at the armistice table, which might also be the place where the peace was settled." The Moscow agreement was, therefore, an attempt to extract concessions by diplomacy since economic and military pressures were no longer available to the British.[6]

Churchill had been wanting to make a deal of this kind since the spring of 1944. By then it had become apparent that the Soviets alone would occupy the former Axis states and that British and American troops might not even get to Yugoslavia or Greece, countries that were still deemed vital to Britain's maritime interests. So he thought that prior arrangements were essential for guaranteeing British authority on the Adriatic flank. He could not understand Roosevelt's reluctance to adopt political arrangements before the end of hostilities and rejected the President's alternative suggestions for a consultative committee. Acceptance of Russian predominance in the Black Sea would be " a natural development of the military situation," and would eradicate potential political conflict later.[7]

In Churchill's eyes some kind of division in Eastern Europe was " natural " and necessary; but it was also regrettable. Throughout the war, he had hoped to nurture governments there that would show their independence of the Kremlin. Ideally, he would have liked to have undertaken limited military operations in the Balkans. But this was not possible, given the limits on manpower and material and America's pressure for a concentration of force in France. He also tried to foster various schemes of national federation in Eastern and Central Europe. But this, too, had foundered on the rocks of Soviet opposition. Stalin was aware that the scheme could reduce Russian influence in Europe. So there remained only one alternative: to accept the Soviet Union's predominant influence but to extract some reciprocal acknowledgement of British interests. If resignation and incapacity could be disguised as concession, then some quid pro quo might be won

[6] Record, Anglo-Soviet Political Conversations, VI/10, Ismay Papers.

[7] Churchill to Roosevelt, 31 May 1944, in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944: V, The Near East . . .* (Washington D.C., 1965), pp. 114–15 (hereafter cited as *F.R.*, relevant volume). The development of Anglo-American discussions can be traced in Hull, op. cit. pp. 1451–59; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1948) pp. 832–35; Churchill, op. cit. pp. 63–71.

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from Stalin. If he could be persuaded to accept and legitimize a notional British presence in the Near East, then the area might avoid total communization. The Foreign Office was convinced that continued authority in Greece, together with a British force "to show the flag" in the rest of Southeast Europe, would promote stability, protect Britain's lines of communication to the oil-producing areas, and constrain Soviet power. It urged Churchill to consolidate Britain's ties with Greece and Turkey and "avoid *direct challenge* in the former Axis states." [8] Thus in Moscow Churchill did not presume that he was writing off Rumania and Bulgaria. In conversation with Stalin, the Prime Minister implied that he viewed the arrangements not as an abdication but as a prelude to the broadening of Allied influence in the Balkans. He qualified the terms by presuming to speak Stalin's mind: "We are glad that you have declared yourselves against trying to change by force or by Communist propaganda the established systems in the various Balkan countries." Stalin understood perfectly well that Churchill was trying to recoup some of his former influence. He chided the Prime Minister's expressed concern over Bulgaria with the taunt that "Bulgaria was a Black Sea country. Was Britain afraid of anything? Was she afraid of a Soviet campaign against Turkey?" [9] Churchill's strategy was obvious. He had hoped to convert his impotence in the Balkans into subtle leverage—he had, he thought, gained in the very areas that were apparently being ceded. But, as suggested earlier, he was troubled by the fear that it was a subtlety nobody else would appreciate.

THE remainder of this essay will be confined to an examination of the evolution of British policy in Rumania and Bulgaria at this time. It is to be hoped that it will illuminate the argument that Churchill's "spheres of influence" was an act of retrieval, not of abdication. Although Rumania and Bulgaria had been at war since 1941, the British government had not seriously analysed its post-war policies towards the eastern Balkans until early in 1944. By then it had become clear that the Red Army would defeat and occupy Rumania and would be in a strong position to determine Bulgaria's future. As success followed success for the Soviets in battle, the governments of the two Axis countries were eager to break with Germany and join the Allies, preferably as co-belligerents.

Rumania especially felt a sense of urgency. Unlike Bulgaria, it

[8] Author's italics. Eden to War Cabinet, 7 June 1944; F.O. memo, n.d. (4 June 1944?) in Foreign Office Files, FO 371/43646, Public Record Office, London; F.O. memo, "British Interests in South-Eastern Europe," 17 April 1944, *F.R., 1944: I, General* (Washington, D.C., 1966), pp. 596–99; Minutes of meetings, 19 May and 10 August 1943; memo, US Chiefs of Staff, 9 August 1943; *F.R.: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943* (Washington, D.C. 1970), pp. 114–16, 489–503, 472–82. Eden to Clark Kerr, 4 February 1943; F.O. to Moscow, 15 March 1943, Prem 4, 30/1.

[9] Churchill, op. cit. pp. 201–03; Churchill memo, 12 October 1944, Prem 3, 66/7. Record, Anglo-Soviet Political Conversations, VI/10, Ismay Papers.

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was at war with the Soviet Union and stood to lose most by undue delay in a change of allegiance. It had, after all, lost about one-third of its territory in 1940 to the Soviets and Hungarians, and had played a formidable role in the invasion of Russia. So it could not expect leniency from that quarter. However, its pro-Nazi ruler, Marshal Ion Antonescu, was in a cleft stick. He was dependent on Hitler for supplies and was constrained by the German troops stationed on Rumanian soil. At the same time, he knew he had to prepare for certain defeat. He consequently made numerous attempts to secure favourable surrender terms. Since he wanted to avoid a vengeful Soviet occupation, he directed his peace-feelers towards the United States and Britain. He hoped, quite vainly, that he could entice the western allies to land their forces in Rumania and keep the Red Army out.[10]

The most important contact was made by Prince Barbu Stirbey, a wealthy aristocrat with Liberal Party associations, in March 1944. Stirbey travelled to Cairo and presented himself to the British as the representative of both the Antonescu government and the tolerated opposition of Iuliu Maniu, leader of the National Peasants, and Constantin Bratianu, head of the Liberals. Stirbey tried to exploit the West's anxieties about Soviet intentions. The Red Army, he pointed out, was near the Rumanian border and might well dismember his country again. Bucharest would use all available means to prevent a Soviet occupation. Hitler was already pressing Antonescu to activate the 15 Rumanian divisions on the Crimea-Dniester front. Antonescu would not be able to straddle for long. If the West did not land forces in Rumania and permit a unilateral surrender, Stirbey warned, the Rumanian government would continue to throw in its lot with the Germans. Of course, the British clearly were not prepared to treat with Antonescu, their foe, on this basis. They showed more interest in a plan, master-minded by Maniu, for a coup to be staged. But again Britain was only willing to give reassurances about peace terms if the Russians were involved. Although Britain had some minor political and commercial interests in Rumania, it did not wish to press these at the risk of arousing mistrust and endangering the alliance. For it was clear that the Soviets alone would occupy Rumania and the proclivity for the West among non-communist party leaders could be counterproductive. So it made sense to acquiesce to the Kremlin and allow it to take the lead. Eden saw his role as a purely intermediary one. Once Moscow and Bucharest were brought together, " we feel that the initiative should be left to the Russians." [11]

Despite Britain's apparent diplomatic lever through its Rumanian

[10] Henry L. Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven, 1951), p. 235; Robert L. Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 238–40; Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, 1944–1962 (London, 1964), pp. 71–83; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (London, 1950), pp. 84–90.

[11] Eden to Churchill, 3 April 1944; also, Cairo to F.O., 29 March 1944; Istanbul to Cairo, 21 March 1944, FO 371/43995.

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contacts, it should be emphasized that its policy was shaped purely by military considerations. An early surrender would hasten the Soviet advance and open up valuable oil resources for the Allied effort. It was hoped that Britain's acquiescence to the Soviets' short-term goals would be rewarded later. From Washington the Joint Chiefs of Staff were reported to be interested only in "prompt results." They wanted no "restrictive political considerations" that could possibly hinder an early surrender. Britain was even prepared to offer "some territorial bribe" from Hungarian-occupied Transylvania to Rumania in order to induce a prompt withdrawal.[12] Britain swallowed its reservations about the justice of Rumanian-Soviet rivalry in its negotiations. Unlike the United States, it did not intend to reopen the question of the Soviet gains of 1940 in Bukovina and Bessarabia. Furthermore, the Foreign Office readily accepted the proposal to transfer the surrender negotiations to Moscow. In acquiescing to this change in location, it reconciled itself to a further reduction in influence. Similarly, Britain echoed the Soviets' views in its dismissal of Maniu's pleas for a lenient armistice with minimal occupation and a guarantee of military assistance. It was not tempted to push for diminished authority for the Soviets. Russia's terms were generous, it believed, and Maniu was indulging in an "obstinate stare into the Soviet gift-horse's mouth." Churchill himself wanted to see a prompt surrender and ordered an intensification in the bombing of Bucharest and the oil fields to bring Rumania to heel.[13]

One weather vane of British policy was to be found in an incident involving three British officers, led by a Colonel A. G. De Chastelaine, who were secretly dropped by parachute into the Rumanian countryside by the undercover Special Operations Executive (SOE). The men, two of whom had been former managers of Rumanian oil companies, were captured in December 1943 and brought under guard to Bucharest. They had been instructed to assist in sabotage operations and to contact Maniu and persuade him to force a surrender. Unfortunately, the Soviets had not been told about the secret operations until after their capture. Stalin chafed at Britain's withholding of information and accused it of trying to gain political advantage before the arrival of the Red Army. Whatever their intentions may have been, Churchill and Eden buckled before the Kremlin's attack. They reassured Stalin that the De Chastelaine mission had not been a clandestine manoeuvre to gain advantage for Britain. Churchill reaffirmed that he still bowed to Russian leadership in Rumanian affairs. The Foreign Secretary also realized the mistake and said

[12] Halifax to F.O., 29 March 1944; minute by Sargent, 3 April 1944; Lord Moyne to F.O., 31 March 1944, FO 371/43996.

[13] Minute by Howard, 1 April 1944, FO 371/43997; Lord Moyne to F.O., 28 April 1944, FO 371/43999; memo, "Rumania," Stettinius Mission File, 3, State Dept. Files, Group 740.0011, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; memo by Huston, 11 April 1944, *F.R., 1944; IV, Europe* (Washington, D.C. 1966), pp. 172–73.

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Britain could not gain advantage by such independent ploys. He told Lord Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare, who was troubled by the overtures to Russia that where "neither our interests nor our obligations are involved"—and they were not involved in Rumania—no action would be taken that might antagonize the Soviets. Indeed, such reasoning provided Britain with a justification for taking a firm line in areas of vital interest, such as Greece.[14]

Thus by the summer of 1944 the British had abandoned hope of exercising meaningful influence over Rumanian affairs. Such efforts as the SOE mission and the mediations in the surrender negotiations had backfired. The Russians believed that Britain was trying to deprive them of the full fruits of victory and so thwarted these attempts to hasten Rumania's withdrawal from the war. Eden himself agreed "emphatically" with the view that "We have burned our fingers enough." All Britain had earned from its mediatory activities was "the inevitable and cheeky snubs from Molotov." He resolved that the Soviets and Rumanians should be left to sort out the thorny problem of surrender themselves. So he instructed Lord Moyne, Minister Resident in Cairo, to rebuff another emissary from Maniu, Constantin Visoianu who had come to Egypt to plead for guarantees on Bessarabia and an independent political system. If Britain had ever possessed any influence, it certainly disappeared as the Red Army approached the Rumanian border. Its only hope was to resurrect authority in the negotiations that would follow the peace.[15]

In the event, it was King Michael who brought the issue to a head. Michael realized that Rumania could not break with Hitler as long as Antonescu remained in power. On 23 August, shortly after Antonescu had returned from a stormy and humiliating meeting with Hitler, the king ordered his arrest and appointed a new government of "national union" under General Constantin Sanatescu. At the same time he proclaimed that Rumania had surrendered to the Allies. Prince Stirbey and Visoianu consequently left Cairo for Moscow where the Soviets presented their terms. Basically, Rumania was required to throw its forces behind the Soviet military effort and to pay for the occupation of its territory. In addition, the Russians fixed reparations at $300 million, payable over six years, and called for the restitution of Allied property.[16]

At Moscow the Soviets dominated the armistice negotiations. Interestingly, it was not the American delegation but the British who tried to modify the harsher aspects of the terms. Although the British representatives scarcely put up a hard fight—they could

[14] Selborne to Eden, 19 May 1944; Eden to Selborne, 6 June 1944, FO 371/44000; Churchill to Clark Kerr, May 2, 1944; Eden to Churchill, 1 May 1944, FO 371/43999.

[15] Minute by Howard, 16 May 1944; minute by Eden, 18 May, 1944, Lord Moyne to F.O. 27 May 1944, FO 371/44000; tel. from Maniu, 28 June 1944, FO 371/44002.

[16] On the background to the coup of 23 August, see Wolff op. cit. pp. 239–42; Ionescu, op. cit. pp. 83–86; A. Gould Lee, *Crown Against Sickle* (London, 1950), passim.

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not as the Red Army had occupied Bucharest on 31 August—they did attempt to find ways of lessening Rumania's economic dependence on the Soviet Union. While the British still believed that Rumania should lie in the Soviet sphere, they were prepared "to cause bewilderment and some annoyance" to the Soviet negotiators. They felt that since the Americans appeared to be uninterested and the Rumanians were discredited, responsibility fell to Britain to salvage influence in the area.[17]

This strategy was clearly encapsulated in the instructions to the British members of the Control Commission in Bucharest, which had been established to oversee the implementation of the armistice terms. Again, the United Kingdom recognized that it was prepared to sacrifice Rumania as the price of eliminating Soviet influence in Greece and diminishing it in Yugoslavia. But it still clung to the hope of nurturing the leverage it had enjoyed earlier in the year. Indeed it was this hope that prompted Churchill in his October meeting to inject a formal "10 per cent" western element into Rumania's future. The British directive to its representatives in Bucharest recognized Russia's pre-eminence in Rumanian affairs. However, it also stressed Britain's commercial stakes in its oil and related properties. These interests could only be guarded if a political voice were maintained. Britons, the directive read, would want to

> recover their political position and influence in Rumania which they possessed before the war. Although during the armistice period Soviet influence will be predominant, there can be no question of abdicating our claims to have an equal share in the post-war period in all political questions affecting Rumania.[18]

Britain had reverted to its original position. It recognized Soviet pre-eminence and Britain's coupled helplessness, but at the same time put forward the hope that the creation of the Soviet sphere would not dissipate the West's influence. Thus Churchill's 90 per cent/10 per cent proposal can be seen as a request for *increased* authority in Rumanian affairs. In corollary and in hindsight, Roosevelt's hesitancy in accepting this arrangement and his lack of concern over the armistice negotiations seem paradoxical. The British were asking for more influence than they possessed or were likely to possess. The Americans reluctantly resigned themselves to the deal but within less than a

[17] Harriman to Hull, 15 September 1944, *F.R., 1944: IV*, pp. 234–37; Eden to Clark Kerr, 3 September 1944; FO 371/44006; Eden to Clark Kerr, 5 September 1944, FO 371/44007. Clark Kerr's description of the armistice negotiations was rather amusing and, no doubt, perceptive. It merits quotation. He reported that around Stirbey "there hangs a redolence of Edwardian drawing rooms. The royal portraits looking down on him made him gently reminiscent of smoother times. He was clearly hating the whole business and wondering what the hell he was doing in Moscow anyway." General Damaceanu, another member of the Rumanian delegation, "seemed mainly concerned with the polish on his fingernails. Its sparkle was uncommon but his contribution to the talks was light." See Clark Kerr to Sargent, 17 September 1944, FO 371/44010.

[18] Political Directive for British Element of Allied Mission in Rumania, 18 September 1944; Draft Directive on Economic Questions . . . , 18 September 1944, FO 371/44009.

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year would insist quite rigidly that the West's influence was too small and so should be increased.

BRITISH policy towards the other Axis satellite, Bulgaria, followed a similar pattern, although its interests there were greater. England had been at war with it since 1941, when King Boris joined the Axis in order to annex territory in Macedonia and Thrace. Both the Greek and Yugoslav royal governments were, of course, British allies. As allies, they were to play a vital role in Churchill's strategic thinking. He was determined to retain the political independence of the Adriatic countries as a means of guaranteeing Britain's maritime ambitions. So he opposed any diminution in their territorial size. Bulgaria would have to return the annexed land and means would have to be found to reduce its potential to undermine stability in the area.[19]

This policy was fraught with difficulty, however. In the first place, Britain wanted to force a Bulgarian surrender, but not at the expense of inducing a German occupation of that country. A Nazi occupation would bring the Soviets into the fray and increase the Red Army's casualties. The long-term political problems were even greater. Since Russia was not at war with Bulgaria, all Bulgarian contacts were made with Anglo-American representatives. These contacts, as the Italian experience had shown, often aroused Soviet suspicions. Furthermore, Britain was less interested in Bulgaria *per se* than in her relations with Greece and Yugoslavia, designated in different degrees as British spheres. The Soviets, on the other hand, were clearly interested in soldering the historic bonds that existed between the Slav countries and were presumably not averse to acceding to Bulgaria's expansion at Greece's expense. So Britain had to accommodate herself to the probability of close links between Moscow and Sofia, but at the same time sought to infuse sufficient voice into the shape of the peace agreement to guarantee the territorial integrity of her Adriatic allies.

Bulgaria itself had tried to preserve peace with the Soviets. Until the autumn of 1943, when King Boris died, Bulgaria had sought to retain its neutral but cool relations with Russia and to realize its irredentist claims by a policy of sitting tight and doing nothing. But the victories of the Red Army in the east, the activities of the small bands of pro-communist partisans within Bulgaria, and the air-raids on Sofia that had begun in November 1943 forced the new Bozhilov government to reassess the balancing act undertaken by King Boris. Peace overtures were made to the West, although these were less direct and authoritative than the parallel ones in Rumania. The Bulgarians wanted to retain their acquisitions in Macedonia and Thrace, a con-

[19] Wolff, op. cit. pp. 197–98; Stephen G. Xydis, *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944–1947* (Thessaloniki, 1963), pp. 27–28; L. S. Stavrianos, *Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity* (Chicago, 1952), pp. 94–102. For a useful symposium analysing British interests in Greece and Yugoslavia see Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg (eds.), *British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece* (London, 1975).

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dition that was intolerable to the British. But the longer the western allies held out, the greater the likelihood that Bulgaria would turn to the Soviets as a matter of political insurance. The Foreign Office fully appreciated this dilemma. It knew that if the peace were unnecessarily delayed, the Kremlin would benefit most and could subsequently pose as the champion of Bulgarian nationalism. So Britain sought to hasten the peace and to incorporate a Soviet interest into the terms. It was hoped that such a strategy would win Stalin's approval and encourage an extension of Britain's temporary level into the post-armistice period.[20]

Anthony Eden was particularly keen to preserve Britain's presumed muscle. He advised Churchill to upgrade Bulgaria's relative strategic position in his war plans, as a quick subjugation there would hasten the liberation of Greece and Yugoslavia. He wanted to draw the Russians into the negotiations but feared that they would just "sit pretty . . . waiting for the day when they can step in, not as conquerors, but as deliverers." But Eden's counsel was a statement of aspiration, not a realistic assessment of the actual potential of British policy. For Eden confused his temporary initiative—Britain was at war with the failing Bulgaria, while Russia was not—with substantive capabilities. The United Kingdom simply did not have the power to shape either internal events or the military situation in Eastern Europe. His principal advisers were more realistic. They believed that until Britain multiplied its bombing missions over Sofia and forced a surrender, "sophisticated" cooperation with Russia would be a mere charade. In short, England's diplomatic advantage was illusory, or at best ephemeral, and would evaporate unless more solid measures were taken to guarantee a sustained voice for Britain.[21]

British interests were greater in Bulgaria than in Rumania not for any economic reason but because Bulgarian troops were in occupation of Greek Thrace. So throughout the summer of 1944, as Soviet pressure on Sofia to break with Germany increased, the British were anxious to preserve whatever leverage they possessed in Bulgarian affairs. But they could not risk a serious rift with Moscow. For Stalin might consequently decide to support Bulgaria's territorial claims, especially in Greece, which he had written off anyway. Britain thus had to ensure that it would have sufficient voice over Bulgaria's future to prevent any dramatic change in the boundaries. Even an autonomous Macedonia, the War Cabinet was informed, would endanger the stability of the area. It could be the first step towards a pan-Slav federation "under direct Russian patronage, and as such it would constitute a direct challenge to the British position in the

[20] See Churchill to Roosevelt, 12 February 1944; Jadwin to Donovan, 7 February 1944, "Appeal from All-Slav Committee to the Bulgarian People," n.d., FO 371/43587; memo, "Bulgaria," Stettinius Mission File, 3, Group 740.0011.

[21] Draft, Eden to Churchill, 1 March 1944; minute by Cadogan, 11 March 1944; minute by Sargent, 22 March 1944, FO 371/43588.

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Balkans and Turkey." [22] The British were convinced that the future shape of Bulgaria would determine relations between other Balkan countries. So it had to develop a policy in the wake of the Soviets' growing influence—an influence that was emphasized by its ability to force the resignation of the Bozhilov government at the end of May. It is not true, as so many historians have implied, that Britain simply wanted to trade off its influence in Bulgaria in return for a free hand in Greece. It was anxious to build safeguards that would ensure that Greece was not isolated in a condominium of Russian satellites. So British diplomats began to press the Soviets for a positive indication that they would not permit the Bulgarians to reap benefits from their allegiance with Hitler. A break with Bulgaria—and even a declaration of war—would constitute such a measure. Although hostilities would bring the Soviets into the armistice negotiations, it would also firmly establish the principle of tripartite collaboration in the peace-making. Joint consultations might act to inhibit the slide towards subservience to Russia. Nobody in the Foreign Office agreed with the American view that Bulgaria would want of its own accord to "walk arm in arm both with the West and with the East, much as Czecho [slovakia] is doing in Central Europe." Bulgaria would solder its association with the Soviets and the Atlantic allies would have to do all they could to check this process before it was too late.[23]

But events were moving too fast. At the end of August Sofia sent two pro-western envoys to Cairo to negotiate a surrender. The Soviets, however, stifled the possibility of a separate peace with their Atlantic allies when they suddenly declared war on Bulgaria on 4 September. Within five days of the declaration the Bagrianov government had broken with Germany, had dissolved its political police, and had released all Allied prisoners. By 9 September Soviet forces had occupied the country and successfully engineered a coup that installed the left-wing Fatherland Front under Colonel Kimon Georgiev. The Soviets had intervened in the last minute not only to hinder the German retreat but also to pull the carpet from under Britain and America in the armistice negotiations. Although the West had been urging Stalin to break with Bulgaria for a long time, the timing of the break understandably exercised a number of policy-makers. Eden was particularly annoyed with the Kremlin's blatant opportunism and falsely imagined that he could have maintained his initiative in Bulgaria. He wanted to resist the transfer of the peace negotiations from Cairo to Moscow, a move that would underscore the Soviets' preponderant interests.[24]

[22] Attached annexe by Sargent, 30 May 1944, circulated to War Cabinet by Eden, 31 May 1944; F.O. to Clark Kerr, 26 April 1944, FO 371/43583.

[23] Berry to Hull, 21 July 1944, *F.R., 1944: III, The British Commonwealth and Europe* (Washington, D.C., 1965), pp. 351–52; minute by Sargent, 7 August 1944; Eden to Churchill, 10 August 1944, FO 371/43589.

[24] John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy, V* (London, 1956), pp. 383–84; minute by Sargent, 30 August 1944, FO 371/43598; Clark Kerr to F.O., 7 September 1944, FO 371/43583;

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Indeed it was Eden, not Churchill, who clung to the idea that Britain's hostilities with Bulgaria for over three years entitled it to at least an equal share in Bulgarian affairs. As will be seen, Churchill took a more sober view and resigned himself to his slipping authority. It was this recognition that prompted him to claim a 25 per cent interest in Bulgaria, a tactic that was designed to prevent the complete decline of British influence. But in the weeks leading up to the signature of the armistice, the Foreign Office continued to insist that it could and should shape events in Bulgaria. Eden did not want to couple Bulgaria with Rumania in concessions for British predominance in Greece. He feared that abandonment of Bulgaria would actually diminish Britain's standing in Greece and Turkey.[25]

Eden was particularly riled during the armistice negotiations over the Soviets' wish to give Bulgaria cobelligerent status. The Kremlin believed that cobelligerency would help its own war effort and also smooth the way for fairly lenient peace terms. The Foreign Secretary however, feared that a western alliance with Bulgaria would seriously undermine Britain's relations with Greece and Yugoslavia—especially as the occupying Bulgarian troops would pose as the "liberators" of these countries. He dismissed the Soviet toleration of such an about-turn as "exasperating and disingenuous." He was tempted to stand firm and risk "a head-on conflict" with Russia. A clash would be worth risking "if we are to maintain our authority in the Balkans." He told Churchill that Rumania and Finland had already been traded off for Greece; some British influence in Bulgaria was critical to Greece's independence.[26] The Prime Minister, however, recognized that he could not force the issue as he held no trump cards. With the new Georgiev government firmly installed in Sofia, Britain's protests would comprise little more than hollow gestures. He told Eden not to oppose the Soviets' wish to use the former enemy's manpower. The Bulgarians should be permitted to fight in "suitable theatres," although Britain would not need to "recognize them as cobelligerents, for the Russian relation to the Bulgarians has always been different from ours." [27]

Eden eventually reconciled himself to Bulgaria's cobelligerency and accepted its participation on an *ad hoc* basis. But he still insisted that Bulgaria should withdraw its troops from all occupied territory and be made to pay "for her past behaviour." A lenient armistice might draw it closer to Russia and so endanger Britain's Balkan policy. He outlined his thoughts in a petulant telegram to Churchill on 6 October, just

Eden to Clark Kerr, 8 September 1944; Gousev to Strang, 9 September 1944; minute by McDermott, 13 September 1944, FO 371/43599.

[25] Eden to Churchill, 1 September 1944; Eden to Churchill, 14 September 1944, Prem 3, 79/2.

[26] Eden to F.O., 17 September 1944, Prem 3, 79/2; Eden to F.O., 17 September 1944; F.O. to Clark Kerr, 17 September 1944; Eden to Churchill, 19 September 1944, FO 371/43599.

[27] Churchill to Eden, 21 September 1944, Prem 3. 7972.

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three days before their meeting with Stalin and Molotov. The armistice, he wrote, was

> a clear test of strength between the Russians and ourselves. Whereas we were prepared to agree that in Rumania Russian interests and influence must be predominant, we have not taken the same view in respect of Bulgaria. Bulgaria does not, like Rumania, border on the Soviet Union. We and the Americans were at war with Bulgaria for three years, and the Russians for three days.

Britain, he indicated, should try to secure "an equal part" in Bulgaria's control. Anything less than this would be construed throughout the Balkans as "an abdication." [28] However, at Moscow Churchill convinced Eden that his bargaining power was negligible and that he should change his determined posture. Britain should transform its terms of reference and permit the Soviets, not the British, to appear as the concessionaries. Eden relented. Molotov then agreed to order the withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from occupied territories. In return Britain recognized the Soviets' preponderant responsibility for Bulgaria for the duration of the war. The Soviets would take charge of disarming the Bulgarians, controlling their assets, and directing the war effort. Molotov promised, however, that after the war he would comply with the spirit of the tripartite signature and increase the West's representation and influence on the Allied Control Commission. Eden knew that the armistice terms would enable the Soviets to shape Bulgaria's political and economic life according to their own long-term goals. However, he consoled himself with the knowledge that the Bulgarians had been forced to evacuate Greece and Yugoslavia and that he had "obtained all that was humanly possible." [29] John Winant, America's representative on the European Advisory Commission (EAC), commented afterwards that Britain had given in on Bulgaria in the hope of reaping benefits later. A cursory evaluation of the terms "might suggest that our friend Eden was having his pants traded off." But Eden's primary concern, he reported, had been to protect Greece and the Mediterranean. So while the final terms seemed to subordinate the EAC and the United States' version of internationalism, they were consonant with Britain's traditional preoccupation with its maritime security.[30] Above all, they

[28] Eden to Churchill, 6 October 1944; also, report, Bulgarian Armistice, 6 October 1944, Prem 3, 79/2.

[29] Molotov to Eden, 15 October 1944; Eden to Molotov, 15 October 1944, FO 371/43591; Eden to Sargent, 11 October 1944, FO 371/43560; memo, Eden to War Cabinet, 7 October 1944, Prem 3, 79/3; Moran, op. cit. pp. 193–94.

[30] Winant to Hull, 12 October 1944, *F.R., 1944: III*, pp. 451–53. The United States seemed less bothered about imposed conditions on Bulgaria and did not share Eden's insistence on a withdrawal from occupied territory as a prerequisite for signature. It was mainly concerned with securing tripartite agreement *per se* and with shelving territorial questions until after the war. It hoped that if harmony were established, it would persist afterwards. But as the negotiations developed, the Americans realised that the Soviets would dominate the country completely unless safeguards for a tripartite voice were

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were accepted within Churchill's terms of reference on Balkan policy. Namely, Britain had lost its earlier leverage and had to accept the fact. Such a recognition of Soviet preponderance would hopefully nurture some sympathy within the Kremlin for a few concessions to British interests.

BY October 1944 the British had witnessed the growth of Soviet ascendancy in the Balkans. Churchill's preoccupation with Greece thus forced him to try and make a deal which he hoped would result in a Soviet policy of non-intervention in that country. Existing historical accounts are thus correct in seeing the "spheres of influence" agreement as an attempt to provide the Russians with an incentive for keeping away from Greece. But the totality of Churchill's motives has become blurred. The Prime Minister sought not merely to secure Greece but to retrieve sufficient influence in the Balkans to halt the "slithering to the Left." Earlier in the war Britain had possessed considerable diplomatic initiative in Rumania and Bulgaria, but its advantage had dissipated before the spectacular advances of the Red Army. Its declining influence was underscored in the armistices, which clearly left the implementation of the peace terms in the hands of the Soviets. So the Moscow agreement did not, as is usually argued, signify the final demise of Britain's interest in the eastern Balkans but an ingenious diplomatic attempt to retrieve its voice. It could be argued, as Gabriel Kolko has done, that the arbitrary division of the Balkans at Moscow was little more than a diplomatic charade. It was a sham, according to Kolko, because Churchill closed his eyes to Roosevelt's well-known antipathy to separate Anglo-Soviet accords and to the boundaries of Stalin's opportunism. Admittedly, Churchill was unable to control events in Eastern Europe and so could not give material shape to the agreement. Stalin could do what he wanted "because Churchill could deliver little and the United States was not willing to sanction anything." [31] This argument may be accurate in its analysis of Churchill's impotence but misses the essential point. The Prime Minister fully recognized that the West's power to shape events had been eroded. At Moscow he sought to persuade Stalin that the Kremlin could safely admit some British interest in the Black Sea area. It was a hopeful act of reassertion, a belief, however misguided, that careful diplomacy could still realize rewards that were otherwise unattainable.

Indeed, Churchill was not seeking a completely unrealistic degree of influence in Rumania and Bulgaria. His demands were modest and he felt that Stalin thought similarly. When he left Moscow his mood was characterized by optimism, not resignation. He sincerely believed

created. See Harriman to Hull, 17 October 1944, ibid, pp. 460–61; Halifax to F.O., 23 September 1944, FO 371/43590.

[31] Kolko, op. cit. pp. 142–46; also, Alperovitz, op. cit. pp. 132–34; Barker, op. cit. pp. 140–47.

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that Greece had been secured and that the former satellites would no longer pose a problem. Recognition had been given to Soviet pre-eminence, but the British flag would be retained, even if only in a token way. If Churchill did err, he did so three months later at the Yalta conference. There he endorsed Roosevelt's single-minded concern for shared, concerted action in all areas by signing the tripartite Declaration on Liberated Europe—and in so doing unduly raised public expectations of international harmony. The loosely worded Declaration established "joint responsibilities" for the creation of "broadly representative" governments in the liberated countries of Europe. It is difficult to believe in the light of his earlier supplications for limited responsibility in Southeastern Europe that Churchill took this further broadening of western interests seriously. In fact, he did not even mention it in his account of the Yalta conference in his memoirs. But perhaps he derived some satisfaction from this published protocol. If the agreement did not work out as promised, and the Soviets asserted full domination in the Balkans, he could not reasonably be accused of helping to draw the iron curtain.

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The First Warning

Michael Heller

SOVIET history is rather like one of those ancient maps, with the oceans, islands and continents inaccurately plotted and with vast areas marked in white. The episode which is the subject of this article constitutes one of those white areas, and on the map of history even its outline has been wrongly drawn.

On 31 August 1922, *Pravda* published an announcement on the front page that "according to a decree of the State Political Directorate [*Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie*, GPU] the most active counter-revolutionary elements from among professors, doctors, agronomists and writers are to be deported to the northern provinces. Some will be exiled abroad." The piece was headlined "The First Warning." No mention was made of the total number of deportees, who was destined for "the northern provinces" or who was to be deported abroad. There was only the careful, and false, assertion that, "among those exiled are hardly any prominent names."

In the last 50 years historians have added little to this scanty and inaccurate information released by the GPU. The official chronicler of the security "organs" D. L. Golinkov states: "In August–September 1922 the most active of the counter-revolutionaries were exiled from Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev and other large cities by administrative order according to a GPU decree." [1] S. A. Fedyukin adds a figure: "In Aug.–Sept. 1922, 160 of the most active bourgeois ideologues were exiled from Petrograd, Moscow and Kiev by administrative order, some abroad and some to the northern provinces." [2] Western historians often blindly follow the Soviet sources; the American historian Anatol G. Mazour writes: "In 1923[?] a group of 'irreconcilables' who had been leading an isolated intellectual life received permission [?] to leave the country and to join the Russian emigration in Western Europe. Included in this group were R. U. Vipper, N. O. Losskii, N. A. Berdyaev and F. A. Stepun." [3] Everything is inaccurate here: the date, the evaluation of the activity of the "irreconcilables," the definition of the punitive measure. Of those named, only the historian, Vipper, "received permission to leave the country," which he did in 1924; the three philosophers, Losskii, Berdyaev and Stepun were exiled together with many others, i.e. they received a GPU deportation order and were forbidden to return to the country under pain of death. Berdyaev later recalled: "I was required to sign a statement that if I recrossed the frontier of the Soviet Union I would be shot." [4] The writer M. A. Osorgin had to sign a similar

[1] D. L. Golinkov, *Krakh vrazhevskovo podpolya* (Moscow, 1971), p. 302.
[2] S. A. Fedyukin, *Velikii Oktyabr i intelligentsiya* (Moscow, 1972), p. 287.
[3] Anatol G. Mazour, *The Writing of History in the Soviet Union* (Stanford, 1971).

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document: "If I fail to leave or attempt to escape I accept that the punishment will be the most severe, i.e. that I will be shot." [5] All those exiled signed an identical document—a sentence of exile.

The deportation of a large group of important representatives of the Russian intelligentsia in 1922 is still a relatively unexplored episode in Soviet history, a white area, not only because the Soviet sources do not give the true story, but also because, for a variety of personal and political reasons, those exiled have not written much about it. As a rule, this episode is mentioned only briefly in memoirs or commemorative articles in the Russian émigré press.

However, the deportation of 1922, which Berdyaev called "a strange measure which was never repeated," [6] is of great interest to the historian for many reasons. This episode reflects, as in a droplet of water, many important, one could even say permanent, problems facing the Soviet government: the provision of food, the treatment of the intelligentsia, the use of repression and the conduct of relations with the West. The episode is also interesting as the person who initiated the move and was the architect of the policy culminating in the deportation of these men of culture was Lenin himself. From the first days of the October revolution he had shaped a strategy of war with the intelligentsia, a war in which the 1922 deportations constituted one more victory for the Party. This blow against the intelligentsia, one of the last political acts before his death, became a crucial factor in the testament left by the founder of the Soviet government to his successors. It should be noted that in the 1960s the Soviet government again resorted to this "strange measure."

The deportation of a large group of Russian cultural figures in 1922 [7] concluded the only instance in Soviet history of cooperation on an equal footing between the Soviet regime and the Russian intelligentsia. This experiment lasted five weeks and came to an end in the Cheka prison on Lubyanka Square which is where the members of the intelligentsia who had initiated this episode were to be found on 31 August 1921.

Famine

In the summer of 1921 Russia was struck by famine, the like of which had never been experienced before. Addressing the international proletariat, Lenin wrote in *Pravda* on 6 August 1921, that "some districts" of Russia had been afflicted by a famine no less serious than that of 1891. The Soviet historian, Yu. Polyakov, however, points out that the area afflicted by famine stretched from the northern coast of the Caspian and covered the entire Volga region, the Ural river basin right to Kazan and Cheboksary. It affected part of the central course of the Don, the

[4] Nikolai Berdyaev, *Samopoznanie* (Paris, 1949), p. 263.
[5] Mikhail Osorgin, *Vremena* (Paris, 1955), p. 182.
[6] Berdyaev, op. cit. p. 263.
[7] The first group, from Moscow, left at the end of September; the group from Petersburg left in November; S. Bulgakov, from Sevastopol, left in December 1922.

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Kama basin, the Bashkir regions, part of Kazakhstan and western Siberia and many regions of southern Ukraine. According to his calculations not less than 20 per cent of the entire population was starving and more than 25 per cent of the rural population.[8]

In his address to the international proletariat, Lenin's reference to the famine of 1891 was not without point. As a young man of 21, Vladimir Ulyanov, a lawyer's assistant in Samara, the centre of the famine-stricken Volga region, was the only one of the local intelligentsia who not only did not take part in civil relief work, but was categorically opposed to such work on principle. As V. Vodovozov wrote:

> At the end of 1891 talk about fighting the famine led to the foundation of a special famine relief committee in Samara . . . The committee was formed of the most varied sectors of society, from civil servants in high positions in the local hierarchy to the most suspicious looking characters, who were probably under police surveillance . . . At meetings and gatherings of young people, Lenin systematically and decisively opposed the committee . . .[9]

Vladimir Ilyich, writes someone who knew Lenin in Samara,

> had the courage to state openly that the consequences of the famine would be the birth of an industrial proletariat which would mean the end of the bourgeois order, that it was a progressive phenomenon, as it would contribute to the growth of industry and advance our ultimate goal, the achievement of socialism through the development of capitalism . . . The famine, by destroying the peasant economy, would simultaneously undermine faith not only in the tsar but also in God, and in time, without any doubt, would encourage the peasant on the road to revolution and facilitate its victory.[10]

The future Lenin expressed his opinion of the famine relief committee, i.e. those who were hindering "the progressive phenomenon," extremely clearly and simply, according to his acquaintance: "there is only one way of talking to the members of the Committee—with our hands on their throats and our knees in their chests." [11]

Thirty years later, as the head of government, Lenin remembered the famine of 1891. In 1891, "Vladimir Ilyich always maintained . . . that the government alone must be held responsible for the famine and national disaster." [12] In 1921 he had to find a different explanation.

First of all the drought was blamed. On 12 July, *Pravda* published an address to "All the citizens of the RSFSR" signed by the presidium of the VTsIK. In wide areas the drought has led to a failure of the grain and hay harvests." Lenin also declared: "The famine is the terrible result of the civil war." [13] On 21 July the Central Committee expanded the list of reasons for the "massive disaster":

8 Yu. A. Polyakov, *1921: pobeda nad golodom* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 14, 19–20.
9 V. Vodovozov, *V. I. Lenin v Samare* (Moscow, 1933), p. 101.
10, 11, 12 A. Belyakov, *Yunost vozhdya* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 75–82.
13 V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranoe sochinenii*, vol. 45, p. 285.

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> It is the result not only of this year's drought; many factors have contributed to it, the backwardness of our agriculture, disorganization, the low level of agricultural science, lack of machinery, the obsolete methods of crop rotation; this has been aggravated by the results of the war and the blockade, the landlords', the capitalists' and their lackeys' unremitting fight against us; even now it is being aggravated by the activity of groups of bandits who are carrying out the wishes of organizations hostile to Soviet Russia and its working population.[14]

The only factor left out of this detailed list was the policy of the Soviet government itself from the earliest days of the revolution. It was a fact that Russian agriculture was backward, but up until the First World War Russia had been one of the largest exporters of grain. First the war with Germany and then the civil war, which together lasted seven years, seriously affected agriculture. It is also true that 1920 and 1921 in particular had been very dry years. But the basic reason for the famine of 1921 was the policy of the Party which came to power in 1917. At the Ninth Party Congress in 1920 Trotsky had laconically summed up the civil war, "We have ravaged the country in order to defeat the Whites." However, the destruction of the country was not so much the result of military action, as the result of the policy, consistently and stubbornly pursued by Lenin until March 1921. On 17 October 1921 in a speech at the Second All-Russian Congress for Political Education, Lenin stated the principles of this policy: "We decided that the peasants would give us the necessary amount of grain and that we would apportion it to the factories, and then we would have a communist system of production and distribution." He admitted, "A short-term experiment convinced us that this approach was mistaken . . ."

The experiment, however, was not short-term. The attempt to make a "great leap forward," to jump from "the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom," from reality to a communist utopia lasted for more than three years. As a result of this experiment, the country was ravaged and the government faced a crisis. The result of the experiment was chronic famine in the towns throughout the period of the great leap, of "war communism."

INTERRUPTIONS in the supply of provisions in Petrograd had been one of the most important causes of the February 1917 revolution. These interruptions were caused chiefly by transport problems. But the famine which became a part of life after the October revolution was political. It was the result of the Party's policies, of the nationalization of the grain trade. In July 1918, six months after he had come to power, Lenin formulated his approach: "There are two ways of combatting famine, the capitalist method and the socialist method. The first consists in free trade . . . We, as a workers' state cannot allow this. Our method

[14] *Pravda*, 21 July 1921.

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will be that of grain monopoly." [15] The "struggle for bread" began. Telegrams sent by Lenin to the commissars for supplies provide an eloquent testimony of the nature of this struggle. 10 August 1918 to Saratov district: take "25–30 hostages from the rich in each grain-producing area; they will answer with their lives for the collection of all surpluses." [16] 19 August to Orlov district: "put down the kulak SR uprising mercilessly by confiscating all the grain from the kulaks." [17] 1 October to the whole country "ten times more effort needed to obtain grain . . . clean out all stores for us and for German workers." [18] Every day, sometimes several times a day, the Sovnarkom chairman sent dispatches demanding confiscation, the plunder of grain from the peasants. He behaved like an invasion force in an occupied land, using as his weapons the supply detachments: "the first and greatest step of the socialist revolution in the countryside." [19]

In March 1921, Mikhail Kalinin admitted that "the surplus-appropriation system has caused a great deal of discontent in the countryside. This has frequently been too harsh and hasty." [20] A Soviet historian admits: "Infringements of revolutionary legality had occurred when the surplus appropriation system was applied in the Tambov, Voronezh, Altai and Tyumen districts." [21] He reproduced documents which reveal that these "violations of revolutionary legality" gradually assumed a legal status.

THE policy of the Soviet authorities naturally met with resistance from the peasants and this resistance grew as the civil war came to an end. It was both active and passive.

The active resistance took the form of armed rebellions. A wave of peasant uprisings swept the whole country in 1920. The most revealing evidence of the extent of the peasant uprisings, directed against the appropriation of surplus, against the robbery of the countryside, is the strength of the Soviet forces sent to subdue them. In May 1921, under the command of Tukhachevskii, appointed leader of the battle against the uprising in the Tambov district, were 35,000 bayonets, about 10,000 sabres, several hundred machine guns, and more than 60 field-guns.[22] It is impossible to think of the armed action against Siberian peasants in the winter and spring of 1921 as anything other than a war. "At the request of the Siberian Revolutionary Commission," writes Trifonov, "the Soviet government sent the Kazan and Simbirsk rifle regiments, the Vyatsk infantry units, the 121st and the 122nd cavalry regiments, the

[15] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sob. soch.*, vol. 36, p. 529.
[16] Ibid. vol. 50, pp. 144–45.
[17] Ibid. vol. 50, p. 154.
[18] Ibid. vol. 50, pp. 185–86.
[19] Ibid. vol. 37, p. 137.
[20] M. I. Kalinin, *Za eti gody. Kniga vtoraya.* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1926), p. 106.
[21] I. Ya. Trifonov, *Klassy i klassovaya borba v SSSR v nachale NEPa* (Leningrad, 1964), p. 216.
[22] Ibid. p. 250.

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special Kuban cavalry regiment, the 21st infantry division, four armoured trains, and telegraph and construction companies." [23] In the Volga region, the peasant detachments managed for a time to occupy the towns. Several military formations under the command of the best Red Army commanders took part in the "small war" against Makhno. Among the "main leaders of the military operations against the kulak bands" were all the most important Soviet military leaders, the victors over the White Army, from Tukhachevskii and Frunze to Budenny and Yakir.[24]

No less a threat than the peasant armed uprisings was peasant passive resistance, expressed in the form of reduced sowing. In the summer of 1921, L. Kamenev admitted that the area under cultivation in 1920 had been reduced by 25 per cent.[25]

In March 1921, Lenin confessed that his policy had collapsed, "We have come up against a great, perhaps the greatest, internal crisis of Soviet Russia. This internal crisis has exposed the discontent not only of a large proportion of the peasants but also of the workers." Workers' discontent was particularly alarming for the leader of the Soviet government. He understood that "there are limits to human strength. They (i.e. the workers) have starved for three years, and they cannot starve for four or five years."

The drought, the frightening extent of which became clear in the spring of 1921, heralded another famine, this time after the end of the civil war, in peacetime. The Soviet government had to face a problem which they could not solve by means of force. Everything there was to requisition had already been requisitioned. The lack of reserves was turning the impending famine into a death sentence for millions of people.

AT first, the Soviet government tried to pretend that there was no famine. After a complete silence in June, *Pravda* published on 2 July 1921 a piece entitled "Aspects of the Grain and Hay Harvests" which only said that "this year the grain harvest will be lower than the average for the ten years 1905–14." Lower than average, this was supposed to mean not catastrophic. On 22 July, in a lead article, entitled "The Volga Region and our Enemies" *Pravda* was still saying, "They (i.e. the enemies) are wrong in thinking that we are facing a general catastrophe. The harvest failure in the Volga region is compensated for by the bumper harvest in the Ukraine." And even as late as 23 July, the representative of the people's commission for agriculture, V. Osinskii insisted in an interview with the paper *Novyi mir* published in Berlin: "All in all, we reckon that the harvest will be average, if not slightly higher than average."

Meanwhile, in the same issue of *Pravda* which talked of the "bumper

[23] Ibid. p. 267.
[24] Ibid. p. 297.
[25] *Pravda*, 2 July 1921.

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harvest in the Ukraine" compensating for the "harvest failure" in the Volga region, appeared the VTsIK decree on the foundation in Moscow of the All-Russian Public Famine Relief Committee. The amazing episode, unique in Soviet history, of cooperation between the Soviet government and public representatives had begun.

Cooperation

Soviet historians write about the Famine Relief Committee with touching unanimity. I. Trifonov (1960):

> In July 1921, the All-Russian Public Famine Relief Committee was formed. The former tsarist minister Kutler, the former chairman of the Second and Third Duma Golovin and the Kadets Kishkin, Bulgakov, Kuskova and others joined the Committee . . . The plan of action of the Committee, worked out by Milyukov, was basically to establish control by foreign powers in Russia. The plan provided for the local sections of the Committee to encourage anti-Soviet agitation by all possible means and to take over control themselves.[26]

Trifonov's book came out seven years after Stalin's death but this professor from Leningrad still strictly adhered to the rules: history is to be written in the form of denunciations, all the facts are to be falsified, and those which cannot be falsified are to be replaced with imaginary facts.

E. Drabkina (1968):

> Russian anti-Soviet circles also revived. A group of public figures composed of Kadets or near-Kadets, maintaining that they were only working in the name of humanity with no political motivations whatsoever, founded a famine relief committee, with the approval of the Soviet government . . . In their headquarters on Sobachaya Square, this committee was concerned least of all with famine relief. Here their concerns were quite different—to establish links with foreign countries, and transform their Committee into the nucleus of the future government to replace the Soviets.[27]

Drabkina's story repeats, even more evasively, that of Trifonov. But she at least states that the Committee was formed with the approval of the Soviet government.

In the third edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, the article about the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee (in previous editions of the encyclopaedia, there had been no article on this subject) states:

> The committee was formed in Moscow with the agreement of the

[26] I. Trifonov, *Ocherki istorii klassovoi borby v SSSR v gody NEPa* (Moscow, 1960), p. 21.

[27] E. Drabkina, an old Bolshevik and the daughter of a close colleague of Lenin, acts as a witness to the "legitimacy" of Lenin's policies, later "distorted" by Stalin. She spent 15 years in camp, which should lend weight to her testimony.

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> Soviet government on 21 July 1921 by a group of pre-revolutionary bourgeois public and cultural figures, in which the Kadets predominated . . . Prokopovich, Kuskova and Kishkin led the committee and spread the idea that it was only possible to fight the famine by receiving foreign aid and by restoring capitalist attitudes. Exploiting the slogan of combating famine, they demanded that administrative and economic functions be handed over to the committee and made anti-Soviet propaganda. They established links with the representatives of several bourgeois governments and white émigré circles.

The common denominator of all the passages quoted (and those not quoted) is the emphasis given to the fact that Kadets took part in the Committee and played a leading role in it. The second common trait is the accusation that the Committee was attempting to overthrow the Soviet government. And in order to prove this, the forming of the Committee is presented as an almost illegal act and its leaders are repeatedly named as the "Kadets Prokopovich, Kuskova and Kishkin."

RECONSTRUCTING the historical truth on many events in Soviet history is fraught with difficulty because of the inaccessibility of archives. The episode connected with the activity of the Famine Relief Committee is one of the few exceptions. The work of the Committee for the five weeks that it existed was regularly covered in the Soviet press, three issues of the Bulletin *Pomoshch*[28] are still extant and Ekaterina Kuskova wrote about it in her memoirs.[29] A vital source for an understanding of the reasons why the Committee was founded and why it was disbanded are Lenin's recently published letters.

THE idea of public participation in famine relief was born in Moscow in June 1921. On 18 June, at the Seventh All-Russian Congress on experimental agricultural work, the question of the drought was discussed. On 22 June, M. I. Kukhovarenko, a cooperative member, and Professor Rybnikov, an agronomist, spoke at a meeting of the Moscow Agricultural Society. They had just returned from Saratov and reported the extent of the disaster, which the Soviet press had grossly underplayed. At a subsequent joint meeting of the Congress and the Society, Kukhovarenko stressed the need for government and public aid, as did the well-known economist, Professor Prokopovich, former Minister of Food in the Provisional Government. Those present decided to form a public committee at the Moscow Agricultural Society to fight famine. Prokopovich also said: "We cannot undertake any activity without the consent of the Soviet authorities, without their approval and cooperation. . . . We must inform the authorities about what we have heard today and

[28] Two issues were printed, the third was stopped by the censor, but the proofs have been preserved.

[29] E. Kuskova, "Mesyats soglashatelstva," *Volya Rossiya*, Nos. 3-5, 1928.

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that we wish to provide assistance, within the limits of our capabilities." [30] A delegation was elected to seek a meeting at the Kremlin with the chairman of the Sovnarkom. These public figures, agronomists, cooperative members, economists, were acting according to the old pre-revolutionary principles, just as many of them had acted in 1891. They were offering their assistance to the government, proposing combined action to aid the famine-stricken.

THE following day, however, Lenin refused to receive the delegation, as did the commissar for agriculture, Teodorovich. Kuskova and Prokopovich appealed to Gorky to intervene.[31] Gorky used his connections in the Party. L. B. Kamenev, chairman of the Moscow Soviet and a member of the Politburo, invited the delegation to the Kremlin. The delegation included Kuskova, the agronomist A. P. Levitskii, the chairman of the agricultural cooperative movement P. A. Sadyrin, and a doctor, Professor L. A. Tarasevich. Kuskova does not mention in her memoirs when the delegation was received by Kamenev. We can assume that this was not before the middle of July. The Politburo could not agree; several Soviet leaders objected to the idea of cooperating with representatives of the public. Semashko, the commissar for health, expressed his objections against the Famine Relief Committee on 12 July. Lenin wrote him a note in which he defined his own position and tactic: "Directive to the Politburo: deal with Kuskova strictly and render her harmless. You are in your 'communist cell' but be vigilant. We shall take from Kuskova only her name, her signature and a couple of railway coaches from those who are her sympathizers. *Nothing* more." [32]

The decision to use Kuskova's name and signature to get a "couple of coaches" of provisions testifies to the catastrophic situation in the country. The situation was considerably worse than in 1891 not only because the drought had affected a much more extensive area. In 1921, there were absolutely no stocks left in the countryside; in contrast to 1891, the famine also hit the towns and the wrecked network of transport made it difficult to transport the available grain to relieve the famine-stricken areas. The peasant uprisings and discontent among the workers aggravated the crisis for the government. The only source of rapid aid possible was foreign, capitalist countries. Even the Soviet leaders realized this. "Do you believe," said Kuskova to Kamenev at the

[30] E. Kuskova, "Mesyats soglashatelstva," *Volya Rossiya*, No. 3, 1928.

[31] Ekaterina Kuskova—whose biography still remains to be written—had met Aleksei Peshkov, the future Gorky, in 1893 in Nizhnii Novgorod. Since that time, Gorky had been fond of Kuskova. He even recalled this in a letter written on 22 January 1929, "I am speaking sincerely when I say that I would not reply to these criticisms to anyone except you. And I am not replying to you in the hope of 'justifying' myself, but because we have a special relationship, which dates from our first meeting in the summer of 1893 in Nizhnii, when you were ill and lived in Voznesensky street." See E. Kuskova, "Tragediya Maksima Gorkogo," *Novyi Zhurnal*, No. 38 (1954), pp. 240–41.

[32] *Leninskii sbornik*, vol. 36, p. 287.

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Kremlin, " that this catastrophic situation can be solved by internal means alone? " " No, I do not," answered Kamenev gravely.[33]

Aid from the capitalist countries meant in fact the USA, as Western Europe, exhausted by war, was barely in a position to provide food for its own population. The Soviet government hesitated to ask for aid directly, for fear of an outright refusal. To Lenin it seemed perfectly natural that the capitalist countries would refuse to send aid to a government whose avowed aim was world revolution and the destruction of capitalism. Kuskova explained to Kamenev: " Only foreign countries can help us. But aid will not flow if they think that it will reach you, the Red Army, not the starving population." [34] The West had good reason to think that the aid would be distributed on a discriminatory basis, using criteria not directly relevant to the famine. Shortly after the October 1917 coup, when rations were introduced into the cities, their amount was made dependent on the status of the recipient. There were four categories: 1. those engaged in heavy physical labour, 2. all other workers and office workers, 3. free professions, 4. those who did no work. In June 1918, the rations for the last two categories were abolished in Petrograd, a decision affecting 13·9 per cent of the population. From its very first days, the Soviet government took upon itself the right to decide whom to feed and whom to allow to die of hunger; it refused to acknowledge people's equality in the face of death from starvation. This could only cause mistrust as to the use of aid from the West. " There must be a guarantee," said Kuskova to Kamenev. " We suggest that the old public figures be allowed to provide this guarantee." [35]

" The old public figures " mentioned by Kuskova were those prominent representatives of Russian science, literature and culture, known in the West, who had taken an active part in organizing famine relief in 1891. They were the only ones who could guarantee that the aid would be distributed to the starving according to the humanitarian principles which the revolution had repudiated. They were ready to give this guarantee, but demanded in return a " guarantee " from the government: they demanded a " constitution," i.e. official ratification of the statutes of the Famine Relief Committee. " Do you still believe in constitutions, then? " Kamenev asked ironically.[36] As this was the only possible way out, the Soviet government agreed to a " constitution." On 21 July, the chairman of the VTsIK, Kalinin, signed the " Decree of the All-Russian Central Committee " on the " All-Russian Famine Relief Committee " and the " status of the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee." [37]

THE Committee was allowed to use the sign of the Red Cross and was given the following rights: to obtain in Russia and abroad provisions, fodder, drugs and other vital supplies for the starving population; to distribute the resources of the Committee among the needy population;

[33, 34, 35, 36] E. Kuskova, " Mesyats soglashatelstva."
[37] *Izvestiya*, 23 June 1921.

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to have priority for transporting their supplies, and also to have and to use their own means of transport; to organize everything needed to feed the public; to give agricultural assistance in famine-stricken districts; to give medical help; to organize community work for the starving; to collect donations and in general to take other measures to promote the stated aims of the Committee. It was also given the right to organize local branches. Point five of the decree stated:

> In order to attract aid and resources from abroad, the Committee has the right to open branches abroad, to organize the formation of foreign relief committees and to send its own emissaries abroad.

Not five weeks had passed before the full significance of this point became obvious. Point six indicated the additional powers given to the Committee:

> The right to discuss measures taken by central and local authorities relating to the fight against harvest failure and famine and to enter into contact with the relevant establishments in order that these measures may be in accordance with its plans. All departments of the republic, both central and local, must cooperate fully with the Committee.

The Committee insisted on the right to publish a newspaper. Permission was granted with the reservation that it was to be called a "bulletin." The independence of the Committee was strengthened by the fact that it was not subject to review by the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate as were all other organizations and establishments in the Soviet republic. The VTsIK ratified the "initial composition" of the Committee and gave it the right to choose new members.

Never in the history of the Soviet state, neither before July 1921 nor after August of that year, has a public organization been given similar rights. But why was this short-lived decision taken? Maybe because the position of the Soviet authorities has never been quite so shaky. Maybe the Bolshevik leaders still retained a vivid recollection of the events of February 1917, when the delay in the supply of bread to Petrograd served as the jolt which brought down the tsarist government. In July 1921 there was a serious danger that food would completely run out. And the Soviet government, in a desperate attempt to maintain power, made a concession and enlisted public assistance.

The Famine Relief Committee

The VTsIK ratified the initial composition of the 63 member Committee; their names were published in *Izvestiya* and *Pravda* and we can therefore verify the claims of Soviet historians that "the Committee is formed of a group of bourgeois figures from the Kadet party," [38] and that "it was led by E. D. Kuskova, N. M. Kishkin and S. N. Prokopovich." [39] The chairman of the Committee was the chairman of the Moscow Soviet,

[38] Yu. Polyakov, op. cit. p. 95.
[39] *Lenin i VChK. Sbornik dokumentov (1917–1922)* (Moscow), 1975) pp. 501–02.

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L. B. Kamenev, the vice-chairman was the vice-chairman of the Work and Defence Soviet, A. I. Rykov. The Committee included, in Lenin's words " a communist cell " which numbered 12 people. The fact that the Soviet government was serious in its intention to cooperate with the Committee, is evident from the presence of representatives of the most important people's commissariats: foreign affairs (M. Litvinov); foreign trade (L. Krasin); health (N. Samashko); agriculture; food; social welfare; communications; education (A. Lunacharsky); the trade unions were represented by A. Shlyapnikov.

The " communist cell," however, formed a minority in the Committee, the majority consisting of prominent representatives of Russian science, culture and philosophy. Those who initiated the formation of the Committee drew up a list of potential members; some of them accepted and some refused to join; some were very hesitant, others were not yet ready to cooperate with the Bolsheviks. After the VTsIK had ratified the initial membership of 63, a further 10 were chosen on 1 August. Thus of the total of 73 Committee members, 61 represented the Russian public. The largest group was of agricultural specialists—agronomists, economists, statisticians, including the well-known professors S. N. Prokopovich and N. D. Kondratiev; P. A. Sadyrin the chairman of the cooperative movement, the economist A. V. Chayanov, the rector of the Zootechnical Institute M. M. Shchepkin and the chairman of the Moscow Agricultural Society, A. I. Ugryumov. The Academy of Sciences gave its full support to the Famine Relief Committee. The president of the Academy, A. P. Karpinskii, the vice-president V. A. Steklov, the president of the commission to study the productive forces of Russia P. P. Lazariev, academicians V. N. Ipatiev, A. V. Fersman, N. I. Kurnakov, N. Ya. Marr and S. F. Oldenburg all joined the Committee. Among the representatives of Russian culture were A. M. Gorky, K. S. Stanislavsky, A. I. Yuzhin-Sumbatov, B. K. Zaytsev, M. A. Osorgin, P. P. Muratov, A. K. Dzhivegelov and others. The well known doctors and followers of Tolstoy who had had experience of famine relief work, P. I. Biryukov, V. F. Bulgakov, A. L. Tolstaya also joined the Committee, as did representatives of religious sects with wide international contacts, Mennonites, Baptists, Adventists, and also the old revolutionary Vera Figner. The post of honorary president of the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee was filled by V. G. Korolenko, the only person in Russia whose moral authority was accepted by all.

Today, Soviet historians present the forming of the Committee as an anti-Soviet act, carried out in stealth, apparently taking the astonished government quite unawares. Here is what Karl Radek wrote after the Committee's first meeting:

> We have no doubt whatsoever that the bourgeois elements, who have now joined forces, under the control of the Soviet government, in order to overcome the effects of the famine, are not dedicated to the cause of communism and do not see the Soviet govern-

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> ment as the embodiment of their ideals. The tsarist minister and leader of the Kadets, Kutler, the chairman of the second and third Duma, Kerensky's minister Kishkin, the semi-Mensheviks Prokopovich and Kuskova, the former member of the People's Will, V. Figner are no believers in communism. On the contrary, all these people are "bourgeois elements." Their motives for joining forces under the chairmanship of the Moscow Soviet chairman, Kamenev, are no doubt very varied. For one person, humanitarian considerations will be uppermost, for another there may be an element of political calculation. The Soviet government welcomes these humane tendencies and is not afraid of any ulterior motives.[40]

Kamenev repeated this almost word for word in an interview with a *Pravda* correspondent a few days later:

> The Committee has been founded under the sign of the Red Cross; its aim is to collect voluntary contributions . . . Ulterior motives, which some or other of these people may have, cannot alter the significance of voluntary cooperation between those figures from the bourgeois camp who have stayed in Russia and the Soviet government. The dictatorship of the proletariat has not in the least been shaken by the fact that former ministers and members of the Central Committee of the KD party, leaders of petty bourgeois cooperatives and agronomist and agricultural societies are now working under the leadership of the Soviet government in an attempt to find rapid solutions to the consequences of the disaster. The Soviet government has, at a difficult time, proved sufficiently strong and alert not to reject proposals from the bourgoisie, which has already been defeated in open battle.[41]

The "honeymoon" of cooperation between the Soviet authorities and the Russian public lasted, however, less than six weeks. The resolution of the presidium of the VTsIK concerning the foundation of the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee was signed by the chairman of the VTsIK M. I. Kalinin on 21 July 1921; the resolution to dissolve the Committee was signed by the vice-chairman of the VTsIK P. Zalutskii on 27 August the same year.[42]

THE liquidation of the Committee was not totally unexpected by its members or by the more perceptive observers of Soviet internal politics. Kuskova relates how, a few days after the decree on the founding of the Committee, "somebody with access to the Kremlin"[43] warned "that a great danger was threatening them." Maxim Gorky, the man "with access to the Kremlin" explained to Kuskova, "the Kremlin

[40] K. Radek, "My, golod i oni," *Pravda*, 2 Aug. 1921.
[41] *Pravda*, 4 Aug. 1921.
[42] *Izvestiya*, 28 Aug. 1921.
[43] E. Kuskova, "Mesyats soglashatelstva." In her article "Tragediya Maksima Gorkogo" Kuskova reveals the name of the person "with access to the Kremlin," Gorky himself.

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issued the decree. But in addition to the Kremlin, there is the Lubyanka. The Lubyanka stated firmly and categorically, that they would not allow this organization to exist." [44]

The published documents suggest that there was a difference of opinion among the Bolshevik leaders on many internal policy matters, especially on the questions of food policy and relations with peasants. In the collection of memoirs *Khleb i revolyutsiya* (Moscow, 1972) statements by the opponents of "war communism" can be read. They argued for a less rigid approach and against the total nationalization of trade. On the basis of these documents, it would appear that it was Kamenev above all who wanted more "room for maneouvre," but, as in 1917, he expressed his opinions only tentatively and rapidly abandoned his position in the face of the hurricane force of Lenin's criticism. Lenin was absolutely opposed to any "manoeuvring" or "putrid retreats."

Only when Lenin realized that it had "become impossible to live under the conditions of war communism" [45] did he decide to retreat from the position he had clung to for so long. In agreeing to the formation of the Famine Relief Committee—which Lenin saw as a kind of Brest-Litovsk Treaty, a breathing space—he hoped to obtain aid from abroad by "using the name and signature of Kuskova," and secondly, to establish, in a roundabout way, diplomatic relations with the capitalist world, if not *de jure* then at least *de facto*. As soon as this aim was achieved, the Committee was dissolved. On 21 August, Litvinov signed an agreement in Riga with the American Relief Administration (ARA), led by Herbert Hoover. Kuskova recalls that Kutler, when he heard that this agreement had been signed, said, "Well, it's time for us to go home . . . Our work is done. Now 35 per cent of the starving will perish and not 50 or even 70 per cent." [46] Kutler was only partially correct. The Committee had done its work, the Americans announced the first delivery of food and Hoover promised that a monthly sum of 1·2–1·5 million dollars would be allocated for food for Russia. But the members of the Committee were not allowed to "go home." On 27 August, Frithof Nansen signed an agreement with Moscow on the delivery of food to the starving, in the name of the International Aid Organization. Unfortunately, this famous polar explorer made a crucial mistake even before the agreement was signed: he included a member of the Famine Relief Committee in the list of members of his organization.

Gorky had mentioned to Kuskova that the attitude to the Committee in the "Kremlin" and the "Lubyanka" was different. The main enemy of the Committee, the leader of the "Lubyanka" in the "Kremlin" was Lenin. On 26 August, he wrote a letter "To Stalin and all members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b)," in which he gave detailed instructions for the liquidation of the Famine Relief

[44] E. Kuskova, "Tragediya Maksima Gorkogo."
[45] I. V. Stalin, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 6, p. 37.
[46] E. Kuskova, "Mesyats soglashatelstva."

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Committee. "I propose," writes Lenin, expressing his anger at Nansen's "outrageous suggestion" and the behaviour of Committee members, "to issue a VTsIK decree today dissolving the Committee . . . Prokopovich is to be arrested today for anti-government speeches [47] and to be held for about three months . . . The other members of the Committee are to be exiled from Moscow immediately, today, and sent individually to provincial towns, if possible where there are no railways, and kept under surveillance." Lenin combined the role of investigator, prosecutor, judge and warder; he gives in the same breath the nature of the crime, the verdict and the sentence. He repeats "today" three times.

The second part of the letter deals with the handling of public opinion. Here also Lenin is business-like and specific:

> Tomorrow we shall print five lines [on the Committee], a short, dry government announcement, stating "disbanded because unwilling to work." We shall send a directive to the newspapers to start mocking the Committee in a hundred different ways as aristocrats, White Guardists, who just wanted to escape across the border . . . Press home this mockery and vilification as strongly as possible, mentioning them not less than once a week for two months.

Lenin sums up: "the rotten tooth must be extracted immediately." [48]

Lenin's instructions were supported energetically in the Politburo by Trotsky, who threatened that he would resign unless the Committee was dissolved and its members arrested. Trotsky emphasized that not once during the Riga talks had the Americans from the ARA mentioned the Committee and that therefore it could be liquidated without adverse reaction.[49] Lenin's sharp tone and Trotsky's ultimatum lead one to believe that there were those in the Politburo who opposed the liquidation of the Committee, although they did not manifest their position in any concrete fashion. Lenin's letter was accepted as the recommendation for (almost) immediate action. Not on "that very day," but on the next day, 27 August, the members of the Committee held a routine meeting. Somehow, the Committee chairman, Kamenev, was delayed. And in his place a detachment of *Chekisty* arrived and surrounded the house. All the Committee members, with the exception of Vera Figner and of the chairman of the agricultural cooperative movement, P. A. Sadyrin, were arrested and taken to the Lubyanka.

The next day, the second part of Lenin's letter was put into effect: to mock and vilify the Committee in the press. The headlines alone are sufficiently eloquent evidence of the nature of this campaign: "Famine is no joke" (*Pravda*, 30 Aug.), "Abandon your speculation" (*Izvestiya*, 31 Aug.), "Committee for the Relief of Counter-revolution" (*Kom-*

[47] Prokopovich, in particular, aroused Lenin's wrath, as according to information received from someone called Runov, who had attended a Committee meeting, Prokopovich had given "anti-governmental" speeches.

[48] V. I. Lenin, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 53, pp. 140–42.

[49] See Benjamin Weissman, *Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia 1921–1923* (Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 76.

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munisticheskii Trud, 30 Aug.), "Speculating in famine" (*Kommunisticheskii Trud*, 31 Aug.). The most popular "humorists," Demyan Bednyi, Yasha Zub and others filled the papers with feuilletons, mocking the Committee and its supporters in prose and in verse.

ON 8 September *Pravda* published a Cheka announcement "concerning arrests among the members of the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee." The charges against them are interesting for two reasons: first, they betray a total lack of substance and second, because they have been repeated unchanged by Soviet historians to the present day. The Cheka announcement opened with the information that "Antonov's main intelligence organization has been disclosed" in Tambov. This organization had links, the Cheka explained, with the Kadets in Moscow. Two representatives of Antonov, arrested in Moscow, admitted that "they were to have got in touch with N. M. Kishkin" but "were unable to contact him personally." Nevertheless, Kishkin was charged with contacts with the Antonovites. Among the papers found in his place during the search was a detailed plan to reorganize Soviet Russia, to be headed by a government with a chancellor, a governmental Duma and a governmental Council. "Experts established" that this plan was in Kishkin's handwriting. Kishkin did not deny that he had written it, he merely pointed out that he had done so in 1907. The investigator had just torn off the date and included the plan in his "case" as evidence. Bulgakov was charged with writing in his diary that "we and famine are means in a political struggle." [50] Then an odd thing happened. Maybe for the only time in the history of the Soviet government, a Soviet citizen was able to answer publicly, in the press, charges brought against him by the "organs." On 18 September, *Kommunisticheskii Trud* published "Explanation by V. F. Bulgakov. From a letter to the editor":

> The former member of the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee, V. F. Bulgakov, keeper of the Tolstoy Museum, states that the words quoted in the Cheka announcement of 9 September, "we and famine are means in a political struggle" are not taken from his diary but from the summary of a speech concerning a government representative's contribution to a committee meeting; they did not express approval but rejection of any political activity being introduced into the Committee's work. Bulgakov maintains that as a Tolstoyan he could not possibly take part in any political combinations.

The publication of this letter did not prevent Soviet historians from repeating even today the charges made against Bulgakov.

The Committee itself was portrayed as an anti-Soviet terrorist organization, preparing the overthrow of the Soviet regime. In the Cheka announcement, the Committee was linked in an occult fashion with Antonov. Simultaneously with the decree to liquidate the Committee,

[50] *Pravda*, 8 Aug. 1921.

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the newspapers published sensational stories about the discovery of the so-called "Petrograd organization" led by Professor Tagantsev and the execution by firing squad of those arrested. Hence, a Soviet historian writes: "The liquidation of the Famine Relief Committee coincided with the liquidation of several other counter-revolutionary plots." [51]

OSORGIN who, together with Kuskova, is the true historian of the Committee, has written on several occasions on the activity and fate of its members. He fully understood the implications of and the reasons for its liquidation. After being arrested and before being sent to prison, Kuskova asked him, "What do you think, are we going to be shot?" "Yes, I think so." "So do I," she said.[52] They were people who thought logically, Osorgin continues, "and clearly understood the difficult position of the government. They had nothing to charge us with. The only thing we were guilty of was trying to do what the government was incapable of doing—helping the famine-stricken." [53] In *Vremena*, Osorgin, in his usual laconic fashion, wrote about the activity of the Committee:

> Only a few days were enough to send to the famine-stricken districts trainloads of potatoes, tonnes of rye, cartloads of vegetables, from the centre and from Siberia, as money flowed in to the Committee, money people had not wished to donate to official representatives. The cooperatives, damaged but not destroyed, did an enormous amount of work, and the Committee, invested with no power, relying only on the moral authority of its cultural leaders, sent orders all over the country which were followed with energy and joy. The October government had to kill the Committee, before it took over the work. In the Volga region, five million people died, but the political situation was saved.[54]

Osorgin wrote about the activity of the Committee briefly and to the point. "One of the most important leaders of the Cheka" was more lyrical and poetic. He told someone anxious about the arrested members of the Committee:

> You say that the Committee did not take any disloyal step. This is true. But it did become the centre of attraction for the so-called Russian public . . . We cannot afford to let this happen. As you know, if a willow branch in bud is put into a glass of water, leaves rapidly start to appear. This is how quickly the Committee started to flourish . . . We had to throw the branch out of the water and trample it underfoot.[55]

This poetic image of a branch bursting into leaf contains a great deal

[51] I. A. Chemerisskii, "Iz istorii klassovoi borby v 1921," *Istoricheskii zapiski*, No. 77, 1965.
[52, 53] M. Osorgin, "Chtoby luchshe oshushchat svobodu," in *Vospominaniya*, 1924, p. 112.
[54] M. Osorgin, *Vremena*, p. 161.
[55] E. Kuskova, *Mesyats soglashatelstva*.

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of truth. The All-Russian Famine Relief Committee, whether it wanted this or not, became the focal point for the revival of Russian public activity, crushed by the revolution, and this revival was what Lenin feared most of all. Its policy of attempting to unite all who could help to save millions of people from dying of starvation when the government was incapable of doing anything, was in effect a political act. Their appeal to the Orthodox Church for help was also a crime. The Committee decided to appeal to the Church, in the first place to Patriarch Tikhon, who was living in the Troitskii Monastery under the strictest police surveillance, for two main reasons: the priests had the strongest links with the Russian peasants; only the Russian Church, especially Patriarch Tikhon, could arouse foreigners to grant aid. When Kamenev learned that two members of the Committee (Kishkin and Prokopovich) had visited Patriarch Tikhon, who had blessed the work of the Committee and promised his support, he expressed his displeasure, saying, "Why does the Committee take on this counter-revolutionary organization?" Nevertheless, the government allowed Patriarch Tikhon's appeal to be published in the bulletin *Pomoshch*, with a print run of 100,000, and even to have it broadcast on the radio. Kamenev tried to censor the Patriarch's appeal but it was published in full. And for this the Committee was not forgiven. "I do not know," wrote Kuskova, "if the late Patriarch realized that by awakening all believers in Russia and abroad to the need for help he was dealing a mortal blow to the cause of public cooperation. In the eyes of the Bolsheviks both his and our manifestation of energy was merely seen as counter-revolutionary." [56]

Thus, the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee was liquidated and its members locked up in the Cheka Lubyanka prison. Kuskova writes that three members of the Committee were sentenced to death—herself, Kishkin and Prokopovich. Osorgin writes about six people so sentenced, adding that they included Korobov, Cherkasov and himself.[57] Thanks to the intervention of Frithof Nansen, these sentences were not carried out. The "instigators," Kuskova, Kishkin, Prokopovich, Osorgin, Korobov and Cherkasov, were held for several months and then exiled to distant provinces. At first the Soviet government used this well-tried form of humane repression—removing people who were a nuisance. Osorgin wrote:

> we were taken at night by lorry from the Special Department prison, shoved into railway carriages with broken windows and for three days travelled through the frost to the first stage (for me, this was Kazan). The winter was severe, and the carriages were not heated. There was also typhus and there was no way of getting away from the insects.[58]

[56] E. Kuskova, ibid.

[57] M. Osorgin, "Nansen i 'Obshchestvennyi komitet,'" *Poslednie novosti*, 18 May 1930.

[58] M. Osorgin, "L. D. Trotskomu—naputsvennoe," *Dni*, 22 Jan. 1928.

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The " crimes " of the Committee were not, however, forgotten. Arrest and exile were only the beginnings of further repressions meted out to its members. The activity of the Committee was considered by Lenin as yet further proof of the enmity of the " old intelligentsia " towards the revolution, proof of the danger it presented to the Soviet government.

The history of the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee can serve as a model for the relationship between the Soviet government and its opponents from the intelligentsia, those who are willing to help, but with reservations. The sequence is invariably as follows: 1. concessions if this is the only possible course of action, 2. withdrawal of concessions as soon as the danger has passed, 3. revenge for the concessions.

Instead of the Death Sentence

Soviet historians make a direct connexion between the activity of the Committee and its liquidation and the use of an unusual form of punishment unknown in tsarist Russia and used for the first time in the Soviet republic: deportation abroad.

A year passed between the dissolution of the Committee and the exile of its members abroad. The idea of using this form of punishment was completely new. One of those exiled recalled that as they were being put on the boat, the faces of those accompanying them " expressed surprise and longing: not one of them, or us, could understand the point of our strange punishment—deportation abroad—when everybody would have considered it a salvation to leave the Soviet Eden." [59]

The decision to apply this new method of punishment was apparently taken in the spring of 1922. When Kuskova arrived in Berlin, she received a letter from Gorky who had left Soviet Russia in October 1921. Gorky wrote, " I am not surprised by your arrival, as I knew in April that a decision had been taken to exile all the Committee members from Russia." [60] On 19 May 1922, Lenin wrote a letter to Dzerzhinsky, in which he gave detailed instructions for " preparations for the deportation abroad of writers and professors who had supported counter-revolution." [61] In the first sentence of the letter, Lenin names the social group which was to suffer repression and the sentence which was to be passed. Osorgin thought that the person who had initiated the idea of exile abroad, of " ostracism," was Trotsky. There is no doubt, however, that Lenin was personally in charge of organizing the operation. In May Lenin edited the criminal code, mentioning specifically in a letter to the people's commissar for justice: " Comrade Kurskii! In my opinion, we should extend the use of the death sentence (or, as an alternative, exile abroad)." [62] Lenin's idea was legally incorporated in the decree on

[59] I. Matusevich, *Zataennaya plamennost.*
[60] E. Kuskova, " Tragediya Maksima Gorkogo," p. 237. Gorky's letter is dated 30 June 1922.
[61] V. I. Lenin, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 54, p. 265.
[62] V. I. Lenin, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 45, p. 189.

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administrative exile, passed on 10 August 1922, which permitted "exile abroad or to specific regions of the RSFSR for a period not exceeding three years of persons taking part in counter-revolutionary activities."[63]

LENIN'S illness delayed the operation, but did not interrupt the preparations for it. When E. Zamyatin in September 1922 was given a document in prison sentencing him to "exile for life" abroad, the document stated that it was issued in accordance with a Sovnarkom decree of 10 May 1922.[64]

In August, Lenin gradually got back to work, to the most important business—a decisive offensive on the "ideological front." The Central Committee noted: "in the first months of 1922 there was a revival of activity among the remainder of the old bourgeois intelligentsia."[65] This revival was evident in the opening of private publishing houses, the revival of the journals *Byloe*, *Golos minuvshevo* and the resumption of the activity of professional associations and organizations—of engineers, doctors, agronomists. In March 1922 in an article entitled "The Meaning of Militant Materialism" (published in *Pod znamenem marksizma*) Lenin emphasizes the need for a "systematic, offensive struggle against bourgeois ideology, against philosophical reaction, against all forms of idealism and mysticism," and called this struggle the "most important responsibility of a communist."

The fight "on the ideological front" meant war against the intelligentsia. The article on militant materialism provided the theory for this war. The letter to Dzerzhinsky of 19 May incorporated the practical application of this theory. Lenin outlined to the chairman of the GPU the concrete steps to be taken in order to prepare for the "exile abroad of writers and professors." A special meeting of the leading workers in the GPU was to be called,[66] the members of the Politburo were to take part in censorship activities: examining books and periodicals collecting systematic information on political records, the work and the literary activity of professors and writers. As a sample of censorship work Lenin gave a "reference" for two Petersburg journals. *Novaya Rossiya*, closed by "our comrades in Petrograd," does not seem to the "censor" to be a completely lost cause. At any rate, as the Sovnarkom chairman comments, "not all of those working on this journal are candidates for exile abroad." The second journal, however, *Ekonomist*, published by the 11th section of the Russian Technical Society, deserves no mercy: "It is manifestly a White Guard centre. On the cover of No. 3 (only the third! N.B.) is a list of contributors. They are almost all perfectly legitimate candidates for deportation abroad."[67] Then Lenin

[63] *Istoriya sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1968), p. 580.
[64] Yu. Annenkov, *Dnevnik moikh vstrech*, vol. 1 (New York, 1966), p. 262.
[65] *Pravda*, 1 Mar. 1923.
[66] In February 1922, the VChK was renamed the GPU.
[67] *Ekonomist* was published between December 1921 and June 1923. Its contributors included Sorokin, Brutzkus, Kondratiev and Berdyaev.

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sums up: "All of them are blatant counter-revolutionaries, accomplices of the Entente, an organization of its lackeys and spies and corrupters of student youth. Things must be arranged in such a way that these military spies are caught—and caught regularly and systematically and deported abroad." [68]

War was declared. "Professors and writers" were charged with military crimes—spying, counter-revolution, as well as the "corruption of youth." The letter to Dzerzhinsky was kept secret. Lenin insisted on this, perhaps because he suspected that the accusations were exaggerated. But even in the open press he did not mince his words. On 5 May 1922 in *Pravda* Lenin called the book *Oswald Spengler and the Decline of Europe* "a literary cover up for a White Guard organization." The authors of this collection of essays, N. Berdyaev, Ya. Bukshpan, F. Stepun, were not forgotten when the lists were drawn up of those to be deported abroad.

The historian Golinkov expands what was meant by Lenin by "professors and writers." It meant the intelligentsia in general:

> Anti-Soviet parties acting through the intelligentsia (professors, specialists, littérateurs), worked among young people—petty bourgeois and narrow-minded elements—created strongpoints in high schools, in the press, in literary circles and cooperatives . . . In several philosophical pamphlets they trailed their bourgeois ideology. They published formalist literary works, far removed from everyday life. At medical congresses, voices were heard speaking against the "communist encirclement." Anti-Soviet speeches were heard at agronomist congresses and agricultural cooperative congresses.[69]

THE transition to the New Economic Policy was understood by the Russian intelligentsia to herald a new era. The arrest of the members of the Famine Relief Committee could not dampen their hopes for the democratization of the regime. At the 2nd All-Russian Congress of doctors (May 1922) Soviet medicine was criticized and Zemstvo medicine was praised, a demand was made for "full democracy," the doctors demanded permission to form an independent trade union and to issue their own printed journal. At the Third Congress of agronomists (March 1922), the most prominent Russian economists, Professors Brutzkus, Kondratiev, Chayanov, etc., spoke against government interference in agriculture and argued for the development of private initiative. On 10 March in the trade union building a public debate was organized between the "Marxist-agrarians" and their critics. *Pravda* reported the next day that an enormous number of people who were unable to get tickets rushed into a hall and laid siege to all the exits until late at night.[70] Everyone wanted to hear Brutzkus and Chayanov.

[68] V. I. Lenin, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 54, pp. 265–66.
[69] D. Golinkov, *Krushenie antisovetskogo podpolya v SSSR*, vol. 2, pp. 156–57.
[70] *Pravda*, 11 Mar. 1922.

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Famine still afflicted the Russian land and many wanted to hear their explanations. Professor Brutzkus had no doubt at all: the policy of the Soviet government and the system of appropriation were to blame for the famine. "We cannot accept that the principle of nationalization of the land is compatible with the need for the normal development of agriculture." The Marxist Dubrovskii answered Brutzkus with a poetic metaphor: "Brutzkus has sharpened the arrows of private property to aim them at the heart of the land policy of the Soviet government, at the nationalization of land." [71]

Lenin found this kind of public debate dangerous and senseless. He noted the important and dangerous tendencies in medical circles which became apparent at this congress and wrote instructions to "comrade Stalin" to ask Dzerzhinsky "to work out a plan [to deal with it] with Semashko's help and to inform the Politburo within two weeks." The note to Stalin immediately followed the letter to Dzerzhinsky about preparing measures to exile "professors and writers."

IN June 1922 the trial of the SRs started. Gorky, who had left the country, considered this as yet another blow to the intelligentsia. In a letter to Anatole France, he said "the trials of the SRs are . . . preparations in public for the murder of persons who sincerely helped in liberating the people" and asked the French writer to intercede on behalf of these valuable socialists. The "storm-petrel" of the revolution then wrote a letter to Rykov: "Aleksey Ivanovich! If the SR trials end in executions—it will be murder. I ask you to tell L. D. Trotsky and others that this is my opinion. I trust that this will not surprise you as you know that throughout the revolution I pointed out a thousand times to the Soviet authorities that to exterminate the intelligentsia was a senseless crime in our illiterate, uncivilized country." [72]

Twelve of the accused in the SR trial were sentenced to death, but the court decided to delay the execution of the sentence. This sentence reflected Lenin's wish, who was impatient with Bukharin and Radek for having promised the Socialist International to spare the accused in return for its support of the Soviet regime, but the court was also responsive to Gorky's wishes and progressive world public opinion. The sentence was postponed for several years.

The specific charges against the priesthood (on whom a total of nine death sentences was passed by August 1922) were the refusal to hand over church treasures to the fund for the famine-stricken, and against the SRs—anti-Soviet terrorist acts. And although the Church had agreed to hand over its treasures, although the SR activity related to the civil

[71] S. M. Dubrovskii, "Fetishism chastnoi sobstvennosti (otvet B. D. Brutskusu)," *Selskoe i lesnoe khozyaistvo*, 1922, No. 7–8, p. 56.

[72] Lenin replied with a letter to Bukharin (7 Sep. 1922) which started with the words, "I have read Gorky's foul letter (in *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik*) . . ." In the notes, it is claimed that this refers to Gorky's letter to Anatole France dated 3 July 1922, but in fact it refers to two of Gorky's letters which have never been published in the USSR.

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war years and had already been amnestied or even punished, it was easy to use these charges for propaganda purposes. It was more difficult to find charges against the "professors and writers." It was one thing to present the Famine Relief Committee as a White Guard centre, connected simultaneously with Antonov, Milyukov and Clemenceau, but it was more difficult to present the authors of philosophical books, economists and doctors, as counter-revolutionary conspirators on the basis of some unorthodox ideas.

Deportation abroad was a radical decision and at the same time, in comparison with a sentence of death, passed at public trials, could be seen as "humane." The possibility of the mass exile of "professors and writers" is first mentioned by Lenin in May 1922 in his letter to Kurskii as an alternative to the death sentence. This punishment had the further advantage that it could be a mass punishment, whereas at the beginning of the 1920s, shooting one or two hundred of the most prominent representatives of the Russian intelligentsia at one go seemed a risky business which could have unpleasant repercussions abroad. And the fact that the Russian intelligentsia was so small meant that there would probably be no need to repeat the operation. On 10 June 1922, Gorky wrote to the American, Jane Adams, from Berlin that in the whole of Russia there were only 9,000 "creators of Russian science and culture," without whom "it is impossible to live, as one cannot live without a soul." [73]

IN the middle of 1921 an event took place which opened up new possibilities for the Communist Party in the war on the ideological front. A book appeared in Prague called *Smena vekh* ("Change of Bearings"). This book put an official stamp on the *Smena vekh* movement, which was initiated in Russia and was actively supported by the Party.[74]

The essence of all the articles in this collection, reported *Izvestiya*, "is the acceptance of the October revolution and rejection of all struggle against its results." [75] *Pravda* echoed *Izvestiya*: "Life teaches [the authors of the book] and they are good pupils. The logic of life forces them to go further and further along the road to joining the revolution." [76] In his speech at the Second All-Russian Congress of Political Education (October 1921) Trotsky insisted that: "We must have at least one copy of this book *Smena vekh* in every district of the country." [77] Finally, Lenin at the Eleventh Party Congress (March–April 1922) announced: "The *Smena vekh* movement expresses the mood of thousands and tens

[73] This letter was published in *Novyi zhurnal*, No. 79, 1965, p. 287.

[74] In the summer of 1920 *Izvestiya* published a series of articles by Professor Gredeskul, a former Kadet, calling for the intelligentsia to join the Bolshevik camp.

[75] *Izvestiya*, 13 Oct. 1921.

[76] *Pravda*, 14 Oct. 1921.

[77] Quoted from the Parisian journal *Smena vekh*, No. 6, 1921.

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of thousands of bourgeois or Soviet employees who are cooperating in our New Economic Policy." [78]

The *Smena vekh* movement provided an ideology for that part of the Russian intelligentsia which had fought against Soviet power, admitted defeat and decided to give in to the victors. This ideology was patriotism, the acceptance of the October revolution as a Russian revolution and Soviet power as Russian power. As Trotsky said about the *Smena vekh* movement, "They came to Soviet power through the gates of patriotism."

For the Party it was irrelevant which gates they came through; what mattered was the position they reached. It was also irrelevant that the *Smena vekh* ideologues were representatives of parties on the far right—Oktyabrists, right-wing Kadets, even monarchists. The Bolsheviks had always been suspicious of "leftists."

Above all, it was of great significance that the *Smena vekh* movement was splitting the intelligentsia and providing a model of "useful Soviet intelligentsia." "The useful intelligentsia" had given in to their victors and did not aspire to participate in governing the country, to play a leading role in science or culture, or to express criticism. They only asked for one thing: to be allowed to work under the leadership of the Communist Party and to fulfil Party tasks.

In his letter to Dzerzhinsky,[79] Lenin makes a fine distinction between two "intelligentsia" publications: he stresses the need for reviving the pro-*Smena vekh* journal, *Novaya Rossiya*, shut down by overhasty Petrograd comrades, and recommends the closure of that "blatant White Guard centre," the journal *Ekonomist*. In 1921 members of the *Smena vekh* movement started returning to their homeland.

The Whip of Dictatorship

When, in May 1922, shortly before the first attack of his illness, Lenin told Dzerzhinsky to start preparations for the exile of "professors and writers," he insisted that his letter be kept secret. But on 2 June *Pravda* published a hysterical article entitled "Dictatorship, Where is Your Whip?" in which Lenin's plans were expounded and the group of victims specified. This article was signed merely by the letter "O," [80] and against the journalistic background of the 1920s it was remarkable for its extremely crude language. It could well take its place in a collection of Soviet journalistic style from the years when it was at its most vivid—1937–38 and 1948–52.

In June 1922 there was no special need to remind citizens of the whip of dictatorship; they were all well aware of it. Moreover, this article was written while the SR and the priesthood trials were in progress. The

[78] V. I. Lenin, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 45, p. 94.

[79] See page 177.

[80] M. Olminskii sometimes signed his articles with the letter "O". V. Vorovskii wrote under the pseudonym "Orlovskii" but there are no serious grounds for assuming that either of these two journalists wrote this article.

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Pravda article indicated the circle of new victims and defined the form the new repression would take.

On 31 August *Pravda* published an announcement on measures to "clean up" the Soviet republic, under the heading, "First Warning." It stated that "certain layers of the bourgeois intelligentsia have not become reconciled with Soviet authority," and listed the "strongpoints" of anti-Soviet agitation:

> Their most important citadel was in higher education . . . Politicking university professors showed at every step a stubborn resistance to the Soviet government's attempts to reform higher education. These groups stubbornly, maliciously and consistently tried to discredit all initiatives made by the Soviet authorities, objecting to them on so-called educational grounds. In the realm of publicity they followed the same course. The creative literature published by these circles was also anti-Soviet. In philosophy, they preached mysticism and religion . . . A group of anti-Soviet doctors zealously fabricated anti-Soviet opinions in their milieu . . . counter-revolutionary elements among agronomists carried on the same work in their field . . . In the cooperatives, Menshevik and SR elements did the same . . . Finally some groups of anti-Soviet elements were seeking to establish links with the counter-revolutionary movement in that section of the priesthood which was actively protesting against the impounding of church treasures . . .

The sentence was pronounced: "According to a GPU decree the most active counter-revolutionary elements from among professors, doctors, agronomists and writers are to be exiled to the northern provinces. Some will be exiled abroad." The announcement expressed the certainty that "these precautionary measures taken by the Soviet authorities will undoubtedly be warmly welcomed by Russian workers and peasants who are waiting with impatience for the day when these ideological 'Wrangelites' and 'Kolchakovites' will finally be thrown out of the territory of the RSFSR." This formula is of historic interest as the first variant of the future obligatory cliché: "to meet the wishes of the workers." The brand-name of "ideological Wrangelites and Kolchakovites" was to become half a century later when Alexander Solzhenitsyn was exiled "a literary Vlasovite."

The announcement claimed reassuringly: "Among those exiled are hardly any prominent names," and threatened that "the exile of active counter-revolutionary elements from among the bourgeois intelligentsia is the first warning from the Soviet authorities in relation to this milieu . . ."

ON 30 August Trotsky, in an interview with the American journalist, Louise Bryant, a correspondent of the International News Service, explained the reasons for the exile:

> Those elements which we have exiled and will exile, are in themselves politically insignificant. But they are a potential weapon in

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> the hands of possible enemies. In the event of new military complications, despite our love of peace, it is not out of the question that all these unreconciled and incorrigible people will turn out to be the military-political agents of the enemy. And according to the rules of war, we should be obliged to shoot them. This is why we have chosen, in a relatively peaceful time, to exile them in advance. And I express the hope that you will not fail to recognize our foresight and humanity and will defend it to public opinion.

Trotsky, as people's commissar for military and naval affairs, felt responsible for the safety of his country, and was happy to see the Soviet republic cleansed of potential "military-political agents of the enemy." And he expected gratitude for this "foresight and humanity." Soon, Stalin dealt with Trotsky with similar "foresight and humanity."

The most important thinker in the *Smena vekh* movement, Nikolai Ustryalov, produced three arguments, which could help "to counter the pessimistic reactions from an over-impressionable people, in connection with the Soviet government's measures." The first idea echoes Trotsky's words: the "means of suppression" are relatively humane: if this is the path of the future, if the regime is to become less and less harsh at the same rate, then it is a sin to complain. The second reason could be called "physiological"; in Russia, Ustryalov reasons, a purely animal process is underway, the restoration of the organic tissue of government. "The brain of the country" should not impede this process, should for a short while (suggests the author) "refrain from fulfilling its primary function—thought." The brain is interfering with the process of restoration and must be, so to speak, removed—temporarily—from the organism. The third reason is historical: surely we, the Russian intelligentsia, thinking people, expected the revolution, helped it to happen, longed for the "new Huns," invited them to trample on the old world. There is, therefore, nothing to complain about, now that the Scythian with the primordial features of a barbarian has arrived. "Attila," writes Ustryalov, "did not behave well. But while he was necessary to history, Roman law was silent." [81]

Ustryalov was convinced that the Bolsheviks, the October revolution were necessary to history, necessary to Russia.

SEVERAL of those exiled thought that the initiator of the exile was Trotsky. Some were convinced that Trotsky wrote the article "Dictatorship, Where is Your Whip?" although it was unlikely that he would have needed to use a pseudonym. Others thought that Zinoviev [82] or Dzerzhinsky took the initiative. Documents recently published leave no doubt that the initiator was in fact Lenin himself. We do not know if there were any opponents to this new form of repression. We do know,

[81] N. Ustryalov, "Obmirshchenie," *Novosti zhizni*, 10 Dec. 1922.
[82] See B. Khariton, "K istorii nashei vysylki," *Dni*, 13 Feb. 1923.

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however, that at the Twelfth Party conference, held from 4–7 August 1922, Lenin's initiative was confirmed:

> It is impossible to deny the need for repressive measures, not only against the SRs and the Mensheviks, but also against the political intriguers at the top of the allegedly non-aligned, bourgeois democratic intelligentsia, which to further its counter-revolutionary aims abuses the basic interests of whole enterprises and to whom the true interests of science, technology, education, cooperation, etc. are empty words, a political screen.[83]

The "bourgeois democratic intelligentsia" is directly charged with counter-revolutionary activity, but in the GPU announcement only the counter-revolutionary aims are mentioned, without any reference to the "bourgeois-democratic" label. For Lenin, democracy and counter-revolution, after he came to power, were synonymous.

The exact number of people exiled has not yet been accurately established. Those exiled did not concern themselves with making a list, and of the Soviet historians, only Fedyukin gives a figure—"160 of the most active bourgeois ideologues,"[84] adding, however, that some of these were exiled abroad and some to the northern provinces.

So who was exiled? This is an important question as this was the first time in Russia that a sizeable group of "thinking people" was expelled, people who were very much needed in their country. Moreover, an answer to this question throws light on the sources of the most important principle of the later, Stalinist "great terror." When we analyse the list of those exiled as it stands today and which is far from full, there is one question which is irrelevant: for what specific misdeeds were they exiled? In asking this question the historian falls into the trap laid by the organizers of the operation. Some Soviet historians maintain, for instance, that Kishkin was exiled for having dealings with Antonov and for allegedly having drawn up a plan for a new anti-Soviet political structure for Russia. This explanation would be logical, if the charges were genuine, if they had been exiled "for something." In actual fact, Kishkin remained in the Soviet Union until his death in 1930. Also, Zamyatin was arrested and sentenced to be exiled abroad; the sentence was signed by Yagoda. But the writer was able to have this sentence commuted relatively easily.

We can reasonably assume that a general decision was taken to strike a blow at the intelligentsia and for that purpose the basic centres of independent thinking which had to be paralysed were singled out. There were some people, and here Lenin mentioned several names, who simply had to be thrown out of the country. For the remainder, the initiative rested with the GPU, influential party leaders and their cronies, who also used it for settling personal scores.

The professions of those exiled make an eloquent list. The rector

[83] *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh*, vol. 2, p. 395.
[84] S. Fedyukin, *Velikii Oktyabr i intelligentsia*, p. 287.

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of Moscow University, Professor Novikov, a zoologist, was exiled as was the rector of Petersburg University, Professor Karsavin, a philosopher, and a sizeable group of mathematicians led by the dean of the Faculty of Mathematics at Moscow University, Professor Stratonov.[85] Agricultural studies—agronomy, economics—suffered severe losses. Among those exiled were Professors Brutzkus, Zvorykin, Lodyzhenskii, Prokopovich, the agronomists Ugrimov, Volikhov, and the leaders of the cooperative movement Izyumov, Kudryavtsev, Bulatov (as a result of their exile, the cooperative *Zadruga* was destroyed). Historical studies suffered a severe blow: such eminent historians as Kizevetter, Florovskii, Myakotin and Bogolepov were exiled and so was the sociologist Pitirim Sorokin. The list of exiled philosophers reads today like a list of the greatest Russian philosophers of the twentieth century: Berdyaev, Frank, Losskii, Bulgakov, Stepun, Vysheslavtsev, Lapshin, Ilyin, Karsavin, Izgoev, Trubetskoy. This list was drawn up almost entirely by Lenin. And of course, the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee was not forgotten. The following members of the Committee were exiled: Kuskova, Prokopovich, Osorgin, Bulgakov, Professors Velikhov, Yasinskii, Ugrimov.

Some people were also included in the list who never ceased to ask themselves, "Why me?" and there were many about whom their friends asked, "Why him?" This uncertainty, the absence of specific charges, obliging the victim himself to discover his own "guilt," created an atmosphere of collective culpability, which was the essence of the new policy of repression.

The "exile abroad" operation was put into effect throughout the country: in Moscow, Petrograd, Kiev, Yalta and other cities those on the lists were arrested then sent to prison, where they spent from several days to two months. They were then required to sign a document stating that if they were to return to Russia they would be shot.[86] As Osorgin, a lawyer by profession, points out, this did not follow the letter of the law, which provided only for a three-year exile, but "orally" it was made clear that this exile was for life.[87] They were allowed to take with them one winter and one summer coat, one suit and a change of linen, two day shirts, two night shirts, two pairs of underpants and two pairs of socks. Gold and jewels were forbidden to be taken out of the country, even crosses had to be left behind. They were allowed to take 20 dollars in hard currency.

In autumn 1922, two German ships, the *Oberburgermeister Haken* and the *Preussen* brought to Germany "the only wares which the present Russian government could offer Europe, free of charge and in plenty: the guardians of the cultural heritage of Russia." [88]

[85] See N. S. Losskii, *Vospominaniya (Munchen)*, p. 218.

[86] See N. Berdyaev, *Samopoznanie*, p. 263; M. Osorgin, "Kak nas uekhali, *Posledniye novosti*, 28 Aug. 1932; *F. Stepun, Byvshee i nesbyvsheesya*, vol. 2 (New York, 1956), p. 419; Pitirim Sorokin, *Leaves from a Russian Diary*, (New York, 1924).

[87] F. Stepun, ibid. pp. 420–21.

[88] M. Osorgin, "Tatyanin den," *Dni*, 25 Jan. 1923.

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A Special Case: Gorky

One member of the Famine Relief Committee, Maxim Gorky, left the Soviet Republic earlier than the others—in October 1921, while six of his colleagues on the Committee were still in prison in the Lubyanka. His departure was not a formal exile; Gorky was not arrested, he was not forced to put his signature to any sentence. But at the same time, the departure of the most famous of the Russian writers of his day was not completely voluntary. The departure of Gorky was a special case of exile.

The difference of opinion between the father of proletarian literature and the Bolsheviks dated from before the October coup. In July 1918, Gorky's newspaper *Novaya zhizn'* was closed down. Here, he had regularly published his "Untimely Thoughts"—merciless exposés of the Bolshevik party's policies and the behaviour of its leaders, "poisoned with corrupting power." His personal feud with Zinoviev, whom Gorky had mocked in his comedy *Rabotyaga Slovotekov* (forbidden after two performances in June 1920) made his position even more difficult, especially as Lenin started to insist more and more emphatically on Gorky's departure. Traces of this persistent wish to get rid of his former friend and reliable source of finance for the Party can be found in Lenin's published correspondence. For instance, on 24 June 1921, he wrote a note to the chief of the operational department of the Cheka asking him to grant Gorky's request without delay "or otherwise he will not agree to go abroad." Lenin insisted: "see to it as a matter of urgency, use all your strength, get it done." [89] It was important to make Gorky leave as soon as possible.

But, Gorky was in no hurry to leave. When Lenin was so anxious to get rid of him, Gorky was trying to help in establishing links between representatives of the public, who were trying to organize aid for the starving, and the government. In its way Gorky's position was unique: he was accepted in both camps—in the Kremlin, where they were extremely displeased, but where he was received, and in intellectual circles, where the fact that he was a writer and that he had done so much to save "thinking people" from starvation and government persecution, was not forgotten. Gorky, however, felt a stranger in both camps. He was dissatisfied with the Party's policies. And he reacted with extreme caution to the initiatives of the intelligentsia. Gorky joined the Famine Relief Committee, but did not participate in any of its work. From his friends in the Kremlin, he knew that it was doomed. Gorky wrote an appeal to the world community to ask for aid for the starving in Russia. This appeal is astonishing for its petulant tone and the blame put on the world as a whole for the famine in Russia:

> The misfortune which has afflicted Russia provides an excellent occasion for the defenders of humanity to show the vitality of their

[89] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 52, p. 289.

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> ideas. I believe that those who incited nation against nation during the shameful war should take an especially vigorous part in this, those who destroyed with this propaganda the educational influence of beautiful ideas, developed by mankind with such effort and so easily killed by the cult of gold and stupidity.[90]

It was this appeal from Gorky which got a response from Herbert Hoover, who offered bread for the starving.

Gorky's irritability, his uncomfortable position between two stools, is explained by his difference of opinion with Lenin. When he was already in Berlin, Gorky announced, " In principle, I am in complete agreement with Lenin's theory and firmly believe in the world socialist revolution." [91]

" In principle " the writer agreed with " Lenin's theory," but not with its practical application, especially with regard to the question of relations with the intelligentsia.

Shortly after he arrived abroad, Gorky wrote an article on " The Russian Peasants," which is the most pitiless judgment of the Russian people ever written by a Russian author. He ends by expressing the hope that " the uncivilized, stupid, turgid people in the Russian villages will die out, all those, almost terrifying people I spoke of above, and a new race of literate, rational, energetic people will take their place." [92]

Gorky considered Lenin's policy towards the intelligentsia too severe and his policy towards the peasants too lenient. After he was obliged to leave the country, " the storm-petrel of the revolution " was included in the list of those who were to be systematically " mocked and vilified."

On 20 July 1922 the professional " mocker and vilifier " Demyan Bednyi passed sentence on Gorky in *Pravda*: " He is of course a sick man; poisoned through and through by swarms of various frenzied bourgeois White-Guard mosquitoes. As far as I am concerned, it has long been clear to me that alas! there is no point grumbling and showing compassion: he is incurable."

Until his eventual " cure " Gorky was to be numbered among the exiles. But he was, nevertheless, a special case.

The Missing Factor

It is difficult (perhaps impossible) to evaluate the impact on the life of a country and its people of the missing factor, the group of " professors and writers," the " thinking people," the independently thinking people. Its significance becomes clear when one considers the impact of the " missing factor " on the spiritual life of Germany, another country which allowed itself the luxury of exiling its " thinking people," and which feels their absence even today, 35 years after the fall of Nazism.

The exile of " thinking people " from the Soviet republic was the result of the crisis of 1921, when the Soviet government, faced with a catas-

[90] Quoted from *Poslednie novosti*, 19 July 1921.
[91] *Poslednie novosti*, 11 Nov. 1921.
[92] Maksim Gorky, *O russkom krestyanstve* (Berlin, 1922), pp. 43–44.

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trophe it could not solve by its own devices—a famine threatening the lives of tens of millions of citizens—was obliged to reach an "obscene agreement" with the public and agree to the formation of the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee, thereby relinquishing a fraction of its power and breaking the sacred principle of Leninist policy—the Party's monopoly of power. This was the first and last time the Leninist doctrine was violated.

The existence of the Committee, the fruitfulness of its activity, proved to Lenin that the "red terror" of the period of "war communism" had not yet eliminated social ties, had not annihilated a memory of the past. The *Smena vekh* movement, with its ideology of capitulation, with its recognition of Bolshevik legitimacy, through the granting to the victors of the right to express the "Russian idea," made it easier for Lenin to strike a heavy blow against the Russian intelligentsia. Those intellectuals who had remained in the country still hoped to find a *modus vivendi* with the victors on the basis of mutual respect and even cooperation. But the deportations meant an ultimatum to the intelligentsia: give in to the victors or perish.

The intelligentsia surrendered to the ultimatum and gave in. Osorgin relates how before he left he went to his last meeting of the All-Russian Writers' Union, of which he was one of the founders and leaders, having prepared a short speech in reply to the "farewell speech, which I naturally expected." But there was no such speech. "And suddenly I understood," wrote Osorgin, "that the Union had been sufficiently intimidated, that it was no longer the same Union and that its future was already determined." [93]

The future was indeed determined for many decades. The period from August 1921–August 1922 played a vital role in the process of destroying Russian society, the process of enslaving the intelligentsia. For those who were exiled, thrown out of their native country, the years of exile were years of fruitful creative work, the extent of which is only now becoming clear. If we compare the work of the exiles with the work of those who remained, or who returned, it is clear that work in freedom in exile was immeasurably more fruitful than work without freedom in one's homeland.

Translated by Elizabeth Winter

[93] M. Osorgin, *Vremena*, p. 184.

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The Eye and the Tear

Igor Pomerantsev

IT'S a bit like an old joke that you've heard for the tenth time, or a thrilling second-rate film that as a child you thought terrific, but it really is true; when the *Kagebisty* come at dawn with a warrant for your arrest, they nearly always reply to your mother's, your husband's, your wife's or your own sleepy question of "Who is it?" by saying "Telegram!" "Just a minute!" you mutter under your breath, trying not to wake up too completely so that you can get back to your warm bed and cosy morning sleep as soon as possible; you put on the first thing you can find, get some small change from your jacket pocket and open the door. It's funny, but the worst thing is not that they've come for you, nor that they've woken you up at such an unearthly hour, but that they lied and said "Telegram!" and you believed them like a child and there you are standing there with some coins clutched in your hot, suddenly sweaty fist, mortified to the point of tears.

What's going on in the minds of these postmen of misfortune, these harbingers of fear? Probably they have to work themselves up to it somehow. I remember once as a child going to the Dynamo sports centre to watch my older brother wrestle and was horrified to hear the trainer shout, "Kill him, Valka!" "Valka" is my brother and "him" was the boy he was fighting. There is a perfectly acceptable expression for what the trainer, a teacher I worshipped from a distance, shouted: competitive rage. But somehow, I took it quite literally and wanted to jump up and scream to my brother, "Don't listen to him! Don't kill him!"

The *Kagebisty*, likewise, probably work themselves up to a professional rage. Otherwise, I'm sure, it would be quite impossible to wake someone up in the early hours of the morning with malicious intent. For some subconscious reason, by the way, they hate to be called *Kagebisty*. What could they possibly have against this word, which sounds so official and bureaucratic? Nevertheless, they prefer to call themselves *Chekisty*. For some reason, they find this word, heavy with blood and salted with tears, more heroic and romantic. Mind you, their job is rather short on heroism and romanticism; listening to private telephone conversations, reading denunciations, personal correspondence, analysing curricula vitae, ploughing through *samizdat*, going to union and party meetings, writing notes for the wall newspaper *Dzerzhinets*, recruiting informants, fearing the bosses, listening to the "Voice of America" in the evenings, playing the role of clever and important fathers to their children, and finally, arresting and conducting investigations on people who, for the most part, do not even try to hide their lack of sympathy for the official ideology.

There is usually no hint of detective work in these arrests, nothing

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reminiscent of Sherlock Holmes. It's merely gun-law; the man with the gun arrests a man who thinks differently and makes no secret of it. It's work. It's routine. It's boring. And not very pleasant. This is why they're as lazy and apathetic as all Soviet state employees.

In September 1976 I was interrogated for six days on end by a major and a colonel. Whenever the colonel went out of the room, the major completely lost interest in me, got out a book of chess problems and worked away at them, chewing the end of his pencil. This was no cunning game for the prisoner's benefit, no refined psychological move. The major was just putting in his hours, like millions of other civil servants all over the country. But still, for six days I could not help feeling that these reasonable people, well-turned out men, of medium height, not without a sense of humour, reasonably well-informed and reasonably well-educated, represented a deadly threat for me, for the people I love, for the people I know and for those I do not know, for all people. This was no panicky, emotional feeling. No! I simply saw that the men sitting in front of me were completely lacking in any personal ethic, any concept of right and wrong. There was nothing they would refuse to do. Either they were not aware of or just did not want to know about conscience or honour, that actions can be dishonest or dishonourable, and that each human act is directly linked with conscience and with honour. These men are governed by an artificial professional ethic which for some reason gives them the right to behave basely: to read other people's letters, to listen to other people's conversations, to make tape recordings of people's kisses and embraces to use as blackmail, to determine which books their compatriots may or may not read. I was filled with anxiety when I imagined people dear to me being brought before these men who were capable of obeying any order or instruction. There was something insane about them, despite the relevance and logic of their questions, despite their commonplace features and clothes, despite their ordinariness and seeming normality.

AFTER the Moscow film festival, one of the films that somehow found its way to Kiev was the Austrian film *The Doomed*. The film opens with murder. The murderers throw a body into a shallow pond, overgrown with reeds and covered in slime. The audience then expects to get involved with a police investigation, a complicated and dangerous search for the criminals, with, no doubt, a happy ending. What happens, however, is quite different. Gradually it becomes clear that the corpse, with water lilies swaying gracefully above it, is a symbol, an attempt to convey to the audience that all is not as calm as one might think in comfortable, peaceful Austria.

It is impossible to live happily when thousands of your compatriots are forcibly held in camps and psychiatric hospitals for their political and religious beliefs. They are not a symbol, not an artistic hyperbole,

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not a director's trick, but the everyday reality of your country. Each of these thousands has a name, a biography, a destiny.

In the town of Kiev, on Umanskaya Street, in the building where Leonida Svetlichnaya lives, there is on the ground floor, on a small metal plaque on the wall, together with the names of all the other inhabitants, the name of Ivan Svetlichnyi. He was imprisoned seven years ago, but the formalities are still observed by the Housing Department: Ivan Svetlichnyi is still the official tenant and the flat is rented in his name. This plaque must cause much heartache. Leonida Svetlichnaya probably passes it several times a day. In seven years she has visited her husband seven times. All those years he was in camp she spent altogether seven days with her husband. Now he is in exile in Altai. I have seen the letter he wrote from exile. He calls his wife "my old dear." She is not even fifty yet. Her friends call her Lelya. This "my old dear" is not just flippant humour or gentle condescension. It expresses the grief of a long separation, of years spent forcibly apart.

I once saw a photograph of the two literary critics, Ivan Svetlichnyi and Yevgen Sverstyuk. I do not know Sverstyuk's wife. But other people have told me about her husband and even in this reflected light it was impossible not to feel Sverstyuk's charm. Svetlichnyi's sister, Nadya, * used to say what a joy it had been, when during her trial, after long, difficult months of investigation, a witness was unexpectedly brought into the courtroom: Yevgen Sverstyuk. He was under escort. His marvellous face was radiant, it was impossible not to stare at him. He answered the questions put to him by the faceless court clerks with dignity and humanity. He smiled gently and charmingly at Nadya. He was also smiling on the photograph. It was taken in the autumn. Ivan is wearing a beret, Yevgen is wearing a coat. Those grey Chinese coats were fashionable in the mid-1960s. I used to wear one too. Zabolotsky wrote some verses to his friends:

> In wide-brimmed hats, in long jackets,
> With notebooks of their poetry.

I think that Zabolotsky's tender, sorrowful lines are dedicated to the poets from Leningrad who perished at the end of the 1930s, either within the walls of the Leningrad *Okhranka* or else in some camp in the steppes or forests. From the *Chronicle of Current Events* I learned that Yevgen (everyone calls him by his first name), probably for annoying the camp administrators with his inimitable mixture of endless patience and uncompromisingness, is constantly being put into solitary confinement. The evil does not stop with the arrest and the trial. These are followed by long, dreadful years, each year made up of 365 long days and nights.

* Nadya Svetlichnaya, released after four years in camp at the end of 1976, now lives in the USA (ed.).

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SOMEWHERE in Khersonsk province, the composer and musician, Vadim Smogitel is serving his three-year sentence in a general regime camp. He used to sign his works with the Ukrainian spelling of his name. He was expelled from the conservatory, accused of Ukrainian nationalism. Then followed many years when his works were played neither on the radio, nor on television, nor in concert halls for the same reason. He only had to write a couple of songs about the Party or its Leader and the ban on his works would have been lifted. Such a little thing—two or three more bad songs—what difference could that possibly make? But it did make a difference. Vadim chose to teach singing in a school, rather than dishonour himself.

In 1977 Vadim Smogitel was summoned by the KGB and told that a foreign radio station had announced that the composer from Kiev, Smogitel, wanted to emigrate to the West. Vadim was asked if he really intended to leave the USSR. It is clear now that this was a provocation. Then, however, Vadim thought for a long time and said, " Yes. It's true. I do want to emigrate." He was advised to do something practical about it. First he must arrange for an invitation from the country he wished to go to. Vadim went to Moscow, to a western embassy. It so happened that the militia men on duty at the entrance failed to stop him. Later, he related that he was expecting to be told to stop at any moment, even as he was opening the door to the building. He had made it! In the embassy, they refused point blank to help Smogitel obtain an invitation. He tried to explain that he ran the risk of being arrested as soon as he went out, under the very eyes of the diplomats.

" And what if I stay inside this building? "

" We'll call the police. . . ."

Smogitel went back to Kiev. He managed, without diplomatic help, to arrange for an invitation to Canada. The day after discussing the question of an invitation on the telephone to Canada, Smogitel was arrested and accused of assaulting a worker on the street in the centre of Kiev, with several witnesses present. A long time later, after the trial, in the local paper, *Prapor Kommunizma*, Vadim Smogitel was mentioned in the *faits divers* section, along with several other cases of hooliganism and drunken behaviour. There was a brief description of his " crime," a complete fantasy from beginning to end: at a loose end, he was wandering about town and bumped into a worker, knocking him over and then started to kick him. Several alert and responsible passers-by intervened and then a police car drew up. That was it. I am reminded of the case of the Jewish activist Aleksandr Feldman. Feldman first learned of his " crime " at the police station. It appeared that on the evening he was arrested he had attacked a girl carrying a birthday cake, and had even broken her leg. And the girl was so sweet and innocent, an irreproachable worker in a kindergarten. Feldman's friends were unable to find any trace of her in broad daylight in any kindergarten in

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the city. . . . Smogitel, like Feldman five years earlier, was accused of malicious hooliganism, accompanied by particular brutality.

I learned that Smogitel was under investigation only a month after his arrest. One of his friends, a Ukrainian philologist, came to see me and asked me to come out on to the staircase to talk; he was afraid that my room was bugged and that the KGB would recognize his voice. We went out. He was trembling. I felt awkward. "It is cold today," I said. He managed to say in a shaky voice, "Do you remember Vadim?" and told me about his arrest. He then added, "Tell me, are any of the Ukrainians left?" I have never felt so keenly what it means to be Ukrainian.

Consider for a moment that unfortunate girl from the kindergarten, the worker who allegedly came in for heavy treatment from Smogitel and the role they were asked to play. I do not doubt that these people work part-time for the KGB. I do not know how they are bought—money, a new flat or a tourist trip to the German Democratic Republic, but even so, they *are* human and the *Kagebisty* must have given them some reason for asking them to do what they did. Fabricated cases testify not to the strength of the *Okhranka* but to its weakness. It means that they are not completely indifferent to world opinion, that they do take the western press and radio stations into account. I do not know what was in fact said in connexion with Smogitel and Feldman, but it is obvious that "witnesses" were recruited to lie, were taught to give false evidence in court, although in principle the KGB exists to uphold the law. The KGB has several hundred thousand, if not several million, agents. Apart from straightforward crimes against dissidents, the KGB commits daily another grievous, although not so obvious, crime: in secret flats, in the rooms of Special Departments, at universities and institutes, in shady corners of parks, in the premises of the *Otdel Kadrov* of every enterprise, KGB agents teach their collaborators to keep an eye on their colleagues, friends, relatives, to listen to other people's conversations, to inform on them, to behave despicably. This mass corruption of human beings, this process of depravity, is no less horrifying than the political trials.

IN the Ukraine, repressions have in the first place always taken the form of blows to culture and literature, without which it is impossible to establish and develop national consciousness, form public opinion and those who are able to articulate it. One would have hoped that those who have not yet forgotten how to think in national categories—although such people are fewer and fewer in number, isolated individuals against a background of arid, barren literature, art and science—could somehow mitigate to a certain extent the brutal internal policy of the regime. But how can this happen in the Soviet world, where criteria of morality and decency are hopelessly confused? I was told, "Academician B. Poton is a decent man, he's not anti-semitic." An ethical norm is seen as an exceptional virtue.

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An enlightened 60-year-old writer from Kiev once said to me, " The time is not yet right to tell the truth. But I will tell the truth, the time will come! " This writer is now dead. He died without telling the truth, without the right time ever arriving. His false books and noble thoughts died with him. There is something pathetic and tragic about his death.

Even more tragic is the fate of really talented people who have no courage, no sense of duty, no honour. You would think that the fate of the celebrated poet, Pavlo Tychina, who had such a brilliant start but then became a sycophantic poetaster, could be a lesson, a living parable, a warning. In fact, it did serve as a lesson for some writers, such as Vasyl Stus and Igor Kalynets and scores of other almost unknown poets, who by now are well over 30. These poets are true to their aesthetic principles and taste, they realize that personal corruption leads to the loss of talent and professional impotence, especially in such a delicate matter as poetry. This is why they prefer to write for the drawer, rather than make aesthetic or ethical compromises. Whoever is both talented and honourable today works only for a future audience.

What an intense and brilliant *debut* Ivan Drach made in literature! How much hope there was then, both in him and in his contemporaries, the generation of the thaw. He succeeded in writing several marvellous poems and in producing, together with Osyka, that cinematographic masterpiece *The Stone Cross*. Then the thaw came to an end. At the end of the 1960s it was a crime to telephone Drach at his home; the KGB had it bugged. Now Drach is writing literary monuments. He has won prizes, but has lost his readers. I should like to touch on a very tricky theme—that of personal loyalty. Ivan Svetlichnyi and Ivan Drach used to be friends and allies. Svetlichnyi has been imprisoned for many years now. Well, O.K., you are still on this side of the barbed wire, you got frightened, it's perfectly understandable, you do not write letters to your friends in camp, you do not send them parcels, but why, why do you glorify the hangman, the hangman who is in no way an abstract person, but who lives in the same town as you! It is so easy to be a humanist in verse about a distant war, but how difficult to lead a decent life in our peaceful, cloud-free times. The day before I left the Soviet Union, I happened to see Drach in a pedestrian subway. In the artificial light of the subway his face looked like wax, like a death mask, and now I have the feeling that our meeting took place not underneath the noisy Kreshchatik, but somewhere in a dank, musty crypt or in a dreadful dream of a night spent in a graveyard among desecrated tombs.

I REMEMBER once, in Mark's kitchen, when we were gathered in the days of the Great Plague or in the days of the Black Death or the Minor February Cholera, Dima Mikheev, who had spent six years in a strict regime camp, asked the few admirers of Chaucer and Boccaccio, gathered to celebrate the End of the World, " What can you remember about the day Czechoslovakia was invaded? " All present remembered that day and what they had been doing.

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Everyone in turn told how he had spent 21 August 1968. Vladimir Malinkovich, a 37-year-old doctor, had apparently been doing his military service as an army doctor in 1968 near Kiev. He had been called up two years after qualifying. When his unit was put on the alert and sent to Czechoslovakia, Volodya refused to obey orders. He was arrested. The special section of the KGB took charge of his case. The authorities were fearful of any publicity and kept the case quiet. All that happened to him was an officers' court of honour and early demobilization.

Everyone knows about the demonstration in Red Square in August 1968. A lot has been said and written about each of the handful of demonstrators. A play has been written about them. We, their compatriots, knew about them the day they achieved their feat, and many of us then felt and understood that our frail, and as yet bashful, conscience had stepped out on to Red Square. And if this conscience had not stepped out, life for all of us then and now would have been much more dark and gloomy. I think that the demonstrators themselves realized how vital their protest was, and not only for themselves but for all the others, the silent, the fearful, the weak. In no way do I want to play down their role or the significance of their action, but I do feel that Vladimir Malinkovich's action was more significant. He was alone. Nobody would have thought badly of him, if he had gone with his unit. On the day of his insubordination, during the investigation, and for years afterwards, hardly anyone knew of his action. He was not supported by the idea that his protest would lift the morale of his compatriots, would be an example and symbol of civic courage in the spiritual history of the country. But nevertheless, alone with himself, Malinkovich was true to his conscience and honour. This must be what is meant by acting as a free man.

I can easily imagine how it all happened. Volodya—handsome, lighthearted, intelligent, smiling Volodya—is a delightful man. He was probably very well liked in the army, all the more so as a doctor, who could at any moment be needed by anybody; not only by the colonel, but also by the colonel's wife and family. And then, this universally popular man, who has only got two years left to serve, goes up to the political officer, who is busy with urgent meetings, and whom he of course knows quite well, indeed is on friendly terms with him, and, smiling apologetically, very embarrassed, says, softly, almost mumbles, not at all soldier-like, "You know, I'm not going to Czechoslovakia." I can imagine the officer's shock, his attempt to brush it off, "Stop kidding, Volodya!" then the fury, guards being called, the order to arrest. I can imagine it all, but I cannot imagine myself in that situation. I cling to the thought that at the time I was 20 and Volodya was 27, but that does not help very much. Now I'm beset by regret: why did we not see more of each other, speak to each other more, while we were living in the same town? Why did we not become close friends? He was one of the few whom I could ask, without worrying about mumbled excuses,

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" Will you sign this in defence of . . . ? " I would like to think that when he asked me " Will you sign this in defence of . . . ? " he also had no doubts about the reply.

ONCE upon a time, there was a boy who loved to read and to study. He came top in all his subjects, except sports, where he came last. Almost every teacher thought of him as their best pupil. His name was Grisha Tokayuk. Everyone called him Grishenka. When he left school, he won the gold medal. He went to the Kiev State Institute of Foreign Languages, the French department. He loved French, which, thanks to his grandmother, he had learned as a child. He was a tactful student and refrained from correcting his teachers in class. During the journeys to and from the institute, on the tram, he learned Spanish, English, Italian, Czech, Swedish. He graduated from the institute with distinction. . . . That was how he lived, never looking up from his books, never noticing what was going on around him, serious, innocent, as small as a pocket dictionary. My worldly-wise compatriot, on reading these lines, may well sneer, " What do you mean, how about membership of the Komsomol and doing exams in the history of the CPSU, compulsory practical work and, although it was not for long, working with Intourist? Do you call that innocence? " I would still maintain that I had chosen my words well. Not because the model senior pupil, Grisha Tokayuk, for some reason joined the Komsomol only in his last year at school, and not because as a multi-lingual translator he was kept so busy at Intourist that his failure to produce the required reports for the KGB was tolerated. But because innocence is a profound inner, almost innate, quality. In the summer of 1972, Tokayuk was sent to Paris with a group of linguists to perfect his French. You can imagine how happy he was. At last he would hear the language, immerse himself in the living linguistic element, see for himself what he had previously seen only on postcards or reproductions! The group was staying at the Hotel Victoria. One evening, out of his mind with happiness, Tokayuk went to visit his French friend, M. Gallorini, whom he had met when working for Intourist in Kiev. He came back late at night, after 11 p.m. In the foyer of the hotel, four of his " colleagues " were waiting for him. One of them grabbed Tokayuk by the shoulder, and hissed malevolently, " You bastard, not only do you go out by yourself, but you come back late as well. We'll have to show you what happens to people who go off and have a good time in Paris! "

I want to draw the reader's attention to this point in Tokayuk's life. Until this moment he had been able to live without, so to speak, becoming involved in the existential problems of life. Naturally, he had had his difficulties at home, the problem of being so small, arguments with some of his teachers, but all these were somehow peripheral; his whole life was contained between the covers of books, where it had plenty of space. How should a normal Soviet man react to a reproach, to put it mildly,

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of this sort from the *Kagebisty*? He should of course be frightened, tremble, try to mitigate his crime by well-chosen words, appropriate facial expressions, a bottle of "Napoleon" . . . But for some reason, *Monsieur* Tokayuk behaved differently. He coldly brushed the intruding hand off his shoulder and no less coldly said, "Try to restrain yourselves. I am on free French soil!" For some reason I always feel sorry for the underdog, which must be why I feel sorry for that poor *Kagebist*. During the night, however, Tokayuk must have come to his senses, come back to reality and stepped down from his famous ivory tower. He must have realized, during the night, that what had just happened in the foyer of the Hotel Victoria (Rue Tournefort) could change his whole life, that not only was this the end of all trips abroad, but probably the end of his teaching career, and, if the worst came to the worst, the end of more than just his career? But maybe, says my worldly-wise reader-compatriot, your Tokayuk was just plain stupid? "No stupider than you, you wretch," I reply on Grisha's behalf, "if you had but a drop of Grisha's dignity . . ."

The next day, the whole group of linguists was taken to the centre of Paris, to a square near the Pantheon. There a meeting was held to condemn Tokayuk. They did not hold the meeting at the hotel for fear of being overheard. Tokayuk kept his peace at this meeting, breaking his silence only once to shout at one of his accusers, "You KGB swine!" Being an intelligent man, he shouted this in French.

If this fateful event had never happened to Tokayuk, what would his life have been like? Making conjectures in the subjunctive mood is a vain exercise. I am inclined to believe that this event could not have not happened to Tokayuk.

At the beginning of February 1978, Grigorii Tokayuk went to Moscow with Pyotr Vins,† and there, in Irina Ginzburg's apartment, Tokayuk made an open accusation against the KGB in Kiev. He started to speak in Russian, but the correspondents did not pay a great deal of attention. They were whispering, joking, winking to one another. Then Grisha spoke French, and the journalists started to scribble furiously . . . It's a pity that Tokayuk was so modest and did not hold the press conference in at least three languages.

IN Russian there is a word *podpisant*—a signatory. It's a relatively new word which, if I'm not mistaken, dates from the mid-1960s, just after the Sinyavsky and Daniel trial. *Podpisanty* are those people who sign letters in defence of political prisoners. To begin with there were quite a few of them. In Kiev at the height of liberalization they could be counted in more than double figures. In July 1978 there were 12 left in Kiev. The letter in defence of Aleksandr Ginzburg, whose case had been under investigation for more than a year, I signed in the doorway of some building, on a radiator, trying not to let the melted snow fall from

† Now in the USA (ed.).

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my hat on to the paper. The feet of spies scurrying about outside could be seen under the door. There was a danger that the paper would be confiscated, but what could we do? I do not know, maybe some of the famous defenders of human rights find it easier to put their signatures to letters. Maybe I'm a coward; but every time I come out in defence of someone, I cannot help thinking that I am taking a step towards my own arrest, I cannot help having sudden difficulty in swallowing. There were two reasons for not signing letters: first, that you do not intend to emigrate so you cannot take the risk, and, secondly, that you do intend to emigrate and so, again, you cannot take the risk. A lot of people thought that it was quite natural for former political prisoners to sign. But for them, in fact, the risk was greater than for others; it was a step in the direction of their second, and then of their third arrest, and as recidivists they would get harsher sentences. One young man explained his refusal to sign in the following way: "Listen, it's just not a constructive proposition . . ." But I dare to believe that all of these signatures do achieve something constructive. Who knows, were it not for them, maybe more people would be imprisoned, maybe there would be no trials at all, prisoners would be shot in their cells, and the bodies thrown into communal graves, dug by the prisoners themselves. And then, it is in the name of the people, in the name of every one of us, that others are arrested and imprisoned, and by putting your signature to a letter of protest, you are refusing to take part in a collective crime. But even if nothing constructive ever came of signing, there would still be something for which it is worth putting your whole self into the several letters which form your name. That something is your conscience.

By 1978, after six years of constant harassment, threats, intimidation, expulsion from work, Grigorii Tokayuk instead of hiding away somewhere, disappearing into a hole, evaporating, has learned not only how to defend himself, but also how to defend others, and whenever anyone is under threat of arrest, that person turns to Tokayuk, and whenever a letter in defence of someone wrongfully accused has to be signed, Tokayuk signs first.

WHEN I came to the West I was asked by a German acquaintance, "What would you advise us to read to get an accurate picture of the Soviet Union?" I replied, "*The Gulag Archipelago.*" He objected, "No, I want to read something objective and Solzhenitsyn is tendentious." It seems to me that this attitude, although perhaps not typical, is certainly characteristic. Many people believe that the truth lies somewhere between official Soviet pronouncements and *The Gulag Archipelago.* After all, not everything is bad in the Soviet Union.

I try to look at German Nazism, not from a historical point of view, but through the eyes of the people who were alive at the time. Now, thinking about mass murders, genocide, concentration camps, it is almost impossible to visualize the people who did not live in fear the whole time,

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but also from time to time ate and drank with pleasure, went out to restaurants, enjoyed getting together with their fellow countrymen, danced the latest dances, cheered their favourite sportsmen and enjoyed nights of passion. Probably then also someone exclaimed, " After all, not everything is bad in Germany! "

Yes, human life is not experienced in black and white, but history, sooner or later, puts everything in its place. *The Gulag Archipelago,* despite, or maybe because of, its burning passion and its moral defiance, is a work written in historical perspective. It is a highly truthful book, the most important book written about my compatriots and for my compatriots.

I should like somehow to convey the protracted character of the continuing tragedy of my country. Behind the arrests and trials stand years of suffering, not only for the prisoners themselves but also for their friends and relatives. The mother of Semen Gluzman, the psychiatrist, died before her son was released. The mother of the historian, Gabriel Superfin, died while her son was in exile after a long term of imprisonment. There was, of course, nothing in the press about this, the radio was silent. . . .

A fellow ex-Russian, who has been living in the West for seven years, told me not long ago, " You dissidents are of no use to anybody once you are here. You can only be useful before you leave the USSR." This is not true. Anyone who was a conformist in his own country will remain a conformist in the West. I am sure that this ex-Russian lived in the Soviet Union as though the Mordovian and Perm concentration camps were on a different planet. Why should he, therefore, concern himself here in the West with these camps? What he said is no more than a lame excuse. I repeat, it is not true. In West Germany I have already met scores of people whose conscience is troubled, people who would like to help us but are not very sure how. I have received telephone calls, I have received visits from people of all ages who work selflessly for Amnesty International. They ask, what is the best way to help, how can they get in touch with the relatives of political prisoners without causing them any harm, what parcels to send, to whom to appeal for the release of prisoners unjustly accused.

SHORTLY before my departure I read some verses by Igor Kalynets which had by some miracle been smuggled out of camp. There is one line which I cannot get out of my head, not even a line, but a figure of speech—that someone or something is as " inseparable as the eye and the tear." It was not because I was in search of another homeland that I left my country, which will remain in me and with me for ever. We are as inseparable as the eye and the tear.

Translated by Elizabeth Winter

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The "Normalization" of Post-Invasion Czechoslovakia

Otto Ulč

THE Czechoslovak political system as it exists in Husák's era of "normalization" is officially called *reálný socialismus*. The exact meaning of this awkward term is not clear either in English translation or in its Czech original, for that matter. *Reálný socialismus*—real, realistic, fatalistic, given once and for all, in resigned acquiescence to the facts of life.

All the available evidence indicates that the Czechoslovak people accept a socialist order, albeit not its Soviet variety. The imposed status quo has already survived several self-inflicted wounds: since 1968 some 150,000 Czechoslovaks have fled the country. This represents an exodus of one per cent of the population, a mini-diaspora mainly of the young, the skilled and the well educated.[1] Of the total 1,678,500 members of the Communist Party, 518,000, i.e. about one third, were eliminated.[2] Of these, three-quarters were assigned to manual labour.[3] An estimated one million Czechoslovaks, including family members, have become "the untouchables of normalization." They are subjected to politically motivated economic hardship. Occasionally, if only one marital partner is thus stigmatized, a divorce of such a "mixed marriage" may save the career of the other partner.

A full two-thirds of all those who were (in 1969) members of the Union of Czech Writers became the target of political persecution, their books banned and destroyed. Who is an artist and who is not became a matter for the government to decide. The government thus decided that Václav Havel was not a playwright at all and the Austrian authorities' invitation to Havel to attend the opening night of his new play in Vienna was rejected as a provocation.[4]

[1] For example, according to Dr Prokopec, The Minister of Health in Prague, 1,381 physicians were counted among the missing. *České slovo* (Munich), Feb. 1972, p. 7, and Oct. 1973, p. 9; *Listy*, Feb. 1973, p. 59.

[2] *Listy*, Oct. 1974, pp. 13–15; Dec. 1975, pp. 10–12; May 1975, p. 5; July 1977, p. 13. *Listy* is a periodical published in Rome. Jiří Pelikán, a former member of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the former President of Czechoslovak Television (now an Italian deputy in the European Parliament), is in charge. This publication contains the best information concerning Czechoslovakia largely owing to Pelikán's contacts and access to the right sources—the dissidents and those officials whose loyalty to Husák's regime is more apparent than real. A great volume of information reaches the West through diplomatic channels, friendly journalists and through cooperation in other socialist countries, notably Poland, Hungary, and Rumania. Other important sources of data are *Svědectví* published in Paris and *Informační materiály* published in West Berlin.

[3] *Listy*, June 1976, pp. 16–18. According to Minister of Interior Obzina, of the expelled Party members, 76 per cent are manual labourers and the rest occupy positions such as janitors, ushers, archive assistants, or they are retired.

[4] *Tvorba*, 27 Oct. 1976, p. 2.

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Some 900 university professors and lecturers were dismissed, 21 scientific institutes closed, entire scholarly disciplines (such as history) devastated, and several dozen journals devoted to culture banned. Between 1969 and 1971 not a single literary journal was published in Bohemia and Moravia—the first prohibition of this kind since 1821! [5]

POLITICAL loyalty is the prime, and frequently the only, qualification for holding office. "I would not hesitate to fire even Einstein," was the vow of one of the officials of the Academy of Sciences in Prague, which prompted the comment that whereas in the Soviet Union healthy people are locked up in lunatic asylums, in Czechoslovakia mentally disturbed individuals are put in charge of healthy institutions.[6]

The present Czechoslovak political system carries the label "Made in the USSR" although many of its excesses are home-made and many of its wounds self-inflicted. Yet this system has managed to generate acquiescence and public acceptance however grudging and cynical. For the majority of the population the standard of living has not fallen but risen. This development was not expected by the opponents or even by some of the proponents of the new order.

Yet, the more visible characteristics of the Czechoslovak post-invasion *apparatchiks* are insecurity, awareness of illegitimacy and the lack of a mandate. In contrast to the genuinely popular leaders of 1968, their successors live in self-imposed detachment. They do not stroll in the streets of Prague. Security considerations aside, any seeming bid for popularity with the public would violate the neo-Stalinist mode of rule. It might engender the thought of and taste for genuine choice on the part of the disenfranchized citizenry.

Leading roles in political and economic structures, in culture and academia have frequently been filled with individuals who proved incapable of making a career in the pre-1968 era of Antonín Novotný. Even some former Nazi collaborators have been elevated to fill vacancies. In central offices sit many individuals with neither conviction nor talent.

Official insecurity and intolerance at times surpass the excesses of the Stalinist past. The highly irritable "specialists in social engineering" are afraid of the living and the dead (as evidenced by the snatching of Jan Palach's body), of pop music, of Xerox machines and Mickey Mouse cartoons. Some works by Shakespeare, Molière, and Lope de Vega have been declared taboo. Beethoven's Fidelio has been withdrawn from the stage of the National Theatre for political reasons. For the same reasons works of some Soviet artists (in good political standing) are banned in Czechoslovakia apparently because the local population has not yet

[5] An account issued by 150 Czechoslovaks on the tenth anniversary of the publication of the 2,000 Words Manifesto, and reprinted in various Czech language sources in the West—e.g. *České slovo*, Aug.–Sep. 1978, p. 2. For the casualties among the historians see *Acta Persecutionis* presented at the XIVth International Congress of Historical Sciences in San Francisco, August 1975.

[6] *Die Zeit* quoted by *Listy*, Aug. 1973, pp. 18–19.

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reached the Soviet level of ideological maturity needed to comprehend such works properly. With the approach of the 10th anniversary of the Soviet invasion the censors vigorously scrutinized even the crossword puzzles and weather forecasts in search of Aesopian, politically destructive messages. Truth being a perishable commodity, a novelty was introduced in the book industry: a loose leaf format from which pages that in the future do not meet the test of new truth can be removed with ease.[7]

Zušlechtování informací, literally "beautification," i.e. improvement of information, is a new official term denoting the dissemination of desired inexactitudes.[8] For example, according to Václav Doležal [9] almost 400,000 West German spies were stationed in Czechoslovakia in the first half of 1968. According to Cesar Solodar [10] Jewish émigrés from the Soviet Union to Israel are forced to sell their virginal daughters to Zionist brothels. This particular report is accompanied by a photo of two orthodox Jews praying at the Wailing Wall, with this caption: "No, as a matter of principle, in this place I do not thumb through Playboy magazine."

Sweatshirts are among the more recent spectres that haunt the Czechoslovak rulers. A sweatshirt with the print STANFORD UNIVERSITY CALIFORNIA prompted alarm about ideological diversion in a long article by Jan Beran in the weekly *Tribuna* published by the Central Committee of the Party. The author proceeding dialectically from Stanford to the Hoover Institution and to Herbert Hoover himself, whom he characterized as a "wild, hateful, mad, literally zoological anti-Communist." [11] Evidently, an inappropriate garment worn by a Czech teenager was a dagger aimed at the heart of the Party. The same Jan Beran wrote in another article that western scholars of Communist affairs are a "colourful mosaic of war criminals, members of the Gestapo, spies, murderers, perverts, robbers big and small, revanchists, militarists, anti-Soviets and anti-Communists." [12]

The holders of power are upset about a variety of improprieties, ranging from the selection of first names for newly born Czechoslovak citizens to the labelling of Czechoslovak industrial products. The national

[7] *RFE Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 9, 10 Mar. 1976, referring to *Nové knihy*, No. 7, 11 Feb. 1976. Husák's regime defends its cultural policy record of banning hundreds of authors and destroying millions of books with its own statistics stressing *quantity*. For example, propagandist Jan Kliment asserts in *Rudé právo*, 12 Feb. 1977, that annually 2·5 million readers borrow 67 million books from 13,000 public libraries, and that 105 theatre ensembles attract an audience of 9·5 million to view 22,000 performances. (When Jiří Purš, the director general of the Czechoslovak film industry revealed—in *Film a doba*, quoted by *Americké listy* (New York), 3 Dec. 1976, p. 3—that Soviet films attracted only 12·1 per cent of the total audience and the majority of viewers preferred films of so-called "non-socialist production" this was politically significant information which the guardians of ideological purity do not bear lightly.)

[8] Imrich Rubík in *Otázky žurnalistiky*, No. 2, 1976, quoted by *České slovo*, Dec. 1976, p. 3.

[9] *Rudé právo*, 17 June 1978.

[10] *Tribuna*, 25 Jan. 1978.

[11] *Tribuna*, 5 Oct. 1977.

[12] *Tribuna*, 28 June 1978.

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enterprise Fruta in Brno was selected for particular verbal lashing because it put on the market an alcoholic beverage labelled LIBERTY GIN.[13] The producers apologized for the term LIBERTY and for the bell on the label, but rejected the implication of hostile political motives in the matter. Be that as it may, the objectionable gin was withdrawn from the shelves.[14]

Along with the vitriolic condemnation of foes and heretics, real and imagined, one encounters an extraordinary kind of sycophantic adulation of all things Soviet. In the cultural weekly *Tvorba*, Jan Janů in an article entitled *Slovo jako pohlazení* (" Words As a Caress ") refers to Brezhnev's visit to Czechoslovakia and ascribes to his words " a special hypnotic power," " an over-abundance of logic," expressing even a touch of amorous infatuation.[15] According to another author, there was hardly a single Czechoslovak who did not follow " with joy and happiness the 1978 visit of our dear friend Leonid I. Brezhnev." [16] The Czechoslovaks are also reminded of the matchless character of the Soviet people.[17] " We owe everything to the Soviet Union and to the Communist Party. Without them we would have absolutely nothing." [18]

It is difficult to imagine that the Kremlin demands these tributes of Byzantine adulation or that there are many authentic believers in such messages. The propagandistic overkill deflates these protestations of faith and condemnations of the infidel; it is rather doubtful that the authors believe their own aggressive rhetoric.

VERBAL shrillness is characteristic of the Czechoslovak post-invasion order. The dogs bark, they frighten, bite and maim, but prefer avoiding fatalities. In contrast to the punitive policies in the early years of Communist rule, the post-invasion repression is less harsh, more extrajudicial, with stress on socio-economic hardship rather than on imprisonment. This state of affairs is sometimes labelled as " repression with a human face " or " reluctant terror." As František Kriegel, a Politburo member in 1968 put it, for his dissident acts of today he would have been hanged in the 1950s.[19]

No political opponent has been executed during Husák's tenure, most of them are merely subjected to socio-economic persecution. The modernization of oppression includes the modernization of its enforcement agency. The police force has almost doubled in strength (from 50,000 to 95,000); a Police University with three faculties, has been established, as has an Institute for the Utilization of Computer Techniques. This is the most accomplished exemplification of the Orwellian

[13] *Tribuna*, 1 Feb. 1978.
[14] *Tribuna*, 21 June 1978.
[15] *Tvorba*, 7 June 1978.
[16] Milan Wagner, *Tribuna*, 26 July 1978.
[17] Libuše Hájková, *Tribuna*, 29 Nov. 1976.
[18] Karel Mach, *Tribuna*, 26 July 1978.
[19] Interview in *Die Welt*, reprinted in *Americké listy*, 11 Mar. 1977.

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Big Brother to date, and is equipped with sophisticated western made machines and registers. Among other things, they check the flow of mail to and from Czechoslovakia.[20]

An anonymous former university professor from Bratislava whose book *Restoration of Order* is scheduled for publication in the West, terms the state of affairs as one of "civilized brutality." Should the law be consistently applied, he asserts, at least half of the total Czechoslovak population would have to be kept behind bars. Hence, "lawlessness" is not epitomized by the act of sentencing *per se* but by the random selection from the whole multitude of "punishables." The trials of the 1970s could have been held with substitute defendants.[21]

The State may or may not punish; it may issue or deny a travel permit. Arbitrariness, lack of any detectable logic or consistency, rather than the predictability reminiscent of the Prussian military machine, are what characterize the style of the decision-makers in Prague, the city not of Clausewitz but of Kafka.

Literary works of merit do not appear in official publishing houses but in the *Edice Petlice* ("Edition Padlock"), an underground do-it-yourself enterprise which throughout its six years of existence has achieved the status of semi-legality. Before "normalization" authors fought the censors in order to minimize the damage inflicted to their texts. Since "normalization" authors do not bother to deal with the censors, but produce their own, *samizdat*, books. A so-called parallel literature has come into existence, and no one has yet been physically liquidated for this heinous anti-totalitarian initiative.[22]

AS in the case of Hungary after 1956, the Soviet leadership decided to pacify the Czechoslovak populace with an improved supply of consumer goods. "Normalization" of the country also carries with it a certain *depoliticization* of the people, the transformation of the unruly citizen into the consumer expending his energies in the laborious process of acquiring the goods that constitute the socialist petty bourgeois ideal: an automobile, a country house, modern household equipment, a vacation abroad. Since the desired goods are seldom available and their prices relatively high, the citizen is forced to take a second job, and whatever time is left he spends chasing after items in short supply.

The results attest to the remarkable ingenuity of the public: it manages somehow to obtain drugs available only, say, in Switzerland, to drive obsolete cars for which spare parts have been non-existent for decades, to build luxurious mansions from officially unobtainable

[20] *Listy*, May 1975, p. 14f; Oct. 1976, pp. 33–36; Feb. 1977, p. 21.

[21] The Czech title of the book is *Obnovení pořádku*. Excerpts appeared in *Svědectví*, No. 56, 1978, pp. 639–658.

[22] However, one writer—Jiří Gruša—was arrested in 1978 and charged with the crime of incitement (*pobuřování*) according to Art. 100 of the Penal Code. Nature of the crime: Gruša wrote a novel entitled *Dotazník* ("Questionnaire") and the police seized the manuscript. For details see *Listy*, Sep. 1978, pp. 44–48.

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material and for prohibitive prices, and so on. The citizen has to be at his place of work on time, but once he gets there, whether he works or not, or pretends to work in an unlimited number of ways, is another matter. In Czechoslovakia, the country of full employment, the bars are full at all hours of the day.

The attempt to produce dedicated believers in the Cause is clearly a matter of the past. Instead, " the State does not want the whole citizen but only a minor part, that part which appears on the surface of public life, to nod to the official truth, but in the non-public sphere of life he will be left alone. The State has let the citizenry know that all it requires is passive loyalty . . . " [23]

After a protracted post-war low birthrate, population growth peaked in 1974. This welcome trend is credited in part to generous social policies for newly weds and steeply escalated child allowances. This success has occurred against the background of near-full employment of women.

The standard of living of the members of the agricultural cooperatives has improved considerably. Some of these Czechoslovak *kolkhozniki* are counted among the estimated 2,000 legitimate millionaires in the country. Needless to say, these millionaires are outnumbered by individuals who have amassed their fortunes through corruption, pilferage and sundry private services.[24] In 1977 the economic planners projected a 25 per cent increase in the earning power of the Czechoslovak populace by 1980, so that the average household income would reach Kčs 60,000 per annum.[25] Czechoslovakia is a country in which the most complicated surgical operation and prolonged hospitalization will cost the patient not a single *koruna*. It is claimed that in the climate of socio-economic security the population has abandoned the habit of saving for emergencies. Earnings are spent for goods and services faster than is customary in the insecure capitalist world.

Czechoslovak law guarantees a minimum of two weeks vacation with full pay to each gainfully employed person, and of three weeks after five years of employment. Judging from the statistics it appears that the nation is possessed by a fever to travel abroad. Whereas in 1960 only half a million Czechoslovaks went abroad, in 1964 the figure exceeded two million, in 1974 neared six million, and in 1976 reached almost eight million, i.e. the majority of the population.[26] Behind this holiday exodus of biblical proportions a political fact is noticeable, namely, that western countries are off-limits to the majority of Czechoslovaks.[27]

[23] *Obnovení pořádku*, op. cit. p. 656.

[24] See Otto Ulč, " Some Aspects of Czechoslovak Society Since 1968," *Social Forces*, Winter 1978.

[25] Dana Špačková, *Tvorba*, 29 June 1977.

[26] *Statistické přehledy*, Apr. 1977; *Americké Listy*, 17 June and 22 July 1977; Jiří Linhart and Jana Vítečková, " Vývoj pracovní, mimopracovní doby a volného času v socialistickém Československu " (" Trends Concerning the Time Spent at Work, Outside of Work, and Free Time in Socialist Czechoslovakia "), *Sociologický časopis*, No. 4, 1975, p. 367. The greatest is the *Drang nach* DDR, and second to Poland.

[27] According to *Listy*, Aug. 1975, p. 48, the authorities divide the population into three categories in the context of the opportunity to travel outside the socialist block:

1. Those never permitted to leave.

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The advocates of a seemingly old-fashioned austerity are occasionally heard rejecting this consumerist trend as a kind of *embourgeoisement*, a sell-out goulash Communism, an ideal for the gluttons, the devotees of the so-called *prestižní spotřeba*, i.e. a show-off, ostentatious, status conscious consumption.

This dialogue between an economist and a journalist touches upon the problem:

> The economist: "Our economic propaganda directly supports such an inclination toward a 'consumer' mentality, and this propaganda must be criticized for this."
>
> The journalist: "But we are striving to raise our standard of living in a material sense, and our five-year plans are also designed with this purpose in mind."
>
> The economist: "Certainly. However, we must not forget to ask a question Leo Tolstoy asked in his day—'All right, you have eaten, but what next?'" [28]

ONCE the Party had made clear its preference for the neutralized, overtly politicized, but essentially apolitical populace, not much was left of the textbook ideal of a "new socialist citizen." Instead, an unwritten social contract well understood by both parties came into effect: the rulers rule and the citizens, for not meddling in public affairs, are rewarded with the opportunity of attending to their own private affairs. Hence, the legitimized preoccupation with the pleasures of a consumer society.

This social contract and its consequences have been deplored by individuals of quite different persuasions, such as for instance the former Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Zdeněk Mlynář, and the lifetime non-Communist playwright, Václav Havel, who presented a most eloquent plea in an open letter to Husák in 1975.[29] He attacked the reduction of the citizen to a "socialist bourgeois," a monodimensional representative of primitive consumerism. Overt normalization was thus achieved for the price of a spiritual and moral crisis in society.

Inside observers seem to endorse Havel's pessimism that the price of normalization is prohibitively high. One entire cultural generation was liquidated and the birth of a new one prohibited.[30] According to Josef

2. Those who perhaps some day will receive permission. It is anticipated that the applicant after several unsuccessful tries will give up.
3. Those with a fairly free access to a travel permit. An estimated 8 per cent of the Prague population belong to this group.

[28] Jaroslav Nygrýn, deputy dean of the Prague School of Economics in *Mladý svět*, 6–12 Apr. 1976; Jindřich Filipec, "Aktuálnost problematiky socialistického způsobu života" ("The Timely Issue of the Problematics of the Socialist Way of Life"), *Tvorba*, 20 Apr. 1977, p. 4.

[29] The full text of Havel's letter was published in English in *Survey*, No. 96, Summer 1975.

[30] See the brilliant short essay "Smrtáci" by Dalimil in *Listy*, Sep. 1978, 43–44.

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Sládeček,[31] the extent of the moral decay is unprecedented in modern Czech history. Society did not exhibit much resistance to this decay, and of all possible attitudes the least demanding was adopted—that of cynicism.

Cynicism, opportunism, egotism, aggressiveness, and contempt for human solidarity are frequently mentioned among the symptoms of this malaise.

OUTSIDE observers of developments in Czechoslovakia do not seem fully to appreciate that the system of hostages[32] is perhaps the most effective factor of the citizenry's adaptation to the new status quo. The Czechoslovak State takes exemplary care of the children—until they reach the age of 15. Then their future is decided on the basis of their parents' record. The rule is simple: parental obedience leads to rewards, disobedience to punishment in the form of ruined career prospects, lifelong exclusion from university education, etc. For a great number of Czechoslovak citizens this type of blackmail was the only reason for conforming, recanting and humiliating themselves. The predicament of the open dissidents should be appreciated: not only do they provoke the wrath of the Party but they also meet with censure from some of their mute supporters. In the opinion of the majority of the public, a politically and morally admirable act is also an act of parental irresponsibility.

Discrimination against the young because of the political stigma of their parents is probably the most resented policy of Husák's regime. Ludvík Vaculík, a banned writer, an expelled Party member, and a family man, is among those who accuse the regime of engaging in "biological hatred towards the talented and the intelligent." The Jesuits of the past used to seek out talented children, the Party of today tries to destroy them.[33]

The Party's answer to these accusations: "This is not discrimination —this is prevention."[34]

Corruption is another offspring of normalization. This new phenomenon of truly oriental proportions penetrates all spheres of life and reaches into high political office, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party included.[35] It has ceased to be abnormal or

31 Pseudonymous author living in Czechoslovakia in *Svědectví*, No. 56, 1978, p. 631.

32 The topic is further analysed in *Obnovení Pořádku*, op. cit. p. 651f.

33 Ludvík Vaculík on West German Television, quoted by *Listy*, Feb. 1974, pp. 24–25. See *Listy*, Aug. 1974, 11–13, Dec. 1975, p. 14, Feb. 1977, pp. 4–7.

34 *Tribuna*, 26 Nov. 1975.

35 Husák's report at the session of the Central Committee of the Party was censored for the press. His remarks about corruption in the highest places were deleted. See *Listy*, May 1975, pp. 5–6 and Apr. 1976, p. 15.

Tribuna, 8 Sept. 1976, p. 4 under the title "Žebrota nebo vydírání?" ("Begging or Blackmail?") reports on the widespread habit of official visitors to economic enterprises who expect and even demand "souvenirs," i.e. illegal gifts.

Tribuna, 16 Feb. 1977, p. 2, offers practical suggestions to combat dishonesty such as increasing the proportion of factory-packed goods, and promoting self-service at petrol stations.

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immoral to offer and accept bribes. Putting aside the ethical implications of the issue, a word should be said in favour of corruption: it facilitates results which otherwise could not be achieved, it blunts the impact of injurious political demands. A corruptible school official is possibly the only hope left to a young person who wishes to be admitted to higher education and develop his ability.[36]

THE architects of Czechoslovakia's "normalization" have managed to pacify or at least to de-sensitize most of the nation. However, they seem to view this achievement as rather a tenuous one and not all that reassuring in view of the nervous, even jittery and thoroughly intolerant reaction to any indication whatsoever of unauthorized political initiative. On the one hand, *Rudé právo* asserts that according to the most recent (but otherwise unidentified) public opinion poll, a mere five per cent of the Czechoslovak population favours the capitalist way of life.[37] On the other hand, the weekly *Tvorba* published by the same *Rudé právo* maintains that any attempt to weaken the leading role of the Communist Party will *inevitably* lead to the restoration of capitalism. So will any pluralism in culture and ideology. Any deviation from the Soviet model inevitably rekindles the capitalist way of life.[38] (The Chinese should, perhaps, find this kind of normalized political analysis interesting.)

According to Jan Fojtík, the current Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, no dissent, no opposition, no challenge to the Party will ever be allowed—in the name of the people and democracy.[39] The old-fashioned totalitarian ethos of such declarations of faith published in Moscow's *Pravda* and Prague's *Tribuna* from the pen of this *apparatchik* of prime rank should receive an unqualified endorsement from any consistent Stalinist.

For the post-invasion "normalizers" the former comrades were the most troublesome challengers. After all, one is more resentful of a traitor than a mere enemy.

In the post-1948 purge the opportunists and the frightened "bourgeois elements" were mainly weeded out. In 1970, many authentic Communist believers, including pre-war Party veterans were affected. In a country of 15 million, the existence of half a million former party members, demoted, harrassed, and frequently persecuted along with their families, may worry the current leadership more than would the spectre of a handful of executed innocent comrades. The former members bound by

[36] It is indeed a welcome progressive development that even officers of the secret police are for sale. This writer is familiar with a case of such an officer who traded an exit visa from the country for one *Playboy* calendar. In the early years of the Party rule such behaviour would be unimaginable.

[37] "Zpráva současné politické situaci ČSSR a podmínkách činnosti KSČ" ("A Report Concerning the Current Political Situation in Czechoslovakia and the Conditions of Party Activities"), *Rudé právo*, 2 July 1978.

[38] Jiří Bagár, *Tvorba*, 13 Sep. 1978.

[39] Jan Fojtík, "Spolehlivá cesta, cesta leninism" ("Reliable Road, Road of Leninism"), *Tribuna*, 6 Sep. 1978.

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common past experience and present stigma symbolize in the words of the purged apparatchik Alfred Černý [40] the "Party of the Future" in contrast to the "Party of the Past," maintained in power by Soviet might. A situation unique in a one party system has developed: the creation of an alternative ruling Party consisting of Communists who were purged but not killed nor even incarcerated. Because of the bloodless nature of this purge a new phenomenon has been born—namely, a shadow Communist Party, a Party-in-Waiting, an alternative entity, eager (but not ready) to assume power.

The normalized Party was not oblivious to this eagerness, but in the second half of the 1970s relief came from unexpected quarters. By then it had become quite evident that the nation-at-large did not feel attracted to the prospect of a Communist leadership of any stripe. Strange as it may seem, evidence is at hand to indicate [41] that the gap between the former Communist Party members and the non-Communist majority has even widened. For one, the nation noticed not entirely without satisfaction that some of the Communists fell victim to the oppressive machinery they themselves had served for so many years with such gusto. In turn, these ex-Party members accused the nation of ingratitude and lack of political solidarity, whereas the nation-at-large felt relieved that finally, for the time being at least, the attention of the repressive state apparatus was not focused on them but on the former co-oppressors. Some non-Party people were even given an opportunity to take over roles vacated by the purged Communists.

Both the ruling and the shadow Communist Party lost the political initiative to a remarkable movement, named "Charter 77" in accordance with a document issued in January 1977 in Prague and signed by several hundred Czechoslovaks, Communists and non-Communists, workers, priests, professors, and even former potentates, including an army general and a police colonel. This was a truly unique document—an appeal to the government to obey its own laws. The Yugoslav rebel Milovan Djilas described Charter 77 as "the most mature and accomplished program produced by Eastern Europe from the war up to today." [42]

The response of the normalized Party leadership to this careful, judiciously formulated document was one of unmitigated fury, unheard of since the early 1950s. On 12 January 1977 *Rudé právo* launched a campaign vilifying the signatories of Charter 77, variously referred to as enemies, traitors, vermin, scum, a handful of self-appointed adventurers who represent nobody (but who nonetheless manage to generate this mammoth publicity response). Charter 77 was declared a hostile anti-

[40] *Listy*, July 1972, pp. 11–13.

[41] See especially Josef Sládeček, a former Party member, "Komunisté a ti druzí" ("The Communists and the Others"), *Svědectví*, No. 56, 1978, pp. 601–631.

[42] *The New York Times*, 14 Apr. 1977.

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state pamphlet, a product of CIA inspired anti-Communist hysteria.[43] Not a single sentence of Charter 77 has ever been quoted in any Czechoslovak newspaper or other mass medium.

The Chartists have produced numerous documents (e.g. Document No. 18 which provides ample evidence that the presence of the Soviet armed forces on Czechoslovak territory is in violation of the Czechoslovak constitution and other laws, and even contradicts the USSR-ČSSR Treaty of 16 October 1978). Despite official pressure, contacts with civil rights groups in Poland were established, *samizdat* literature flourishes, a new underground literary journal has come into existence[44] and also *svépomocná univerzita*—an unaccredited university education system in which purged educators educate, in private, purged students. In the words of Václav Havel, one of the prominent members of Charter 77, "Sooner or later in our country will emerge in addition to the official structures a 'sort of second political life,' in which various political concepts will confront each other; this trend is quite natural and irrepressible in any modern structured society."[45]

IN short, during the process of "normalization," the Czechoslovak citizen did become pacified. Materially, he is semi-satisfied; politically, he is anaesthetized and does not throw bombs around.

As stated earlier, it was in the interest of the Soviet leadership to encourage and to contribute to this pacification with generous economic policies. However, if Husák's leadership is dependent on Moscow, Moscow is not independent of the economic facts of life. The economic situation of the Soviet Union is not a rosy one and "normalized" Czechoslovakia has been told in no uncertain terms to stand on its own feet. Czechoslovakia is the last of the Warsaw Pact countries to show an interest in western technological advancement and investment.

Czechoslovakia emerged from the Second World War relatively unscathed, and in 1945 it owned the best industrial equipment in Central Europe. Three decades later, this advantage has turned into a substantial handicap. Western experts estimate that some 70 per cent of the entire industrial equipment in Czechoslovakia should be relegated to the scrap heap![46]

Instead of technologically sophisticated products, the country exports food, consumer goods, and even raw materials, prompting the perhaps whimsical recommendation that Czechoslovakia request international

[43] Samples from this lead article:
"With desperate instinct for self-preservation the bourgeoisie is hitting around left—right."
"Brutal forms of anti-Communism."
"Holy witch hunts—contemporary crusades."
"It is an antistate, antisocialist, antipeople, demagogic, disgraceful pamphlet."
"Self-appointees contemptuous of the people."
[44] *Spectrum*, reprinted in Czech (1,500 copies) in London by *Index on Censorship*.
[45] Interview with *Der Kurier*, 31 Mar. 1978.
[46] Křesomysl, *České slovo*, Mar. 1978, p. 3.

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recognition as a developing, economically backward country.[47] Czechoslovakia experiences growing trade deficits, dependence on imports and difficulty in reaching the hard currency markets with its own industrial products. The causes of this predicament are not to be found beneath Arabian sands. They are rooted in the economic system which, as one observer put it, is " bad but sacred." [48]

The Party as the monopolist of power is also the author of the economic system. Once people are recruited for jobs and allocated them according to political criteria, large-scale wastage of talent is inevitable. Management of the economy by the mediocre but politically unobjectionable cadres is destined to yield mediocre and objectionable results.

DURING the experiment with humanistic socialism in 1968, dirty linen was frequently revealed to the public. The post-invasion " normalizers " operate their neo-Stalinist launderette with curtains drawn. Occasionally, some information reaches the West attesting to disagreement among the leaders. The most recent showdown between the less conservative and modernization-prone wing led by Husák, and the neo-Stalinist hardliners led by Vasil Bilak, took place at the Session of the Central Committee of the Party in December 1977. With Brezhnev's backing, Husák won this round and as a seal of victory one of the neo-Stalinists—Jaroslav Hejna, the Party chief in South Bohemia —was exiled as an ambassador to Bulgaria.

All the contenders for power are no doubt aware that the opportunity for further extensive expansion of the economy has been exhausted. No labour reserves are left. Progress is achievable through the rational use of human resources and talents, but this would require less intolerance not only in recruitment but in the entire process of " normalization."

The record of Husák's post-invasion leadership does not confirm Richard Löwenthal's observation that Communist Party regimes in the post-revolutionary stage " are capable, without major further changes, of making considerable adjustments to the needs of a mature industrial society for technical rationality and economic efficiency." [49]

The logic of the policy makers is not unrelated to the legitimacy of their mandate. The rulers in Prague are exceedingly insecure, and thus tend to be intolerant and non-innovative. A comparison with neighbouring Hungary may be in order: in 1966—10 years after the Hungarian revolution and the Soviet invasion—Janos Kadar and his team were presiding over a course of national conciliation, characterized by prudent tolerance and efforts at modernization under Moscow's confining tutelage. Unlike Kadar, who chose the centre course, weeding out the too liberal and too conservative factions alike, Husák stood up against the reformists

[47] " When Will Czechoslovakia Become a Developing Country? " *Listy*, Dec. 1976, pp. 19–21.
[48] J. Glebněr, *Listy*, Apr. 1976, p. 5.
[49] R. Löwenthal in Mark G. Fields, ed., *Social Consequences of Modernization in Communist Societies* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1976, p. 94).

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and his former supporters, and allied himself with the neo-Stalinists. These allies have proved a formidable brake to progress, and instead of national conciliation, an atmosphere of vindictiveness and *provisorium* prevails. This precarious state of affairs was not terminated with the introduction of the "social contract" between the Party and the nation.

The gap between the rulers and the ruled has remained. The latter are anaesthetized and the former are conscious of their lack of a mandate. Given the economic facts of life, the price for the material pacification of the citizenry is becoming prohibitively high.

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Recasting Czech History

Milan Hauner

> *" The struggle for Czech independence has, above all, been led by Czech history. If that had not existed, we would have been a crowd lacking a higher self-consciousness, a people without aim and ideal. Courage, pride, and hope we drew from the past . . ."*

WITH these words the foremost Czech historian Josef Pekař welcomed in 1918 the restoration of Czech independence. They were repeated by one of his disciples in 1945, and in the autumn of 1968, after Dubček and his group had signed the Moscow protocol and thus the capitulation of Czechoslovakia, the prominent Czech philosopher, Karel Kosík, in an article entitled " Illusions and Realism," echoed Pekař's *cri de coeur*. He warned his compatriots that they might cease to be a political nation in Central Europe, that the path lay open to degeneration into " Czech and Slovak speaking producers of steel and wheat."

It would not be difficult to compile a long list of omitted anniversaries and expose the fabricated versions of historical events which the present rulers of Czechoslovakia have imposed in the course of the so-called normalization, inspired by the Orwellian model of the Ministry of Truth. Yet one can give some examples: when the centenary of the death of the Czech national historian František Palacký was due in 1976, *The Czechoslovak Historical Journal*, the leading historical periodical in the country, failed to commemorate even with one single sentence the anniversary of a man who 100 years ago had been buried with almost royal pomp, an honour which the resurrected Czech nation felt he deserved. In 1975 the mass media were ordered to eliminate the caption " 30th anniversary of the victory over fascism " and replace it with " 30th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army "; no mention was tolerated of the fact that one-third of Bohemia had been liberated by American troops. Moreover, in the same year the authorities ordered the suspension of the annual celebration of 28 October 1918, which had been hitherto accepted even by the Communists as the Day of National Independence.

But the matter does not rest with the senseless falsification of recent Czech history. Reprisals have been taken against individual historians by the Husák regime, especially against those who dared to sign the human rights document, Charter 77. There were 27 historians among the initial 240 signatories; perhaps the largest professional group to join in the defence of elementary human rights on this particular occasion. This in itself should be a good reason for undertaking a brief survey of Czech historiography. Perhaps a critical examination of the ups and downs of Czech history as reflected in its historiography may

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help to explain the excesses of the present, for the manipulation of the Czech past has by no means been confined to the cynical *apparatchiks* now in power after the crushing of the Prague Spring. Why does Czech historiography alter its course from time to time so violently like a panic-stricken boatman between Scylla and Charybdis? Why, on the one hand, does it so frequently aspire to the loftiest ideals of European civilization, often foolishly proclaiming that true democracy and humanism can be understood in Central Europe by nobody but the Czechs, and why, on the other hand, does it fall into an abyss of apathy and indifference? It was Thomas G. Masaryk, the founder and first President of Czechoslovakia, who in 1935 said that nations live and preserve themselves by the ideals out of which they were born.

Nationalism

At first, the leading historian of Bohemia, František Palacký, understood his official function as the historiographer of the Bohemian Estates, to be the servant of both nationalities, Czechs and Germans. However, from 1848 onwards, he turned into a committed nationalist historian writing in the Czech language for the Czech nation only. Karl Marx regarded Palacký's conversion as a betrayal of the cause of progress which he identified with Greater Germany, and in his *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany* he ridiculed Palacký as somebody who was "nothing but a learned German run mad, who cannot even speak the Tschechian language correctly," and predicted that after the failure of 1848 "Bohemia could only exist, henceforth, as a portion of Germany, although part of her inhabitants might yet, for some centuries, continue to speak a non-German language." Events were to show that, as far as the immediate future was concerned, Marx would be proved wrong, but his long-term prediction became almost a reality when Hitler destroyed the first Czechoslovak Republic and replaced it by the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under the aegis of the Greater German Reich.

Palacký committed himself to the ideal of Czech national emancipation within the federal framework of the Habsburg monarchy, hoping it would materialize during his lifetime. The revolutionary year 1848 turned him into a political leader of the Czechs who had already accepted him as their scholarly and ideological authority. Thus, he attained that rare stature—though not so unusual in his day elsewhere in Europe—where he was able to exercise a powerful influence on three levels: as the foremost scholar of Bohemian history; as a politician representing the Czechs in negotiations with the Viennese Government and putting forward one of the first schemes for the federalization of the Habsburg monarchy; finally, as a symbol of Czech national emancipation for future generations. Palacký's idea of history was that of ethnic polarity between the two races, the Czechs and the Germans, interlocked in a "continuous congruity as well as rivalry." He also saw this conflict in an idealized fashion as a spiritual contest between the idea of democracy,

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Reformation and Protestantism on the one hand, and of violence, Roman universalism and Catholicism on the other. Among the Slavs, however, Palacký's romantic interpretation of national history, inspired by the German poet and philosopher Herder, was certainly not unique. His great contemporary, the Polish historian Joachim Lelewel, shared the same vision in depicting the idyllic life in the prehistoric peace-loving Slav village commune, the model of genuine democracy and freedom, which was to be corrupted by the evil expansion of feudalism and Catholicism under the banners of bellicose Germanic tribes. The most glorious period in Czech history which Palacky describes in his *History of Bohemia* (from 1848 onwards it appeared in the Czech language as *The History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia*) was the Hussite epoch, seen by Palacký as a just struggle by Czech democracy, the protagonist of the first Protestant Reformation in Europe. He went even further when he conceived Hussitism and the Czech Reformation as an historic ideal still waiting for its fulfilment through the political and cultural emancipation of the Czech nation. By contrast, he saw in the Battle of the White Mountain, at which the elective Bohemian Estate Monarchy had been defeated by the forces of the Catholic Habsburgs, the symbol of how " the nation deceived itself." Thus, Palacký's warning addressed to his contemporaries: " Whenever we achieved victory, it was always due to our spiritual advantage rather than sheer physical might, and whenever we were defeated, this was always due to our lack of spiritual activity, moral boldness and courage . . .", constituted henceforth the necessary reference whenever the Czech past was exploited for a political programme of national revival.

It is therefore not surprising that it was the historian of a small nation, whose very existence was threatened, who became obsessed with the idea of searching the past for special ethical meaning. Hence the discussion of the universal significance of Czech history which has been going on until fairly recently. The chief cultural function of historiography was in furnishing the politicians with an ideological weapon of high calibre, suitable as a defence against ethnic encroachments and as the clarion of the national liberation struggle. The imminent threat of Germanization was successfully checked during the second half of the nineteenth century by an emergent Czech nationalism which underwent remarkable social, economic and cultural developments.

Forgeries, Myths and Criticism

A new school of Czech historians headed by Jaroslav Goll and centred around the Czech University in Prague (established in 1882) made its conspicuous debut with the critical analysis of manuscript forgeries which for more than six decades had been regarded by the patriots, Palacký included, as the most precious jewels in the national literary treasury. The main aim of Goll and his pupils was to lead Czech historiography out of the provincial backwaters of parochial disputation

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and to elevate it to the professional level that historical science had achieved elsewhere in Western Europe. Hence the launching of the *Český Časopis Historický* (1894), a Czech equivalent of the *Historische Zeitschrift* and *Revue Historique*, the widening of historical disciplines, of improved critical editions of historical sources, etc. The new school of Czech historiography, to which we will refer as positivist, demanded a value-free approach to the past, strict causal interpretation of historical events, emphasis on rigid empiricism as against romantic mysticism. The positivist historians encountered strong hostility from the Czech nationalists, who were not going beyond the linguistic criterion for their understanding of the Czech Question.

They were also to face criticism from somebody who was even more opposed to the primitive nationalism of the Czech middle classes. This man was Thomas G. Masaryk, a moral philosopher, who, as his rival Pekař once characterized him, "was brought up in an alien cultural environment, little if at all touched by Czech tradition, and who came amongst us as a self-conscious disciple of a higher civilization"—an obvious allusion to Masaryk's non-Czech background and upbringing. Masaryk rejected the academic norm of the Gollists to study history for its own sake and demanded instead that history should be studied for the sake of life. Masaryk preserved the religious approach in Palacký's philosophy of Czech history, its Herderian element, but stripped it of all romanticism. Moreover, he enlarged the ideas of humanity and morality, which he believed to have found in the teaching of the Czech Brethren, the first Protestant sect established in Bohemia and Moravia in the mid-fifteenth century. For Masaryk the Czech Question was predominantly a religious one. But he would have none of the overburdened theory of Czech-German antagonism which runs like a red thread through Palacký's work.

Masaryk's provocative challenge to the effect that the first duty of Czech historians was to define the significance of the past for the whole national endeavour (particularly in his book *The Czech Question*, 1894) was sharply rebuked by the most prominent among Goll's pupils, Josef Pekař, who argued that Masaryk's historical knowledge was inadequate and that he displayed dangerous inclinations towards mysticism and a teleological interpretation of history. If Masaryk believed that the history of nations was not accidental and that, on the contrary, it reflected a certain design of Providence, then Pekař concluded, we were back in the Middle Ages. It was in this vein that St. Augustine used to write, as did the medieval chroniclers with their *Gesta Dei per Bohemos*. No, Pekař exclaimed, as a scholar Masaryk certainly "didn't impress us."

Masaryk's philosophy of Czech history was perhaps the last attempt to provide a comprehensive and synthetic revaluation of the Czech past. Several individuals have attempted since to interpret the meaning of Czech history, particularly Zdeněk Nejedlý, the cultural overlord in Communist Czechoslovakia, but he failed, as did many others, to evoke

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a national response. Masaryk's interpretation of Czech history, despite its many factual errors and wrong assumptions, provided the strongest ideological foundation of the liberation movement during the First World War. Pekař, on the other hand, resisted the temptation to pronounce an assessment of the meaning of Czech history which would amount to a general value judgement. However, in his schoolbook on national history he put forward a certain philosophy of Czech history, underlying which, according to him, were four crucial factors: firstly, the decisive influence of Europe, not only in terms of polarity as Palacký understood it, but also in terms of the adaption and reception of the advanced culture from the Germanic and Romanic worlds. Secondly, there was the geographical position of the Czechs among the Germans. As for the Hungarians, Pekař thought that their role was rather beneficial because they pressed the Czechs into the German world and cut them off from Slav and Byzantine influences. Thirdly, Pekař stressed the role of accident, mainly confined by him to the influence which individuals have exercised upon history. Finally, "our history itself," by which he meant mainly the creation of historical myths and the use or misuse of historical names and themes in the nationalist ideology, for example, manuscript forgeries, the cult of Hussitism, and even Masaryk's thesis that the meaning of Czech history was religious.

The German and Slovak Questions

The creation of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 made the ethnic homogeneity of the new state a problem of utmost urgency, the German, and to a lesser extent the Slovak minorities presenting particularly serious problems. The Czechs, who considered themselves the new rulers, formed just about 50 per cent of the entire population, the Germans 22·5 per cent (though in Bohemia and Moravia around 30 per cent), the Slovaks 15·6 per cent, the Hungarians almost 5 per cent, the Ruthenes 4 per cent, apart from the smaller minorities of Poles and Jews who were counted separately. Whereas for Masaryk the Czech Question was always a "Czechoslovak" one, Pekař, who had remained until the last days of the war a loyal Austrian subject, still thought in terms of the historical rights of the lands of the Bohemian Crown in which the Slovaks had no place. The majority of Czech historians, by and large uncommitted scholars under the Habsburgs, became overnight dedicated defenders of the official ideology of "Czechoslovakism." Indeed, many Czech historians seriously believed that the indigenous Slovak culture and separate history could be brought under one common, albeit artificial, denominator entitled "Czechoslovak," and thus integrated with its stronger Czech counterpart. The majority of the Slovaks wished to maintain their national identity, but instead their stronger Czech brothers expected them to merge overnight into this artificial "Czechoslovak" nation.

The German question was even more acute. The German inhabitants

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never felt at home in the new republic and became receptive to irredentist claims encouraged from Germany proper, especially after the Nazi take-over. As for Czech historiography, it was unable to overcome the basic tenet of nineteenth-century Czech nationalism, based predominantly on linguistic criteria, and to replace it by a theory of multinationalism. Subsequently, attitudes on both sides hardened, resulting in a cultural "apartheid" between two nations which worked and lived together but preferred to ignore each other. Among the few intellectuals who were able to overcome this narrow linguistic approach was Emanuel Rádl, like Masaryk, a philosopher-moralist with a bias towards history. In his book, *The War Between Czechs and Germans* (1928), Rádl severely criticised his fellow-countrymen for their intolerance which—and in this he was to be proved right—would lead to the disintegration of the republic. Rádl was also among the first who warned the public about the danger of Nazism in Germany.

The respected masters of the historical guild remained quiet, with the exception of their grandmaster, Pekař himself, who had been following the events in Nazi Germany for some time. But he failed to understand the nature of the new totalitarianism. His deep-rooted conservatism, which he had previously shown in attacking the land reform, the Communists and the Jews, prevented him also from understanding Nazism. He became easy prey for unscrupulous Nazi propagandists who exploited his interpretation of Czech history and made him into the leading representative of Czech culture advocating a reconcilation between the Czechs and Germans and accepting the dependence of Bohemia on the Reich. Pekař's lecture of 1935 about the "New Historiography in the Third Reich" was a typical example of helplessness shown by a member of the old historical guild, who did not want to condemn fascism outright, trying positively to assess the pros and cons of the new Nazi historiography, the persecution of Jewish scholars, the purges in institutions and universities, and the ascent of ruthless young historians like Walter Frank, just nominated Director of the Reich's "Institute for the History of New Germany." As for the immediate future and the impact of Nazi historiography on Czech historians, he is rather vague; we have to wait and see, says Pekař. Under German occupation he was posthumously made into a model of collaboration in contrast to the legacy of Palacký and Masaryk. After the war the Communist propagandists in turn did not fail to slander Pekař and his work.

Disrupted Continuity

It was not only Munich but the entire period of 1938–45 which marked the beginning of the deepest breach in modern Czech history and which historians failed or were not ready to analyse and assess when it was most needed. The fine texture of historical continuity was shattered on two important levels. The Second World War put an end to more than

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seven centuries of co-existence between the Czechs and Germans in Bohemia and resulted in the expulsion of practically the entire German population from Czechoslovakia. Recalling the earlier idea of polarity between the two ethnic tribes, one is necessarily led to interpret the expulsion of the Germans as the final act and consummation of Palacký's theory of Czech history. What was now to be the new interpretation of the meaning of Czech history and the evaluation of the Czech Question if the main antagonist of the Czech nation had been eliminated for good?

The second violent disruption of the continuity of traditional values in Czech, and also in Slovak, history happened under two totalitarian systems, personified by the names of Hitler and Stalin, following each other in rather quick succession. Nazi terror shook the belief of the population in the essential moral values of western civilization. One can hardly imagine a more contrasting antithesis than the one symbolized by the names of Hitler and Masaryk. The Nazis degraded Czech history into an appendix of the imperial idea of Greater Germany; Czech historians were permitted for the time being to write eulogistic comments on that theme in their own language. Only a few historians had the courage to disagree and abstain from these despicable exercises at the risk of their lives. Here again, historiography was left with many questions which the public expected to be answered sooner or later. Was Masaryk's humanitarian philosophy still relevant? What future role should the historian assume if the war and post-war society no longer needed committed historians concerned with the examination of the past for values, nor the legacy of democratic traditions?

The stormy events which followed the capitulation of Germany made a fundamental discussion on the meaning of national history and the break-up of its continuity very unlikely. Understandably, the predominant passion was hatred for everything German, although a few lonely voices protested against this aberration as unworthy of Masaryk's republic. Many historians, on the right and on the left, lent their support to the anti-German campaign, preached Panslavism and Czech chauvanism, and even supported unfounded territorial claims. When the Communists finally assumed full control in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the representatives of the historical guild appeared unprepared and resigned. This time they were attacked by their own impatient pupils who were restlessly awaiting the arrival of a new society "without exploitation of man by man." These young students of Marxism experienced the trauma of Munich and Nazi occupation, the failure of the bourgeois republic between 1919 and 1938, the betrayal of their political leaders, and they still suffered under the shock of wartime collaboration with the Nazis. They accepted the principle of violence as a legitimate instrument of history which would help accelerate progress towards the utopian future.

Before this juncture was reached, Czech historiography had failed to preserve its legacy of humanism and democracy. It could have warned

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the public about past abuses of violence, especially in the light of the recent experience with Hitlerism and Stalinism, but of course it did not do so. As early as 1936 a young Czech historian, Záviš Kalandra, member of the Communist Party, wrote a pamphlet in which he publicly denounced the purges which were then taking place in the Soviet Union. He had scarcely time to recuperate from the years of imprisonment and deprivation in a Nazi concentration camp, when in 1949 the Communists, now firmly established in power, took vengeance on him: Kalandra was arrested and later executed. This is just one example. Between 1948 and 1954 when thousands of Czechoslovak citizens were arrested and sent to labour camps, over 200 death sentences were pronounced for alleged political crimes. A historian's work, published for obvious reasons only during 1968, revealed that already in 1949 the number of death sentences and executions in Czechoslovakia—the paragon of democracy in Central Europe 15 years earlier—equalled those in all "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe put together! There is indeed no parallel to this judicial carnage in Czech history if we leave out the period of the last war as a special case. In order to find a parallel case in Czech history one would have to digress to the dark Middle Ages when the ruling princely house of Přemysliden eliminated the threat of political rivalry by slaughtering the entire clans of the two most prominent families in the country. Even the Habsburg ruler in 1621 did not demand more than 27 heads of the Bohemian leaders who had staged an open armed rebellion against him.

Rewriting History

The young Marxist historians began vigorously to rewrite national history according to the new socio-economic periodization. A ruthless campaign was launched against "cosmopolitanism in bourgeois historiography." A historiography based on the class struggle became an instrument of Communist policy in all learned institutions and educational establishments. The Slovak Question was declared solved thanks to "the new fraternal bond and class solidarity" between the Czechs and Slovaks. Judging by the sheer quantity of titles published every year, the number of new historical periodicals and institutions and the number of historians (in the 1960s in the region of 300–400), there were certainly impressive signs of hectic development. Above all, social and economic history, hitherto neglected, received official encouragement, and so did the study of archaeology for reasons of prestige. On the other hand, the interpretation of history became grossly unbalanced on the political side: it was suppressing the role of individuals and eliminating the religious factor as an important driving force in key phases of Czech history such as the Hussite movement and the Protestant rebellion of the Bohemian Estates.

Curiously enough, Palacký's historical work was preserved almost in its entirety owing to the efforts of one man, Zdeněk Nejedlý, who until

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shortly before his death in 1962, ruled unchallenged as an absolute master over Czech culture. Never had there been a historian who exercised such far-reaching influence on the development of Czech historiography and on the teaching of history in schools, and who brought about radical educational reforms in his function as Minister of Education and life-long President of the Academy of Sciences. Nejedlý was one of Goll's talented pupils; he opposed Pekař and worshipped Palacký. He made his name as a historian of Hussite songs and a biographer of Smetana and Masaryk, yes, the same Masaryk who became the target of slanderous attacks during Nejedlý's autocratic rule over Czech culture. There was nothing Marxist in Nejedlý's methodology of history, despite his outward affiliation with the Communist Party. All his life he remained an old-fashioned romantic Panslavist firmly entrenched in the intellectual milieu of the nineteenth century.

Taboos Remain

In 1956, Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the 20th Congress and the popular uprisings in Hungary and Poland produced tremors which left visible cracks in the monolithic structure of Stalinism. In the same year one of the most distinguished Czech poets, Jaroslav Seifert, appealed from the rostrum of the Writers' Congress to his fellow-writers to become again "the nation's conscience." Among historians, however, his appeal found no response. The few modest attempts at criticism that did take place were quickly quelled by the still powerful Party watchdogs. Thus, many controversial themes from recent Czech history remained taboo, and historians understood that in order to survive in their profession they had to comply with the limitations imposed from above. Their position, which fell just short of schizophrenia, meant in reality collaboration with the Party apparatus, however much they may have voiced criticism among themselves in private.

Among many subjects which post-war Czech and Slovak historians had long neglected were two highly topical issues: the political purges and trials of the 1950s and the Slovak Question. In 1963 a large group of historians was selected to participate in the work of a Party commission investigating evidence on the political trials of the 1950s. It was still the period of "Stalinist deformation," and their findings were published only five years later. The second subject suffered particularly from the falsified official version of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. In the same year of 1963 Slovak historians publicly demanded a revaluation of the Uprising and the rehabilitation of the so-called Slovak bourgeois nationalists imprisoned during the 1950s, among whom Gustáv Husák, the present Party Secretary and President of Czechoslovakia, was one of the best known victims. Among the Czech historians, Milan Hübl supported the claim of his Slovak colleagues in a bold article published shortly afterwards ("Social Responsibility, Scientific Method and Ethics") in which he also discussed the problem of the

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individual responsibility of Czechoslovak intellectuals for the trials of the 1950s. The Party bureaucrats counteracted in 1965 by dismissing the entire editorial board of the popular historical monthly *Past and Present* (*Dějiny a Současnost*) because the periodical had published a critical review of a recent book edited by Václav Král, a faithful Party historian who was attacked for presenting as complete some documents from which entire passages had been omitted.

A decisive impulse for historians to discuss the past was given by the Fourth Writers' Congress of 1967 which foreshadowed the developments leading to the Prague Spring of the following year. The themes discussed by the writers had the highest relevance for the question of the Czech tradition. Ivan Klíma, the playwright, for instance referred to the bill on preliminary censorship, drafted no doubt by men with an absurd sense of humour, for as he ironically pointed out, it was due to appear on the centenary of the 1867 Austrian Constitution which had entirely abolished censorship in the Czech lands. If the abolition of censorship during the early part of 1968 served as an obvious encouragement to hesitant historians, the August invasion by the Warsaw Pact troops worked like a catalyst. The same names we used to find in the 1950s among the radical Marxists fighting pitilessly against the bourgeois prejudices of their elder colleagues were now in the forefront of those indignantly criticising the government and Party authorities, Dubček included, for their betrayal of the ideas of the Prague Spring. The Historical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences published a document called *Seven Prague Days: 21–27 August 1968*, edited by Milan Otáhal and Vilém Prečan and known as the *Czech Black Book*. František Graus, who during the 1950s as chief editor of the *Czechoslovak Historical Journal* had been a model of Stalinist orthodoxy, attempted in 1968 to analyse what he called "the present crisis of our historical consciousness." Although he would see the years of 1938–45 as a break, he would, nevertheless, avoid evaluating the "Gulag" period in recent Czech history of which everybody still had vivid recollections. As for the Czech Question and the problem of the expulsion of the Germans after 1945, this was touched upon during 1968–69 once or twice in an improvised debate, in which the participants unanimously condemned the transfer as immoral. With an obsession understandable in the context of the Soviet occupation, the theme of wartime collaboration was openly discussed (the historian Jan Tesař played a prominent part in this discussion). Melancholic reflections on the meaning of Czech history and its particular philosophy were heard once more throughout most of 1969 until the replacement of Dubček by Husák gradually silenced the free press again.

Present Persecution

In today's "normalized" Czechoslovakia historians belong to the most persecuted category of intellectuals. Compared with the 1950s, the present persecution is more sophisticated: it is no longer necessary to apply

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crude physical coercion. Those who refused to approve of the Soviet-led occupation in August 1968 lost their jobs: they are being shadowed by the police, their children are barred from higher education and their names are ostracized in the government-controlled media so that they cannot defend themselves. The official historiography is no longer represented by fervent young fanatics believing in the coming of a new Jerusalem (most of these were converted during the 1960s to reformism) but by calculating cynics who do not believe in an egalitarian paradise. They attack the familiar target: "bourgeois objectivism" (called "cosmopolitanism" 20 years ago). There is also an effort to suppress any emotional manifestations of nationalism which might be directed against the Russians. At long last the theoretical dilemma between nation and class of early Marxist historiography in Czechoslovakia has been resolved in favour of the class approach, for Nejedlý is no longer in command. One of the leading official historians, prominently appearing in the purification rituals, is Václav Král, whose habit of falsifying historical documents has already been mentioned. He does not bother to conduct polemics with his opponents, he prefers to silence them: those under suspicion of holding "bourgeois" ideas are instantly dismissed and never again allowed to publish. In November 1972 a so-called scientific seminar of communist historians took place in Prague and published a list of 21 proscribed historians termed as "aggressive." However, the document *Acta Persecutionis* presented to the XIVth International Congress of Historical Sciences in San Francisco in August 1975 contains a list of 145 Czechoslovak historians, of whom only a tiny minority are exiled, the rest being deprived of further work in their own profession and banned from publishing any written work. Three historians who signed Charter 77 have spent a considerable time in prison for political offences which a hundred years ago would have been regarded as perfectly normal civic activities: Jaroslav Mezník, arrested in January 1972 was sentenced to three and a half years' imprisonment and released in December 1974; Jan Tesař, first arrested in September 1969 and released without trial after 13 months, was re-arrested in November 1971 and sentenced to six years' imprisonment, from which he was released in October 1976; Milan Hübl, arrested in January 1972 and sentenced to six and a half years' imprisonment, was released before Christmas 1976.

IN the last four decades Czech and Slovak historiography has passed through a period of unprecedented disruptions caused by the profound socio-political changes imposed on countries of Eastern and Central Europe. But the crisis of historiography and discontinuity with the past is certainly not a characteristic of Czech and Slovak history alone. It is a universal phenomenon of our civilization which has been so profoundly disrupted by world wars and revolutions that the man of today is losing his capacity to confront the key problems of his existence

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and his own past. The historian has lost the privileged role, enjoyed until fairly recently, as the national augur predicting the future.

The vein of nationalism seems to have dried up among the Czechs, though the Slovaks have discovered that it could still be a powerful force if applied at the right moment. But the adoption of exclusively nationalist criteria by Czech historiography has failed, just as earlier, class determinism was discredited when the preachers of Utopia donned the garb of executioners. Both criteria were not merely academically controversial. The failure occurred at a more fundamental level of human relations and values: the cost in lives and defeated hopes was too great. Perhaps Czech historiography has now reached the point of inner balance from which, if conditions permit, it can slowly start to pick up its former, expropriated and rejected, values with the understanding that national heritage is relevant only if it also carries universal implications.

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CHINA: The experience of writers since 1949

In this issue of *Index on Censorship* (1/1979) Jonathan Mirsky discusses the significance of Mao's 1942 Yanan talks in **In Mao's Cave.** William Jenner discusses **The Hundred Flowers** movement of 1956–8 which although supported at first by Mao was later suppressed. Alain Peyraube and Leung Kiche look at the Cultural Revolution and its tragic consequences for writers in **Rule of the Red Guards.** The current **Human Rights Movement,** including the cases of Wei Jingsheng and Fu Yuehua, is described in detail by Arlette Laduguie. Anita Chan in **Chinese Dissidents Abroad** describes the activities and influence of former Red Guards now in exile in Hong Kong. In **Official Publishing** Frances Wood examines government policies and practices in publishing since 1949. John Beyer presents a **profile of Ding Ling,** one of China's best known modern writers. There is also an extract from Ding Ling's novel **'In the Hospital'.** Lek Hor Tan interviews **Fou T'song,** the famous concert pianist, on his impressions on cultural development in China today. **Poems of the Democracy Movement** by Qu Tian, Ling Bing, Bei Dao, Shu Ting and Yong Yu.

Ding Ling

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